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1 
Introduction 
Governmental interventions are important because they have effects. 
They seldom reform the world according to plan, but they do change things. 
(Li 2007b: 276) 
 
This study is about the Loita Maasai of Kenya1 who, faced with increasing outside in-
terventions and pressure from neighbouring communities, the state and other agencies, 
are struggling to maintain access to and control over the land they inhabit and the forest 
they use. They have been on the losing side of territorial struggles with their neighbour-
ing Purko Maasai and (non-Maasai) Sonjo. However, regarding the state, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and international environmental organizations, the 
Loita have successfully negotiated land reform and various development and nature-
conservation projects to retain access to and control of land and the forest. They are still 
able to benefit from the environmental resources that are key to their livelihoods and 
their cultural identity. This is remarkable because, since the colonial period, similar in-
terventions in other parts of Maasailand and Kenya have triggered processes that have 
eventually led to a loss of land and to local people being excluded from forest areas, 
either intentionally or unintentionally. Loita’s historical trajectory and their current po-
sition in Maasailand are thus quite exceptional in terms of their apparent autonomy in 
matters relating to control over their land and forest.  
Interventions have, nevertheless, transformed the way people in Loita engage with 
the land and the forest and with each other on these issues. The combination of conti-
nuity in collective access and control on the one hand, and profound change on the other 
                                                 
1  The Maasai are divided into a number of socio-territorial units commonly called ‘sections’ (iloshon, 
sing. olosho) in the literature. There are between 16 and 22 Maasai sections, depending on one’s 
source, and the Loita are one of them. Loita is the anglicized version of Iloitai (sing. Oloitai) in Maa 
and is used here to refer to both the people and the territory, depending on the context. The Loita 
occupy land on both sides of the Kenya-Tanzania border in the highlands west of the Rift Valley (see 
Map 1.1). This research was carried out among the Loita Maasai of Kenya (see Map 1.2). Henceforth 
and unless stated otherwise, when I write ‘Loita Maasai’ or ‘Loita’ or when I talk about the ‘Loita 
section’, I am only referring to the Kenyan Loita Maasai. 
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is historically produced and serves as the starting point for an investigation into the so-
cial changes triggered by outside interventions. More precisely, I set out to investigate 
the effects of interventions as they mix and articulate with existing relations, practices, 
processes and struggles (Li 2007a) in Loita. Loita’s exceptionality, in the sense of its 
continued autonomy, gives such an investigation an interesting twist and makes this a 
compelling case to study. The way autonomy has been reproduced has not only shaped 
how interventions have played out but also reveals that the struggle to maintain access 
and control over land and forest is interlaced and embedded in a more subtle struggle 
for self-government and for ‘not being governed’ (too much) by the state and other 
powerful, external agencies (Scott 2009; Li 2007a). This dissertation will show how 
change and continuity were formed in this arena of power and political struggle by fo-
cusing on articulations and the effects of interventions in Loita.  
Social change will be studied by concentrating on two domains: land and forest. The 
topic of leadership is a third, important theme in this thesis because it contributes to an 
understanding of the struggle for self-government and not being governed as well as to 
how people’s engagement with land and forest and with each other on these issues have 
changed. In this introductory chapter, I work out and problematize the themes of land 
and forest in addition to the more cross-cutting topic of leadership, and end with the 
research questions that will guide the study. The next chapter, where I discuss the de-
bates, concepts and methods that frame this research, will elaborate on how the research 
problems are approached. To start with, let me provide a brief account of the historical 
conjuncture that sees the Loita Maasai stubbornly holding on to their land and forest 
despite the increasing interventions targeting them. This is the situation that I encoun-
tered during my main fieldwork period between mid-2007 and the end of 2008.  
Of land and forest: auspicious conjunctures 
One way in which the Naimina Enkiyio Forest, as the forest in Loita is called,2 was de-
scribed to me was as ‘the deeper forest … the place where people don’t live’.3 This way 
of seeing the forest lies at the heart of the distinction made in this thesis between the 
‘forest’ (where people do not live) and ‘land’ (where people do live). Loita territory is, 
thus, divided into two general areas that are meaningful to the Loita themselves: the 
land covered by the forest, which is uninhabited but open for all to use if certain rules 
are followed, and the land west of the forest where the Loita Maasai have their home-
steads, where they are organized territorially into localities (settlement areas) and differ-
                                                 
2  The forest’s full name in Maa is Entim e Naimina Enkiyio, lit.‘The Forest of the Lost Child’. It is 
named after a Maasai legend: ‘a child looking after her father’s calves took them to the edge of the 
forest. While following and herding them she entered the forest itself. In the evening the calves 
returned home without the child. Young Maasai warriors, or Morans, were sent to look for her. They 
wandered deep into the forest, calling her name, but eventually they too, like the calves, returned 
home alone. To this day, the forest has never returned her’ (LNECTC 1994: 1). The Naimina Enkiyio 
Forest is also known as the Loita Forest. In times of drought when herds are driven to the forest in 
search of water and grass, it is also called Saru Enkiteng, ‘Haven of the Cow’ (Voshaar 1998: 114). 
3  Interview ML: 22/8/01. Another interviewee (Interview LN: 30/10/07) told me something very 
similar: ‘It is that forest where people don’t live that we call Naimina Enkiyio, but not this [small 
forest]. Here there are homesteads.’ 
3 
 
ent rules with respect to land tenure apply.4 The boundary between uninhabited forest 
and settled land is not fixed. As more families open up land for settlement and cultiva-
tion on the fringes of the forest, the boundary between the forest and land is moving, 
reducing the forest area and increasing the area of land used for habitation. 
The land inhabited by the Loita Maasai holds a unique position in Maasailand. The 
Loita are the only Maasai section in Kenya whose territory has not been subjected to 
official tenure reform and, therefore, has not been divided, registered or titled as indi-
vidual holdings or group ranches. In the late 1960s, the Kenyan state launched a policy 
of land tenure reform that sought to turn the semi-arid pastoral lands of Kenya into pri-
vately owned group ranches (Rutten 1992: 265-327, 2008; Galaty 1992, 1994a; Kimani 
& Pickard 1998; Mwangi 2007a, 2007b; Coldham 1979). This land adjudication pro-
gramme had its roots in the late colonial period and was part of a larger state-led but 
foreign-funded livestock development project aimed at commercializing the pastoral 
areas of Kenya. ‘Adjudication’ starts with the declaration of an ‘adjudication section’, 
which is followed by an identification of the ‘landowners’ in the area, demarcating the 
tract of land and issuing a title deed to the identified ‘owner’ that, in the case of group 
ranches, is a group of people but can also be an individual. Maasailand, representing the 
southern pastoral lands of Kenya and covering the administrative Narok and Kajiado 
Districts,5 was a principal target of the land adjudication programme. The group ranch 
scheme was first implemented among the Kaputiei section that occupies the northeast-
ern corner of Kajiado District (Rutten 1992: 272) and it was then extended to the rest of 
Maasailand. In Kajiado District and in the larger part of Narok District, the land adjudi-
cation programme has been completed. In some of the northern areas of Narok District, 
land adjudication either remains incomplete pending the issuing of title deeds or has 
been abrogated as land slated for adjudication became reclassified as a forest conserva-
tion area (Matter 2010a, 2010b). However in Loita, which is in the southeast part of 
Narok District, the land adjudication programme never got started and the status of the 
land (and forest) has not been reclassified either. 
Much research has been dedicated to the creation of group ranches in Maasailand, 
especially in Kajiado District, with a focus on performance but mainly on the problems 
and failures, the ensuing subdivision into individually owned parcels of land, its further 
fragmentation into smaller plots and the final loss of land through sale (Rutten 1992, 
2008; Galaty 1992, 1994a, 2013a; Kimani & Pickard 1998; Mwangi 2007a, 2007b). 
There is general consensus in the literature that the privatization of land into group 
ranches and the unforeseen individualization that followed in most group ranches has 
been detrimental to the majority of the Maasai and favoured only a few, Maasai and 
                                                 
4  This categorization of Loita territory does not include two border-zone areas because these are either 
shared or contested. Kamorora, which is located beyond the Naimina Enkiyio Forest on the Nguruman 
Escarpment, was historically a shared grazing area used during droughts by Loita and Loodokilani 
Maasai. Since it was transformed into the Kamorora Group Ranch in 1973/1974, it has become 
disputed land as its ownership is now being claimed by foreign individuals (see Chapters 5, 8 & 9). 
The area west of Mount Sampu, also on the Nguruman Escarpment but south of the international 
Kenya-Tanzania border, has seen periods of sharing and fighting between the Loita (from both Kenya 
and Tanzania) and the Sonjo (see Chapter 3).  
5  In 1994, a third Maasai district, Trans-Mara District, was carved out of Narok District (Rutten 2001: 
434).  
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non-Maasai alike, who acquired vast tracts of prime land through land grabbing (prior 
and during subdivision) and through the purchase of fragmented plots, mostly by immi-
grant non-Maasai cultivators. This left many former group ranch members with individ-
ual ranches in the marginal areas, with small, economically unviable land units or with-
out any land at all. Droughts reveal some of the far-reaching consequences of this. The 
acquisition of land in the well-watered areas of Maasailand by immigrating non-Maasai 
cultivators, for example, has deprived the Maasai of valuable drought-retreat grazing 
lands and forced them to move further away in search of pastures for their herds 
(Campbell 1984). As a result of the processes set in motion by an outside development 
intervention, many Maasai lost access to and control over land that they were formerly 
entitled to use for their livelihood needs.  
For the Maasai, the land adjudication programme introduced a new land tenure sys-
tem founded on private property held by groups or individuals. This was a system de-
vised by external agencies, sanctioned by state law and implemented, supervised and 
enforced by state institutions and its officials. It was superimposed on existing tenure 
arrangements that were regulated by the Maasai according to their own rules of access 
and use. Regardless of whether the Maasai tenure system was replaced successfully or 
not, the fact remains that people in the adjudicated parts of Maasailand now have to 
reckon with the state in matters relating to land. With support from international donors 
and by means of a development intervention, the Kenyan state, in turn, was able to gain 
a strong foothold over a domain – land in the Maasai districts – where it had no or little 
authority before. 
The exception is Loita. Although Loita leaders had accepted the group ranch scheme 
(Kronenburg 1986: 51), the land adjudication programme never reached the implemen-
tation phase.6 One reason for this was a quarrel between two Loita leaders as to where 
the internal boundaries of future group ranches should lie. As it has turned out, collec-
tive access and control over land thus remain in the hands of the Loita. Access to land is 
organized by Loita Maasai tenure practice and land disputes are resolved by leading 
elders at meetings according to Loita Maasai rules. While people elsewhere in Maa-
sailand have to take the state into account, i.e. its institutions, its officials and its land 
law, this field in Loita is still governed to a large extent by Loita’s own leaders, institu-
tions, rules and practices. 
The degree of autonomy from the state with regard to land governance is, in fact, en-
shrined in state law. Since land in Loita, including the forest, was not and never has 
been adjudicated into titled holdings, it holds the legal status of ‘Trust Land’ under state 
law.7 Trust Land that undergoes adjudication, through demarcation and the titling of 
                                                 
6  Loita, as part of the Cis Mara area of Narok District, was declared an ‘adjudication area’ (but not an 
‘adjudication section’!) under the Land Adjudication Act in 1969 (CCD ‘Notice of Motion’: 5; 
‘Statement’: 5 (f), 6 (a); ‘Replying Affidavit’: 12). However, it was never set apart for this purpose 
and therefore remains classified under the legal category of Trust Land (see later). 
7  Legislation in Kenya on Trust Land that is relevant to this thesis includes: Constitution of Kenya, 
revised edition 1998 (1992), Constitution of Kenya, revised edition 2001 (1998), Constitution of 
Kenya, revised edition 2008 (2001), and the Trust Land Act (Cap 288). The category of Trust Land 
was abolished by the new constitution of Kenya, which was promulgated in 2010 and came into effect 
in March 2013 after the general elections. Loita now falls under the new category of ‘Community 
Land’. 
5 
 
group or individual holdings, becomes classified as ‘Private Land’. All adjudicated are-
as in Maasailand fall under the legal category of Private Land. The third legal category 
is ‘Government Land’.8 Trust Land comes under the jurisdiction of the local authority 
(the county council) that, as the legal trustee of the land, holds the land in trust for the 
benefit of residents. The legal trustee of the land in Loita was Narok County Council. 
Legislation on Trust Land recognizes customary rights, specifying that ‘for the time 
being’ these lands are to be governed under ‘African customary law’ of the resident 
‘tribe, group, family or individual’ (Constitution of Kenya, revised edition 2008 (2001), 
Chapter IX ‘Trust Land’, Section 115 (2)). ‘African customary law’ is not encoded in 
state law as it is understood to vary from community to community. For the Loita, this 
means that disputes over land fall under the jurisdiction of the leading elders and have 
to be settled according to their own rules. Only when land becomes formally demarcat-
ed and registered (and thus loses the status of Trust Land) can disputes be taken to state 
courts.9 Loita leaders govern relations of use and access to land when they mediate land 
disputes. As long as Loita remains Trust Land, its leaders will enjoy considerable free-
dom and autonomy from the state to settle land disputes according to their own rules. 
Having been left to govern a domain (land) that lies at the basis of Loita Maasai liveli-
hood and identity, Loita leaders occupy a key position from which they can exercise 
power and authority not only within Loita but also in relation to outsiders. Hence state 
law, by defining what happens and what does not happen in Trust Lands, has signifi-
cantly shaped leadership in Loita. Politically, this arrangement implies a certain degree 
of self-government for the Loita. 
Yet the legal status of Trust Land also has its flip side. Trust Land can, apart from 
being turned into Private Land through adjudication, also be set aside for public purpos-
es by its legal trustee. It was within this legal framework that the County Council of 
Narok attempted to appropriate the Naimina Enkiyio Forest in the early 1990s. The plan 
was to change the legal status of the forest from that of a Trust Land forest to a forest 
reserve. To achieve this, the forest needed to be ‘gazetted’ as a nature reserve by placing 
a legal notice in the Kenya Gazette (the state’s official publication) announcing its new 
status. The Loita, because of their historical proximity to the Naimina Enkiyio Forest, 
have greatly benefited from its various resources and it has been a key pastoral resource 
in times of drought and of immense material and cultural value to them too (Kronen-
burg García 2003). So when Narok County Council announced its intention to convert 
the Naimina Enkiyio Forest into a nature reserve destined for commercial tourism in 
1993, the news alarmed the majority of the Loita who had not known of the plan. Fear-
ing losing access and control over the forest and under the leadership of a group of Loita 
leaders, they mobilized resistance and filed a court case to prevent this plan from going 
ahead. After almost a decade of turbulence, the tug-of-war was finally settled in an out-
of-court agreement in 2002 and Narok County Council had to abandon its plans for the 
forest, which has remained an ungazetted Trust Land forest. Like the unique position of 
Loita land in Maasailand, the forest too is somewhat exceptional in the Kenya context. 
                                                 
8  Government Land constitutes 13.3% of the total land area of Kenya; Private Land accounts for 12.9% 
and Trust Land for 73.8% (Wily & Mbaya 2000 in Karanja et al. 2002: 1). 
9  There are, nevertheless, indirect ways of taking disputes over land to state courts (see Chapter 11). 
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It is one of the few indigenous Trust Land forests in Kenya that has not yet been gazet-
ted (Karanja et al. 2002: 1).  
The controversies surrounding the Naimina Enkiyio Forest did not end with the 
state’s retreat and the conflicts over the forest turned violent. The International Union 
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) appeared on the scene at the invitation of the same 
group of leaders that had organized opposition to Narok County Council. Their collabo-
ration culminated in a joint forest conservation project, known in Loita as the IUCN 
project, after the conflict with the County Council ended. However, when IUCN wanted 
to implement an EU-funded community-based forest management project in 2004 after 
a one-year preparatory phase, resistance flared up again. Fierce opposition in the form 
of violent demonstrations by Loita and Purko Maasai was directed at IUCN. This time, 
opposition in Loita was organized by another group of leaders who had actually sup-
ported the County Council’s forest plans during the conflict with Narok County Coun-
cil. These leaders stood squarely against the group of leaders that had opposed the 
Narok County Council forest plan and now supported the IUCN project. The IUCN pro-
ject was finally halted when a person died during one of the demonstrations. An attempt 
to resume the project failed after new conflicts broke out in 2005 and IUCN decided to 
pull out of the project.  
Just like the proposed forest plan by Narok County Council, the IUCN project, how-
ever well-intended and participatory it may have been, meant a loss of access and con-
trol for the Loita. In the case of the former, Narok County Council would take over the 
management of the forest and introduce its own rules of access and use and, in the case 
of the latter, the joint co-management construction of the project would mean that the 
Loita would have to share control and ‘biodiversity conservation’ would become a key 
criterion of access. With Narok County Council and IUCN no longer involved, the for-
est can still be accessed and is under the control of the Loita Maasai, more or less as it 
was before. 
Auspiciously for the Loita Maasai, the combination of circumstances now sees them 
upholding access to and control of the land and the forest. In both the land adjudication 
programme and the forest interventions, the interests of Loita leaders and conflicts 
amongst them seem to have played a key role in the outcome. For a thorough under-
standing of the dynamics at hand, leadership also needs to be included in the analysis. 
The next section introduces the important cross-cutting theme of leadership.  
A tale of two leaders 
Letiya ole Maine is the age-group chief of the Ilkishili circumcision-group.10 On 5 Feb-
ruary 2010, he welcomed a delegation of prominent politicians, including Prime Minis-
ter Raila Odinga, who were visiting the ‘manyata’,11 the special ceremonial settlement 
                                                 
10  The word ‘age-group’ is used here as a general term to refer both to circumcision-groups and age-sets. 
An age-set is composed of two successive circumcision-groups. Where the distinction between 
circumcision-group and age-set is important, as in the present chapter, I will be specific and consistent 
in my use of these terms. Where the distinction is not relevant for the argument being made or where 
reference is made to both age-sets and circumcision-groups, I will use the more general term ‘age-
group’. 
11  Manyata (pl. manyatas) is the anglicized form of the Maasai word emanyata, pl. imanyat.  
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in Naibala, Loita.12 The manyata had been built in preparation for the final ceremony of 
the age-group ceremonial cycle at which ole Maine’s circumcision-group, the Ilkishili, 
would merge with the younger circumcision-group, the Ilbuluka, to form a single age-
set with its own name: Ilkisaroni. This ceremony would also mark their final passage to 
elderhood as well as the start of their term as the ‘governing age-group’ in Loita. The 
delegation of politicians had been one of many to visit the manyata in the previous 
months. Part of the ceremonial process before the final celebration is to receive groups 
of people that represent the social categories on which Loita society is built. These are 
festive occasions when visitors pay their respects to the Ilkishili and Ilbuluka circumci-
sion-groups by presenting gifts of livestock and the latter reciprocate by offering food 
and drink, performing songs and dances and a place to sleep. In this way, the manyata 
received delegations from all the existing age-groups in Loita,13 a delegation of Loita 
women, another of the Inkidongi sub-clan of Loita who do not join in the ceremony14 
and a delegation of their Tanzanian Loita Maasai age-mates who synchronized and built 
their own manyata in Olorien near Loliondo. ‘Politicians’ emerged as a new social cate-
gory in Loita and were incorporated in the series of delegations received by the man-
yata. Their delegation even acquired a name of its own: olamal loo siasani, which 
means ‘the delegation of the politicians’, based on the Swahili word siasa meaning ‘pol-
itics’.  
It was a big day in Loita. People had come from all over to see Prime Minister 
Odinga, who the majority in Loita had voted for in the 2007 presidential elections. He 
arrived by helicopter early in the afternoon and politicians and civil servants from 
Narok and other Rift Valley districts as well as a number of ministers and deputy minis-
ters were also present. The manyata of 2010 was certainly not the first to receive a dele-
gation of politicians but, for ole Maine, it was a particularly important event. As the 
age-group chief of the Ilkishili and with the age-group leadership of the Ilbuluka in dis-
array (see Chapter 8), ole Maine was, without doubt, the most powerful man in the new 
age-group.  
  
                                                 
12  The complete name of this particular manyata is emanyata oo lorikan (the ceremonial settlement of 
the stools), also known as enkang oo lorikan (the settlement of the stools). I attended and documented 
the visit of Prime Minister Odinga and his entourage to this manyata. I was also present on the day 
that the delegation of the Iromboi circumcision-group and the upcoming warriors visited the manyata 
(19 September 2009) and I accompanied a delegation of the manyata in Kenya on a two-day trip to the 
manyata of their counterparts in Tanzania on 6-7 March 2010. The speeches of another delegation of 
politicians on 18 January 2010, which I was not able to attend, were recorded for me.  
13  When they arrive at the manyata, the visiting age-groups break up according to clan affiliation. 
Previously selected manyata residents, one from each clan, then host members of their own clan. In 
this way, the social category of ‘clan’ is also accounted for. Gifts and hospitality are exchanged 
between clan-mates.  
14  The Inkidongi sub-clan provides the ‘laibons’ (sing. laibon, this is the anglicized word for oloiboni, pl. 
iloibonok) in Maasai society. They have been variously described as ‘prophets’ (Fratkin 1979; 
Berntsen 1979; Spencer 1991; Waller 1978), ‘diviners’ (Spencer 1991; Waller 1978), ‘sorcerers’ 
(Fratkin 1991), ‘ritual experts’ or ‘ritual innovators’ (Waller 1978) and ‘war-leaders’ or ‘war-prophets’ 
(Waller 1978, 1995) in the literature. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of laibons and laibonism. 
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Photo 1.1  Age-group chief ole Maine addressing Prime Minister Raila Odinga and his entou-
rage at the manyata of the ‘stools’ (February 2010) 
 
© Angela Kronenburg García 
 
 
He was the first to speak in a series of speeches that afternoon and was the only Loita 
Maasai to do so.15 He addressed the Prime Minister in Maa.16 He started by praising 
Maasai culture and the importance of manyatas for the unity of the Loita. Then, and 
after assuring Prime Minister Odinga that the Loita had voted for him in large numbers, 
he raised some issues concerning the marginal position of Loita in Kenya in terms of the 
                                                 
15  Others who spoke, in order of appearance, were: Solomon ole Moriaso (Narok County Council’s 
chairman), Isaac ole Partoip (Narok Town Council’s chairman), Nkoidila ole Lankas (Member of 
Parliament (MP) for Narok South), Jonathan Magerer (MP for Kipkelion), Gideon Konchella (MP for 
Kilgoris/Trans-Mara), Musa Sirma (Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) nominated MP), Alfred 
Khangati (MP for Kanduyi and Assistant Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister), Joseph ole 
Nkaiserri (MP for Kajiado Central and Assistant Minister for Defence), Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o 
(Minister for Medical Services and secretary of the ODM party), William ole Ntimama (MP for Narok 
North and Minister for National Heritage and Culture), Jan Bonde Nielsen and Prime Minister 
Odinga. All of those who spoke belonged to the ODM party, except for Gideon Konchella (Party of 
National Union, PNU) and Jan Bonde Nielsen who is not a politician but a wealthy Danish-British 
businessman who had built a lodge in Kamorora (see Chapters 5 & 9) and appeared to be a personal 
friend of the Prime Minister.  
16  Ole Maine never went to school and does not speak English although he can speak some basic 
Swahili, which he picked up while trading livestock across Kenya. He apologized for not speaking in 
Swahili and used a Maa-Swahili interpreter during his speech.  
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few resources made available by the state for the development of the area. Point by 
point he requested funds to expand the health centre at Entasekera, the installation of a 
booster for mobile phone network coverage in the area, road repairs in Loita and the 
reinstatement of five wards (instead of the current two) to increase political representa-
tion of the Loita on Narok County Council. At this point, ole Maine was not talking on 
behalf of his age-group as an age-group chief but for all Loita as a Loita leader. The 
timing was perfect because the ceremony marked the start of his age-group’s political 
term in Loita and the visit of a prominent politician to their manyata not only brought 
prestige and popularity to the age-group but also the prospect of a better future for Loita 
because of the apparent links that the age-group had to Kenya’s political elite.17 This 
was a very good start for ole Maine and his age-group as the new ‘governing elders’ in 
Loita. 
 
Leadership and the practice of mediating and governing 
I chose to use this event to introduce the topic of leadership because it illustrates an im-
portant dynamic that entertains the analysis of leadership in this thesis, namely how 
Loita leaders exercise authority by governing and mediating interventions. At the same 
time, the occasion described above is an excellent case of an encounter between the 
Loita and the state and therefore offers revealing insights into the nature of the relation-
ship. 
The visit of Prime Minister Odinga to a Loita Maasai manyata shows that the Loita 
are not only part of Maasai culture and society but are also part of Kenya as citizens and 
voters and have been incorporated and integrated in the Kenyan state since colonial 
times. The description above also shows that the Loita too have incorporated the state in 
their social structures, giving state actors a way to participate in their age-group cere-
monies as the ‘delegation of politicians’ alongside other delegations. This dynamic runs 
as a thread throughout this thesis. The event also shows that encounters of this sort be-
tween the Loita and the state are typically mediated by key persons, usually male lead-
ers. As an age-group chief, ole Maine interacted with Prime Minister Odinga as a repre-
sentative of the Loita and a Loita leader. This demonstrates how meetings between ‘the 
state’ and ‘the Loita Maasai’ often involve embodied encounters between a person rep-
resenting the state and a person representing the Loita Maasai.  
The occasion described above also reveals the importance of a development dis-
course in the interaction between Prime Minister Odinga and ole Maine, where the state 
is seen as a driving actor and a provider but also a patron of development interventions. 
It is clear that ole Maine seized the occasion of Prime Minister Odinga’s visit to request 
– or even demand − some very specific development interventions. These requests had 
been discussed and agreed upon in advance by the Loita leaders and formally written 
out in a letter that was handed over to the Prime Minister later. In this particular case, 
                                                 
17  These links follow patron-client relationships embedded in the ODM party structure. (The ODM is the 
party that advanced Odinga as its presidential candidate in the 2007 elections.) The links were through 
the ODM councillor in Morijo Loita Ward (Panin ole Parkisuaa) who is also a ceremonial age-group 
leader in the Ilkishili circumcision-group, via the ODM MP for Narok South (Nkoidila ole Lankas) 
and the ODM MP in Narok North who is also the Minister of National Heritage and Culture (William 
ole Ntimama). 
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development was linked to voter rights. Understood by all, though not explicitly ex-
pressed by ole Maine in his speech even though it was alluded to, was the idea that if 
Prime Minister Odinga and his political allies fulfilled these development requests, the 
Loita Maasai would vote for him in the next presidential elections. This was, in effect, a 
way of negotiating votes for development. 
The attempt to control and take charge of state interventions in Loita by proactively 
requesting development projects that are desired (rather than being faced with imposed 
and unwanted state interventions and policies) should be seen as part of a long history in 
Loita of being confronted by state interventions and interventions by other agencies in 
the name of development and/or conservation. Interventions targeting land tenure and 
forest management were discussed earlier in this chapter and leaders in Loita have 
played key roles in the mediation and negotiation of these and other interventions. They 
have opposed and thwarted some outside initiatives, while supporting, inviting and 
channelling others, sometimes in adapted and more desirable forms. Loita leaders can 
thus be seen as ‘articulation points’ or intermediaries that mediate outside interventions, 
whether they are spearheaded by state actors, as in the case of the land adjudication pro-
gramme and the Narok County Council forest plan, or global environmental organiza-
tions such as IUCN or, as we will see later, by missionaries and NGOs. But ‘mediating’ 
does not at times seem to entirely capture what leaders do in relation to outside inter-
ventions. Instead of mediating between two parties as a neutral go-between, leaders 
sometimes appear to be actively managing, or even capitalizing on, interventions. Ra-
ther than merely mediating, they appear to be governing relations with the state and 
other agencies. Mediating and governing are two facets of leadership and, depending on 
the context, one rather than the other would seem to adequately describe the leader’s 
role. 
Mediating and governing also work the other way. To come back to the topic of 
Loita-state encounters, Loita leaders are trying to mediate and control attempts by Loita 
Maasai to access the state directly, particularly state law. This is in an effort to keep 
issues, such as violent fights, within the community and for leading elders to mediate 
and resolve cases in their own way rather than having to involve the police and state 
courts. The point is that the legal involvement of the state undermines Loita’s own insti-
tutions for resolving disputes, and hence the authority of their leaders. Outside agencies 
with different governing structures, of which the state is a prime example, challenge the 
Loita Maasai’s self-government. This hints at a wider struggle for Loita leaders who 
want to maintain control over relations, practices, processes and conflicts in Loita. It is a 
political struggle to govern their own people without unwelcome interference from the 
state and other outside agencies.  
Mediating and governing do not only happen at the interface of Loita and the outside 
world but also internally, inside Loita. Particular leadership positions, such as the age-
group chief and the clan chief, but also positions that have emerged from historical ar-
ticulations with the state, such as the (Provincial Administration) chief,18 govern parts 
                                                 
18  To distinguish this type of chief from others that are discussed in this study, such as the ‘age-group 
chief’ and the ‘clan chief’, it will be referred to as the ‘PA chief’. PA stands for Provincial 
Administration, which is the state institution that lends this leadership position its authority. PA chiefs 
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of the Loita − the age-group, the clan and the administrative ‘location’ respectively − 
and are ultimately responsible for mediating conflicts in these areas. Terms like the 
‘governing age-group’ and the ‘political term’ of an age-group that were used in the 
account about ole Maine and Prime Minister Odinga should be placed in this context 
too. This thesis will explain how individual leadership positions intersect with a collec-
tive form of government centred on the governing age-group whose political term is 
shaped by the temporality of the age-group system.  
The ceremony for which the manyata was built marked the transition of political 
power from one age-group to the next. Ole Maine’s age-group was at the beginning of 
its political term as the governing age-group in Loita. Viewed from this angle, the event 
described in the anecdote above not only highlights an encounter between the state and 
the Loita Maasai but also, at another level, an encounter between two ways of govern-
ing. Ole Maine did not only invite Prime Minister Odinga to attend the event to increase 
the popularity of his age-group in Loita but also to present and introduce his age-group 
and its leaders as the upcoming governing age-group of a unified and well-organized 
Loita community. The on-going struggle to maintain access and control of forest and 
land in Loita is part of a wider quest by Loita leaders to hold on to their power and au-
thority. Land, forest and leadership are closely interlinked, which is why they form the 
three thematic pillars of this study. 
Articulations and effects 
The auspicious conjunctures described in the first section of this chapter form the start-
ing point for an anthropological study of the dynamics surrounding interventions in 
Loita. The interventions are those that Tania Murray Li (2007a, 2007b) had in mind 
when she wrote about ‘governmental interventions’. They occur when policies, pro-
grammes, projects and schemes intervene in the name of development and/or nature 
conservation under the aegis of agencies such as the state, NGOs and (international) 
environmental organizations. They are governmental not because they come from ‘the 
government’ as in the ‘Government of Kenya’ but because they are informed by the 
wish to change society and are manifestations of a process called ‘governmentality’ 
(Foucault 2001) that seeks to transform the behaviour of people. Governmental inter-
ventions aim to implement planned social change. However, and as the quote that 
opened this introduction indicates, changes and transformations following governmental 
interventions often deviate from the trajectory envisaged. Not only are changes fre-
quently unexpected and unintended, they are sometimes even contradictory. The articu-
lation of governmental efforts with the world they want to transform create ‘messy situ-
ations’ (Li 2007b: 278) because governmental interventions encounter, become entan-
gled with and (co-)produce ‘a witches’ brew of processes, practices, and struggles’ (Li 
2007a: 28). In other words, when governmental policies, programmes, projects and 
schemes are implemented, they produce ‘messy consequences’ (Ibid.). Li’s ‘messy con-
sequences’ are the social changes that I am seeking to understand and are thoroughly 
political. They constitute the kind of effects that will be examined in this study, i.e. 
                                                 
are called ‘government chiefs’ in Loita. To avoid confusion and because of the specific way the word 
‘government’ is used in this thesis (see later), I do not follow Loita usage in this case.  
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those that are triggered when governmental interventions articulate or ‘intersect with 
other processes shaping particular conjunctures’ (Ibid.: 1). Articulations and effects are 
the keywords that will guide my investigation of social change in Loita. I will show 
that, despite the fact that the Loita retain collective access and control over land and 
forest, transformations have taken place in the way people relate to land and forest, and 
with each other in relation to land and forest. Leadership is a topic that permeates these 
land- and forest-related changes because, as we saw, political struggles involving lead-
ers in their mediating/governing role have shaped articulations and the effects of inter-
ventions in important ways. These struggles involve both conflicts among Loita leaders 
as well as the struggle by Loita leadership to maintain the power to govern Loita. To 
tease out how these power relations and other political struggles are implicated in the 
land- and forest-related changes, I engage with a field of study called political ecology, 
which takes these issues as its object of inquiry. 
To understand changes and transformations, a grasp of historical processes is neces-
sary. The discussion of the legal category of Trust Land earlier in this chapter indicated 
that state law, by defining what happens and what does not happen in Trust Lands, has 
significantly transformed leadership in Loita. In a similar way, Trust Land has shaped 
the land- and forest-related changes in Loita too. Colson (1971) demonstrated that cate-
gorizations of land, such as ‘Reserves’ and ‘Native Trust’ lands, and evolving legal sys-
tems during the colonial period that were ‘thought to permit local peoples to develop 
along their own lines’ and ‘recognize[d] local custom’ (Ibid.: 193) profoundly altered 
people’s ties to the environment and had far-reaching effects on customary forms of 
tenure in Africa. It is, therefore, important not only to investigate how the state’s legal 
framework sets the conditions for leadership and land- and forest-related struggles and 
changes but also to do so from a historical perspective. Trust Land, as we shall see in 
Chapter 4, replaced the colonial category of ‘Native Land’, which was created at a time 
when indirect rule through ‘native authorities’ was being exercised and the trusteeship 
of land was placed in the hands of the state. To understand how, for example, Narok 
County Council became the trustee of land in Loita, the history of the category of Trust 
Land must be traced as well as how Loita came to be defined as being in Narok District 
and how the state institution of Local Government evolved. The changes in Loita do not 
stand in isolation. They came about because they interlocked with wider-ranging pro-
cesses and dynamics that go back to the colonial period and created constraints and op-
portunities regarding the development of particular processes. State law is important but 
other processes will also be touched upon in the chapters to come. 
With respect to land-related changes, two issues immediately caught my attention 
when I arrived in Loita in 2007. The first was the proliferation of meetings that were 
convened to resolve land disputes. Not a week would pass without me hearing of a land 
dispute meeting taking place to mediate competing claims by neighbours over land. The 
nature of the disputes, as my informants would tell me, was new. They had started to 
appear intermittently since 2000 but had recently seen a drastic upsurge in numbers and 
turned out to be linked to the land rush that became evident later in my fieldwork. The 
second observation relates to the Loita Maasai’s way of life. Based on the literature 
consulted on the Maasai in general, and the Loita in particular, my expectation was that 
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I would encounter people with pastoral livelihoods. However, there were cultivated 
fields everywhere and people seemed to be putting a lot of energy into the ploughing, 
tending and harvesting of the maize and beans they had planted. The growing im-
portance of cultivation was something new too, I was told. ‘The effects of governmental 
interventions are both proximate and indirect’ (Li 2007b: 280 original emphasis). This 
thesis argues that, even though the land adjudication programme had failed to take off in 
Loita, it had had indirect effects in Loita: land use changed, new ideas of landed proper-
ty developed and land disputes emerged that had not existed before. These changes all 
reflected profound land tenure transformations over time and explained the land rush I 
witnessed in the field. These land-related changes form one focus of this study.  
The forest plan by Narok County Council and the forest project by IUCN met wide-
spread opposition and conflict, and were eventually called off. As we saw, the fear of 
losing access and control over the forest played a role but so too did the disagreements 
between Loita leaders as to what path to follow vis-à-vis these interventions. Although 
the height of the forest conflicts had passed by the time I did my fieldwork, the internal 
divisions that they had created were still simmering in Loita society. While discussing 
the matter with key informants, I learned that the forest interventions had not merely 
triggered these cleavages but had actually intensified existing divisions and struggles. 
For a thorough understanding of the forest conflicts, it is necessary to trace precisely 
how the interventions by Narok County Council and IUCN intersected or articulated 
with the processes, practices, struggles and relations already at play in Loita. While the 
emphasis will be more on the (indirect) effects of governmental interventions in the case 
of the land adjudication programme, investigating the forest conflicts will allow an ex-
amination of articulations of governmental interventions, although both cases take the 
effects and articulations into account. 
In a nutshell, this study investigates the effects of governmental interventions as they 
articulate with existing relations, practices, processes and struggles (Li 2007a) in Loita. 
By focusing on historical processes related to land and the forest and taking the cross-
cutting topic of leadership into account, the following questions will guide the research:  
 
(1) What are the (indirect) effects of state legislation and land reform policy on the organi-
zation of land tenure and governing practices in Loita, and how did they come about? 
How did/do Loita leaders influence the way land-related interventions play out and land 
tenure transformations unfold?  
(2) How did interventions relating to the status and management of the forest involving 
state and environmental institutions seeking to preserve the natural environment and/or 
develop tourism articulate with existing relations, practices, processes and struggles in 
Loita? What role did Loita leadership play in the forest conflicts?  
(3) What do these conflicts and transformations disclose about governmentality (Foucault 
2001) and the struggle for self-government and ‘not being governed’ by the state (Scott 
2009) and other governmental actors (Li 2007a)? And, more specifically, as the state is 
the longest established and most powerful of these external governing actors, what is the 
historical process by which Loita people and society have gradually and inevitably be-
come interlocked with the state’s governing and legislative structures? 
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The research presented in this thesis combines two fields of study that have been 
mentioned in this introduction, namely governmentality studies and political ecology. I 
draw insights from both fields of study to develop an approach that seeks to answer the 
research questions above. The next chapter discusses the notions, concepts and debates 
that form the ingredients of this approach and inform the argument in this thesis. 
 
 
 
2 
The political ecology of  
governmental interventions 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this study aims to understand articulations and the 
effects of land and forest interventions in Loita. The concept of governmentality frames 
my view on interventions, and political ecology provides the lens through which to ana-
lyse articulations and effects. Political ecology is a field of study that examines the way 
power relations and political struggles are implicated in socio-environmental interaction 
and change (Robbins 2004; Bryant 1992, 1998; Greenberg & Park 1994; Escobar 1999; 
Watts 2000; Peet & Watts 1993; Paulson et al. 2003). It treats engagements at the hu-
man-environmental interface as political processes. I follow the line of research that 
takes ‘a serious treatment of politics in political ecology’ (Peet & Watts 1993: 240 orig-
inal emphasis).1 In my study, the development and conservation interventions by the 
state, Narok County Council and IUCN, were thoroughly political because they implied 
a shift in the distribution of access and control over land and forest areas. Since these 
interventions contributed directly and indirectly to land use change, land disputes, the 
run for land, tenure transformations and forest conflicts, I view these dynamics as well 
as the interventions themselves as political processes. The concept of access will consti-
tute an important building block for developing this analytical approach.  
The interventions central to this thesis are, as stated in Chapter 1, ‘governmental’. To 
understand exactly how governmental interventions are considered here, it is necessary 
to delve a bit deeper into the governmentality literature. This will be done in the first 
section of this chapter. The second section outlines the conceptual tools required to get 
to grips with Loita’s land-related changes and to answer the first research question on 
the (indirect) effects of state legislation and the land reform policy on land tenure in 
Loita, and the role of leaders in it. To analyse the process of land appropriation and the 
                                                 
1  Vayda & Walters (1999) accused political ecological studies of putting too strong an emphasis on the 
political at the expense of the ecological. Their critique is valid if indeed the object of explanation is 
solely environmental change, such as mangrove forest degradation. In the present study, it is not, 
however, environmental change but socio-environmental change that is the object of interest.    
16 
 
new ways of claiming land as well as the increase in land dispute meetings, I combine 
insights from access and property theory and link them to the governmentality literature.  
To gain an understanding of how the forest interventions articulated with existing re-
lations, practices, processes and struggles in Loita and the part leadership played in the 
forest conflicts (the second research question), I draw on two lines of inquiry that politi-
cal ecologists have employed to tackle resource conflicts. One focuses on the concepts 
of access and control and the other on scrutinizing existing political struggles. These 
two analytical angles will be briefly introduced in the third section of this chapter. A 
more extensive elaboration of this two-pronged approach fits better in Chapter 8, which 
considers the forest conflicts, and will be presented there. The fourth section in this 
chapter engages with the theoretical debates that form the backdrop to the third research 
question on the Loita leaders’ struggle for self-government and ‘not being governed’, in 
particular in relation to the state. The anthropological methods of research will be ex-
plained in the fifth section and the chapter will end with an outline of the structure of 
the thesis.  
Governmental interventions, practices of  
government and governmentality  
Confusingly, the term governmentality is used in two different ways in the academic 
literature. One sees governmentality as a historically specific form of power or rule, 
alternatively called ‘modern government’ (Inda 2005), alongside other forms such as 
discipline and sovereignty. A second group of authors employs the term governmentali-
ty to denote an analytical perspective. Unless stated otherwise, I use governmentality in 
the latter sense, that is, as an analytical lens and a theoretical concept.2  
In common parlance, the term ‘government’ is used to refer to the activities and the 
political power of the state, such as when one speaks of ‘the Dutch government’ or the 
‘Government of Kenya’. Behind this is the idea that the state and government are insep-
arably tied. Following Michel Foucault, I conceive of government and state differently. 
In his 2001 lecture entitled ‘Governmentality’, he suggested that government and state 
are two different phenomena and that the prevailing perception of their intertwinement 
is actually the result of a historical process during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
in Europe whereby the state gradually became ‘governmentalized’ (Ibid.: 220). He 
showed that before the term government came to be used as the exclusive preserve of 
the state after this ‘governmentalization of the state’ (Ibid.: 220-221), it was employed 
in a more general context. One could refer to ‘the government of the family’, i.e. the 
family being ruled by the family head, usually the father, ‘the government of the con-
vent’ by the superior or ‘the government of pupils’ by the teacher. Government in this 
broad sense refers to the management, control, direction and guidance of groups of peo-
ple but it also extends to include ‘the government of oneself’, associated with morality, 
                                                 
2  Dean (2010: 16, 24, 28, 30) recognizes this double meaning of governmentality and proposes calling 
the latter an ‘analytics of government’ to avoid confusion with the historical meaning of 
governmentality. The use of ‘analytics of government’ has, however, not been adopted widely, with 
many authors still using and explicitly choosing the term governmentality instead of ‘analytics of 
government’ (for example, Merlingen 2006). 
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appropriate personal behaviour and ethics, that became a theme of particular interest to 
Foucault as he elaborated on his ideas of government (Rose et al. 2006: 90; Dean 2010: 
20).3 Practices of government are thus not only found in state institutions but ‘cut across 
domains that we would regard as separate: the state, civil society, the family, down to 
the intimate details of what we regard as personal life’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 989). 
In other words, the government of the national population by the state, or more precise-
ly by state officials, is just one particular form of government alongside many other 
governments that are found in society (Foucault 2001: 205). Foucault holds on to this 
general idea of government and, later, he famously defined government as the ‘conduct 
of conduct’ to include all governments that range from ‘governing the self’ to ‘govern-
ing others’ (Foucault 1982: 220-221, 2007: 192-193 in Dean 2010: 17; Lemke 2000: 2, 
2001: 191; Dean 2010: 19). 
Government as the conduct of conduct points to a practice that endeavours to shape, 
direct and control human behaviour. Dean (2010: 18) expands on Foucault’s phrase and 
provides a more precise definition of government, which I will adopt in this study as my 
working definition of the concept of government. 
Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of au-
thorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape 
conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite 
but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and out-
comes. 
The interventions in Loita in the form of development programmes and conservation 
projects are good examples of practices of government in Foucault’s extended sense. 
These interventions are governmental because they have sought to change the conduct 
of people in Loita.4 The land adjudication programme’s aim, for instance, was to ulti-
mately change the traditional nomadic pastoral behaviour of Maasai and make them 
modern sedentary ranchers so that they would provide meat for the national market and 
land degradation would reduce through destocking (Rutten 1992: 265-327, 2008: 95; 
Galaty 1992, 1994a; Kimani & Pickard 1998; Mwangi 2007a, 2007b).  
This conception of government has implications for the way ‘the state’, either colo-
nial or independent, is approached in this study. If government happens inside and out-
side the state, as Foucault convincingly shows, then the state and its institutions should 
be seen as one – albeit a rather important one – of the many authorities involved in the 
government of people. State officials, NGOs and missionaries are some of the govern-
ing actors, or ‘trustees’ as Li (2007a) calls them, that will be reviewed in this thesis. But 
Loita leaders too aim to change, lead or control the lives – the conduct – of people in 
Loita. Whereas practices of government by state institutions and international organiza-
tions are best studied in their interventions, those of Loita leaders can best be captured 
in the arena of the meeting, as will be argued later. Despite the empirical pervasiveness 
of the state in people’s lives (Trouillot 2001), analytically, non-state governing agencies 
and actors should be seen as ‘operating on the same level’ as the state and approached 
                                                 
3  I do not explore ‘the government of oneself’ in this study. 
4  The list of authors that have analysed development and conservation interventions explicitly from a 
governmentality perspective is growing fast (Li 2007a; Bryant 2002; Sending & Neumann 2006; 
Watts 2003; Bose et al. 2012; Agrawal 2005; Corbridge et al. 2005). 
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‘within a common frame’ (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 994). The concepts of government 
and governmentality, with their focus on governmental practices, provide this common 
frame.  
Ferguson & Gupta (2002) recognize the plurality of actors, agencies and institutions 
involved in practices of government and propose the term ‘transnational governmentali-
ty’ to draw attention to the complex and shifting alliances and networks being set up on 
a global scale and ‘beyond “the state”’ (Li 2005).  
These include not only new strategies of discipline and regulation, exemplified by the WTO [World 
Trade Organization] and the structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund], but also transnational alliances forged by activists and grassroots organizations and 
the proliferation of voluntary organizations supported by complex networks of international and 
transnational funding and personnel. The outsourcing of the functions of the state to NGOs and other 
ostensibly nonstate agencies, we argue, is a key feature, not only of the operation of national states, 
but of an emerging system of transnational governmentality. (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 990)  
The value of the term transnational governmentality lies in the fact that it highlights 
how governmental interventions not only originate out of the efforts of a single govern-
ing institution, but more often than not out of the transnational collaboration of differ-
ent governing agencies. The IUCN project, for instance, came about through the alli-
ance of an international environmental organization (IUCN) and a group of Loita lead-
ers that were closely linked to an NGO in Loita.  
The concept of transnational governmentality was coined by Ferguson & Gupta to 
highlight a form of government linking ‘grassroots’ organizations with international and 
global organizations to the exclusion of the state. Yet, as Sending & Neumann (2006) 
show in their cases on the international campaign to ban landmines and international 
population policy, states and (transnational) non-state actors may also work together 
when it comes to governmental interventions. The land adjudication programme, for 
example, was a combined effort of the Kenyan state and funding agencies such as the 
World Bank, USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and ODA 
(the UK’s Overseas Development Administration) (Rutten 1992: 107).  
This study focuses on how governmental interventions change the way people en-
gage with land and the forest, and with each other in relation to land and the forest. This 
will lead to an exploration of interventions that specifically target the behaviour of peo-
ple regarding land and forest (such as the land adjudication programme and the IUCN 
project) and those that do not, but that have nevertheless affected people-environmental 
relations in Loita. State interventions in the colonial period, for example, were primarily 
concerned with state-making but they did set the conditions for many subsequent hu-
man-environmental dynamics. Let me briefly discuss the nature of these colonial state 
interventions before moving on to a description of the character of the interventions that 
happened later in Loita.  
In his book Seeing Like a State, James Scott (1998: 2) asks: ‘[h]ow did the state 
gradually get a handle on its subjects and their environment?’. His answer can be suc-
cinctly summarized as follows: by attempting to make people and the land ‘legible’ 
through what he calls ‘state simplifications’. State simplifications involve the creation 
of categories abstracted from complex and dynamic socio-environmental realities so 
that they are understandable, useful and relevant to a centralized state. Standardization, 
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homogenization and grid-making are key terms in the process of simplification. The 
resulting models or ‘abridged maps’ (Ibid.: 3) respond to state interests by facilitating 
state objectives such as taxation, conscription and political control. Although Scott 
based his observations on the early modern European state, his analysis bears striking 
resemblance to practices by early colonial states (Geschiere 2007: 129). In Kenya, the 
early colonial period was a time when state control over its newly acquired territory and 
its population was still fragile and weak. The need for administrative order to assert 
political control and strengthen state power was therefore imperative. State-making was 
coupled to indirect rule and it is within this context that the first governmental interven-
tions by the colonial state took place in Loita. These interventions were part of the at-
tempt to make the new territory and the diversity of its people legible by dividing the 
Kenyan territory into ‘tribal’ land units headed by appointed ‘native authorities’. Mak-
ing legible, or constructing a ‘field of visibility’ as Dean would put it (2010: 41), is an 
important first task of government. It was intrinsic to governmental interventions in the 
early colonial period, whose ultimate aim was to make government by the new colonial 
state possible. Practices of simplification and legibility are thus integral activities of 
state government and were apparent in the early years of state formation. 
Towards the end of the colonial period, interventions started to present themselves in 
the form of programmes and projects under the banner of development and/or nature 
conservation. The state-led land adjudication programme, Narok County Council’s plan 
to turn the Naimina Enkiyio Forest into a nature reserve, and the IUCN forest co-
management project all fall within this category. Unlike the interventions of legibility, 
whose commonality rests on the fact that they share the same governing authority in a 
specific phase of its institutional development, namely the colonial state in its formative 
stage, this second group is organized around a common discourse. Many state interven-
tions, especially those towards the end of the colonial period and following independ-
ence, happened in the name of development and/or conservation. But other governing 
agencies, such as NGOs or international environmental organizations, justify their in-
terventions in these terms too. This group of interventions is therefore different from the 
first category of governmental interventions because it involves a plurality of governing 
authorities although there is a common discourse.  
A pervasive aspect of this discourse is the desire to improve things. Governmental 
interventions in the name of development and nature conservation are ‘traversed by the 
will to improve’ (Li 2007a: 6) or what Dean (2010: 44) calls ‘the Utopian element of 
government’. The will to improve is an aspect of government that Foucault discusses in 
his exploration of governmentality as a historical form of power or rule and that Li, as 
the title of her book The Will to Improve (2007a) indicates, has as central to her study 
(see also Li 2007b). For Foucault (2001: 216), the wellbeing of the population is the 
goal of government. Contrasting sovereignty as a form of rule whose purpose is the act 
of government itself, he claims that ‘government has as its purpose … the welfare of the 
population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, 
health, and so on …’ (Ibid.: 216-217). This will to improve the condition of the popula-
tion, help people and make the world better should ‘be taken at its word’ (Li 2007a: 9). 
The will ‘is both benevolent and stubborn’ (Ibid.: 283) and ‘expansive’ (Ibid.: 6), yet 
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programmes of improvement may have damaging effects (Ibid.: 2). As Li (Ibid.: 1) ex-
plains: ‘[i]ronically, these programs, intertwined with other processes and relations, set 
the conditions for some of the problems that exist today’, though they also bring about 
changes that people want. Despite the fact that interventions may have damaging effects 
and there can be ‘instances of bad faith’, one should not assume a hidden agenda (Ibid.: 
9). The contradiction between a sincere desire to help people, i.e. the will to improve, 
and the observation that interventions often make people and their environments worse 
off than they were before is a striking feature of development and conservation inter-
ventions, and a theme that has been taken up by many writers. Scott (1998), for exam-
ple, looked into some of the disasters in the twentieth century that resulted from well-
intended state-initiated development schemes, as the subtitle of his book How Certain 
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Failed suggests.   
The promise of improvement is a common justification for development programmes 
and nature conservation projects. We will see later how Narok County Council justified 
its plan by referring to the benefits of developing the forest for tourism: it promised to 
create local jobs and solve the environmental problems in the nearby Maasai Mara Na-
tional Reserve by alleviating the pressure of mass tourism there (LNECTC 1994: 5; 
CCD ‘Statement’: 6(j)). Interventions to conserve the environment typically appeal to 
the idea of the global significance and environmental heritage of biodiversity hotspots 
(Li 2007a; Bryant 2002: 275-276) or particular animal species (van den Bergh 2014) 
and emphasize the need to protect dwindling global commons of biodiversity and wild-
life from the damaging activities of local communities (Robbins 2004: 149). IUCN’s 
mission was the conservation of biodiversity. As will be seen later, IUCN justified its 
intervention in Loita by referring to the inadequacy of traditional institutions to manage 
the forest sustainably and the need for IUCN’s technical advice to deal with new pres-
sures and demands on the forest (L/PNEFICDP undated: 4). 
Foucault originally coined the term governmentality to analyse the exercise and op-
eration of the form of power that is inherent in practices of government. The position of 
trustee is ‘defined by the claim to know how others should live, to know what is best for 
them, to know what they need’ and this claim of knowing better − of expertise − is a 
claim to power and authority (Li 2007a: 4-5). Government is thus about exercising 
power and authority. It is a type of power that works by (re-)shaping the conditions of 
social life that determine the conduct of people (D. Scott 2005). It is a very subtle and 
diffuse form of power that ‘operates by educating desires and configuring habits, aspira-
tions and beliefs’ (Li 2007a: 5, 25, 2007b: 275) and people are not always aware of this 
(Foucault 2001: 217; Li 2007b: 275). The notion of governmentality, therefore, opens 
up avenues to study this subtle form of power – how it works and what it does – con-
tained as it is in the interventions of governmental programmes, projects, schemes and 
policies. From the Foucauldian-inspired literature, three main analytical concepts have 
emerged that make an analysis of governmental power possible. These concepts not 
only constitute the way the concept of governmentality is generally broken up but also 
reflect lines of investigation in the governmentality literature. I will briefly discuss these 
and then position the present research within this field of governmentality studies. 
21 
 
Inda (2005) distinguishes three closely related analytical themes or lines of investiga-
tion at the heart of governmentality studies: political rationalities, technologies of gov-
ernment and the formation of subjects. Technologies of government and political ra-
tionality are often mentioned in one breath. Lemke (2000: 2, 2001: 191) sums up the 
relationship between these two concepts very comprehensively: ‘The semantic linking 
of governing (‘gouverner’) and modes of thought (‘mentalité’) indicates that it is not 
possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationali-
ty underpinning them’.5 Political rationalities are the ‘intellectual machineries’ (Inda 
2005: 7) that explain social reality and make it amenable and manageable to govern-
mental intervention – ‘governable’ in one word – and which typically justify interven-
tion in terms of solutions provided to previously formulated problems. Problematiza-
tion, i.e. identifying some aspect of conduct that needs to be rectified, is thus a key prac-
tice of government (Dean 2010: 38; Li 2007a: 7) and ‘a highly political act that may or 
may not be grounded in scientific “fact”’ (Bryant 1998: 88). Technologies of govern-
ment refer to the practical translation of political rationalities into specific and concrete 
forms of governance, such as programmes, policies, schemes and projects for imple-
mentation and intervention (Dean 2010: 32). Li (2007a: 7) captures this practice as 
‘rendering technical’. The land adjudication programme and the IUCN project are both 
examples of technologies of government underpinned by political rationalities. When 
implemented, they act directly on the previously defined subjects and their environment 
with the aim of reforming the conduct of people in a certain way. The exercise of gov-
ernmental power is at its clearest here in its intention to direct and regulate people’s 
behaviour, which is why technologies of government are often interchangeably called 
technologies of power.6  
Scholars concerned with governmentality have overwhelmingly focused on the study 
of political rationalities and technologies of government. Less attention has been given 
to the theme of subject-making and the actual effects of governmental power on subjec-
tivities and identities. Although some scholars consider effects to be beyond the agenda 
of governmentality analysis (for example, Rose et al. 2006: 99-100), others, like 
Agrawal (2005) and Li (2007a, 2007b), argue that outcomes, consequences and effects 
of governmental interventions on the lives of targeted populations should, at least, be 
related to, and perhaps even included in, governmentality studies. Studies that have ex-
                                                 
5  In the literature, the notion of technologies of government is alternatively referred to as technologies 
of power, political technologies (Merlingen 2006), technologies of rule (O’Malley et al. 1997), 
techniques of government (Bevir 1999; Lemke 2000), the technical aspect or techne of government 
(Dean 2010) or simply technics (Inda 2005). Political rationalities are also called political reasons 
(Inda 2005), political knowledge (Lemke 2000), rationalities of government (Inda 2005) or simply 
reasons (Inda 2005). 
6  Lemke (2000: 5-6) explains that Foucault identifies three types of power relations. ‘Strategic games’ 
are the casual and transient ephemeral power relations found in everyday life that result when some 
people try to determine the conduct of others; and ‘domination’ results from more rigid, stable, 
irreversible and asymmetrical power relations, where the subordinated persons are limited in their 
behaviour. Domination can result in states of domination. ‘Government’ lies between the two and 
‘refers to more or less systematized, regulated and reflected modes of power’, i.e. ‘technologies’. 
Technologies of government play a role in the creation of states of domination: ‘[t]echnologies of 
government account for the systematization, stabilization and regulation of power relations that may 
lead to a state of domination’. See also Merlingen (2006: 191-192). 
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plored the effects of governmental interventions on subjects show that although subjec-
tivities may at times transform so that people become the envisioned subjects of gov-
ernmental programmes (see Agrawal’s 2005 study of environmental subjects in Ku-
maon, India), governmental interventions have, in other cases, stimulated unintended 
subjectivities that even contest the governmental programmes that target them (Li 
2007a). Or, as Bose et al. (2012) demonstrate, subjects may resist imposed identities at 
first, only to internalize them later. Such studies raise questions as to the ‘the docility of 
the governed’ (Merlingen 2006: 190), a topic that has been generally unproblematized 
in the governmentality literature, and the (in)capacity of governmental practices to suc-
ceed in producing the subjects that they seek to create (Inda 2005: 10-11). Outcomes of 
governmental interventions are unpredictable and therefore merit study. The theme of 
subject-making overlaps with the political ecological study of articulations and the ef-
fects of governmental interventions. The present study aims to contribute to this re-
search niche by examining the political process of subject-making and exploring what 
happens with the targeted subjects when governmental programmes and projects inter-
vene in their lives.  
Changing land tenure: from access to property 
Access 
The introduction to this thesis (Chapter 1) discussed the struggle by the Loita Maasai to 
maintain access and control of their land and forest. Clear definitions of the terms ‘ac-
cess’, ‘control’ and even ‘maintain’ are therefore required. Ribot & Peluso (2003) de-
veloped a theory of access to natural resources and defined access as ‘the ability to ben-
efit from things’ (Ibid.: 153, 155),7 with the ‘things’ in this study being land and the 
forest and the most important ‘benefit’ being the material and immaterial use of re-
sources. By differentiating between ‘access control’, ‘access maintenance’ and ‘gaining 
access’, Ribot & Peluso offer a practice-oriented approach that allows for the empirical 
investigation of the process of access. Gaining access refers to ‘the more general pro-
cess by which access is established’ (Ibid.: 159). Access control and access maintenance 
go together because access maintenance involves efforts, like expending resources or 
investing in a social relationship ‘to keep a particular sort of resource access open’ 
(Ibid.: 159) that is controlled by another actor – an individual, a group of people or an 
institution. Control over access is, thus, defined as ‘the ability to mediate others’ access’ 
(Ibid.: 158). So when writing about ‘control’ in the context of tenure practices and for-
est conflicts, reference is actually being made to ‘access control’. Controlling access is, 
as we shall see later, a form of government.  
In Ribot & Peluso’s definition of access, the term ‘ability’ is key because it refers to 
the relations of power ‘that can constrain or enable people to benefit from resources’ 
(2003: 154). The concepts of access control and access maintenance clearly involve a 
power relation. In the case of the former, an actor or institution holds the power to direct 
and regulate access of others, and in the latter, an actor depends on his/her ability, or 
power, to successfully keep a certain resource access open through his/her relationship 
                                                 
7  They draw on their own previous work on access (Ribot 1998; Peluso 1992) and on that of others, 
such as Berry (1989). 
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with the actor or institution that controls and governs access (Ibid.: 154, 158-159; Ribot 
1998: 311). By focusing on ‘the range of powers … that affect people’s ability to bene-
fit from resources’ (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 154), Ribot & Peluso take notice of the polit-
ical dimension of the distribution of access. 
The concept of access is both the starting point and the common denominator in this 
analysis of tenure transformations on the one hand, and of the forest conflicts on the 
other. In each case, however, it is deployed differently as it engages with different theo-
retical debates and combines with other concepts. 
 
The grey zone between access and property 
Struggles over land in Loita arise from attempts by families to gain access to land for 
cultivation and settlement that had previously been used collectively for the seasonal 
grazing of cattle, sheep and goats. Gaining access to land involves practices of appro-
priation that set out to exclude others from using the land unless permission has been 
granted: families thus also attempt to control access. Practices of appropriation in Loita 
are thus employed both in the process of gaining access to land and while controlling 
access to land. 
The practices of appropriation employed by Loita Maasai families convey and sub-
stantiate claims of individual property over accessed land, advancing the family head as 
the owner of the land. Claiming property is a way of access control (Ribot & Peluso 
2003: 159). The concept of property helps to further specify and theorize the form of 
control that is pertinent to the topic of land tenure change in Loita. I follow Sikor & 
Lund’s (2009: 3) understanding of property as ‘legitimatized claims, in the sense that 
the state or some other form of politico-legal authority sanctions them’.8 The difference 
between property and access resides in the fact that while property presupposes a legal 
or social sanction of claims to land, access does not because it refers to all the ways 
people can benefit from resources, including legal (such as property) and illegal ways, 
such as through theft or the use of violence (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 156, 161, 164). The 
concept of access is broader in scope than that of property. Hence property, or ‘legal 
access’ in Ribot & Peluso’s terms (2003: 162), is a subset of access (Ribot & Peluso 
2003). People in Loita use the language of property to justify access to land. Property, 
then, is a main ‘mechanism of access’ (Ibid.: 161) in Loita. 
Access encompasses property (Ribot 1998: 310-312, 335-336; Ribot & Peluso 2003: 
154-161) or at least they partially overlap (Sikor & Lund 2009: 3-6). Sikor & Lund 
(2009: 1) have called this overlap the ‘grey zone’ of access and property. In post-
colonial and post-socialist countries, this grey zone is characterized by a ‘central dy-
namic ... created by people’s attempts to secure rights to natural resources by having 
their access claims recognized as legitimate property by a politico-legal institution’ 
(Ibid.). This dynamic, which is manifest in the practices of appropriation that people in 
Loita employ when seeking to turn their gained access to land into recognized individu-
al property, is the central topic of Chapters 9 and 10.  
                                                 
8  Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan (2002: 6) offer a similar definition of property: ‘Property rights may be 
defined as claims to use or control resources by an individual or group that are recognized as 
legitimate by a larger collectivity and that are protected through law’. 
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Property as legitimized claims 
Property is approached here from the perspective of legal anthropology, which is con-
cerned with how property operates in the real world as opposed to the more dominant 
instrumental or (neo-)utilitarian approach that debates how property regimes should best 
be designed (F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; Rose 1994: 1-7).9 This means that by 
adopting Sikor & Lund’s (2009) definition of property as legitimized claims, I choose a 
notion of property that centres on ‘claims’ over the more conventional idea of property 
as ‘rights’. Although these two terms are often closely related in the property and access 
literature, and are sometimes used interchangeably,10 I consider that a focus on claims 
and the practice of claiming better captures the dynamics and struggles surrounding 
property making and property unmaking that I observed in Loita. In addition, the term 
‘claims’ offers a common language and a bridge between access theory and property 
theory, an argument I make in the next sub-section. Although most of the scholarly 
work that is discussed below holds for property in general, my interest lies specifically 
in land as an object of property. So when I talk about property, I refer more precisely to 
‘property in land’. Property in land, or landed property, is also called land tenure in the 
literature (see Ingold 1986; van Dijk 1996: 18).  
The term rights, or property rights, has dominated the property scholarship ever since 
Maine coined the phrase ‘a bundle of rights’ to describe property in 1861 (see Ribot & 
Peluso 2003; F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; Ostrom & Schlager 1996; Schlager 
& Ostrom 1992; Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan 2002). The term rights is appropriate and 
useful for a synchronic snapshot analysis of property and may recognize the diversity of 
bundles of rights that exist empirically at that moment (Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan 2002; 
F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006). Schlager & Ostrom (1992: 249-254) distinguish 
five property rights that individuals or groups can hold bundled (often cumulatively) 
with regard to common-pool resources such as fisheries and grazing lands: the right of 
access,11 the right of withdrawal, the right of management, the right of exclusion and the 
right of alienation (see also Ostrom & Schlager 1996: 130-137). The term rights, how-
ever, connotes a degree of permanency and fixedness that does not mesh well with calls 
by various authors to regard property, including land tenure, in its diachronic dimension 
as changing, relational and negotiable (F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006; Meinzen-
Dick & Pradhan 2002; Juul & Lund 2002; Berry 1993; Hann 1998; Leegwater 2011). 
‘Claims’ better describes the temporariness, contingency and negotiability of the prop-
                                                 
9  Given the extensive literature on property, my discussion of property is limited here to those aspects 
of property theory that find resonance with my empirical findings. I cannot avoid engaging in some of 
the theoretical debates on property and not in others. For a description of the sub-discipline of legal 
anthropology (also called ‘the anthropology of law’), see F. von Benda-Beckmann (2008).  
10  As in the following description of property: ‘property generally evokes some kind of socially 
acknowledged and supported claims or rights – whether that acknowledgement is by law, custom or 
convention’ (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 156 original emphasis). Ribot & Peluso, in turn, take their cue 
from MacPherson’s (1978) often-cited definition of property as ‘a right in the sense of an enforceable 
claim to some use or benefit of something’ (cited in Ribot & Peluso 2003: 155). See note 8 for another 
definition of property that reveals the close relationship between rights and claims. 
11  Their use of the word ‘access’ is different from the meaning of ‘access’ in access theory. Ostrom & 
Schlager use it to denote ‘simple access’, i.e. ‘the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy 
nonsubtractive benefits’ (1996: 131), as in having the right to hike in a forest reserve but without 
having the right to harvest timber or other forest products (see Schlager & Ostrom 1992: 250). 
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erty investigated in Loita. By focusing on claims and the practice of claiming, I show 
that property is a process (Ingold 1986; Berry 1993) and not a finished product. Change 
and transformation are part of property. The word ‘claims’ also focuses attention on the 
agency of claimants and counterclaimants, as well as on those who validate their claims. 
We will see later that claiming land as individual property and legitimately sanctioning 
claims are not always simple or easy practices and they need to be seriously worked on 
by them. 
 
Appropriation as the link between access and property 
It was argued above that property as legitimized claims should be seen as a process. 
Ribot & Peluso (2003: 160) insist that access is a process and they also observe that 
claiming property is a form of access control (Ibid.:159). ‘The key word is process’ (Si-
kor & Lund 2009: 3). If we view both access and property as processes that revolve 
around claims and claim making, then I propose focusing on this common ground as a 
way of clarifying the grey zone between access and property. I suggest that a focus on 
the process of appropriation, with claim making as its key practice, adequately accounts 
for this common ground. Sikor & Lund (2009: 6) made a call to study the grey zone 
between access and property:  
[C]ompetition over access can in many ways be seen as the forerunner of property contestations where 
people try to secure their possession with recognition from a politico-legal institution. This calls for 
research into the economic, political and discursive practices that actors undertake in a terrain of com-
peting claims when they seek legitimacy for their own (…). Moreover, it suggests the need to investi-
gate the processes whereby property is made and solidified or challenged and, possibly, undone, di-
recting our attention to social practices employed by actors and institutions seeking to legitimize their 
actions. 
I suggest that appropriation best captures the process that sees access morphing into 
property and I propose that a focus on claim making adequately responds to Sikor & 
Lund’s call. A notion of appropriation will help to understand practices of claiming land 
in Loita. Claim making will be tackled in the next sub-section. 
Appropriation is making a thing one’s own, according to Locke in Olivecrona’s 
(1974: 222) interpretation. Appropriation, or how people accomplish appropriation, was 
key to Locke’s treatise on the origin of property. According to him, appropriation was 
the beginning and foundation of the right to property (Ibid.: 223). Locke developed his 
theory on the origin of property with the history of agrarian enclosure in England in 
mind (Ibid.: 227). First reported in the fifteenth century but then gaining momentum in 
the seventeenth century, the rural population of England appropriated areas of common 
land for their own benefit by enclosing it (Kingston-Mann 2006: 62). The process of 
appropriation in Loita bears similarities with the history of enclosure in England: fami-
lies attempted and succeeded in acquiring individual rights to property on previously 
commonly used land by demarcating and fencing it. Marx coined the term ‘land grab-
bing’ to describe the English enclosures (White et al. 2012: 621) and this is also the 
term people in Loita are using to describe the process of appropriation occurring there.12 
                                                 
12  ‘Land grabbing’ was also used to describe the attempt by Narok County Council to gazette the 
Naimina Enkiyio Forest, as recorded in the court case documents: ‘He [the lawyer] did so on the 20th 
August 1993 and he alerted the Council and the relevant Government Ministries and Departments 
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Parallels can be found between the arguments used in Loita to legitimize the appropria-
tion of land and Locke’s ideas on appropriation and property, such as the notion that 
people have a right to benefit from land for their livelihood needs (Olivecrona 1974: 
221) and that something becomes property when one adds one’s labour (Ibid.: 224), 
such as by cultivating a piece of land (Ibid.: 226).  
Ingold (1986: 133) links property, process and appropriation more clearly to the 
making of claims. He describes property in land, or land tenure as he calls it, as ‘a mode 
of appropriation, by which persons exert claims over resources dispersed in space’ 
(original emphasis). He insists that ‘every claim is part of a continuous process’ (Ibid.: 
138) to stress the importance of viewing property in its diachronic dimension. He also 
argues that information is conveyed to others during the ‘appropriative movement’ that 
communicates territorial demarcation, a kind of behaviour he describes as territoriality 
(Ibid.: 130, 133, 135, 141, 143, 146-147). Speech is one way of communication but 
when people are not in direct audio-visual contact, they resort to the language of signs: 
‘[t]hese signs have, as it were, to be “written” down onto the landscape (or seascape) in 
the form of durable boundary markers of diverse kinds – notched trees, stone cairns, 
buoys, etc. – whose implicit message can be “read off” on encounter by others’ (Ibid.: 
147). This communicative aspect of appropriation is key to my argumentation and will 
be taken up in the next sub-section on claim making. 
 
Practices of land appropriation: grounding claims and talking claims 
If appropriation is the process of making land one’s own, then the way to accomplish 
this is to have one’s claims to land socially or legally understood and accepted. As a 
first step, claims to land need to be communicated and people have to be ‘persuaded’ 
(Rose 1994) of their validity as individual property. Claiming land as property, as I not-
ed before, is a practice that needs to be worked on. It is ‘hard work’ (Juul & Lund 2002: 
4) as it requires a considerable amount of effort and investment in resources, labour, 
time and networks, but it also demands foresight and persuasive negotiating skills. 
I identify two ways of claiming land. Land appropriation in Loita always starts with a 
practice that I call ‘grounding claims’, which is part and parcel of the process of gaining 
access to land. Grounding claims is the practice of inscribing and altering the landscape 
with visible markers that are socially understood in Loita as conveying the notion of 
individual property. A fence, for instance, is an example of a grounded claim, however 
ramshackle it may be. It is a powerful assertion of property over the enclosed piece of 
land: a ‘statement’ (Rose 1994: 1, 6). It is a ‘technology of access control’ (Ribot & 
Peluso 2003: 165). Fences, with their connotation of exclusion, are frequent causes of 
property-related conflicts (see Fortmann 1995). Disagreement over grounded claims can 
similarly be expressed, for example, by destroying a fence. This would be an instance of 
a grounded counterclaim. As long as the grounded claims by a particular family to a 
piece of land go unquestioned by others, they may be seen as socially legitimized claims 
and accepted as property. When grounded claims are challenged, for example by a 
                                                 
including the Ministry of Local Government and the Attorney-General of our displeasure at the 
manner in which the Council was attempting to grab our land and dispossess us of it and our rights 
interests and benefits in it’ (CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (r) emphasis added).  
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neighbour, an alternative practice of claim making is required. I call this second way of 
appropriating land ‘talking claims’. 
I borrow the label ‘talking claims’ from an article by Fortmann (1995) entitled ‘Talk-
ing claims: discursive strategies in contesting property’ but, although broadly referring 
to the same phenomenon, i.e. the use of speech (stories in Fortmann’s case) as a strategy 
to claim property, there is one key difference between her use of ‘talking claims’ and 
mine that needs to be explained here. While Fortmann refers to stories told within the 
contesting groups, for example black villagers telling each other stories of their past and 
white commercial farmers recounting stories of their own good deeds among them-
selves, I use the notion of talking claims to refer to the face-to-face spoken claims and 
counterclaims between conflicting parties in the process of negotiating property and in 
the arena of the land dispute meeting.   
Talking claims becomes a practice when disputants cannot solve an issue amongst 
themselves and the dispute is brought before a land dispute meeting to be debated by all 
those present, but ultimately resolved by one person who takes on the role of mediator. 
The elders who are approached to mediate land disputes are recognized leaders. The 
resolution reached by the mediating leader grants, rejects or adjusts a particular claim to 
land. Practices of claiming land as individual property occur both in the process of gain-
ing access to land (grounding claims) and when claimants seek legitimization of their 
claims by the elders in general and the mediating leaders in particular (talking claims). 
If social or legal legitimization is granted, the land can be considered someone’s proper-
ty and the process of appropriation concerning that particular piece of land is complete. 
The process of appropriation that leads one from access to property thus starts by 
claiming property. It is followed by seeking legitimization of these claims (social or 
legal) and ends with the consolidation of the claims when they are legitimized (i.e. 
property). This process is sequential and always starts with grounding claims. The pro-
cess of appropriation may end here with the social legitimization of claims, but if 
grounded claims are challenged, they need to be followed up with talking claims. Both 
strategies of appropriation are discursive ways of claiming land and are thus forms of 
communication intended to persuade people to recognize these property claims: the 
former is ‘written’ on the landscape and the latter is spoken (aloud) during land dispute 
meetings. 
 
Governmentality and appropriation in the arena of the land dispute meeting 
Land dispute meetings highlight two dynamics that pertain to the field of appropriation. 
On the one hand, they serve as the arena where claims are ‘talked’ by disputants as part 
of their efforts to appropriate land. On the other, land dispute meetings are events where 
land appropriation is governed. This second dynamic links up with the concept of gov-
ernmentality.  
Talking claims and governing appropriation correspond with what F. von Benda-
Beckmann et al. (2006) call ‘concretised social relationships’ and the ‘legal-
institutional’ analytical layer of property respectively. These two layers are part of four 
analytical layers they identified where property manifests itself and can be studied em-
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pirically.13 In the layer of concretized social relationships, property relations ‘find ex-
pression at the layer of actual social relationships, that is, in relationships between actu-
al property-holders with respect to concrete valuables’ (Ibid.: 19). An example would be 
a statement such as: ‘This is my field because I cleared it’. Concrete property relations 
substantiate categorical property relationships, which are constructed from general cate-
gories of property relations by specifying property holders, property objects and the 
rights and obligations attached to these, as well as detailing the rules and procedures for 
acquisition and the transfer of such valuables (Ibid.: 16). Categorical property relation-
ships belong to the ‘legal-institutional’ analytical layer of property, where property rela-
tions between people with respect to valuable things are legally or socially formalized 
(Ibid.: 17). An example is the following normative statement: ‘If you leave a locality, 
you lose your rights to land in that locality’. Property in the legal-institutional layer is 
not the same as property at the layer of concretized property (Ibid.: 3, 20, 26, 27). In the 
same vein, legal rules regarding marriage are different from the actual relationship be-
tween two married people, to borrow the analogy with marriage offered by F. von Ben-
da-Beckmann et al. (Ibid.: 15).  
In practice, however, elements of property at the different layers interact in myriad 
ways, mutually influencing what property is in the separate layers (Ibid.: 15, 16). I sug-
gest that land dispute meetings, when disputants justify their claims to concrete property 
objects (thus expressing concrete property relations) with reference to property rules 
(indicating categorical property relationships), are empirical events where this interac-
tion occurs (Ibid.: 15, 25). This thesis discusses a case where a dispute over concretized 
property practices leads to negotiations over categorical property and gave rise to new 
forms of property rules (Chapter 10). On the contrary, the formulation of new property 
rules can also have far-reaching implications for concrete property situations (Ibid.: 28, 
30-31).14 The analytical framework outlined by F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) 
offers a valuable way for analysing the way property is created, maintained and 
changed. This research investigates this dynamism by studying property in land at the 
interface of the legal-institutional layer and the layer of concretized property relation-
ships. Land dispute meetings provide the empirical setting where the interaction and 
interrelationship between these two analytical layers of property will be studied.  
When disputants ‘talk claims’, the concern is their mutual property relationship in re-
lation to the disputed tract of land. Here, property comes in the layer of ‘concretized 
social relationships’ but in land dispute meetings, it is also discussed more abstractly in 
terms of categories and rules. This is property in the ‘legal-institutional’ analytical layer. 
In both cases, property is negotiated and land dispute meetings therefore reflect pro-
cesses of negotiation of different orders about concrete property and categorical proper-
ty. When studying property in the legal-institutional layer, one enters the realm of law. 
                                                 
13  The third and fourth analytical layers are the layer of ideology (where property relations are expressed 
in cultural ideals, ideologies and philosophies, such as communism, capitalism or neoliberalism) and 
the layer of everyday social practice of which property forms a part. 
14  Certain dispute rulings, such as Snyder’s (1981) case of a land dispute in Senegal shows, can be 
decisive for future legitimate access to land. His study demonstrates how new legal categories were 
formulated that gave legal claims over land to people who had previously lacked this basis for making 
claims. 
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Law – whether state law, customary law or any other form of law – is a source of legit-
imacy for property claims (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 156, 163). It spells outs regulations for 
use, access and property (land and resources). The regulations may range from ad hoc 
agreements and basic principles to more solidified social values and norms, or they may 
take a higher institutionalized form where a whole repertoire of rules and procedures 
guides legitimate use, access and property of land (Sikor & Lund 2009: 3; F. von Ben-
da-Beckmann et al. 2006: 17). I use the term ‘Loita Maasai law’ or simply ‘Loita law’ 
to describe the unwritten rules that are used to validate property claims and solve land 
disputes in meetings. With ‘rules’, I refer to the ‘generally agreed-upon and enforced 
prescriptions that require, forbid, or permit specific actions for more than a singular 
individual’ (Schlager & Ostrom 1992: 250, following Ostrom 1986). Loita law is not a 
fixed pre-colonial relic. Rather, and as Moore (1989) showed for Chagga law, Loita law 
is adaptive, accommodating and flexible, changing in interaction with new practices and 
changed circumstances or when new rules are devised and old ones discarded, or exist-
ing ones are modified to keep up with the times. Law is subject to change (Starr & Col-
lier 1987) and should therefore be approached as a process (Moore 1978, 1972). This is 
not a new phenomenon, but it is of all times.  
I distinguish Loita law from state law, which is the domain of magistrates, judges 
and lawyers who refer to the written laws of Kenya to plead for their clients or adjudi-
cate disputes in the arena of the court. Loita law is rooted in the shared social experi-
ence and history of the Loita Maasai. Kenyan state law, on the other hand, was drawn 
up by legislatures and is enforced by the state. The relevance of both Loita law and state 
law in Loita characterizes Loita as a plural legal social field. Legal pluralism refers to 
the coexistence and interaction of multiple normative or ‘legal orders’ with different 
institutions and authorities and different sources of legitimacy within a single social 
setting (J. Griffiths 1986; Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan 2002: 4; Benjamin 2008: 2258). 
The legal order of the Kenyan state derives legitimacy from state law, is formed by in-
stitutions such as the state court, and includes actors such as magistrates and judges. In 
the Loita legal order, Loita law that pertains to land tenure is enacted by mediating lead-
ers in the arena of the land dispute meeting. 
Mediating leaders arbitrate and settle land disputes with reference to Loita law. They 
are the ones who exercise the ‘politico-legal authority’ that sanctions and recognizes 
claims as legitimate property (Sikor & Lund 2009: 1, 3, 6, 8). In the face of changing 
land tenure practices, it is their task to resolve and decide which claims to land are valid 
and which are not. Thus, in the process of mediating a land conflict between two dispu-
tants, they govern access and property. Mediating leaders simultaneously govern, man-
age and direct the behaviour of people in relation to land appropriation. Government 
entails any attempt to shape aspects of human behaviour in a rational way according to 
particular sets of norms (Dean 2010: 18-19). At land dispute meetings, leaders attempt 
to regulate and control the behaviour of others with arguments that are in accordance 
with Loita law. Land dispute meetings are thus arenas where governmentality can be 
studied and law, with its set of rules and procedures on punishing those who break the 
rules, is used as a ‘tactic’ of government (Foucault 2001: 211). Its aim is to correct the 
behaviour of the culprit and discourage others from misbehaving and following in 
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his/her steps. What leaders do at land dispute and other meetings should be considered 
attempts at governing the people of Loita.  
Reframing the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts 
The forest conflict with Narok County Council caught the attention of a number of 
scholars (Péron 2000; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006; Adano et al. 
2012; Zaal & Adano 2012). The conflict surrounding the IUCN project, though ending 
in deadly violence, did not however. The analysis presented in this study makes a con-
tribution to the existing literature because it studies both forest conflicts in relation to 
each other and, by doing so, casts new light on the Narok County Council conflict. This 
is made possible by being particularly attentive to the underlying struggles of the forest 
conflicts, especially those within Loita’s leadership. 
 
Politicization and ecologization 
Each of the scholars referred to above have analysed the Narok County Council conflict 
against the backdrop of a different academic debate. Péron (2000) emphasizes neo-
patrimonialism and the recourse of the Loita to state law and the international move-
ment on indigenous people’s rights. Ole Siloma & Zaal (2005) focused on ‘neo-African 
governance’ institutions and the role they played in the resolution of the conflict. Zaal & 
ole Siloma (2006) placed the Narok County Council conflict in debates surrounding 
pastoral poverty, institutions and political networks. Adano et al. (2012) and Zaal & 
Adano (2012), with the latter based on the former and thus advancing very similar ar-
guments, look at the interrelationship of institutional arrangements, violent resource 
conflict and climate change. My analysis places the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts in 
the political ecology debate. 
In the case of the forest interventions, I examine how governmental interventions ar-
ticulate with existing processes, practices, struggles and relations in Loita. We already 
know that in both the case of the Narok County Council and the IUCN interventions, 
the articulation was conflictive, or even violent, and mixed issues of access and control 
with politics and power. Conflicts of this sort have been a staple in political ecology. 
There are two broad lines of argumentation in political ecology that explain environ-
mental or resource conflicts. The most commonly used sees struggle over access and 
control as being at the root of the conflict. In this view, environmental issues ‘become 
“politicized” when local groups (gender, class, or ethnicity) secure control of collective 
resources at the expense of others by leveraging management interventions by devel-
opment authorities, state agents, or private firms’ (Robbins 2004: 173). The second line 
of explanation is less common. The argumentation here is not that an environmental 
issue has become ‘politicized’ but rather that a political issue has become ‘environmen-
talized’ or ‘ecologized’. ‘Existing and long-term conflicts within and between commu-
nities are “ecologized” by changes in conservation or resource development policy’ 
(Robbins 2004: 173). Robbins (2004) coined two phrases to describe these lines of ar-
gumentation: ‘the politicization of ecology’ and ‘the ecologization of an existing politi-
cal struggle’, respectively. Both tendencies can be seen in the Naimina Enkiyio Forest 
conflicts and, to understand the intricacies of these conflicts, the two approaches will 
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therefore be explored. Chapter 8, which considers the forest conflicts, elaborates on 
both these approaches. 
 
‘Community’, collaboration and shifting alliances  
‘Local communities’, according to Ferguson & Gupta (2002: 981), ‘have historically 
constituted the objects of anthropological inquiry’. By studying the cultures or social 
systems of local, often rural, communities (Gupta & Ferguson 1997), early anthropolo-
gists have tended to see wholes and bounded entities rather than internal cleavages and 
conflicts. Despite long being (correctly) criticized in the field of anthropology, this ten-
dency appears to be particularly difficult to dislodge and has contributed to ideas of ver-
ticality that label communities as local phenomena, states as national-level phenomena 
and international institutions as operating at the global level. Ideas of verticality, or 
more precisely of vertical encompassment, have, however, been confounded by the 
phenomenon that Ferguson & Gupta (2002: 995) called ‘transnationalized local actors’, 
such as local grassroots NGOs that are funded by international donors. Are these local 
or global phenomena? Transnationalized locals ‘question both commonsense assump-
tions about the verticality of states as well as many received ideas of “community”, 
“grassroots” and the “local”, laden as they are with nostalgia and the aura of authentici-
ty’ (Ibid.: 990). Of importance here, as Ferguson & Gupta (2002: 983) note for state 
verticality, is that: 
[a]n imagined topography of stacked, vertical levels also structures many taken-for-granted images of 
political struggle, which are readily imagined as coming ‘from below’, as ‘grounded’ in rooted and 
authentic lives, experiences, and communities. The state itself, meanwhile, can be imagined as reach-
ing down into communities, intervening, in a ‘top down’ manner, to manipulate or plan society.  
Such understandings of struggle and resistance are often permeated by a romantic 
view of traditional communities that are menaced by the state and the modern world and 
are common in popular discourse but also found in the academic literature. As will be 
shown in Chapter 8, the majority of the analyses of the Narok County Council conflict, 
but particularly that of anthropologist Péron (2000), have tended to frame the conflict as 
being between the local Loita community on the one hand and powerful state actors on 
the other. As I will show by analysing the IUCN conflict in conjunction with the Narok 
County Council conflict, the forest conflicts cannot be readily understood by looking at 
them in these terms and it will become clear that ‘transnationalized local actors’ have 
much more leverage than one might have expected.  
I have already argued for attention to be given to the (transnational) alliances and 
networks in governmental interventions. This is an alternative approach to the one that 
analyses governmental interventions in terms of ‘local’, ‘national’ or ‘international’ 
levels. By focusing on the intra-Loita leadership division to understand the Naimina 
Enkiyio Forest conflicts, I move away from a conception that sees ‘local’, ‘traditional’ 
and ‘rural’ ‘communities’ (as the Loita Maasai are often portrayed) as being unified and 
homogeneous, to a more political approach that acknowledges that the global is present 
in the local and that ‘recognize[s] their internal differences and processes, their relations 
with external actors, and the institutions that affect both’ (Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 
630). This approach implies a reorientation and reframing of the forest conflicts and a 
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different appreciation of who was fighting who and why. Rather than interpreting the 
conflicts as a fight between the local Loita community on the one hand and a state insti-
tution and a global environmental organization on the other hand, I instead focus on the 
changing alliances and networks (Ferguson & Gupta 2002) and the ‘contingent collabo-
rations’ and ‘global connections’ (Tsing 2005) that linked political actors in Loita with 
state and other governing actors over time. 
The state, self-government and the art of not being governed 
Foucault (2001) uses the terms governmentality and the ‘art of government’ inter-
changeably. Calling government an ‘art’ ‘suggest[s] that governing is an activity that 
requires craft, imagination, shrewd fashioning, the use of tacit skills and practical know-
how, the employment of intuition and so on’ (Dean 2010: 28). The art of government by 
Loita leaders in their attempt to guide and change people’s conduct in the context of 
land dispute meetings is considered in Chapters 10 and 11. A focus on the governing 
practices of Loita leaders, elucidates an ‘art of not being governed’ at the same time. 
James Scott’s (2009) book entitled The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist Histo-
ry of Upland Southeast Asia,15 describes how the remoteness and inaccessibility of up-
land South East Asia (Zomia) enabled its inhabitants to devise social practices that 
would ward off attempts by classical states in the valleys to govern them. He argues that 
social practices as disparate as the choice about which crops to grow, levels of literacy 
and local leadership patterns should be seen as ‘political choices vis-à-vis state power’ 
(Ibid.: 32). Although differences in time, scale and place exist, similarities between 
Zomia and Loita are to be found not only in their relative distance from state centres but 
also when looking at the political strategies employed by Loita leaders in response to 
increasing state influence and interventions since the colonial period.  
The strategies by Loita leaders vis-à-vis an encroaching state have, however, been 
more than only an attempt at not being governed and are also a claim to autonomy and 
self-government. Li (2007a: Ch. 4 & 5) discusses a political response that conveyed 
claims to self-government, something that was triggered by a number of governmental 
interventions. These interventions fell under the label of ‘integrated conservation and 
development’ and were devised by transnational donors and NGOs. They targeted the 
inhabitants of the villages that bordered the Lore Lindu National Park in the Central 
Sulawesi highlands in Indonesia because they crossed park boundaries illegally for agri-
culture, hunting and the harvesting of timber and rattan. The project’s objectives ranged 
from increasing the agricultural productivity of land outside the park and promoting 
alternative sources of income for the landless or near-landless to educating villagers and 
officials about the value of conservation. An unintended and adverse effect of these in-
terventions, as a result of mixing with other processes and struggles, was the large-scale 
occupation and clearing of the forest inside the park in the Dongi-Dongi Valley by vil-
lagers who called themselves the Free Farmers’ Forum in 2001. A very concrete way in 
which the claim to self-government by this group was conveyed was the banner they 
hung over the road at the entrance to the occupied area that read: ‘You Are Entering the 
                                                 
15  Interestingly, Scott makes no reference whatsoever to Foucault or the governmentality literature. 
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Sovereign Domain of the Free Farmers Forum’ (Li 2007a: 158). When farmers were 
quizzed about the banner and the word ‘sovereignty’, Li (2007a: 162) was told that: 
‘It means we can organize ourselves according to our own customary laws,’ they answered. ‘We can 
work together; we are not organized by the government.’ Or, more simply, ‘It means we have our own 
rules.’ Despite the brave words, the forum leaders were finding it quite difficult to organize more than 
a thousand families and enforce ‘their own’ rules. 
The case of the Free Farmers’ Forum is a clear example of a struggle for self-
government.16 It emerged as a response to the unmet promises of the governmental in-
terventions that were experienced ‘as one among other forces shaping and constraining 
their lives’ and the failure to address their landlessness (Li 2007a: 155). It expressed the 
wish for freedom and independence from the state and other governing actors so they 
could organize themselves according to their own laws and rules. The quote above also 
highlights the difficulties that the Forum leaders encountered when trying to make self-
government work. It is against the backdrop of these debates on the art of not being 
governed and self-government that the struggle by Loita leaders for the authority to 
govern Loita is analysed in this thesis. 
To understand the struggle for self-government and for not being governed in rela-
tion to the state, it is necessary to briefly discuss how the state is viewed in this thesis. 
In line with an anthropological and historical approach, this study moves away from 
seeing the state apparatus as a unified and homogeneous entity and instead recognizes 
that it consists of separate state institutions that may exist and develop amid tensions 
and rivalry between each other (Geschiere 2007: 130; Hansen & Stepputat 2001: 6-7). 
Processes of state formation (Geschiere 1993, 2007: 130) and everyday practices of 
state-building (de Vries 2012) therefore receive attention as they affect and co-produce 
Loita’s dynamics and changes surrounding leadership, land tenure and forest conflicts. 
To understand how Loita was gradually made ‘legible’ by and for the state in the pro-
cess of (colonial) state formation (Scott 1998), I consulted archival sources, particularly 
the official (state) Kenya Gazette, where legislative notices and public announcements 
are placed, and which is now available online.17 Chapter 4, for example, draws on these 
sources to discuss how emerging state institutions created new leadership positions in 
Loita that shaped and transformed Loita’s existing political organization. The focus will 
be on how the state manifests itself empirically in Loita, how it is experienced in daily 
life (Hansen & Stepputat 2001), how it is present in people’s ‘encounters’ with state 
power (Trouillot 2001), and how it is ‘seen’ (Corbridge et al. 2005) by the people. En-
counters can take the form of personified meetings with state representatives, officials, 
employees or even Prime Minister Raila Odinga (see Chapter 1). People also experience 
the state through its policies and programmes of improvement and their effects (Trouil-
lot 2001: 131). In this sense, the state is seen as a provider and patron of development. 
The state is also viewed as the source of an alternative legal system. Chapter 11 will 
show that the state was present at a land dispute meeting in the form of a piece of paper 
                                                 
16  The case of the Zapatista autonomy movement in Mexico is a more extreme example (Stahler-Sholk 
2007; Stephen 1997).  
17  See http://books.google.co.ke/books/about/Kenya_Gazette.html?id=SiZddRcP0BcC accessed  
23/10/14.  
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− the so-called P3 form − that is a legal document that can be produced in court as evi-
dence of bodily harm and, as such, implies the arrest of an offender. It thus symbolizes 
the power of state law in Loita. In summary, the state will be studied in its localized 
forms, its empirical manifestations, its personifications and its interventions and effects.  
Akin to the notion of the land dispute meeting as an arena I consider the idea of a 
broad, more abstract and historically produced ‘arena’ useful when mapping and analys-
ing the powers and struggles reviewed in this section.18 This will allow an evaluation of 
how social change is linked to governmental power, the political struggle for self-
government and not being governed, and the dynamic power relations between trustees 
and targets as well as those between differently positioned governing actors. 
Methods of research 
This thesis is built around data collected during periods of residence and short visits to 
the field area between July 2001 and March 2010. The longest period of time that was 
spent in the field was the eighteen months of continuous residence between July 2007 
and December 2008.19 From a central base in Entasekera, I crisscrossed Loita territory 
on foot, by car or by hitching to visit homesteads, temporary cattle camps, markets and 
manyatas or to attend meetings, ceremonies and other important events. My research 
assistant Lenaai ole Mowuo was my indispensable companion on all these trips. The 
methods were qualitative and ranged from informal conversations to more focused in-
terviews, from participant observation while staying with families to observation only 
during meetings when my active participation was not appropriate. During my stay in 
Loita, a rare age-group ceremony that only occurs approximately every 30 years called 
the ‘raiding party of the brisket’ ceremony (enjore e nkiyieu) at the ‘manyata of the 
feathered headdress’ (emanyata oo nkorrenkel) was held and I took the opportunity to 
include it in my fieldwork. A great deal of time and effort went into following and doc-
umenting its preparatory phase, the ceremony itself as well as its aftermath. This gave 
me priceless insights into age-group dynamics and although part of this material is in-
corporated in this thesis, a more thorough analysis still needs to be made of it. The eth-
nographic material used in this thesis has been arranged in three main blocks, each as-
sociated with a particular technique of data collection: a longitudinal study of six fami-
lies, focused interviews with key informants on various subjects and the documentation 
of a wide range of meetings. The blocks are not mutually exclusive and overlap at 
times. For example, there was the case of a member of a family that I was following for 
the longitudinal study who called for a land dispute meeting that I subsequently attend-
ed and documented. And when the head of another family in the longitudinal study, 
who was also a Loita leader, became a key informant who I interviewed several times 
about leadership and politics in Loita.    
                                                 
18  What I mean by arena here bears some similarities with Nuijten’s concept of ‘force field’ (2005). 
19  Fieldwork for my Masters thesis was carried out between mid-July and early November 2001. 
Additional three-week visits in 2004 and 2005 were made to Loita to conduct exploratory fieldwork 
(Dec 2004-Jan 2005), to film (Jan-Feb 2005) and to hold feedback workshops (Sep 2005) about a 
documentary on the eunoto ceremony of the Iromboi circumcision-group in Loita. Research visits 
after the long-term field stay of eighteen months took place in February/March 2009, August 2009, 
September 2009, February 2010 and March 2010. 
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Longitudinal study 
The aim of the longitudinal study was to gain an understanding of the lives and liveli-
hood strategies of the Loita Maasai in order to place the land- and forest-related issues 
in the appropriate social context. Exploratory research indicated that there was a major 
difference between families that were considered wealthy because they owned large 
cattle herds and those with smaller herds who were considered less wealthy. It also re-
vealed that livelihood practices varied between seasons. Six families were selected and 
approached for the longitudinal study: three were small herd owners (with between 10 
and 20 head of cattle) and the remainder were large herd owners (with 100 to 300 head 
of cattle). The selection also considered the geographical location of the homes so as to 
cover the whole Loita territory. Repeated visits to their homesteads ranged from one-
day visits to stays of several days and, occasionally, weeks. Some families, consisting of 
the male family head, his wife/wives and their children, lived dispersed over several 
homesteads and all the homesteads were visited at least once. Care was taken to make 
visits in both the rainy season and the dry season.  
While at the homesteads, I would accompany family members in their daily activities 
and participate whenever possible, while conversing and asking questions about their 
lives. I accompanied women and young girls as they gathered firewood, went to the 
river to bathe, wash clothes and/or fetch water with the donkeys, and I would go to 
markets with them. On one occasion, I went with a woman whose turn it was, as a 
member of a women’s group that owned a dairy, to run the milk-processing machine. I 
woke up with them at sunrise to milk the cows and stood at the lookout in the evening 
watching for the herd to come back before they milked the cows again. I helped them 
repair their houses after it had rained, shelled peas with them and sat with them in their 
houses as they prepared tea and/or cooked meals. There were always children around. 
On other occasions, I would accompany the herders, often boys, to water the cattle at 
the river or dam and to lead them to pastures or join those who were charged with look-
ing after the goats and sheep, which are grazed separately. I observed family heads 
working their fields with ox-drawn ploughs and spraying their livestock with acaricide 
to control disease-carrying ticks and also tending sick animals and cows in labour. I 
accompanied family heads as they inspected livestock they had placed in other home-
steads, transported timber to build a new house and scouted for a place to build a new 
homestead. On one occasion, I joined a family head at the Dagoretti cattle market near 
Nairobi where he had gone to sell some of his cattle. 
Apart from participant observation, I also conducted more focused interviews with 
the family head and sometimes with his wife/wives. Questions focused on their family 
history, their current practices and future plans in relation to their use of land. Although 
women would give me valuable information about their history and current practices, 
when it came to plans and strategies I was always directed to the head of the family as 
they are the decision-makers in such matters. Given my interest in past, current and fu-
ture strategies of land appropriation, I interviewed family heads more frequently than 
their wives and, as a result, women are largely absent from this thesis when it comes to 
discussing this topic. I also asked them how they used the forest and what it meant to 
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them, and I quizzed family members on the forest conflicts. When the families shared 
homesteads with other families, or if dependants lived with them, I would visit their 
houses too. Armed with the extensive, in-depth information gathered in the longitudinal 
study and by comparing this with information obtained in informal conversations or as 
part of an interview with a key informant and observations made of other families, I was 
able to discern wider patterns and trends that I subsequently tested by discussing them 
with as many people as possible to ensure their validity. 
When women visited me at the house I was renting at the Catholic Mission in Enta-
sekera, they would often bring a calabash of fresh milk, curdled milk or corn cubs for 
roasting. I quickly learned that this was Maasai custom. Since I had no cows to milk and 
no field to grow maize, I adapted this rule and presented every house that I visited with 
a bag of sugar and tea. When staying with a family for a period of time, I would also 
bring along bags of foodstuffs (rice, flour, cooking fat, sugar, tea and salt) for every 
house in the family’s homestead to ensure that I was not a burden on their food supply. 
More than once, I was surprised to have a goat or sheep slaughtered in my honour. Par-
ticipating in these practices of reciprocity and hospitality paved the way for a pleasant 
stay in the various Loita homesteads and allowed lasting friendships to flourish.         
 
Meetings as arenas of politics, government and power 
Under the word ‘meeting’, I include a variety of gatherings: political rallies, such as 
those held by aspirant councillors seeking votes prior to elections; barazas, like the pub-
lic gatherings called by PA chiefs to communicate a new state policy; Loita leaders’ 
meetings such as those called by the Ilkerin Project to discuss development matters; 
land dispute meetings when competing claims to land need to be solved; age-group 
meetings that were held in preparation for age-group ceremonies; clan meetings when 
problems pertaining to the clan need to be tackled; and locality meetings to discuss, for 
example, when to open the common grazing area or how to organize labour for the con-
struction of a new classroom at the local school. 
Land dispute meetings are of particular interest in the context of this thesis with its 
focus on land appropriation. As argued earlier, land dispute meetings empirically cap-
ture the practice of talking claims and the government of land appropriation. They are 
like a theatre where contested claims regarding property are played out. Most land dis-
pute meetings are convened to mediate competing claims between members of the same 
locality. These meetings are thus locality meetings at the same time. When two or three 
localities claim a former border-zone area as their own, or neighbouring individuals that 
belong to different localities dispute a piece of land, then a meeting at section level is 
called. Similarly, when whole sections dispute land along their territorial boundaries or 
two individuals that belong to different sections dispute a piece of land, the matter is 
then discussed and solved at Maasai level. Maasai meetings of this kind are very rare 
and I was lucky that such a meeting took place during my fieldwork stay and that I was 
allowed to accompany the Loita delegation to this two-day event.20 The meeting was 
attended by leaders from four different sections: the Loita and Purko in Kenya and Tan-
                                                 
20  The meeting took place at Nkokirdinga in Loita near the international Kenya-Tanzania border and 
close to the territorial boundary between the Loita and the Purko on 10 and 11 September 2008. 
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zania, and the Salei and the Kisongo from the Ngorongoro area (also known as the 
Serenget Maasai) in Tanzania. Several land disputes between different sections were 
dealt with.21 For the Loita, the disputed area involved tracts of land along the Loita-
Purko territorial boundary in both Kenya and Tanzania. The leaders of the other sections 
acted as mediators. An analysis of this meeting is beyond the scope of this thesis but 
this concise description reveals an important aspect of meetings: they are probably the 
best place to see leaders in action and interaction. An example is the visit by Prime Min-
ister Odinga to the manyata of age-group chief ole Maine (Chapter 1).  
I approach meetings as arenas of politics and power. It is at meetings that leaders 
‘perform’ leadership, where they assert their authority and (re-)affirm their leadership 
position. And it is at meetings that they perform their role as governor and mediator. 
Important decisions are made in meetings that affect the lives of others and leaders may 
try to persuade and direct others to do – or not to do – certain things. Meetings are the 
places where leaders try to govern and where they make new laws. They are thus arenas 
of government. Meetings are held to discuss problems affecting Loita or to choose a 
path of action when faced with outside governmental interventions. In this sense, they 
are locales where the articulation of intervention in Loita can be seen: they are points of 
articulation. Meetings are thus key empirical arenas for studying leadership, political 
authority, power struggles and government in action. But meetings are much more than 
this alone: they are forums for the resolution of conflicts, the mediation of disputes and 
places where wrongdoers are punished and fined. All sorts of struggles are fought out 
during meetings and they are relevant in understanding social change and how people 
deal with new developments.  
For all the reasons mentioned above, I paid a great deal of attention to meetings dur-
ing my field research and attended and recorded as many as possible (over 60). I attend-
ed the majority of these meetings in person. Those that I was not able to attend were 
recorded for me by my research assistant Lenaai and, on the occasions when he could 
not or was not allowed to be present because, for example, he did not belong to the ap-
propriate age-group, other friends who were attending recorded the proceedings for me. 
With Lenaai’s assistance, I translated and transcribed many of these meetings and after 
my field research, he continued to do this independently. Transcription work and attend-
ing meetings are time-consuming research activities. Meetings could take hours, in ad-
dition to the time spent travelling back and forth to the site of the meeting. In most cas-
es, this would take a whole day and, for some meetings, like those in very remote or 
particularly inaccessible places, I could be away for two or three days in a row. 
Obtaining permission to attend a meeting from the right person was a procedure that 
I had to follow. I learned the hard way. On one occasion, I neglected to request permis-
sion and after the opening of the meeting I was asked, in no uncertain terms, to leave by 
the ‘owner’ of the meeting. The ‘owner’ in this case was the assistant chief of Entasek-
era Location and it was he who had called the meeting. The following day, I visited him 
to clarify the issue and explain my intentions. That same day, after our talk, I received a 
message from him informing me that the sequel to the meeting was going to take place 
the following day and that I was welcome to attend. I had learned my lesson: before 
                                                 
21  Other intersectional issues were also discussed, such as stock theft and fighting. 
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attending any meeting I had to approach the ‘owner’ of the meeting to obtain official 
permission.22 For a land dispute meeting, this involved approaching one of the dispu-
tants, and for a Loita leaders’ meeting it meant contacting the organizer of the meeting. 
By following this formality, all my requests were honoured and the ‘owner’ would take 
it upon himself to respond to the occasional complaints and requests for clarification 
regarding my presence that were raised by participants at meetings.  
At both locality and section land dispute meetings, I was able to identify the locality 
and section leaders. I saw age-group leaders take the lead during the numerous age-
group meetings that I attended. Clan meetings are rare and I only attended one (minor) 
clan meeting. In the run-up to the 2007 general elections, I went to many political rallies 
that were held by aspirant councillors and prospective MPs in Loita. I was given per-
mission to sit in on three Loita leaders’ meetings. One was organized by the Ilkerin Pro-
ject and the other two were called by the District Officer (DO) to discuss issues in Loita 
such as the uncontrolled logging in the forest and illegal beer brewing. Two meetings 
that I attended went beyond the social boundaries of the Loita in Kenya. One was the 
large intersectional Maasai meeting mentioned above. The other was held in Tanzania 
to coincide with a visit by prominent members of the Ilkishili and Ilbuluka circumci-
sion-groups in Kenya to the manyata of the ‘stool’ of their Loita age-mates in Tanzania 
(see Chapter 1).23 
There are many leaders in Loita but no supreme ruler or overall chief. Each of the 
leaders has a particular say concerning a specific socio-territorial group of people in 
Loita. The age-group chief has authority over his age-group, the clan chief is responsi-
ble for matters that pertain to his clan, the councillor represents his ward and the PA 
chief administers his location (which should not be confused with locality). Leaders can 
also emerge informally, i.e. without holding an official position such as age-group chief, 
clan chief, councillor or PA chief. Locality and section leaders belong to this group of 
informal leaders. Their status as leader depends on being recognized as such by the 
wider community which, in turn, depends on their performance in meetings. Directors 
and employees of NGOs (who I call ‘development leaders’) that operate in Loita have 
also at various times emerged as important Loita leaders. There are thus many leaders in 
Loita, each governing a piece of Loita Maasai social life, with varying degrees of suc-
cess. 
Leaders are overwhelmingly male. Official leadership positions such as PA chief, 
councillor, age-group chief or clan chief are occupied exclusively by men. There are, of 
course, female leaders in women’s groups but their authority does not extend to the mat-
ters that are of interest in this thesis.24 Meetings too, except for political rallies and the 
                                                 
22  This was also the case when attending ceremonies.  
23  During this meeting, many matters were discussed but the most important were land-related and the 
harassment of the Loita from Tanzania at the hands of the local authority. Leaders in Tanzania asked 
the leadership in Kenya to share their experiences on this and give advice.  
24  Women have moral authority as a collective, which is voiced when they form a posse to punish people 
who have transgressed important social taboos (Spencer 1988). I have heard of two such cases in 
Loita whereby sexual relations (whether consensual or forced) were discovered between categorical 
‘fathers’ and ‘daughters’. These are violent punishments where outraged women beat and humiliate 
both transgressors regardless of their social and political standing or wealth. Men who are uninvolved 
have no power to stop these expressions of collective anger. 
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occasional exception, are exclusively attended by men. This does not mean that women 
are confined to the domestic sphere and have no say in public. In ritual arenas that like 
meetings are public events, such as at ceremonies, women play a key role, even in those 
ceremonies that pertain to the male age-group system. Yet meetings, political decision-
making and leadership, which are at the centre of this study, are the domain of men in 
Loita and women are, therefore, largely absent from this thesis.   
 
Focused interviews 
Interviews were carried out in the context of the longitudinal study and when following 
up on meetings. My interest in changes and transformations led me to consult archival 
sources, as already mentioned, but also to approach elders and older men and women to 
gain historical background on Loita. At the age of about 100, Noorkipuny, who was 
blind but still sound of mind, was my oldest informant.25 And Letutui, who was a well-
known laibon, gave me a fascinating account of Inkidongi history that I could corrobo-
rate later with the historical literature on this Maasai sub-clan.26 Interviews were also 
conducted with people whose occupations led them to enter or use the resources in the 
forest in a particular way. For example, I interviewed woodcutters while they did their 
work in the forest and a medicine woman who used to find the special ingredients she 
required for her medicines there. Although I learned to speak basic Maa, Lenaai acted as 
my translator when interviewing people who did not speak English. When interviewing 
women, I would try to use female translators. 
As part of my investigation of the forest conflicts, I interviewed men and women of 
all ages. An important finding was that the different interpretations I heard appeared to 
be based on the opinions of those who were considered to be the leaders. This insight 
led me to focus more on interviewing leaders when it came to getting to grips with the 
forest conflicts. The leadership in Loita was divided so I put great efforts into interview-
ing leaders on both sides and I always made it clear to them that I was interviewing their 
(former) opponents as well. This turned out to be a good approach as they were all will-
ing to give their sides of the story. I also took steps to interview two Purko politicians 
that were involved in the conflicts, but without success. In the case of William ole 
Ntimama, who was the MP for Narok North and a cabinet minister under President 
Kibaki, I got quite a long way. Through one of his political clients in Loita, I was for-
mally introduced to him at his office in Nairobi. He agreed to an interview but subse-
quent calls to make an appointment never bore fruit. Thus, although my thesis gives a 
balanced analysis of the forest conflicts in Loita, additional research is needed to incor-
porate the views and experiences of other important actors outside Loita.  
                                                 
25  She married into the Iltiyieki circumcision-group (the right-hand of Ilterito age-set) but Galaty (1992: 
39) claims that the Iltiyieki belonged to the left-hand. According to Mol’s (1996: 12-15) chronology of 
age-sets, the Iltiyieki were circumcised between 1925 and 1927. Noorkipuny’s eldest son belonged to 
the Ilkamaniki circumcision-group (the left-hand of the Ilnyangusi age-set). The latter were 
circumcised between 1946 and 1948. Noorkipuny claims she was the same generation as her husband.   
26  He was one of a handful of living elders who belonged to the right-hand circumcision-group called 
Ilkalikal of the Ilnyangusi age-set. The Ilkalikal were circumcised between 1939 and 1941 and, given 
that boys are circumcised in their sixteenth year at the earliest, Letutui must have been at least 86 
years old when I interviewed him in 2008. Letutui, though old and fragile, was particularly sharp and 
willing to answer my questions about the past. He passed away in December 2011. 
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In total, I conducted 62 interviews, some of them with small groups of people. I rec-
orded in writing the interviews conducted during my Masters fieldwork. The ones con-
ducted from 2007 onwards were all tape-recorded, translated if necessary, and tran-
scribed. Most of the interviews were held in Loita: the majority were done in the home-
steads of the key informants, some at trading centres and others in my house at Entasek-
era. Occasionally, interviews were held in Narok, Nairobi and Tanzania. Only two re-
quests for an interview were turned down: one by an old man who did not appreciate 
my visit and the other by the owner of a lodge on the other side of the Naimina Enkiyio 
Forest in Kamorora who ordered his armed rangers to force me to turn back. And I lost 
the data from one interview when the recorder failed. Transcribed interviews were cod-
ed and are in the possession of the author. In the text, reference is only made to them 
when quoting interviewees. 
In addition to focused interviews, I have included informal conversations, anecdotes 
and observations in my field notes. Specific questions were also asked in phone calls, 
emails and text messages to Loita informants and also to Jan Voshaar, a former mis-
sionary who wrote several books on Loita and to my father, Jos Kronenburg, who 
worked on the Ilkerin Project in the 1970s. 
Structure of the thesis 
The main body of this thesis, which is preceded by an introductory chapter (Chapter 1) 
and the theoretical framework (Chapter 2), consists of three parts, each with three chap-
ters. The first part gives historical depth to the research topic, the second explores the 
organization of Loita leadership and analyses the forest conflicts, and the third part fo-
cuses on land tenure, the practices of Loita leaders and their relationship with the state.  
The first of the three parts starts with Chapter 3, which examines the period between 
1800 and 1913. It traces the emergence of the Loita as a separate Maasai section and 
relates their shifting territorial control around a core area in the Loita Hills by exploring 
their fate and fortune in relation to other sections, particularly the Purko, at the time 
when the British colonial authorities were arriving on the East African scene. Chapter 4 
then considers the articulations and effects of colonial state interventions of legibility in 
Loita between 1908 and 1965. Attention is given to the new categories of land as well 
as to the leadership positions of PA chief and councillor that were introduced by the 
state. And Chapter 5 describes how Loita leaders gradually became involved in securing 
control of their territory in the face of Purko encroachment and other threats to Loita 
land by using and reworking development interventions between 1966 and 1974. The 
emergence of a new category of Loita leader, called the ‘development leader’, is also 
touched on in this chapter.  
The first two chapters in Part 2 focus on the organization of leadership in Loita. 
Chapter 6 introduces the leadership positions of age-group chief, clan chief and chief 
laibon that, with the positions of PA chief, councillor and development leader as well as 
the positions of locality and section leader (which are tackled in Chapters 10 and 11), 
form the whole spectrum of leaders relevant to this thesis. Chapter 7 then explains how 
these leadership positions intersect with a collective form of government organized 
around the governing age-group, whose political term is framed by the temporality of 
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the Maasai age-group system. Drawing on this background information on Loita leader-
ship and the long-standing tensions and frictions between (groups of) leaders, Chapter 8 
proposes a new interpretation of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts. 
The last part of this thesis tackles the topic of changing land tenure but also gives in-
sight into the struggle between Loita leaders and the state over the authority to govern 
Loita. Chapter 9 discusses the process of appropriation by describing the way families 
ground claims in Loita and showing how this is linked to a diminishing land base and 
the transition from pastoralism to agro-pastoralism. Chapter 10 moves into the arena of 
the land dispute meeting and highlights what happens when grounded claims are chal-
lenged. By focusing on a particular case at locality level and describing the claims and 
counterclaims voiced in meetings, an impression is given of how such events unfold and 
disputes are eventually resolved. This chapter also shows how Loita leaders govern ap-
propriation and it lifts the veil on the wider struggle between Loita leaders and the state 
over the power to govern Loita. Chapter 11, which is based on another land dispute 
meeting but this time at section level, illustrates how Loita leaders govern access to 
state law by imposing new rules in an attempt to avoid the state becoming more power-
ful in Loita. 
The concluding chapter of this thesis (Chapter 12) connects some of the (cross-
chapter) dots, ties up some loose ends and presents some concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
3 
Constitutive pasts of present  
territorialities (1800-1913) 
It then became apparent that the existing literature on the Maasai 
overlooked the possibility of variation between the sixteen or so tribal 
sections. Writers had tended to note that the Maasai do this or that, 
rather than noting, for instance, that the Purko Maasai do  
this or the Kisonko Maasai do that. 
(Spencer 1988: 2) 
 
Every now and then, violent clashes erupt between the Loita Maasai of Kenya and their 
closest neighbours, the Purko Maasai and the non-Maasai Sonjo. The Purko, one of the 
biggest Maasai sections in Kenya, surround the Loita on the northern and western plains 
of the highland plateaus west of the Rift Valley, including the northern parts of the 
Loita Hills. To the south, the Loita extend into Tanzania along the western highlands 
but adjoining the Nguruman Escarpment, which marks the transition from the highlands 
to the dry, hot Rift Valley floor they live next to an enclave of Sonjo irrigation agricul-
turalists just across the international border.1 While disputes between the Loita and 
these two groups were over cattle in the past, today they are about territory and land. 
The groups’ respective warriors are at the centre of the clashes. The Loita are on the 
                                                 
1  The east of the Kenyan Loita area is covered by the Naimina Enkiyio Forest that crowns the highest 
peaks of the Loita Hills. After the end of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest, the landscape drops 
dramatically down the Nguruman Escarpment until it reaches the floor of the Rift Valley at the height 
of Lake Magadi. The forest and the escarpment form a natural barrier between the Loita and the 
Loodokilani Maasai of the Rift Valley and violent territorial confrontations of the sort seen between 
the Loita and the Purko and the Sonjo today are, to my knowledge, non-existent. Cattle-raiding 
between the Loita and Loodokilani, on the other hand, was recorded during the intra-Maasai wars in 
the late nineteenth century. The situation in Tanzania appears to be a bit different from that in Kenya 
because Maasai sections there seem to intermingle and mix more, which results in considerable 
overlap of their territorial boundaries, particularly of the Loita and the Laitayok Maasai (Ojalammi 
2006; Potkanski 1997). When it comes to territorial struggles, they tend to unite against common 
enemies, such as the Sonjo (uniting the Laitayok and Loita) and tourist companies that provide 
services for Arab hunters and that brought together the Purko and Laitayok (Ojalammi 2006: 97-98, 
103-104). 
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losing side when it comes to territorial struggles and the area they inhabit is decreasing. 
This chapter examines the period between 1800 and 1913 that was constitutive for the 
present territorial occupation of the area (see Map 1.1) and is important for an under-
standing of current territorial conflicts. 
Spencer’s opening quote to this chapter also applies to the literature on Maasai histo-
ry. With a few notable exceptions (such as Waller 1984), historical works on the Maasai 
generally disregard sectional variations and present ‘Maasai history’ as if it applies 
across the board to all Maasai sections. This makes it difficult to determine which pre-
cise sections any one historical account is concerned with. Where historians do 
acknowledge sectional differentiation, they often have a strong Purko bias (such as 
Hughes 2006 and Waller 2010). In fact, the dominant narrative of Maasai history at the 
start of the twentieth century is primarily based on the experience of the Purko section.2 
Purko history, which is presented as Maasai history, does not match the historical trajec-
tory of the Loita Maasai. The Loita were not allied with the British at the turn of the 
twentieth century as the Purko and other sections were (Waller 1976), they did not sign 
the 1904 Maasai Treaty with the British (Hughes 2006: 34) and were not moved during 
the subsequent Maasai Moves in 1905 and 1910-1913 like the Purko and other sections 
were (Hughes 2006). They were, however, profoundly affected by these historical epi-
sodes. An early history is needed that puts the Loita centre-stage. As an anthropologist, 
I happily took on this challenging task. The main aim of this chapter is to present an 
early history of the Loita Maasai, one that is based as far as possible on their experienc-
es and from their perspective of the main events. This was undertaken, however, against 
the background of various choices that translated into certain limitations.   
The research strategy adopted involved a review of the existing literature, which was 
examined for comments and references to the Loita Maasai. These were added to my 
own material that consisted of interviews with older people in Loita. Stories recounted 
today about the past are undoubtedly coloured by people’s present circumstances (Van-
sina 1985: xii; Tonkin 1992: 2, 38) but I cherish and quote them at length as a way of 
giving Loita informants a direct voice in Maasai historiography. My analysis thus tacks 
back and forth between the academic literature on Maasai history and my own ethno-
graphic material. I try to gauge the experience of the Loita from the most commonly 
documented events in Maasailand. The analysis does not include archival sources. This 
choice springs from practical considerations and was made after visiting the Kenya Na-
tional Archives where I realized how much time and effort it would take to comb the 
archives for relevant information on the Loita. I was afraid that by plunging into the 
archives, I would lose both time and my focus on the main research topic. Similar time-
related considerations deterred me from consulting the undoubtedly valuable Loita 
Maasai narratives collected by historian Richard Waller, which he was willing to share 
                                                 
2  This might be due to an inherent Purko bias in the writings of early European travellers and in the 
colonial archives, which are always key sources for historians. When European travellers first arrived 
in Naivasha and colonial officials established their administrative centre in Nairobi, the Purko were 
the most powerful section in the area (Waller 1988: 74). These outsiders therefore had the closest 
contact with the Purko and their reports on ‘the Maasai’ might have actually been mainly based on 
their observations of and dealings with the Purko Maasai. 
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with me.3 Instead, I make grateful use here of his work that draws on this material.4 The 
present chapter should be read with these source-related caveats in mind. 
This chapter describes the emergence and gradual consolidation of the Loita section 
as a separate Maasai section that came to be identified with a particular area, namely the 
Loita Hills in western Maasailand. The first and second section of this chapter give his-
torical depth to the actual period of interest here and trace the emergence of the Maasai 
up until 1800 when identifiable Maasai sections started to appear. The third section then 
zooms in on the Loita, tracking their historical trajectory for the next hundred years 
from 1800 to 1902. The historical period discussed in the first three sections was forma-
tive for several attributes of (Loita) Maasai society and culture that are relevant to the 
present, such as pastoralism, the age-group system and laibonism. Due attention will be 
given to these. The final section examines the Maasai Moves of 1905 and 1911-1913 
and discusses their effect on Loita territoriality.  
Origins of the Maasai 
 
North-south migrations 
From historical linguistics it can be seen that a move from north to south, from the area 
where present-day Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan meet to the Rift Valley in Kenya, 
marks the point at which the Maasai became an identifiable group of people. The ap-
proximate date of this migration has been the subject of academic debate as scholars 
have interpreted the linguistic evidence of Maa, the language spoken by the Maasai, in 
different ways. One interpretation, based on genetic linguistic relationships, puts the 
start of the southward migration somewhere at the beginning of the first millennium AD 
when early Maa speakers split from other eastern Nilotic-speaking peoples and moved 
southward, arriving in the Rift Valley by the end of the ninth century (Sommer & 
Vossen 1993: 25, 27, 29, 33). Another linguistic interpretation, based on the variance 
and widespread distribution of existing Maa dialects that presuppose relatively rapid 
and decisive migrations, suggests that this migration occurred over a shorter period of 
two to four centuries and therefore places its start more recently ‘at least three hundred 
years ago, probably considerably earlier’, i.e. in the late seventeenth century at the latest 
(Sutton 1993: 39). Questions about when this migration may have occurred can best be 
solved by interpreting the north-south move not as a single period of migration but as a 
series of periods of migration over hundreds of years (Galaty 1993: 65-67). In this view, 
the latest date corresponds with the last wave of immigrants to the region, who appear 
to have occupied a core area around Nakuru and Naivasha Lakes that is commonly 
called the Central Rift Valley (Sutton 1993: 39; Galaty 1993: 67). This last period of 
immigration is generally associated with the emergence of the modern Maa speakers. 
Whether these final immigrants constituted Maasai ancestors themselves or whether 
                                                 
3  I am very grateful for his collegiality on this and look forward to studying these valuable first-hand 
sources. 
4  ‘Tsetse fly in western Narok, Kenya’ (Waller 1990), ‘The Loita-Mara region in historical times: 
Patterns of subsistence, settlement and ecological change’ (Lamprey & Waller 1990: 20-21), 
‘Kidongoi’s kin: Prophecy and power in Maasailand’ (Waller 1995). 
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‘Maasainess’ developed in the Rift Valley region subsequent to their arrival remains a 
question (Lamprey & Waller 1990: 19; Galaty 1993: 65, 67). 
A theory of Maasai expansion (1550-1800) 
A second series of migrations followed the north-south movement, occurring simulta-
neously with the end of the north-south migration. They entailed outward expansion 
from the Central Rift Valley over the Rift Valley region, i.e. the Rift Valley itself and 
the adjacent plateaus and plains, and seem to have taken place between the mid-
sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Sommer & Vossen 1993: 33; Galaty 1993: 68; 
Sutton 1993: 39). These second waves of migration were formative for several attributes 
of modern Maasai society and identity: the development of what has been called a ‘new 
pastoralism’ (see below), the formalization of the age-group system, an internal differ-
entiation of the Maa language into dialects and, last but not least, the emergence of the 
politically autonomous sections seen today. The emergence and development of Maasai 
sections and Maa dialects were so congruently entrenched that Sommer & Vossen pro-
posed referring to them as ‘sectiolects’ (Sommer & Vossen 1993; Galaty 1993: 70-75). 
While the sectiolects emerged as a result of Maasai expansion, new pastoralism and the 
Maasai age-group system account for the process and its success. I mainly draw here on 
Galaty’s (1993) theory of Maasai expansion to understand this period of Maasai history. 
To give it colour and texture, I illustrate elements of Galaty’s theory with my own eth-
nographic material. 
 
New pastoralism 
The Maasai are identified as having a unique and highly specialized form of pastoral-
ism, a ‘purely pastoral way of life’ (Spear 1993: 1) that ‘eschew[s] all cultivation’ (Eh-
ret 1971 in Galaty 1993: 65).5 Their expansion from the Central Rift Valley to the sur-
rounding areas is associated with the emergence of this new pastoralism, which in-
volved a high degree of mobility to use the pastoral resources available. This resulted in 
high levels of productivity (Galaty 1993: 69, 84). The new pastoralism was based on an 
exclusively pastoral economy and was different from the ‘old pastoralism’ that com-
bined animal husbandry with crop cultivation and which had been practised in the Rift 
Valley region prior to the arrival of the Maasai. Until about 40 years ago, the majority 
of the Loita Maasai had such a pastoral economy and their narratives of their pastoral 
past give an idea of how this new pastoralism might have looked on the ground.  
Cows provided milk, which was their main source of food. Milk could be mixed with 
blood obtained by bleeding their animals if it was in short supply (see Photo 3.1). The 
slaughtering of animals for meat and soup occurred during rituals or on special occa-
sions and when the dry season was at its height and milk production at its lowest. Edible 
wild plants and grains, acquired from livestock-grain trading with their agricultural 
                                                 
5  This does not preclude the fact that other groups in the Rift Valley region periodically practised 
specialized pastoralism in the past. Galaty (1993: 66) concluded that groups of early Maa speakers 
probably practised specialized pastoralism, and Sutton (1993: 38-49) insists that the emerging Maasai 
actually ‘revived’ a pastoral ideal and practice in a way pioneered by the now-extinct Sirikwa. 
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neighbours, supplemented the Maasai’s pastoral diet if necessary (such as during peri-
ods of drought).  
Cattle pastoralism relied on the mobility of the herd, which was the key strategy for 
profiting opportunistically from the variable and dispersed pastoral resources, i.e. pas-
tures, water and saltlick areas (Sandford 1983). These movements included daily herd-
ing, returning to the homestead in the evening and seasonal movements to more distant 
pastures. This is called transhumance. Transhumant pastoralism took them to lower-
lying plains to benefit from nutritious pastures there after the rains of the long rainy 
season (March-April-May). Some special lowland plains were preferred because of their 
lower rates of disease or because they offered the saltlicks that were necessary to pro-
vide cattle with the minerals they required. As the dry season set in and the temporary 
streams and ponds on the open plains dried up, herds were moved to grassy areas along 
the banks of the rivers in areas of more permanent settlement where women, the old and 
children had remained with enough milking cows for their own subsistence. The herds 
were usually moved by warriors (ilmurran, sing. olmurrani) and older boys, and the 
elders would travel back and forth between their permanent homesteads and the tempo-
rary cattle camps. The family is the stock-holding unit and several (polygamous) fami-
lies would live together in a single permanent homestead. Its composition was constant-
ly changing, with new families joining it and others breaking away to be with other 
homesteads or to form new ones. Permanent homesteads were not fixed to one place 
though because whole homesteads would move to a new site after some years, although 
usually within the same locality.6 As soon as the first rains fell in the forested highland 
areas, the herds would assemble on the plains adjacent to the forests. In times of ex-
treme drought and as a last resort, they would even go into the forests to make use of the 
resources there such as water, tree leaves and any grass still available. Shortly before the 
start of the short rains (November-December), the highland plains would routinely be 
burnt to remove the tick-infested tall dry grass and encourage new grass to grow. As the 
rains extended to the lowland plains at the start of the long rains, the cycle would repeat 
itself as the herds descended again and dispersed over the surrounding grasslands.  
Loita Maasai pastoralism thus revolved around a core of more or less permanent set-
tlements along perennial water courses, with their herds exploiting the surrounding pas-
tures in an oscillating movement between dry-season and wet-season pastures. Galaty 
(1993: 77) has called this movement ‘pastoral orbits’ and linked the shift of these pasto-
ral orbits over the landscape to Maasai expansion out of the Central Rift Valley.7 He 
infers from his observations of current sectional pastoral practices that the process of 
expansion occurred when the availability of grass decreased within the herding range 
during a prolonged dry season, pushing the herds to the margins of their pastoral orbits 
where they often came into contact with other groups of herders (Ibid.: 78). For Galaty, 
these ‘periods of peaceful intermingling [were] … precursors to conflict and preparatory 
to expansion’ (Ibid.: 78-79) as the emerging Maasai sections sought to appropriate the 
                                                 
6  Due, for example, to mounting cow dung in the cattle enclosure. 
7  Stenning (1957) recognized a similar pattern among the pastoral Fulani of northern Nigeria. He calls 
Galaty’s pastoral orbits ‘transhumance orbits’ and labels the process of orbits shifting on the landscape 
as ‘migratory drift’.  
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interstitial pastoral resources when herd growth at home pushed them to extend their 
pastoral orbits (Ibid.: 77, 84). Maasai expansion from the Central Rift Valley was thus 
accomplished by ‘friction at the margin of herding orbits, when members of a more as-
sertive section penetrate the peripheral pastures of another at the normal extreme of 
their march, then gain implicit rights in those pastures through continued, and often 
peaceful, use, and finally clash with, and, in some cases, muster sufficient force to ex-
pel, their hosts’ (Ibid.: 79).  
 
 
Photo 3.1 Bleeding a cow (October 2008). 
 
© Angela Kronenburg García 
 
 
Expansion, warriors and the age-group system 
The Maasai had the upper hand in border-zone encounters with other pastoralists, a his-
torical fact that has been linked to their sophisticated age-group system and especially to 
the role of the warriors ‘who were the spearhead of territorial expansion’ (Waller 1995: 
35).8 The warrior age-grade, where an age-grade is a stage such as warriorhood through 
which age-groups pass, is made up of a group of young men of roughly the same gener-
ation (an age-group) who are differentiated from boys because they have been circum-
cised and from elders because they are not allowed to marry. Again, from my material 
on the Loita, it is possible to infer how warriors could have been instrumental in the 
success of Maasai expansion. An exploration of the link between warriors and territorial 
                                                 
8  Although the division of men into age-groups was widespread among the peoples of East Africa, its 
refinement as a vehicle for military organization is particularly associated with the Maasai. 
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expansion will necessitate introducing and discussing various elements of the Maasai 
age-group system. 
Loita warriors would proudly describe to me their role in Loita society as that of be-
ing the protectors or askaris (an anglicized word for ‘policemen’ or ‘watchmen’ in Swa-
hili) of the section, including the territory, its people and its cattle. If a predator kills 
livestock or attacks people, it is the warriors’ job to track down the animal and eliminate 
it. And when conflict breaks out with neighbouring peoples over land and territory, it is 
the warriors who lead the fight; and by retaliating and going on cattle raids themselves, 
they bring back animals to replenish their section’s herds. The last two tasks are im-
portant here.  
Let us discuss the first of these two roles, i.e. that of warriors as the defenders of ter-
ritorial land. I will focus on one of the last territorial clashes between the Loita and the 
Sonjo in 2004-2005, an episode I was able to document in some detail because it oc-
curred between my various fieldwork periods.9 The Sonjo, also known as the Batemi, 
form a Bantu-speaking enclave in Maasailand and have a long tradition of irrigation-
based agriculture combined with goat keeping (as well as hunting and bee-keeping), but 
today also have cattle and practise rain-fed cultivation (Potkanski & Adams 1998; Ad-
ams et al. 1994; Ojalammi 2006). The Kisangiro10 Valley and the Valley of Mount 
Sampu, which are just south of the Kenya-Tanzania border, have been two typical bor-
der-zone areas between Loita and Sonjo territories. Over the last two decades, they have 
seen periods of sharing until violent clashes broke out, after which both groups vacated 
the area until tensions subsided and the land was once more shared peacefully.11 Loita 
from both Kenya and Tanzania have shared land with the Sonjo, and fought over it in 
these two valleys. In the past, the Sonjo only used the rivers and streams that flowed 
through the valleys to irrigate their fields, and the Loita only used the pastures and wa-
ter resources in times of extreme drought. However, according to the Loita, the growing 
group of Sonjo have been steadily extending their settlements and fields over the val-
leys, which has led to a decrease in the area of pasture available for their use in times of 
need (see also Olenasha et al. 2004: 4, 9, 10).12 But the Loita too have slowly started to 
settle the area more permanently, with Loita families from Kenya increasingly immi-
                                                 
9  The earliest recorded (Loita?) Maasai-Sonjo clash dates back to 1975 and was triggered by cattle 
rustling (Olenasha et al. 2004: 2, 5). The last clashes occurred in 2012 when Sonjo attacked a 
settlement in Loita and stole large numbers of cattle. See 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000064684&pageNo=1 accessed 21/3/14; 
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-3685/tanzanias-sonjo-attack-village-narok-south accessed  
21/3/14.  
10  Kerunyan according to some informants. 
11  For instance, violence broke out in 1995 between Tanzanian Loita and Sonjo in the context of a 
Tanzanian land demarcation and registration project. Fighting was triggered by a boundary dispute in 
the western area of the Kisangiro Valley that had been formerly shared by both groups (Ojalammi 
2006: 98-90). After the clashes, the area was abandoned by both sides and left unused for several 
years (Ibid.: 99). Similar conflicts occurred elsewhere in the same year between Loita (and other 
Maasai sections) and Sonjo (Ibid.: 95-98; see also Olenasha et al. 2004: 2, 6-7, 9, 11). 
12  Adams et al. (1994: 22, 29-30) and Potkanski & Adams (1998: 88, 89, 91, 106) have noted a 
development of satellite villages since 1960 from the five main Sonjo villages, where extensive rain-
fed cultivation and livestock keeping is practised. This development is related to population growth. 
Ojalammi (2006: 86, 110) notes how population growth and greater pressure on land results in 
increased resource-use conflicts in areas formerly shared peacefully. 
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grating and using the area for permanent settlements (see also Olenasha et al. 2004: 4, 
9, 10, 15). The diversification of the livelihoods of both groups (the Sonjo nowadays 
keep cattle and the Loita have taken up cultivation) adds to the conflict because of the 
need for more land to accommodate the new economic activities (Olenasha et al. 2004: 
9-10).13 Having had complementary economies in the past, the Loita and the Sonjo have 
now become competitors over land. 
Violence broke out over the Kisangiro Valley in July 2004 and quickly escalated into 
a series of attacks and counterattacks that lasted for almost a year and involved young 
Sonjo men and Loita warriors.14 The Loita warriors were able to organize quickly and 
effectively because they then had a manyata in preparation for an eunoto ceremony 
where many warriors were gathered. This provided an effective means of mobilization. 
The Sonjo, on the other hand, who had been surrounded by Maasai for two centuries, 
had adopted a similar age-based warrior force to counter Maasai raids (Gray 1963: 89). 
In combination with the alleged use of firearms and support from the Sonjo-biased Tan-
zanian authorities (see also Olenasha et al. 2004: 10, 11), it turned out to be quite effec-
tive when dealing with spear-wielding and bow-and-arrow-carrying Loita warriors, as 
this case shows. The two groups stole livestock, burned down settlements and crops, 
which resulted in casualties in both camps before the fighting eventually stopped fol-
lowing the intervention of the Tanzanian and Kenyan police.  
The case shows how the Maasai age-group system offers a structure and ideology 
that enables the mobilization of a warrior force against neighbouring peoples when dis-
agreement over interstitial land-based resources breaks out. Linking similar ethnograph-
ic observations to the expansive phase in Maasai history, Galaty (1993: 83, 85) con-
cludes that, as other peoples inhabiting the Rift Valley region lacked the effectiveness of 
the Maasai age-group system (and particularly the efficient mobilization of rapid collec-
tive action through manyatas), they were overwhelmed by the Maasai warriors who 
either defeated them in clashes or chased them away to avoid confrontation.15 For the 
Loita warriors, retaliation against the Sonjo was not only a case of defending pastoral 
resources but also a matter of pride and honour. To understand this aspect, which is in-
herent in warriorhood and the age-group system in general, a closer look needs to be 
taken at the competitive relationship between successive age-groups in the same section.  
  
                                                 
13  After the 1960s, Sonjo started keeping cattle (again?) (Adams et al. 1994: 23; Potkanski & Adams 
1998: 91; Ojalammi 2006: 67). 
14  The July 2004 fighting erupted when Sonjo accused Loita Maasai of having invaded their village 
lands and the Loita, in turn, blamed the Sonjo of having expanded onto their grazing lands (Olenasha 
et al. 2004: 7). The clashes resulted in the death of one Loita, a total of five injured on both sides, the 
loss of goats and the burning of settlements and crops (Ibid. 2004: 3, 7). A next round of fighting 
broke out in Loliondo town in September 2004 when Loita warriors set several buildings ablaze, 
including government offices (‘Two dead in Maasai, Sonjo clashes’:  
http://www.ntz.info/gen/n01217.html accessed 21/3/14). Nobody died but scores were injured and 
‘tens’ were left homeless (‘Two dead in Maasai, Sonjo clashes’: http://www.ntz.info/gen/n01217.html 
accessed 21/3/14). In October 2004, Sonjo retaliated in an effort to retrieve stolen livestock, burning 
down two different Maasai settlements and killing two people (‘Two dead in Maasai, Sonjo clashes’: 
http://www.ntz.info/gen/n01217.html accessed 21/3/14).  
15  Another factor that tipped the balance on the side of the Maasai seems to have been their use of new, 
more deadly spears (Sutton 1993: 42). 
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Photo 3.2  The Valley of Mount Sampu is on one of the many plateaus on the escarpment that 
descends to the Rift Valley floor. The Rift Valley lies behind the mountain in the 
middle of the photo, after which the valley is named (October 2008) 
 
© Angela Kronenburg García  
 
 
The fact that the Sonjo succeeded in burning down the manyata of the warriors of the 
Loita in Tanzania was an embarrassing event that struck at the very core of warrior-
hood. The Loita warriors from Kenya, who had their separate manyata in Kenya and 
had remained uninvolved in the conflict, promptly mobilized to retaliate against the 
Sonjo and raided and torched Sonjo settlements in the Mount Sampu Valley.16  The urge 
to do so stemmed from their feeling that their personal honour and pride were being 
challenged and, by extension, the reputation of their age-group. The involvement of the 
Kenyan Loita warriors was not only to save face vis-à-vis the Sonjo and other neigh-
bouring communities but, importantly, to save face within the Loita vis-à-vis the other 
age-groups. Age-groups are remembered by their achievements or failures during their 
                                                 
16  See ‘One killed as Loliondo tribal clashes erupt again’ at  
http://allafrica.com/stories/200505040853.html accessed 21/3/14. The fighting left one person dead 
and hundreds injured and resulted in the loss of 30 houses (‘One killed as Loliondo tribal clashes erupt 
again’ in http://allafrica.com/stories/200505040853.html accessed 21/3/14). After the attack on the 
Sonjo villages in Mount Sampu Valley, Sonjo warriors retaliated and attacked Mausa, a Loita 
settlement in Kenya, which left two people dead and three injured (see ‘Police posts to help check 
clashes’ www.arushatimes.co.tz/2005/17/front_page_3 accessed 21/3/14). Homesteads and the local 
primary school in Mausa were also burnt down.  
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warriorhood. For example, the Ilkitoip are remembered as the warriors who drove away 
the Kikuyu cultivators from Loita in the 1970s. But there is another element at play here 
too, one that concerns the structural rivalry and competitive tensions that exist between 
successive age-groups (Spencer 1988). Warriors compete to become more famous than 
the previous age-group that occupied the warrior age-grade. Similar levels of competi-
tion will be expressed later in their lives during elderhood, only then they will not com-
pete for fame but for political authority (see Chapter 7). So the warrior age-grade at the 
time of the fighting against the Sonjo was occupied by an age-group called Iromboi. 
The age-group that occupied the warrior age-grade before them was the Ilbuluka. Com-
petition between these two age-groups has been particularly fierce in Loita. The man-
yata incident was used by the Ilbuluka to taunt and ridicule the Iromboi. So an im-
portant reason behind the Iromboi of Kenya becoming involved in the Sonjo conflict 
was the humiliation they suffered at the hands of the Ilbuluka at home. They wanted to 
restore the reputation of their age-group. This ethos of pride and honour, associated par-
ticularly with the warriors but meaningful to all age-groups, represents ‘internalized 
motives for action, which, under circumstances of age-related or resource-based con-
flict, are sufficient to stimulate intemperate bravery, ambition and self-sacrifice’ (Galaty 
1993: 80).17 In this way and through its ideology and structure, ‘[t]he Maasai age-set 
system underpins raiding and warfare, and, therefore the process of expansion’ (Ibid.: 
81). 
 
The emergence of sectiolects 
The process of territorial expansion occurred at the same time as the emergence of the 
so-called Maasai sectiolects (Sommer & Vossen 1993; Galaty 1993: 70-75). Galaty 
(1993: 72) proposed a model to account for the process of expansion and differentiation 
of these sectional dialects ‘characterized in terms of their degree of divergence from a 
core in a set of concentric, geographical-lexical circles’.18 It describes different Maa-
speaking groups radiating outwards from a focal area in the Central Rift Valley in all 
directions. The ‘frontier groups’, as he calls them, are the first to have moved away 
from the Central Rift Valley seeking new territories in northerly and southerly direc-
tions and along the plateaus east and west of the Rift Valley (Ibid.: 68-69; Sutton 1993: 
39). Few of these frontier groups still exist, like the Samburu who now occupy the area 
southeast of Lake Turkana, and the Parakuyo in central east Tanzania, respectively rep-
resenting the northern- and southernmost reaches of present-day Maa-speakers (Galaty 
1993: 68).19 Migration by the frontier groups was followed by a second (and final) wave 
of expanding Maa-speakers. It is in this process of migration that the Maasai sections, 
as we know them today, evolved out of four larger alliances or ‘clusters’ identified with 
the most dominant section (Ibid.: 70-75). The first clusters to emerge were the Kisongo 
and the Purko, expanding to the south and the north of the Central Rift Valley respec-
                                                 
17  Galaty’s (1993) analysis of age-group-related conflict differs slightly from my own observations in 
that he focuses on competition between territorial groups of the same age-group rather than 
competition between successive age-groups from the same territory. 
18  For a more linear reconstruction of Maasai expansion, see Sommer & Vossen (1993). 
19  According to Lamprey & Waller (1990: 19n), the Siria, Uas Nkishu and Laitayok Maasai are relics of 
these early frontier groups.   
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tively. The Kisongo began to occupy the plains of northern Tanzania and the Purko the 
eastern plains north of the Central Rift Valley. The Kaputiei cluster moved in a south-
easterly direction to the highland areas in the foothills of the Kilimanjaro. The last of 
the sectional alliances to come into existence was the Loita cluster that moved to occupy 
the southwestern parts of Maasailand. The Kisongo, Purko, Kaputiei and Loita clusters 
gradually crystallized into the separate sections that exist today.  
The Maasai gained ascendancy over the adjacent savannah plateaus in a process that 
combined age-based ‘deadly jousts’ of warriors and shifting and expanding ‘pastoral 
orbits’ (Galaty 1993: 83; Sutton 1993: 39-42). This ensured a steady and successful ex-
pansion out of the Central Rift Valley over the larger Rift Valley region ‘sweeping all 
others from the plains’ (Spear 1993: 11). Incipient Maasai sections successfully seized 
control over the pastoral resources from populations of both non-Maa speakers and 
frontier Maa speakers alike that already inhabited the area. The periods of fighting asso-
ciated with these waves of migration are commonly called the ‘Iloikop Wars’ (1810-
1875) (Sutton 1993: 39; Galaty 1993: 77; Lamprey & Waller 1990: 20; Rutten & 
Owuor 2009: 307; Waller 1993: 291, 1988: 87).20 Loita’s experience, however, appears 
to be a bit different from other developing Maasai sections in that they did not face op-
position from strong and powerful frontier groups or other peoples, seizing the new ter-
ritories in southwestern Maasailand with relative ease and without the need to resort to 
major warfare (Waller 1990: 93). They steadily pushed out the peoples they encoun-
tered and ultimately came to dominate the area from the Loita Hills in the east, the Loita 
and Mara Plains in the north and extending to the Serengeti Plains southward as far as 
the highlands of the Ngorongoro Crater in Tanzania.21 
The rise and fall of the Loita (1800-1902) 
 
Occupation of the Loita Hills and the surrounding areas 
The Loita cluster climbed the western escarpment taking possession of the Loita Hills 
around 1800 (Galaty 1993: 72; Jacobs 1972: 83 in Holland 1996: 357 n. 5). They prob-
ably encountered very few people in the area as there is no evidence of any major bat-
tles having been fought (Waller 1990: 93). According to Voshaar (1979: 14), Iltatua are 
said to have lived in the area before and to have left stone implements and waterholes as 
evidence (Lamprey & Waller 1990: 17). The present Ilkunono blacksmith community 
of Leshuta who straddle the Purko and Loita territories are another remnant of the earli-
er inhabitants of the Loita Hills (Voshaar 1979: 43).22 Nestled in the Loita Hills, the 
Loita found a forest that provided them with permanent rivers and streams, saltlick areas 
and adjoining dry-season pastures. It became known as the Naimina Enkiyio Forest. 
                                                 
20  The interpretation of the Iloikop Wars and the term iloikop have been the subject of intense academic 
debate (Spear & Waller 1993; Jacobs in Voshaar 1979: 25-27). It is used here solely to provide a name 
for the struggles and fights associated with this period of Maasai expansion. 
21  Loita Hills and Loita Plains are the names given to fixed geographical features and should not be 
confused with Loita territory, which depends on the extent of the land controlled and occupied by the 
Loita.  
22  The Ilkunono probably moved to Leshuta from the Olngarua and Entasekera areas where they lived 
before (Voshaar 1979: 43). 
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Bands of hunters appear to have inhabited the forest around Entasekera (Lamprey & 
Waller 1990: 20).23 After initially using the area around the forest as a base for further 
expansion, the Loita held on tenaciously to the area, especially later in the wake of per-
ceived external threats to their land and forest.  
From the Loita Hills, they expanded onto the surrounding plains, the Loita Plains in 
the north and then slowly to advance in a southwestwardly direction to the Mara Plains. 
The Loita appear to have encountered frontier Loogolala on the Loita Plains, probably 
around Narosura (Voshaar 1979: 39; Galaty 1993: 69; Sommer & Vossen 1993: 35; 
Lamprey & Waller 1990: 19) as well as Siria Maasai, and the Laitayok Maasai on the 
Mara Plains. All the Loogolala were expelled from the area, although some families 
seem to have been adopted into the Loita section later (Berntsen 1979: 143n). And the 
Siria were driven towards the Mara Plains to the Maasai periphery across the banks of 
the Mara River (Jacobs 1972: 83 in Galaty 1993: 72; Jacobs 1972: 83 in Holland 1996: 
357 n. 5).24 The Laitayok started to retreat slowly from the Mara Plains towards the 
south where they occupied the southern part of the Mara Plains and the north of the 
Serengeti Plains (Waller 1990: 93). By the mid-nineteenth century, the Loita dominated 
the Loita Hills and the Loita Plains as far north and west as the Amala River (Upper 
Mara) and the foothills of the Mau Forest (Waller 1990: 93, 98; Lamprey & Waller 
1990: 20), going up to the Ewaso Ngiro River in the northeast (see Map 3.1). To the 
southwest, they were increasingly claiming parts of the Mara Plains. This gradual 
southwesterly expansion appears to have pushed small groups of Bantu-speaking hunt-
ers and cultivators westwards (Anacleti 1977 in Galaty 1993: 72). 
The Loita not only struggled with their neighbouring communities. In the mid-1870s 
they joined a mega alliance of Purko, Kisongo and Kaputiei clusters to retaliate against 
the frontier Laikipiak who had been waging war to the far north.25 The Laikipiak, whose 
homeland was the Laikipia Plateau to the east of the Rift Valley and the north of the 
Aberdare mountain range and Mount Kenya, had raided as far south as Lake Naivasha 
in the Rift Valley. The Maasai considered them an aggressive community that needed to 
be exterminated. The mobilization of the grand coalition and the success of the attack 
have been ascribed to the prophetic and divination powers of Mbatiany who was an in-
fluential laibon.26 Mbatiany was able to unite the widely dispersed sections (Berntsen 
1979: 134, 142; Waller 1978: 213, 217; Fratkin 1979: 55, 63-64). The Laikipiak experi-
                                                 
23  The map in Berntsen (1979: 136) also suggests the presence of Iraqw and Tatog. And the one in 
Matter (2010b: 46) suggests the presence of Digiri.  
24  Sommer & Vossen (1993: 35) claim on comparative linguistic grounds that the Loita and Loogolala, 
who they call Parakuyo, coexisted for about 200 years before the latter withdrew from the area. Some 
Loogolala appear to have joined the Siria (Waller 1984: 247) and others the Loita (Berntsen 1979: 
143n) but most of them regrouped later to form the Parakuyo who now inhabit the Maasai periphery 
in central east Tanzania, although some have migrated as far as northern Zambia (Sommer & Vossen 
1993: 36; Galaty 1993: 69, 70, 72, 74, 79, 84). The Siria would come to occupy the Trans-Mara 
highlands on the western edge of Maasailand. See Waller (1984) for the fortunes of the Siria from 
roughly the mid-nineteenth century up to the 1930s. 
25  The Maasai battle against the Laikipiak is well-documented. See, for example, Galaty (1993: 75, 82); 
Berntsen (1979: 134, 135, 142); Sobania (1993: 105, 108); Voshaar (1979: 38); Waller (1976: 541, 
1978: 217, 1984: 251, 1995: 36, 44); Fratkin (1979: 63-64); and Lamprey & Waller (1990: 20). 
26  The institution of laibonism, which is specific to the Inkidongi sub-clan, is described in Chapter 6. 
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enced a devastating defeat in Naivasha. The so-called Iloikop Wars came to an end with 
this final battle in c. 1875. 
 
Map 3.1 Loita territory, c. 1850 
 
Adapted from Waller (1990: 94) 
 
 
The ‘Disaster’ and cattle-raiding 
 
Whereas the warfare undertaken in the first half of the 19th century 
was motivated by the desire for territory and for livestock to feed 
a growing population, that of the second half of the century  
resulted from the need to feed a starving one. 
(Fratkin 1979: 62) 
 
Maasai territory seems to have been at its greatest after the final battle against the Laik-
ipiak (Waller 1978: 150). A subsequent gradual loss of Maasai land and territory ap-
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pears to have been precipitated by the success of the Iloikop Wars (Waller 1976: 532). 
The Maasai ‘were unable effectively to occupy the areas from which they had driven 
Iloikop’ (Ibid.: 532). The area was too large for the people and livestock they had avail-
able to assume, exploit and control the grazing lands. By the 1880s, the western, north-
ern and eastern Maasai areas were facing increasingly successful raids by their (mixed) 
pastoral and agricultural neighbours, such as the Kamba and Kikuyu from the east, the 
Kalenjin, Luo and Kipsigis from the west, and the Pokot and Turkana from the north, 
enabling their expanding populations to occupy former Maasai seasonal grazing lands 
(Waller 1976: 532, 1984: 248, 1985: 358). This fate was spared the Loita who did not 
have any large non-Maasai communities as neighbours.27 The Loita, in fact, expanded 
even further, now at the expense of other Maasai sections who had suffered more from 
the human and animal epidemics of the late nineteenth century. 
About a decade after the Iloikop Wars and before the arrival in East Africa of the 
British and German colonial powers, Maasai people and their cattle were severely af-
fected by a series of epidemics that, in combination with drought, constituted the most 
serious catastrophe that East Africa has probably experienced in the last two hundred 
years.28 This period is remembered by the Maasai, including my Loita informants, as 
the ‘Disaster’ (emutai) (Waller 1988). The first outbreak of disease spread from the 
north in 1883 infecting cattle with bovine pleuro-pneumonia, followed in 1891 by the 
more devastating and new rinderpest (Lamprey & Waller 1990: 20; Waller 1988: 75-76, 
1976: 530).29 Famine began to spread (Waller 1988: 77) and then a smallpox epidemic 
hit the Maasai population, especially in the Nairobi area, in 1892 (Waller 1976: 540, 
1988: 79). Although their cattle herds had been decimated (Waller 1988: 76), the Loita 
population was not ravaged as seriously as other Maasai sections that suffered starva-
tion and high mortality rates due to smallpox. The Loita, as well as the Purko, were 
known for their large herds of sheep and goats (Hughes 2006: 36; Waller 1988: 95) and 
although they lost cattle, they were still able to feed on their other livestock. Smallpox 
appears not to have reached the Loita at all (Waller 1976: 540, 1990: 93, 1988: 79). 
Faced with diminished herds but still retaining group cohesion and with plenty of warri-
ors in need of cattle for marriage purposes, Loita warriors exploited the situation by 
raiding other weakened Maasai sections (Waller 1976: 534, 540, 1990: 93, 1988: 94), 
thus extending their territorial control south and eastwards.  
Waller (1976: 533-35, 1988: 94-101) explains how, in the aftermath of the 1883-
1891 cattle plagues, the Maasai faced three choices in an attempt to recover from their 
loss of animals. They could turn to hunting and gathering for a living; they could seek 
refuge among their agricultural neighbours or they could mount cattle raids to help them 
recover from the economic blows their society had undergone. The Loita, as well as the 
Purko and Kisongo, opted for mounting raids on the few cattle that were left (Waller 
1976: 534). The War of Morijo (Ibid.: 540-548), which is named after the final battle 
held in the area of Morijo in the Loita Hills (Rutten 1992: 170), also called the Loita 
                                                 
27  The Siria, living to the west of the Loita and facing encroachment by Luo, Kipsigis and Bantu-
speakers, acted here as a buffer community (Waller 1984: 248). 
28  For an in-depth study of the Disaster among the Maasai, see Waller (1988). 
29  The mortality rates for rinderpest in infected herds was 90% or higher. Mortality rates following 
infection with bovine pleuro-pneumonia were slightly lower (Waller 1988: 101).  
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War (Voshaar 1979: 37), commenced in 1891 when the Loita aggressively started to 
mount cattle raids on other Maasai sections (see Map 3.2). These intersectional clashes 
would last for over a decade. The Loita first turned on their immediate neighbours, the 
Siria and Laitayok (Lamprey & Waller 1990: 20; Waller 1976: 540, 1995: 52, 1988: 
77n). Many Siria and Laitayok (Waller 1990: 93; Lamprey & Waller 1990: 20) but 
probably also Salei and Serenget Maasai, were absorbed by the Loita cluster as its ex-
panding front advanced across the landscape (Waller 1988: 93; Arhem 1985 in Galaty 
1993: 72). This Loita cluster must have crystallized later into the separate but still close-
ly linked sections of the area.30 After being raided by the Loita and suffering huge stock 
losses, many Siria followed their stolen stock and sought refuge with their Loita ene-
mies, as well as among other peoples, only to regroup after 1908 in the Trans-Mara re-
gion on the western edge of Maasailand with other scattered kin (Waller 1984: 251-252, 
256-257). The Loita then descended to the Rift Valley to attack Loodokilani and 
crossed the valley to the eastern plains to turn to the Matapato (Lamprey & Waller 
1990: 21; Waller 1988: 78, 1976: 540). As a result, the Kaputiei joined the Matapato in 
their flight to Fort Smith close to present-day Nairobi to seek protection from the British 
towards the end of 1893 (Ibid.: 536).31 More Maasai refugees fled to Fort Smith when 
the Loita attacked them again on the Kapiti Plains in the Nairobi area in December 1893 
(Waller 1976: 537, 545, 1988: 80) following a raid in Kinangop (Ibid.: 80) and another 
attack on the Purko in Naivasha (Lamprey & Waller 1990: 21).32  
The Loita later grew more numerous as they formed an alliance with what was left of 
the Damat Maasai after the latter experienced a crushing defeat at the hands of the 
Purko (Waller 1976: 540, 1988: 80). Much later, they were also joined by Arusha Maa-
sai (Waller 1976: 546, 1988: 81) and Kisongo as well (Lamprey & Waller 1990: 21; 
Waller 1988: 81). Together they continued raiding an alliance of sections gathered 
around the Purko, including the Keekonyokie and the sections in eastern Maasailand 
(Ibid.: 81). The ensuing hostilities of the Loita with these sections, and especially those 
between the Loita and the Purko became more complex when they became mixed up 
                                                 
30  The close links between the Loita, the Siria, the Salei and the Laitayok are evident from the fact that 
they celebrated joint eunoto ceremonies at a certain point (Waller 1978: 130). 
31  Fort Smith was one of the trading posts of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). The 
IBEAC was founded by a Scottish ship-owner who secured permission in 1891 from the Sultan of 
Zanzibar to have a monopoly on trade in East Africa’s interior. ‘The company was mainly interested in 
the exploitation of the fertile and wet area of Uganda and not so much in the less attractive tract of 
land stretching from the coast towards Uganda and on which the feared Maasai and Kamba moved’ 
(Rutten 1992: 169). The British government slowly started to take over the failing IBEAC and used its 
infrastructure to establish a British colonial presence in East Africa. The company was officially 
handed over to the British East Africa Protectorate in 1895 and they started the construction in 1896 of 
the almost 1000 km long Mombasa-Nairobi-Kisumu railway that connected the Kenyan coast with 
Lake Victoria in Uganda (Rutten 1992: 171-173). 
32  Hall, the commander at Fort Smith, started enlisting warriors from among this group of Maasai as 
mercenaries or levies to carry out punitive expeditions against other peoples, rewarding them with 
livestock (Waller 1976: 536-537; Mungeam 1970: 130). This marked the beginning of a tacit decade-
long alliance between the northern Maasai sections, particularly the Purko, and the British (Waller 
1976). The Maasai-British alliance furthered their mutual interests: ‘The Maasai, badly hit by the 
human and animal plagues of the 1880s and early 1890s, needed time to recover their stock and to 
reorganize their society. The British, hampered by lack of money and troops, and in a weak position, 
could not afford to antagonize the Maasai who controlled their lines of communications’ (Ibid.: 553). 
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with a parallel feud between two contenders for the position of chief laibon. One of 
these, Olonana, found support among the Purko, the other, Senteu, among the Loita. 
The resulting conflict pitted the Loita and Senteu against the Purko and Olonana and 
this division dominated the later part of the War of Morijo. 
 
 
Map 3.2 Loita cattle raids 
 
 
Laibon rivalry 
Senteu and Olonana were half-brothers and belonged to the Inkidongi family. The most 
famous laibons of Maasailand come from the Inkidongi family. Both Senteu and Olo-
nana claimed to be the rightful heir to the position of Maasai chief laibon (oloiboni 
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kitok) that had been acquired by their father Mbatiany (Berntsen 1979: 142-143; Waller 
1995: 36-37, 40, 1976: 541). After successfully directing the mega alliance of Maasai 
sections against the Laikipiak in 1875, Mbatiany became a powerful laibon and political 
figure in Maasailand. Mbatiany’s authority was well entrenched among the Purko 
(Mungeam 1970: 130) and possibly extended to other sections with whom the Purko 
celebrated ceremonies. Even among the Loita, who held their ceremonies separately 
from the Purko and their allies, he seems to have been accepted as the most important 
laibon of Maasailand. By the end of the nineteenth century, and by virtue of his success 
against the Laikipiak, Mbatiany was regarded as the Maasai’s chief laibon. 
The link between this fraternal rivalry and intersectional warfare needs to be seen in 
the light of the special relationship between warriors and laibons in the context of cattle-
raiding (Waller 1988: 93).33 Raiding parties of warriors would seek protection and di-
rection from laibons before embarking on a cattle raid. Protection included a blessing, 
charms and ‘a comprehensive curse on the enemy, in the form of a highly allusive and 
abusive song (oloipirri), and a detailed but obscure set of instructions for the conduct of 
the raid … [like] where [the] enemy stock will be found, what route the raiders must 
take to find it and what steps will be necessary to carry the enterprise to a successful 
conclusion’ (Waller 1995: 32, 1978: 213, 239; see also Berntsen 1979: 141). These in-
structions were obtained through divination. Laibons, ‘war-prophets’ (1995) or ‘war-
leaders’ (1978), as Waller calls them, would be recompensed with a share of the looted 
stock after successful raids and an acknowledgement of their power as laibon that func-
tioned as an important precedent for future cooperation (1995: 45, 1978: 239; Berntsen 
1979: 141). In times of successful warfare, the relationship between laibons and warri-
ors would therefore flourish because the auspicious circumstances were mutually bene-
ficial. As Waller (1978: 239) put it: ‘The more successful raids the laibon directed the 
more stock he would accumulate, the more his reputation would increase, and the closer 
his links with the murran [warriors] would become’. In fact, it appears that the rise and 
establishment of the laibon institution among the Maasai would not have been possible 
if it had not responded to expansionist drives at the pan-Maasai level, as in the case of 
Mbatiany during the Laikipiak War and at the sectional level, as in the case of Olonana 
and Senteu during the intersectional wars (Waller 1995: 35-36).34 Expansion by warri-
ors spurred the rise of laibonism (Waller 1978: 217). 
A particularly successful laibon, i.e. one whose ritual skills had proven to result in 
successful cattle raids, could rise in popularity and become a chief laibon for a section 
or a number of sections. In time, the position of chief laibon would become more insti-
tutionalized with rules of succession from father to son and a more exclusive and formal 
relationship with the warriors of a section. For example, when the warriors of a whole 
section organized a large-scale cattle raid (enjore), a select delegation of warriors head-
                                                 
33  See Fratkin’s (1979) comparison of Maasai and Samburu laibons for a discussion of the link between 
laibons, warriors and warfare among the Maasai. 
34  Mbatiany’s father Supeet also appears to have directed warriors in this way. 
59 
  
ed by their age-group chief would visit and consult their official chief laibon (Waller 
1978: 90; Berntsen 1979: 144n).35  
It is in this context that the claims of both Olonana and Senteu to be the rightful heir 
to the position of chief laibon need to be placed. The stakes were high. Different and 
conflicting versions of the Olonana-Senteu feud exist.36 Here is the version recounted to 
me by the present chief laibon of Loita, Mokompo, who succeeded his father Simel as 
chief laibon and who, in turn, inherited this position from his father, Senteu. It is thus a 
version of the Senteu lineage of the Loita section. The story has been edited to make it a 
more fluent and comprehensive account. 
About Olonana and Senteu? How they were? Both of them, they were from one father but different 
wives, (...) wives of the same gate-post. And that is how Olonana and Senteu were. Have you heard? 
Their father became old so the time came to find the person who’d become the leader and take (...) 
this divining horn (enkidong) of Loita, which I have now. Because that is a big position, ever since the 
Inkidongi were founded. So the time came to appoint one of these sons. So who does not want to be 
the one? (...) [Anyone would] find a way of getting this big position. But while they were trying to get 
it, the decision of who would take it depended on their father’s choice. (...) And … this one was more 
favourite, Olonana. (...) And then … his father did not decide [on Senteu]. But Senteu was strong! 
Both of them were laibons but, as you know, there are strong boys, and Senteu was strong and brave. 
He was stronger than the other one. Have you heard? So the time came when tricks (ilosekin) were 
used and there were the mothers as well, like the mother of Olonana and there was the one who gave 
birth to Senteu. And all mothers used to come together, in the house where the boss was. They were 
just sitting. Just to make the husband happy. So the time came when their mothers were there. Which 
one would not want her son to be the one? So they were doing like this and like that to make the hus-
band happy, so that the husband would choose their son. (...) But everyone knew that Senteu was 
strong (kegol). And brave (nepi). And the other one is also laibon, but you know the kind of children 
who are a bit slower. But he is a good laibon, a full laibon. So after everyone left the house, the father 
told her [mother of Olonana] like … like for example now if you are going out and then I do like this 
to you [sending a sign with the tongue] and I catch you and tell you to stay behind. And he told her 
[the mother of Olonana], ‘you go and tell him to come very early in the morning at 5 am, before any-
one else enters this house, to come early’. And the mother to that one [Senteu] overheard when he 
[Mbatiany] was telling his mother [i.e. Olonana’s mother]. And she [mother of Senteu] went to tell her 
son: ‘I don’t know what Mbatiany was saying, maybe he is going to give his powers and he has things 
to give Olonana, he sent for him to come very early in the morning, before daylight’. So then he knew 
what the other one was told. Well, they went to sleep. And that one [Senteu] was sharp, Olonana is 
like slower. And that big strong animal [i.e. Senteu] came very early in the morning. The old man was 
lying [on the bed] but he was just awake. (...) And he heard him. And he was thinking it is his favour-
ite son. It was so dark that he couldn’t see anything, and he removed everything to be given [to Olo-
nana]. To give his favourite son to become a leader. And prepared to bless him so that he could take 
this position. He told him, ‘Onanai’ (my Onana). And the other one changed his sound to pretend he 
was the one because he knew from before that when the old man calls Olonana ‘Onana’, he responds 
with ‘Oe’. And he told him to come near. And he started to remove all his calabashes and he gave, he 
gave, he gave and when he [finished] giving him he told him, ‘OK, go!’ And when he finished, he 
went out. And after Senteu left. He met Olonana on the way as he was coming for yesterday’s [agree-
ment]. They met. (...) And … he just passed him and he didn’t greet him but they recognized one an-
other. And he went. And he [Olonana] was asked, ‘who is this?’ He thought Olonana’s [business] was 
                                                 
35  These large-scale coordinated raids should be distinguished from small-scale raids called olwamba 
conducted by a few warriors and for which they were allowed to consult minor laibons (Waller 1978: 
90; Berntsen 1979: 144n). 
36  See Waller (1976: 541, 1995: 40). I recorded a non-Inkidongi Loita version in 2001, see Kronenburg 
García (2003: 69-70). Fraternal rivalry seems to be a recurrent theme in Inkidongi history. Mokompo, 
the current chief laibon of Loita, and his brother Ndorko, who as the eldest of the two, was a strong 
contender for the position are said to be involved in similar feuding. One informant compared them to 
Olonana and Senteu. 
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over. So since he thought it had been Olonana, he was thinking this must be Senteu now. And then he 
asked him, ‘who is this?’ He responded, ‘it’s me’. He told him, ‘Senteuwa’. He said, ‘I am not Senteu, 
I am Olonana’. ‘Ooooh, my lazy boy! The beast-of-prey (olowuaro) has tricked you!’ It was the end 
because the guy tricked the other one. (...) So he told him that it was finished. Although he liked him. 
He liked his son but he had been tricked by the other one, and he told him, ‘oooh my son, the beast-of-
prey [i.e. Senteu] has tricked you. You are not Senteu. Did you see Senteu with your own eyes?’ ‘Yes 
we met on the way coming here, at the entrance’, and he told him, ‘oooh my dear one, what you will 
do, two things. Because you have been tricked by the beast-of-prey, I will advise you to respect Sen-
teu as much as possible, never fight him [again] because you will never defeat him. You have been 
fighting him. [But now] no one in Maasai will ever defeat him. So what you will do, try to make 
osotua (restore the relationship, make peace) with him because you will never defeat him’. And he 
was also blessed but just the normal blessing. He was never given what was given to the other one be-
cause he had already given everything to him, he was given a different blessing, [and a different] mes-
sage because the other one was already given the information, and he told him, ‘I will also give you 
one section’. So he gave him the section of the Kisongo. ‘Go and be laibon of them’. And Senteu, the 
[new] owner of the original divining horn (enkidong openy) from God was given to Senteu and it be-
longs to this section [Loita], from the beginning it was ours. (...) ‘And then you go to take that piece of 
Kisongo up to Purko at the other side’, but he asked him to leave Matapato in that land, ‘make sure 
you leave Matapato’. That is why you see Matapato coming all the way here without passing through 
those other laibons and that is how he arranged for them. (...) And he said, ‘never fight with the other 
one’, but can you imagine [how you would feel about] the person who tricked you and took the thing 
that you were supposed to be given? That is when sections started fighting against each other.  
Senteu became chief laibon for the Loita, sanctioning their raids against other sec-
tions. Olonana did likewise for ‘his’ section, the Purko and other northern allied sec-
tions.37 But there seems to be another reason why Olonana teamed up with the Purko 
and Senteu with the Loita. This lies in the relationship of these two sections with the 
mothers of Senteu and Olonana, a relationship forged during Mbatiany’s hegemony as 
the chief laibon of Maasailand. Waller (1995: 42) explains how: ‘When deputations 
arrived, they would seek out the wife from their own area or clan and this might initiate 
a relationship between clients and their kinswoman’s sons. Loitai, for example, visited 
Senteu’s mother … Olonana’s mother was either Kaputiei or Kisongo and she enter-
tained Purko visitors as well. Later, Olonana took refuge with Kaputiei and found sup-
porters in both Purko and Kisongo’ (see also Waller 1978: 235, 236n). Mbatiany’s death 
c. 1890 coincided with the onset of the 1890s cattle diseases (Waller 1976: 541). The 
Inkidongi, who had been living in Ngosua near Monduli in Kisongo territory in north 
Tanzania (Waller 1995: 35) west of modern Arusha, started to disperse over Maasailand 
(Berntsen 1979: 135, 138; Waller 1995: 35, 36), which is when Senteu sought refuge 
among the Loita (Waller 1976: 541). This historical episode was explained by Letutui, a 
prominent laibon in Loita and son of Ngabual who, as Senteu’s brother, came to settle 
in Loita with him.38 Ngabual would become an influential elder in Loita, both as a mi-
nor practising laibon and as an advisor and close supporter of Senteu in Loita (Waller 
1995: 43).  
Tell her that all the Inkidongi were Kisongo before, tell her to write [that]. Tell her the homestead was 
located at Olngosua [Ngosua], at the foot of Oldoinyo loo Larusa [Mountain of the Arusha Maasai, 
i.e. Mount Meru] near Monduli. We were not Loita before but we were typical Kisongo. And then 
                                                 
37  It is not clear whether or to what extent the Kisongo joined the Purko alliance in their fight against 
Loita raiders. Mokompo’s suggestion that Olonana also became the chief laibon of the Kisongo is 
supported by the fact that the Kisongo today choose their chief laibon from among the descendants of 
Olonana (Berntsen 1979: 144n). 
38  His age and experience certainly added to his popularity (see Chapter 2). 
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there was a disaster (emutai) brought by God. It is the disease brought by God that finished off cows 
and people. My father was the brother of Senteu, they were born to one mother. They were the only 
two brothers. She was the mother of my father Ngabual and Senteu, they were her only two sons. And 
their father was called Mbatiany. We came to realize that the disease is the one of the vaccination 
[smallpox?], because it is the white men who came and started vaccinating people. We are now lucky 
we got white men. At that time there was an outbreak of the cattle disease called rinderpest (olodua), 
which killed almost all the cows. (...) When this occurred, there was also a lot of hunger because we 
only had a few goats and sheep so there was not enough food for us. And the Loita decided to go and 
invite the laibon [Senteu] as chief laibon, who was given the divining horn by chief laibon Mbatiany. 
(...) They went to Manga [Namanga] to bring them, do you know Manga [Namanga]? What about 
Oldoinyo Orok [another name for Namanga]?39 Namanga is now where Darsania [Tanzania] borders 
Kenya. That is where they migrated from, where Mbatiany died, at Oldoinyo Orok. (...) There were no 
boundaries before so it is the Loita who came and brought us. So this is why these Inkidongi came, 
some went to Purko, also some came to Loita. The brothers came from Tanzania, they were five [in 
total, including other half-brothers]. The two brothers, Senteu and Ngabual, they are the only two who 
came to Loita, at that time Senteu did not yet have children, he was still a young moran, my father was 
still a young boy.40 Three families went to Purko, they were like a swarm of locusts; Neiliang, ole 
Tuya, Makoo. They are four because there is another one called Mosanga. (...) So the Inkidongi dis-
persed because they were fighting poverty. (...) All Maasai [were fighting poverty]. So when they 
came from Kisongo, they already decided to go to Purko and others came to Loita. Our house [line-
age] was brought by Loita, so they were the only ones to come here.41 
Although it is not clear where exactly Senteu came to live initially, what is certain is 
that he established himself as chief laibon among the Loita (Waller 1976: 541). Olo-
nana, on the other hand, appears to have moved first to Ngong in eastern Maasailand 
until he fled to join the Purko in the Naivasha area after Loita attacks in the region 
(Waller 1995: 36; Waller 1976: 541). The Loita-Purko hostilities and the Senteu-
Olonana competition became so interwoven that they resulted in one larger conflict pit-
ting the Loita and their chief laibon Senteu against the Purko and Olonana.  
 
The onset of colonial rule 
The involvement of British and German colonial forces was decisive for the outcome of 
this double conflict. The British, unaware of the details of the conflict and having met 
Olonana first, conveniently interpreted Olonana’s position of chief laibon as one of 
overall chief with political authority over all Maasai. By promoting him to the salaried 
position of ‘paramount chief’ in 1901, they made his position official and integral to the 
emerging colonial administration (Waller 1976: 541, 542, 543, 1995: 37; Hughes 2006: 
16; Mungeam 1970: 131). An informal alliance between Olonana and the British al-
lowed Olonana to widen his sphere of authority and ultimately defeat Senteu (Waller 
                                                 
39  Berntsen (1979: 135-137) reports that by the 1890s ‘due to natural population increase and adoption 
within the lineage, the Inkidongi had extended their grazing areas to all sites of Mt Meru as far north 
as Mt Longido and Ol Doinyo Orok lol Matapato (Namanga) and east as far as Ol Molog high on the 
west slope of Mt Kilimanjaro’.  
40  Senteu belonged to the Iltalala age-set and Ngabual to the Iltuati age-set. 
41  Letutui’s account bears a striking resemblance to Waller’s (1978: 218, 262-267, 1995) historical 
reconstruction of how the Inkidongi spread from their homeland in the Sikirari sub-section of the 
larger Kisongo section, i.e. the Mt Kilimanjaro area and from Mt Meru stretching north to Oldoinyo 
Orok (Namanga), Mount Longido and the Meto hills, to all corners of Maasailand. See also Berntsen 
(1979: 135-136, 138). 
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1976: 542, 544).42 The Olonana-British alliance determined the outcome of the War of 
Morijo. By 1895, Olonana had secured assistance from the British should Senteu and 
his raiding Loita enter British territory (Ibid.: 545). The Loita warriors had been active 
on German territory but, unlike the British, the Germans decided to fight the Maasai 
rather than form an alliance with them (Waller 1976: 545-546, 1988: 82), attacking 
Loita in Ngorongoro (Ibid.: 77n) and driving them northwards into British territory 
(Waller 1976: 546). Loita’s former allies in the south, i.e. the Kisongo and the Arusha, 
also started to raid the Loita (Waller 1988: 81, 1976: 540; Anacleti 1977 in Galaty 
1993: 72). Squeezed between various hostile powers, ‘the Loitai began to crumble, and 
Purko raiders and German patrols reduced the herds and drove the people away from 
their main grazing and settlement areas’ (Waller 1990: 93, 1988: 93; Lamprey & Waller 
1990: 21). Senteu and the weakened Loita, having lost many warriors (Waller 1988: 
103), finally surrendered to the Olonana-British alliance in 1902 (Waller 1976: 540, 
541, 548). The intersectional clashes of the War of Morijo ended with this surrender. 
The defeat of the Loita marked the end of Loita Maasai expansion. 
The surrender of the Loita and their chief laibon Senteu happened in July 1902 when 
a group of Loita, including Senteu, and some Damat supporters capitulated to Olonana 
and the British at Ngong (Waller 1976: 540, 548, 1988: 81).43 Senteu was housed near 
his half-brother Olonana under strict British supervision (Waller 1976: 548, 1995: 37). 
By this time, the heavily defeated Loita had been dispersed and were living widely scat-
tered. Those who came with Senteu to Ngong had followed their captured stock 
(Hughes 2006: 35), others lived on the Mara and Serengeti Plains, and still others in the 
Loita Hills (Waller 1990: 93; Lamprey & Waller 1990: 21). In the years following 
1902, the Loita slowly regrouped and returned to the Loita Hills and the seasonally used 
Loita Plains to rebuild their community and herds there (Waller 1990: 95, 1988: 85). 
After living at Ngong for a while, Senteu also moved back to Loita and established a 
new Inkidongi community in Kisokon around the Olngarua swamp adjacent to the 
Naimina Enkiyio Forest. This is Mokompo’s account of how Senteu came to settle per-
manently in Loita:  
Then Olonana found the white men [i.e. the British] and because he was the boss, the white men 
talked to him. And they were all living in the highlands of the Enchorro e Muny (lit. ‘the spring of the 
rhino’ in the Ngong Hills near Nairobi). The white men went to the other one [Olonana] to talk to him. 
Olonana started to sell land (enkop) to these Europeans and the other one [Senteu] asked him, ‘enta-
wuo,44 you want to sell the soil (enkulukuoni)?’ ‘Yes.’ And he was also strong so the bulls start 
fighting [again], and he answered, ‘yes, because it is mine’ because his people lived from there up to 
there on the other side. And that was his place. Because his people were living there. (...) Well, so it 
was true that he was selling [the land] so it was just like me and you fighting about me selling the land 
and you disapproving of it and these ones of your side don’t want the soil to be sold, so Senteu was 
                                                 
42  For the British, who were militarily weak in their initial phase of colonization, an alliance brought the 
benefit of befriending rather than antagonizing a still uncontrollable and powerful community that 
might sabotage the construction of the Uganda railway (Hughes 2006: 27), which ran right through 
Maasailand or, worse, rise up against the British (Waller 1976: 543, 547, 548). For a full account of 
the mutual benefits and intricacies of the larger Olonana-British alliance, see Waller (1976). In 
retrospect, the disunity of the Maasai made it considerably easier for the British to gain control in 
Maasailand.  
43  Two thousand people, including 260 Damat (Waller 1988: 81n). 
44  A form of address between elders who have given each other a heifer. 
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taken to a European court by Olonana. And during the case he [Olonana] was the only one who talked 
to the Europeans and he was asked, ‘so how do you want Senteu to be punished?’ And he said he 
wanted him to be jailed or to be resettled to where there was malaria so that all his children would die 
of the disease and the family of Senteu would cease to exist in Maasailand, ‘because he is a beast-of-
prey who kills a lot, so we need his fruits (entalipa, descendants) to be finished’ and that is what he 
told the leader. He [the leader of the Europeans] came to him [Senteu] and the white man told Senteu: 
‘Olonana said your fruit has to be finished, and it is your own brother who says so. Where do you 
want to be taken to, to be away from him, if you have [a place you want to be taken to] let us know, if 
you don’t, well, it is up to you.’ (...) Well, ‘so where do you want to go to?’ And this white man was 
afraid of Senteu so they were afraid, like Olonana they feared him, also this white men, so nobody 
was courageous enough when next to him, so they asked him where he wanted to migrate to. He said 
he wanted the land known as Kisokon, he was told ‘fine’, and he was brought up to this place known 
today as Kosika [near Narosura] and when he was brought he asked, ‘is it here?’ ‘Yes it is, I know 
now where I can live’ He was brought, even his cattle, so that he could be away from Olonana and 
when Olonana sold his land, I think you have seen the boundary that he made?45 So the white men 
went to that place, just imagine a place you sold to somebody, he will tell you to go away because it is 
not ours [anymore], that is when Olonana went and Senteu came up here to Kisokon.  
Nevertheless, Senteu became a powerful chief laibon (Waller 1995: 37, 48). The Ink-
idongi community in the Kisokon area of Loita is presently recognized as having the 
most powerful laibons in Maasailand.46 However, the Loita were never able to regain 
their previous hegemony over Maasai territory. They had lost forever their grazing lands 
on the Mara Plains (Waller 1990: 95; Lamprey & Waller 1990: 21). By 1905, the terri-
tory they controlled comprised only the Loita Hills and the Loita Plains. 
The 1905 and 1910-1913 Maasai Moves 
The Maasai prophet Mbatian (Mbatiany in Maa), father of Olonana, 
had foretold the arrival of the white man and the railway many years 
before. He had a vision of Europeans, represented by white birds, while 
the railway was seen as a great snake stretching from sea to lake. 
(Hughes 2006: 27) 
 
Mokompo’s account above attributes Senteu’s departure from Ngong to a dispute with 
his half-brother Olonana over land. Senteu strongly disapproved of Olonana’s moves to 
‘sell’ land to the British. This refers, without doubt, to negotiations between Olonana 
and the British to set aside parts of Maasailand for white settlement. The British practice 
of dealing with ritual leaders that they had appointed to the administrative position of 
‘chief’ as if they were landlords was common in colonial Africa (Colson 1971: 200). It 
was part of a larger colonial state project of making people and land legible (Scott 1998) 
(see Chapter 4). Olonana’s collaboration in the process of land alienation had much to 
do with his desperate attempts to maintain his acquired political power over the Maasai, 
an authority that was increasingly being challenged by secular leaders. Hughes (2006: 
                                                 
45  Olonana is said to have miraculously made a boundary between Maasailand and the land given to the 
white men. At Maai Mahiu, a small town in the Rift Valley on the Nairobi-Narok road, this boundary, 
which can be seen on the eastern Rift Valley escarpment as a straight line, was repeatedly pointed out 
to me by Loita Maasai lifters. Hughes (2006: 137) also talks about this boundary.    
46  Loita laibons are still visited by individuals and delegations from far afield. In 2001 I saw a large 
group of Laitayok warriors passing through Entasekera on their way back to Tanzania from a visit to a 
laibon in Kisokon. In that same year, Matapato Maasai from Kajiado visited Sanya ole Simel, 
presumably to collect protective charms for their eunoto ceremony. 
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41), for instance, refers to a private meeting between Olonana and Governor Girouard in 
1910 at which they apparently struck a deal: Olonana would be recognized as the sole 
paramount chief in return for his cooperation in initiating a second Maasai move to va-
cate prime land for white settlers. It would thus seem that the position of paramount 
chief was, to use Mokompo’s discourse, Olonana’s ‘payment’ for ‘selling’ the land. 
In the years to come, the Maasai, particularly the Purko, would lose prime pasture 
land in the Central Rift Valley, and later also in Laikipia, to white settlers. Pre-colonial 
Maasailand north of the international border is calculated to have been approx. 55,000 
km2 (Rutten 1992: 177). After the agreements (or treaties) of 1904 and 1911 that the 
British made with the Maasai, ‘the only [ones] of its kind made with an ethnic group in 
British East Africa’ (Hughes 2006: 208), that expropriated them of large tracks of valu-
able land, the Maasai would keep an area of almost 38,000 km2 (Rutten 1992: 182), a 
reduction of about 30%.47 Compared to other ethnic groups in East Africa, the Maasai 
lost the most land to the British (Hughes 2006: 105; Rutten 1992: 182, 187). They also 
lost access to their best lands: superb, well-watered and disease-free pastures in a pleas-
ant cool climate (Hughes 2006: 105-132; Rutten 1992: 182). Although the Loita did not 
lose land to white settlers, they did suffer the consequences indirectly when dispos-
sessed Purko settled in the area. 
 
The first Maasai Move (1905) 
The coming of the Uganda railway was instrumental in the run-up to the Maasai Moves 
in three ways (Rutten 1992: 173; Hughes 2006: 27, 31). First, it cut Maasailand in two 
which, in a sense, created ‘northerners’ and ‘southerners’. Second, to recover some of 
the costs of its expensive construction, the British administration actively tried to attract 
white settlers to the East Africa Protectorate.48 Third, the white settlers could access the 
(future) White Highlands more easily, thanks to the route the railway took. It should be 
noted, however, that the opinions of the Foreign Office (and later the Colonial Office) 
in London,49 and the colonial administration in the East Africa Protectorate differed. 
The former was concerned with preventing land speculation (Rutten 1992: 173, 177), 
land accumulation (Hughes 2006: 26) and the protection of native rights to land (Rutten 
1992: 175, 181; Hughes 2006: 30, 32), the latter was solely interested in creating an 
attractive environment for settlers at any cost regardless of the natives’ needs (Rutten 
1992: 174-175). During colonial rule, the colonial administration would side more than 
once with the growing settler community and act independently of London on issues 
concerning land (Hughes 2006: 26, 30-33, 38-42; Rutten 1992: 175, 177-178). Commis-
sioner Eliot set the stage when he made large tracts of land available and offered fa-
vourable legislative regulations for settlers (Ibid.: 173-175). The declaration that all 
‘waste and unoccupied lands’ would be Crown Land made this possible (Matter 2010b: 
                                                 
47  Hughes (2006: 208) puts the total land loss after the Maasai Moves much higher, at between 50 to 
70%. 
48  The construction of the railway had cost £5.55 m and was completed in December 1901 (Rutten 1992: 
173). 
49  The Colonial Office took over the administration of the British East Africa Protectorate from the 
Foreign Office in 1905, changing, amongst other things, the status of commissioner to governor 
(Rutten 1992: 177; Hughes 2006: 25).  
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99-100; Rutten 1992: 19; Hughes 2006: 25).50 After limited interest initially, increasing 
numbers of applications for land were soon filed and settlers – a mix of Boer and British 
South Africans, English and Anglo-Irish aristocrats and adventurers – started to move to 
the East Africa Protectorate (Rutten 1992: 175; Hughes 2006: 27). The most coveted 
lands were often occupied by Africans but, with the backing of the strongly pro-settler 
colonial administration, these were nevertheless made available for white settlement 
(Rutten 1992: 174). In this way, the agricultural Kikuyu inhabiting the area north of 
Nairobi, for instance, lost about 60,000 acres of land to white settlers between 1903 and 
1906 (Sorrensen 1968: 180 in Rutten 1992: 174). 
 
 
Map 3.3 Masai Reserves, 1906 
 
Adapted from Hughes (2006) 
 
                                                 
50  The first Crown Lands Ordinance 1902 allowed settlers to obtain 99-year leases and the possibility of 
selling/buying land up to 1000 acres per parcel. The acquisition of more than 10,000 acres was only 
possible after official approval by the Foreign Office (Rutten 1992: 174; Hughes 2006: 25-26). 
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After initially focusing on land around Nairobi, interest was soon directed further in-
land to the rich pasture lands of the Rift Valley (Rutten 1992: 175). Lord Delamere, a 
rich British aristocrat and the first to apply for a major land grant in the Rift Valley, was 
given a concession of 100,000 acres with a 99-year lease in the heart of Maasailand in 
the Nakuru area in November 1903 (Ibid.; Hughes 2006: 27-28).51 What to do with 
Maasai who claimed but because of their transhumant pastoralism did not continuously 
occupy these ‘uninhabited’52 lands soon became a topic of discussion between those 
who argued for mixed occupation of lands by Maasai and white settlers, like Commis-
sioner Eliot who felt that only in this way would the Maasai’s ‘beastly, bloody system, 
founded on raiding and immorality’ (quoted in Sorrensen 1968: 76 in Rutten 1992: 175; 
see also Hughes 2006: 3) cease to exist and the Maasai would ultimately be ‘civi-
lized’.53 Another group of officials, including Bagge, Jackson and Hobley, wanted to 
save the noble savage from western influences (Hughes 2006: 28-30, 31; Rutten 1992: 
175-176).54 Advocates of the latter argued for a separate settlement and called for the 
creation of a Maasai reserve (Ibid.: 175), an idea that was taken up by the new commis-
sioner when Eliot had to resign (Hughes 2006: 33-34; Rutten 1992: 176).  
Apart from initial Maasai complaints (Hughes 2006: 35), the negotiations went 
through relatively easily thanks to Olonana’s supportive stance. ‘Olonana, who had 
been salaried by the British since 1901, had already agreed to both move and treaty in 
advance of the meeting’ and later, when giving reasons as to why the Maasai did not 
rise up against the forced moves, Hughes (2006: 35) wrote ‘[t]hey could not resist with-
out Olonana’s sanction’. The British and Maasai leaders reached agreement in August 
1904 (Rutten 1992: 177). It is unclear, however, whether the Loita were also part of the 
agreement: ‘[t]he Loitai were said to be represented, but none actually put their mark to 
this document’ (Hughes 2006: 34). The treaty stipulated that the Purko, Loita, Keekon-
yokie, Damat and probably Laitayok55 Maasai would move to a northern reserve on the 
Laikipia Plateau and the Kaputiei, Matapato, Loodokilani and Sikirari to a reserve south 
of the railway in the Ngong-Kajiado area (Ibid.: 34; Rutten 1992: 177). Both reserves 
were planned for outside the Central Rift Valley (Ibid.: 176; Hughes 2006: 34) and thus 
dispossessed the Maasai of their best grazing lands. The land ceded became Crown 
Land and was then legally available for appropriation by white settlers (Ibid.: 25).56 The 
official Maasai area now comprised 24,000 km2, including two extensions to the north-
                                                 
51  Lord Delamere became an important advocate of settler’s interests: ‘his motive was the European 
monopoly of the highlands’ (Hughes 2006: 28; but see also Rutten 1992: 177).  
52  Hughes (2006: 23-24) discusses how the writings of early visitors to Maasailand describing 
‘uninhabited’ and resourceful highlands suitable for white settlement deeply influenced later colonial 
views and the administration of Maasailand.  
53  This quote comes from a secret, confidential letter from Commissioner Eliot to the Foreign Office in 
London dated 9 April 1904 (Hughes 2006: 3, 31-32, 193n; Sorrensen 1968: 76 in Rutten 1992: 176). 
The letter was not well received by the Foreign Office (Rutten 1992: 176; Hughes 2006: 30). 
54  See Hughes (2006: 28-30) for a detailed account of this debate.   
55  Rutten (1992: 177) talks about Loitatok and Hughes (2006: 34) about Laitutok. In fact, they could 
both be referring to Laitayok or Loitokitok Maasai, but probably to Laitayok. 
56  Crown Land was defined as ‘all public lands [i.e. unoccupied land] which for the time being are 
subject to the control of His Majesty by virtue of any Treaty, Convention, or Agreement, or of His 
Majesty’s Protectorate’ (Hughes 2006: 25 emphasis added). 
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ern reserve that would be made within two years (Ibid.: 36). This compared negatively 
with the 55,000 km2 of land that the Maasai once controlled. 
The creation of Maasai reserves and the movement of Maasai to the reserves did not, 
however, mean that there were no Maasai outside the reserves (Hughes 2006: 35; Wal-
ler 1984). The Loita, for instance, who appear not to have taken part in the negotiations 
that theoretically bound them to move to the northern reserve, still lived in Loita (the 
Loita Hills and the Loita Plains), an area that was not included in the newly created re-
serves (Waller 1990: 95; Lamprey & Waller 1990: 21; Hughes 2006: 35) (see Map 3.3). 
Their presence there was tacitly accepted (Waller 1990: 95; Lamprey & Waller 1990: 
21). However, despite the fact that that they did not undergo the distress of a forced 
move themselves, they did so indirectly and experienced the consequences of the treaty 
with the arrival of the Purko in the area.  
 
The second Maasai Move (1910-1913) 
The first Maasai Move was particularly bitter for the Purko who lost access to Maa-
sailand’s best pasture lands around Lake Naivasha and Lake Nakuru. In return, they 
were offered the relatively inferior Laikipia Plateau that, it turned out, could not ac-
commodate increasing numbers of animals and people (Hughes 2006: 36-37; Rutten 
1992: 177). Opinions among Purko leaders varied about whether a move to the north 
was in fact the best option (Waller 1990: 95). About a third (a quarter according to 
Sandford 1919 in Hughes 2006: 35; Hughes 2006: 106) of the Purko community refused 
to move north and decided instead to cross the Mau Forest and go south onto unclaimed 
grazing land between Narok and Mosiro (Waller 1990: 95; Lamprey & Waller 1990: 
21). The Loita Plains lay just across the Ewaso Ngiro River and it was not long before 
Purko herders started to cross it. These Purko intended ‘to follow up the Loitai defeat 
and to replace them south of the Mau’ (Waller 1990: 95). The Loita, still recovering 
from their defeat in the War of Morijo, started to lose ground to the Purko. By 1909, 
some 2000 Purko were sharing the Loita Plains with 4000 Loita (Waller 1990: 95; 
Lamprey & Waller 1990: 21). The arch-enemy of the Loita had become their closest 
neighbour – and their biggest threat. 
As a result of the continuous influx of new settlers demanding land, the British once 
again approached Olonana in January 1909 to discuss the annulment of the northern 
reserve and the possibility of moving the Maasai that inhabited the area to an extended 
southern reserve to open up the Laikipia area for white settlement (Rutten 1992: 178). 
To the surprise of the British, Olonana, who had remained in Ngong, consented because 
he apparently wanted to reassert his then-dwindling control over the spatially divided 
Maasai, and especially over the northern Maasai (Hughes 2006: 37; Rutten 1992: 178; 
Mungeam 1970: 133). British colonials faced a problem though. The 1904 agreement 
stated that the Maasai would be allowed to keep the lands in their reserves ‘for so long 
as the Masai as a race shall exist’ and the Colonial Office in London was especially 
committed to keeping this promise (Hughes 2005: 218; Hughes 2006: 34), insisting 
when talks about a second move began that coercion was out of the question (Ibid.: 62). 
As a result, no transfer of the Maasai from Laikipia could be done openly: ‘the Colonial 
Government made it look as if the removal of the Maasai from the Laikipia area was 
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solely the result of the wish of Olonana and his people’ (Rutten 1992: 179). For Gover-
nor Girouard, ‘it was a measure of the utmost delicacy. Girouard had to abrogate the 
1904 Masai Treaty and pretend to the Colonial Office that the Maasai wanted to move 
south. At the same time he had to disguise the fact that he was acting in the interests of 
the settlers, some of whom had been promised land on Laikipia’ (Sorrensen 1968: 126 
in Hughes 2006: 41; see also Mungeam 1970: 133).  
The opportunity arose when the Purko living in the south were barred from travelling 
to Kinangop in 1909 because of an East Coast Fever quarantine (Rutten 1992: 179; 
Hughes 2006: 41). Kinangop, southwest of the Aberdare mountain range, was an im-
portant ceremonial site and the British had conceded that they would set aside 5 square 
miles on the Kinangop Plateau for ceremonial use during the 1904 negotiations (Rutten 
1992: 177; Hughes 2006: 41). The Purko from the south were preparing to join their 
fellow northerners to hold their eunoto ceremony there (Rutten 1992: 179). Olonana 
manipulated the situation and demanded that the northern Maasai should proceed to the 
south for the ceremony at Ngong instead (Hughes 2006: 41; Rutten 1992: 179), and 
called at the same time for a pan-Maasai regrouping in the south (Ibid.). Girouard took 
his cue from Olonana (Hughes 2006: 61) and ‘[w]ithout waiting for a formal treaty or 
Colonial Office sanction, Girouard began moving the Maasai south in early 1910’ 
(Ibid.: 41). A big trek southward that would mark the start of the second Maasai Move 
commenced in April 1910, but it was not until three years later that the move was com-
pleted, after considerable resistance from some Maasai leaders and interventions from 
the Colonial Office in London that had been warned about the situation by white pro-
Maasai whistle-blowers (Ibid.: 43, 45-55, 60-67, 71-76, 77-84; Rutten 1992: 179; Wal-
ler 1990: 95). Olonana died in March 1911 and his final message was that ‘the (Laikip-
ia) Maasai had to obey the Government and should move with their cattle to the Loita 
Plains in the south’ (Rutten 1992: 180; see also Hughes 2006: 49). This was ingeniously 
(mis)used by Governor Girouard to convince the Colonial Office in London of the legit-
imacy of the Maasai community’s wish for the move and to pressurize Olonana’s suc-
cessors to sign the treaty (Rutten 1992: 180; Hughes 2006: 49). In fact, many elders 
who disagreed with it had been forced to accept it. For instance, ole Gilisho, one of the 
elders opposed to the move, only agreed to leave Laikipia after being threatened with 
deportation and imprisonment in Europe (Rutten 1992: 180; Hughes 2006: 45). Indeed, 
it would appear that this second move could have only been achieved using substantial 
force on the part of the British. It is alleged that threats and intimidation at gunpoint 
were used, but not torture and murder as is sometimes claimed (Hughes 2005: 207, 210, 
221; Hughes 2006: 55, 58, 66, 73, 76, 99). A second Maasai treaty was officially signed 
in April 1911 and the last Maasai living in Laikipia arrived in the southern reserve by 
April 1913 (Rutten 1992: 180, 181).57 
  
                                                 
57  Small Maasai communities still live in Laikipia. 
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Map 3.4 Masai Reserve, 1916 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Hughes (2006) 
 
 
For the Loita, the second treaty meant that their territory now officially belonged to the 
new Maasai reserve in the south. The extension to the west included the Loita Hills and 
Plains, the Mara Plains and later also Trans-Mara (Waller 1984: 257). It was made to 
accommodate the incoming Maasai from the northern reserve (Rutten 1992: 180).58 
Following the southward trek for the eunoto ceremony, 10,000 head of cattle had 
already reached the Narok area by 1910 (Hughes 2006: 36). That same year, some of the 
Keekonyokie families that had remained around Naivasha also arrived in the south and 
settled on the Loita Plains (Sandford 1919: 27 in Hughes 2006: 35, 194n). These recent 
                                                 
58  First an area of approx. 14,600 km2 including the Loita and Mara Plains and the Loita Hills was 
annexed, to be followed by an area of 2,300 km2 in the adjacent Trans-Mara region (Rutten 1992: 
180). A final extension of 580 km2 was granted near the Mau Narok region (Ibid.: 182). Additional 
extensions were made to the east of the southern reserve (Ibid.: 180, 182). In the end, the Maasai 
reserve covered 38,000 km2 (Ibid.: 182). 
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immigrants were joined by 10,000 Maasai (mainly Purko) whose herds had more than 
tripled in Laikipia and now numbered 200,000 cattle and 550,000 sheep (Sandford 
1919: 36 in Rutten 1992: 181; Hughes 2006: 36). They soon started to take over western 
Maasailand: ‘[t]he Purko, spreading outwards from where they had been brought by the 
Moves, occupied the largest area, stretching south and west from Narok to the Mara 
River and the Loita Hills and across the border into Tanganyika [former Tanzania]’ 
(Waller 1990: 96). The arrival of the second wave of Purko in the area forced the Loita 
to retreat into the Loita Hills and to leave the Loita Plains for good. Surrounded by the 
numerous Purko on the northern and western sides, the Loita continue even today to 
experience pressure on their land from the politically well-represented and expanding 
Purko section. 
Conclusion: the waxing and waning of Loita territorial control 
A bird’s eye view of the Rift Valley region following the lives of the Maasai and their 
ancestors there in high speed motion would use one word, namely movement, to charac-
terize the period between 900 AD and 1913. This involved the north-south immigration 
of early Maa speakers to the Central Rift Valley (approx. 900-1700) and the outward 
expansion of Maa-speaking groups (±1550 to ±1800) during the formative period of the 
Maasai; the gradual differentiation and spread of Maasai sections to the north and south 
and to the plains and plateaus east and west of the Rift Valley; the massive mobilization 
of warriors from all Maasai sections to defeat the Laikipiak in 1875; the criss-crossing 
movements of raiding parties and fleeing victims during the intersectional conflicts fol-
lowing the decade of the Disaster (1883-1892); the gradual regrouping after this period 
of warfare ended in 1902; and, finally, the forced Maasai Moves (1905, 1910-1913) 
under British pressure in the early colonial period. 
Tracking the trajectory of the Loita section in this history of movement highlights a 
surprising alternative to the more commonly documented Purko version of events. The 
Loita appear to have been quite a dominant and assertive section not only in western 
Maasailand during the period of Maasai expansion but also during the subsequent inter-
sectional fighting towards the end of the nineteenth century. Loita raiding parties went 
as far south as the Ngorongoro Crater in present-day Tanzania, and they went west until 
they reached the western Maasai periphery along the Siria Escarpment. They crossed 
the Rift Valley to the east in search of cattle on the eastern plateau, chased fleeing Maa-
sai up to Nairobi in the north, and descended again to the Rift Valley attacking Purko in 
the Nakuru-Naivasha corridor. Loita’s successful cattle-raiding was only brought to an 
end by the intervention of the British and German colonial forces. The alliance between 
Olonana (the chief laibon of the Purko) and the British was instrumental in the defeat of 
the Loita, who were led by Senteu, Olonana’s rival half-brother. The outcome of this 
turbulent period had lasting effects for the Loita who would never regain their earlier 
hegemony over other Maasai sections. 
The rise and fall of Loita Maasai hegemony was matched by changes in the territory 
they occupied and controlled. Before the Disaster that started in 1883, Loita controlled 
the pastoral resources of the Loita Hills, the Loita Plains and large parts of the Mara 
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Plains. The neighbouring land was occupied by the Damat in the northeast, the Siria in 
the far west and the Laitayok Maasai in the southwest (Lamprey & Waller 1990: 20). 
During the period of intersectional raiding (1891-1902), Loita settlements extended as 
far as the Serengeti Plains in Tanzania (Ibid.: 21) and to the Ngorongoro Crater in the 
south (Waller 1988: 77n, 81). The Sonjo occupied the Nguruman Escarpment at the 
same level of latitude as Lake Natron. After the Loita were defeated by the Purko-
British alliance at the turn of the twentieth century, they retreated to the Loita Hills and 
Loita Plains, losing the rest of the formerly occupied land. Their control over the Loita 
Plains, however, was soon challenged when large numbers of Purko arrived in western 
Maasailand after the British-enforced Maasai Moves of 1905 and 1910-1913. Purko 
steadily pushed the Loita from the Loita Plains forcing them to withdraw into the Loita 
Hills. The steep escarpment at Narosura marked the natural boundary between the Loita 
on the Loita Hills and the Purko on the Loita Plains. The Purko then spread westwards 
onto the Mara Plains and southwards encircling the Loita to the north and the west. 
Loita territory in Kenya covered the Loita Hills and more or less stabilized at this point, 
comprising just a fraction of the area that they had had in their heyday.  
This chapter has described the emergence and gradual consolidation of the Loita 
Maasai as a separate social unit that came to be identified with a specific territorial area 
in the Loita Hills and a particular lineage of laibons (Senteu’s branch of the Inkidongi 
family). It also considered how pastoralism, as a mode of subsistence, and the age-
group system were essential parts of Maasai expansion and Maasainess. How these 
practices continue to be important markers of Loita Maasai identity in spite of radical 
transformations will be discussed in Chapters 7 & 9. Present-day territorial relations 
with neighbouring Purko (and Sonjo) have their roots in past hostilities that had more to 
do with cattle-raiding and laibon rivalries, and less with territory and land. The arrival 
of colonial forces in East Africa was decisive in the way the hostilities were played out. 
British colonial intervention shaped the new meaning these hostilities would acquire. 
The Maasai Moves brought the numerous and growing Purko section closer to the 
Loita, giving a new territorial and land-based twist to their already-existing animosity. 
Chapter 8 investigates how this enmity and sectional territoriality still persists today. 
After the Maasai Moves, the Loita continued to face territorial pressure from the 
Purko and, over time, they would also lose control of the northern Loita Hills, i.e. the 
highland plain called Osupuko. Holding on to the southern Loita Hills and the Naimina 
Enkiyio Forest, some Loita moved to the grazing lands in the south across the Tanzani-
an border, when their herds started to grow again (Waller 1990: 96, 98; Lamprey & 
Waller 1990: 22): ‘[b]y the late 1920s, up to half of the section was settled semi-
permanently in Tanganyika, together with most of the remaining Laitayok’ (Waller 
1990: 96). This southward orientation, the natural barriers such as the Naimina Enkiyio 
Forest and the Nguruman Escarpment to the east and the Narosura Escarpment to the 
northeast, and the hostile Purko to the north and west formed a geographical and socio-
territorial buffer between the Loita Maasai of Kenya and the developing centres of Ken-
yan colonial rule around Nairobi. This double buffer would combine with colonial dis-
interest to weaken and slow down (colonial) state intervention in Loita. How all this 
would play out with respect to land and leadership is the topic of the next chapter. 
 
 
 
4 
Seeing Loita: State interventions  
of legibility (1908-1965) 
This chapter examines governmental interventions by the emerging colonial state that 
shaped and transformed leadership and land issues in Loita. It traces how the introduc-
tion of the positions of ‘PA chief’ and ‘councillor’ by the state articulated with existing 
leadership positions and gave rise to what are called ‘double authorities’ here. The term 
‘double authority’ (or occasionally ‘triple authority’) is used here as shorthand to refer 
to the accumulation of two forms of authority in one social figure. This should not be 
confused with the ‘double structure of authority’ found in West Africa between immi-
grant chiefs with political authority and autochthonous earth priests with ritual authority 
(Luning 2010, 2007). Double authority is a phenomenon that has persisted until the pre-
sent and is relevant to an understanding of the forest conflicts (Chapter 8). This chapter 
also shows how different land categories were introduced in Loita as new boundaries 
were drawn in the colonial period. ‘The categorization of land in the colonial period had 
far-reaching effects upon the development of local tenure’ (Colson 1971: 209). Chapter 
9 will discuss how one of the new land categories, namely the ‘location’, has become 
the backdrop against which certain strategies of land appropriation have been devised 
by Loita Maasai families and reflects changing tenure practices. 
The conceptual focus in this chapter is the idea of ‘legibility’ (see Chapter 2), as ad-
vanced by James Scott in Seeing Like a State (1998). The concept is used here to exam-
ine the articulations and effects of colonial state interventions in Loita after the War of 
Morijo ended in 1902. After playing a key role in the pacification and stabilization of 
Maasailand by aiding Olonana and the Purko to defeat Senteu and the Loita, the British 
could then turn to the task of establishing order and building up an administrative state 
structure. To accomplish this, the various Maasai groups needed to be known and the 
lands they inhabited had to be mapped. This chapter discusses how, in the process of 
identifying and mapping, the lands and people in Loita were gradually made legible to 
the Kenyan colonial state.  
State practices that increase legibility involve state simplifications (Scott 1998). 
These categorize and bring order to a complex and dynamic socio-environmental reality 
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so that state officials can manage, tax and govern their people. Administrative legibility 
in colonial Kenya was seen as a necessary step in asserting political control. Control, 
and not necessarily legibility, was the ultimate aim: legibility was more a means of at-
taining this goal. The early colonial state of Kenya, in the form of an institution called 
Provincial Administration, thus attempted to make the newly acquired territory and its 
diverse population legible for administrative purposes of order and control. State simpli-
fication in the process involved attaching and mapping ethnic groups (‘tribes’) with ter-
ritories (‘tribal’ areas) and appointing ‘native authorities’ to represent and administer 
these ethno-territorial units as part of their strategy of indirect rule. In Loita, such inter-
ventions of legibility and simplification happened in stages. From 1908 onwards, Loita 
Maasai started to be appointed as ‘headman’ and, two decades later in 1928, after some 
redrawing and renaming, the boundaries were finally drawn that demarcated an ethno-
territorially based administrative unit called the Loita Location. New leadership posi-
tions and land categories defined the way state power started to be experienced in Loita 
during the colonial period. In 1955 when the position of PA chief was first accorded to 
the Loita, the process of making Loita legible was accomplished. The first section of 
this chapter describes this process and its implications.  
The second section introduces another state institution, namely Local Government. 
Local Government, like Provincial Administration, introduced its own leadership posi-
tions (the councillor) and its own land categories (the county and later the ward). As 
Local Government developed later than Provincial Administration, its interventions of 
legibility were calibrated against those of Provincial Administration. For example, 
counties came to cover the same area as districts, and all the PA chiefs in a district 
would automatically become a member of the council of the coterminous county. This 
early institutional interlacing became less strong and Local Government developed as a 
separate state institution with its own government and administration structures that ran 
parallel to those of Provincial Administration. Local Government actually challenged 
the monopoly on government held by Provincial Administration in the early colonial 
period. The second section of this chapter focuses on the struggles and tensions between 
Provincial Administration and Local Government by reviewing their interlinked histo-
ries of formation. By historicizing the state and exploring state formation, two distinct 
elements are shown. First, the state is not a unified and homogeneous entity but consists 
of separate state institutions that may (or may not) develop in competition with each 
other (Hansen & Stepputat 2001: 7; Geschiere 2007: 130). And second, indigenous 
leadership structures, though traditional in appearance, are in fact deeply affected by 
processes of state formation (Geschiere 1993). A detour into the institutional formation 
of Provincial Administration and Local Government is necessary to appreciate the posi-
tion of Loita’s PA chiefs and councillors in the Kenyan state apparatus. It also shows 
that, in their competition for the right to govern, each state institution had its own pro-
jects to make leadership and land legible. 
The final section of this chapter wraps up the issue of legibility by summarizing how 
Provincial Administration and Local Government categorize land in Loita today. 
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Governing the margins 
Uneven state interest and the correspondingly uneven intensity and frequency of state 
interventions across the colony are recurrent themes in this chapter (and elsewhere in 
this thesis too) and merit some additional consideration. Fixated as the colonial authori-
ties and the white settlers were on the economic potential of Kenya’s prime agricultural 
land, interest and interventions were most prominent in the country’s agricultural areas. 
Consequently, colonial activity was most effective (from the point of view of the state) 
and most developed in these areas. For example, among the agricultural Kikuyu, coloni-
al officials succeeded in creating strong collaborationist PA chiefs, while they failed in 
this respect among the Maasai pastoralists living on economically unattractive semi-arid 
lands (Berman 1990; Mungeam 1970; Tignor 1972). The declaration of the northern and 
southern Maasai reserves as ‘closed districts’ in 1906, which was meant to control out-
siders’ access to Maasailand, created another barrier that further distanced the Maasai 
from political and economic developments elsewhere in colonial Kenya (Rutten 1992: 
178; Hughes 2005: 26, 210; Tignor 1972: 274). In Maasailand, a similar pattern can also 
be seen. Maasai sections closer to the developing centres of the state (i.e. Nairobi and 
along the railway line) such as the Purko and the Kaputiei would experience more state 
influence than sections further afield like the Siria, the Damat and the Loita. From the 
point of view of state officials at the centre of colonial rule, Loita was on the periphery 
of the colony, geographically isolated on the country’s southern border with Tanzania. 
In a situation where the colonial authorities were focusing their powers on the agricul-
tural highlands in central and western Kenya, Loita, on the farthest side of the pastoral 
lands of Maasailand, was not a top priority. Encounters with the state were significantly 
fewer in number in Loita than in Purkoland, and even fewer when compared to those in 
the agricultural highlands of Kenya. In other words, to the state, Loita was both eco-
nomically and geographically distant. 
As a consequence, only the new leadership positions and land categories were intro-
duced to Loita in the colonial period as part of the larger colony-wide project of estab-
lishing an administrative structure for indirect rule. Elsewhere, these were introduced 
swiftly and their arrival was followed up with more intense and intrusive state interven-
tions made possible by their legibility. For example, the social landscape of the agricul-
tural areas of Kenya was drastically altered. Changes also took place in Loita but were 
of a different order. The fact that it was spared most of this post-legibility attention and 
intervention gave Loita’s leaders political space to manoeuvre and negotiate their rela-
tionship with the state. This situation echoes some of the dynamics highlighted in Chap-
ter 2 which discusses Scott’s The Art of Not Being Governed (2009). We saw there how 
distant and unreachable Zomia gave its inhabitants the room they needed to respond 
politically to emerging states in the valleys wanting to incorporate and control them by 
devising social practices to avoid this.1 Although the timeframe, the scale and the con-
textual situation is different in Loita, partly because Loita was already administratively 
                                                 
1  Scott (2009: 8) calls this a ‘state effect’. His use of the term should not be confused with Trouillot’s 
(2001) definition of ‘state effects’, which is very different. Trouillot’s ‘state effects’ are basically the 
same as Li’s (2007a, 2007b) ‘governmental effects’ in spite of the fact that Trouillot retains the word 
‘state’.  
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integrated in the colonial state, some parallels can be drawn between Loita and Zomia. 
Loita, like Zomia, was still somewhat distant and marginal in relation to the state and, 
like Zomia’s population, the Loita too responded politically, resisting attempts by the 
state to govern it more closely. 
An issue related to the intense state presence and control in the agricultural areas is 
that the literature on the colonial state has shown a tendency to be based almost entirely 
on its role in the agricultural areas of Kenya (see Berman 1990). As a result, there is an 
important academic lacuna when it comes to the role of the colonial state in the pastoral 
areas of Kenya. Those authors that have explored the relationship of the colonial state 
and the pastoral Maasai either show a strong Purko bias, especially for the pre-colonial 
and early colonial period, as already noted in the previous chapter, or focus on the de-
velopments in Kajiado District, and not on Narok District that incorporates Loita (see 
Rutten 1992).2 
Making Loita legible (1908-1955) 
 
The emergence of double (and triple) authorities 
As elsewhere in British and French colonies, colonial state officials sought to incorpo-
rate native authorities that were imagined to be the political heads of distinct territorial 
‘tribes’ so as to exercise indirect rule through them over the African population (Bier-
schenk et al. 2002: 11-16; Geschiere 1993; Spear 2003; Berry 1992). In Kenya, howev-
er, where centralized indigenous political structures were lacking in ethnic groups in 
most cases, native authorities were almost entirely creations of the colonial state (Ber-
man 1990: 209; Klopp 2001: 42-43; Tignor 1971; Mungeam 1970; Berry 1992: 332). 
Over the years, different categories of native authorities would emerge (Berman 1990: 
212). The highest-ranking category was the ‘paramount chief’ who was considered to 
rule over a whole ‘tribe’. His territorial jurisdiction encompassed the administrative 
units of a ‘reserve’ or ‘district’. Next came the ‘divisional chiefs’ who were in charge of 
three or four ‘locations’. PA chiefs were responsible for locations. Some PA chiefs were 
categorized as ‘senior chiefs’ and received a higher salary. Finally there were the 
‘headmen’ who represented villages or groups of villages. The land-based categories of 
district/reserve, division, location and (groups of) villages would form the basis of to-
day’s administrative units of district, division, location and sub-location in Provincial 
Administration. 
In their quest for native authorities, colonial officials appointed men who claimed to 
be traditional leaders while in fact they were not,3 or men who only had authority over 
parts of the ‘tribe’ (such as clan or lineage chiefs) or whose authority was more ritual 
than political (like laibons). Colonial administrators tried, for example, to appoint Luo 
clan heads as PA chiefs in Central Nyanza District while in North Nyanza District they 
                                                 
2  The overwhelming research attention given to the Maasai of Kajiado District and not to the Maasai of 
Narok District has also been noted by Holland (1996: 2-3, 357 n. 1) who warns of ‘the dangers 
involved in generalizing across Maasailand on the basis of what has been discovered in Kajiado 
District’. 
3  The Kikuyu PA chief Kinyanjui is one such famous case (Mungeam 1970: 137-139). 
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mistakenly recognized the hereditary chief of a Luhya sub-group, the Wanga, as chief of 
all Luhya and appointed him as the paramount chief of this (mainly) Luhya district 
(Berman 1990: 210-211). 
Something similar happened among the Maasai as well. As has already been noted, 
colonial officials appointed the chief laibon Olonana to the position of ‘Paramount 
Chief of all the Masai’ (cited in Mungeam 1970: 131), elevating him to a salaried status 
in 1901 (Waller 1976: 543, 1995: 37; Hughes 2006: 16). They believed that, apart from 
his ritual powers as diviner, he also held political power like an overall Maasai chief or 
even a Maasai sultan (Waller 1976: 541; Hughes 2006: 13, 35), a belief that Olonana 
did not rectify but nurtured as it suited his ambitions of consolidating and extending his 
authority (Waller 1976: 542; Mungeam 1970: 131). Among the Maasai, however, his 
ritual and political authority was a point of contention at the time of his appointment. 
Olonana’s father Mbatiany had been able to extend his ritual authority as chief laibon of 
the Maasai to exert political influence in Maasailand (see Chapter 3). The ritual and 
political authority he had consolidated in the position of chief laibon started to break 
down after his death when his two sons, Olonana and Senteu, claimed to be his rightful 
heirs. Maasai sections were also divided, with the Purko and other allied sections recog-
nizing Olonana, and the Loita and their allies supporting Senteu. Even the Germans in 
Tanzania were drawn into taking sides: they regarded Senteu and not Olonana as chief 
of the Maasai (Waller 1976: 546). With his ritual and political authority challenged, it 
was in Olonana’s interest to convince the British of his paramountcy. This would ‘help 
[him] against Senteu and … strengthen … his own position through access to new re-
sources of political power’ (Waller 1976: 542, 545). Waller concluded that, ‘[u]naware 
of his true position in Maasai society, the British took Olonana’s claims to paramountcy 
in the British sphere at face value and by supporting them turned his claims into reality’ 
(Ibid.: 542). 
The belief that Olonana ruled the Maasai might have come from a misunderstanding 
about the relationship between the laibons and warriors that stemmed from the time 
when the British used (mainly) Purko Maasai warriors in punitive expeditions against 
other ethnic groups and rewarded them with livestock (Waller 1976). Olonana was often 
approached to recruit warriors for these expeditions (Ibid.: 536, 543) and the initial suc-
cess of this practice might have fed the British idea that Olonana was a commander of 
the Maasai warriors, very much in the way that a king is the commander-in-chief of a 
country’s military forces. During the turbulent times of cattle-raiding in the Iloikop 
Wars and the War of Morijo, laibons and warriors had indeed passed through a phase of 
rapprochement (see Chapter 3). However, the relationship between a particular laibon 
and a specific group of warriors was not exclusive and depended on the success of a 
raid. If a relationship with a laibon soured or proved unsuccessful, warriors could turn 
to another laibon for protection and guidance (Waller 1978: 241) or simply raid inde-
pendently. A laibon is thus not in control of a private warrior army (Ibid.) and neither is 
he the commander of a Maasai military force. The closest to a commander is in fact the 
age-group chief. An example provided by Waller (1976: 544) shows that Olonana’s 
control was indeed precarious: 
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One ol aigwanani [age-group chief], ole Kordillo, had led a raid into German territory in defiance of 
Olonana and the British. The British confiscated stock and exiled ole Kordillo. He, however, gathered 
a group of discontented murran in Loitokitok and began to raid independently and beyond the control 
of Olonana or the British. 
That Olonana did not exert the authority that the British thought he had over warriors 
(and over the Maasai as a whole) became increasingly clear by 1911. Some British offi-
cials had already directly contacted age-group chiefs about joining punitive expeditions 
with their age-mates (Waller 1976: 536, 550). And it had also been observed that warri-
ors would only join British troops if they fought under the command of their own age-
group chief in a separate column (Ibid.: 536, 549). The British started to bypass Olo-
nana and to deal directly with the age-group chiefs and the leaders of the ruling age-
group that they now recognized as the proper sectional leadership, reducing Olonana’s 
influence both with the British and among the Maasai (Ibid.: 542, 551). Leaders of the 
governing age-group had slowly regained their authority over sectional affairs after the 
War of Morijo. Previously, in the period of social disruption and warfare that followed 
the Disaster (i.e. the cattle epidemics of bovine pleuro-pneumonia and rinderpest, the 
human smallpox epidemic, droughts and famine) in the late nineteenth century, they had 
lost control of their sections, and particularly over the warriors (Waller 1988: 93). Lai-
bons had in fact been able to extend their authority in this period by sanctioning warri-
ors’ cattle raids when this political niche became available (Waller 1978) but with the 
return of peace, they started to lose ground again to the leading elders.4  
This tug-of-war between elders and laibons over political power slowly dawned on 
the British. The 1904 agreement that consented to the first Maasai Move was signed by 
20 Maasai, 12 of them age-group chiefs, and this ‘implicitly recognized the authority 
and representativeness of the age-set spokesmen [age-group chief]’ (Hughes 2006: 34; 
see also Waller 1976: 551). Recognition of the authority of age-group chiefs was made 
more explicit when an attempt was made to integrate all the age-group chiefs of a sec-
tion, i.e. the chiefs of all existing age-groups per section, into the emerging administra-
tive structure by formally appointing them as headmen. This early state attempt speaks 
of a deep understanding of the nature of the authority of the age-group chief but,5 due to 
its complexity (and hence illegibility), it would soon be abandoned. The appointments 
of native authorities to official positions was announced in the state’s official gazette. 
The Official Gazette of the East Africa Protectorate of 13 January 1915 thus officially 
recognized ole Moti, the age-group chief of the Iltareto age-group in Loita who was in 
the warrior age-grade at the time (Berntsen 1979: 141; Waller 1995: 47), as exercising 
‘jurisdiction over the Loita Muran in the Masai Reserve’ (see Figure 4.1). Ole Moti was 
one of the first Loita Maasai to occupy two positions of authority at one time: one de-
rived from the Maasai age-group system and the other was vested in the colonial state. 
                                                 
4  This seems to be an alternating pattern. Waller (1978) explains how laibonism itself rose as the Iloikop 
Wars progressed in the mid-nineteenth century. Not only their ritual role for cattle-raiding gained 
importance but their ritual importance also spread as the Inkidongi dispersed all over Maasailand from 
their homeland near Mount Meru in Tanzania.  
5  The jurisdiction of each headman matched the actual jurisdiction of the age-group chief who occupied 
this position. Chapter 6 discusses how the jurisdiction of an age-group chief is defined by the social 
boundaries of, first, the section to which the age-group chief belongs, and second, the particular age-
group he belongs to.  
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His double authority combined the position of age-group chief of the Iltareto with that 
of headman in the developing Provincial Administration. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Appointment of age-group chiefs as headmen  
 
Source: http://books.google.co.ke/books?id=B-8XaUA-
AZIC&printsec=frontcover&hl=nl&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=fals
e accessed 16/9/14. 
 
 
The new focus on appointing age-groups chiefs rather than laibons to positions of au-
thority is instructive in another way too. It shows how new state policies and regulations 
were only partially implemented in Loita, while among their neighbouring Purko, who 
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were much closer to the colonial centre, they were put into effect more fully. Figure 4.1 
shows how six age-group chiefs were appointed among the Purko to the position of 
headman, clearly identifying and naming the different age-groups and their areas of 
jurisdiction,6 while only the age-group chief of the warriors at the time was identified 
and appointed headman for Loita. The age-group leadership description for the Loita 
lacks the same detail as that for the Purko. This indicates that the British were much 
more familiar with or interested in the age-group leadership of the Purko than in that of 
the Loita. This would become a pattern characterizing Loita Maasai history with regard 
to state interventions. Policies and regulations targeting the Maasai in the colonial peri-
od and development programmes and schemes after independence would be implement-
ed in Loita much later, partially or even not at all, shaping the form and character of 
subsequent articulations with governmental interventions. Distance and geographical 
barriers, the Purko socio-territorial buffer, colonial economic disinterest and Loita’s 
southward orientation all shaped this persistent pattern. 
Returning to the story of the British and the appointment of the laibon Olonana as 
paramount chief of the Maasai, the British continued to recognize Olonana’s young son, 
Seggi, as paramount chief of the Maasai following Olonana’s death in 1911 (Hughes 
2006: 13, 37, 49, 90). This was administratively convenient. His position offered the 
advantage of a single focal point through which they could attempt to govern the Maa-
sai as a whole.7 However Seggi had ‘inherited his father’s official position but little of 
his authority’ (Waller 1995: 37). And in 1918 or 1923, depending on the source (Rutten 
1992: 183 or Waller 1995: 59 n. 28), the office of paramount chief was finally abol-
ished. 
For the same reasons as the position of paramount chief, the positions of PA chief 
and headman were maintained. It was much easier to deal with a single agent in a loca-
tion or a (group of) village(s) than with the age-group chiefs of a section or a council of 
elders of the governing age-group. Rather than acting upon their understanding of the 
complexity on the ground, colonial officials knowingly decided to simplify matters. 
And in the process of simplification, Maasai leadership was transformed. Men with tra-
ditional authority positions were still the first choice for appointments to the positions of 
PA chief and headman, which resulted in a rise in the phenomenon of double authori-
ties. Waller (1976: 547) mentions how Jackson, a British official in Uganda, supported 
a ceremonial age-group leader (olotuno) who at the same time was an age-group chief 
for the position of PA chief.8 In Trans-Mara, the laibon Toroni became the PA chief of 
the Siria (Waller 1984: 256). But perhaps the most famous case is ole Gilisho, a Purko 
age-group chief, who was appointed PA chief of Naivasha and became a central politi-
                                                 
6  Early colonial officials identified age-groups with the word ‘section’. This is different from the use in 
this thesis of the term ‘section’ as a socio-territorial sub-group of the Maasai, and should not be 
confused. 
7  The same happened with the Kikuyu. ‘In Kenya, by 1914, they [i.e. the British] had collected enough 
information to realise that the Kikuyu, before colonisation, had had no chiefs but had been governed 
through councils. None the less, administrative necessity persuaded the British to establish local chiefs 
and to rule through them’ (Tignor 1971: 342). 
8  The border between Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate initially split Maasailand – just like the 
border between the East Africa Protectorate and Tanzania did – but was later moved westwards. 
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cal figure in Narok District until the late 1930s (Hughes 2006: 21-22; Waller 1976: 
550). Where traditional authorities were uncooperative or seen as problematic by the 
British, they simply appointed men who did not have local leadership positions but ap-
peared to be collaborative. One example is the ‘self-appointed spokesman and ex-
government retainer’ Lembere, who became the headman of the Uas Nkishu Maasai at 
Ravine (Waller 1984: 262). 
 
The creation of Loita Location 
At the same time that headmen and PA chiefs were being appointed in Maasailand, the 
territorial jurisdictions that they were going to administer were being defined; villages 
or group of villages in the case of headman and locations in the case of the PA chief. 
These administrative units fitted into a larger, developing administrative structure of 
(groups of) villages, locations, divisions, districts/reserves and provinces that ‘were le-
gally created to correspond to a Russian doll image of descending “tribal units”’ (Klopp 
2001: 61) and that would form the core of Provincial Administration. The idea behind 
the demarcation of these areas was to create ‘neatly self-contained and ethnically de-
fined administrative units’ (Ibid.: 63). 
The administrative boundaries in Maasailand were based on the territorial occupation 
of Maasai sections (Waller 1990: 23).9 Maasai everywhere started to respond to this 
new framework in an effort to secure land and native authorities for their own sections. 
In the process, formerly fluid sectional identities (and also ethnic identities on a larger 
scale, see Waller 1978: Ch. 4) became more rigid and inextricably linked to fixed terri-
tories. This was especially evident among those Maasai communities on the periphery 
of Maasailand whose identities were ambiguous and open to interpretation because of 
their close links to neighbouring non-Maasai people. Waller (1984: 261) described how 
the Uas Nkishu were initially granted a reserve of their own in 1905 outside the Maasai 
reserve, only to be later forced to move southwards to the southern Maasai reserve that 
the British saw as their appropriate ‘tribal’ place. The Uas Nkishu, which had first been 
seen as a separate ‘tribe’, came to be defined as a ‘sub-tribe’ of the larger ‘Maasai tribe’. 
The closely related Moitanik were eventually also moved to the southern Maasai reserve 
but followed a different path. They were refused their own reserve from the start and, 
when this failed, they agitated unsuccessfully ‘for a separate location and chief of their 
own’ (Ibid.: 264, 266).  
The Loita did not face the same challenges as the Uas Nkishu and the Moitanik did, 
securely located as they were at the heart of Maasailand and thus being indisputably 
recognized as Maasai. They were also well known in colonial circles, having been pre-
viously identified as the principal Maasai section supporting Senteu in his vendetta 
against Olonana, and as the main cause of the streams of refugees coming into Fort 
Smith seeking protection after cattle raids (see Chapter 3). They were recognized fairly 
early on as a separate Maasai section that warranted its own headman and its own terri-
torial administrative unit. The first person in Loita to be appointed was ole Kashu (‘Ol 
                                                 
9  By focusing on the Maasai, the colonial authorities ignored the existence of the hunting and honey-
collecting Dorobo and Ogiek who lived dispersed in the region, thereby subsuming their forest 
territories under the Maasai sections to whom the land was allocated (Matter 2010b: 82-88).  
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Lekashu’ in the early archives), who became headman of the Loita group of villages in 
the ‘Naivasha and Southern Masai Reserve’ in 1908 (KG 1908: 338). The appointment 
of ole Kashu as headman was the first step towards making Loita legible. If this was 
indeed the same ole Kashu that Waller (1995: 47) describes as the age-group chief of 
the Iltalala age-group (Mol 1996: 13), then he was the first Loita Maasai to occupy two 
positions of authority, namely age-group chief and headman, setting an important prec-
edent for future double authorities in Loita.10  
All headmen in the reserve fell under the authority of one (paramount) PA chief, 
namely Olonana (KG 1908: 338). Olonana, by virtue of his position as PA chief, stood 
between the Loita headman and the British authorities and mediated their interactions. 
So the Purko not only formed a physical buffer isolating the Loita from the colonial 
centre around Nairobi in terms of territorial occupation. Through the hierarchy of au-
thority introduced by the colonial state, the Purko, who monopolized the position of PA 
chief, also acted as a political layer between the colonial authorities and the Loita. 
The first native authority appointment recognized the Loita as a social grouping rep-
resented by a headman but did not yet tie them definitely to a specific area. The focus 
on villages might not have posed a problem in settled agricultural communities but it 
did not fit well among the pastoral and mobile Loita Maasai. It should also be remem-
bered that this period, which was marked by displacements following the 1905 and 
1910-1913 Maasai Moves and their confinement to the Maasai reserves, was a time of 
great upheaval and mobility that resulted in a rearrangement of sectional territories as 
new sections arrived in the southern reserve, as well as a redrawing of colonial adminis-
trative boundaries. The Loita were caught in a weak, vulnerable position. After their 
defeat by the Olonana/Purko-British alliance, they regrouped in the Loita Hills and on 
the Loita Plains where they concentrated on building up their herds again. With the arri-
val of the more numerous Purko who had closer links to the colonial authorities in the 
north after the first Maasai Move, they started losing ground on the Loita Plains. Even-
tually the Loita retreated to the Loita Hills. It was at about this time, after the second 
Maasai Move, that the district and location boundaries started to be drawn in Maa-
sailand. The Maasai reserve was divided into Narok District and Ngong District (which 
was later renamed Kajiado District) in 1913 (Rutten 1992: 183). And in 1915, the land 
in the reserve legally acquired the status of Crown Land.11 Locations started to appear in 
official documents shortly afterwards. Ole Kashu’s area of jurisdiction changed from 
being ‘the Loita group of villages’ to the Loita L’Atayok and Salei Location in 1918 
and included the sectional territories of the three Maasai sections living in the area at the 
time, namely the Loita, Laitayok and Salei (KG 1918: 329).  
Loita became a separate location in 1928 (KG 1928: 510) and after ole Kashu retired 
as headman in 1929,12 the chief laibon Senteu was appointed headman of the area (KG 
                                                 
10  He would also become a councillor in 1925 in the newly established local native council for Maasai 
Province, holding in effect a triple authority. 
11  The 1915 revised Crown Land Ordinance extended the definition of Crown Land to all land in the 
Protectorate, including the lands occupied by and reserved for Africans (Matter 2010b: 101; Rutten 
1992: 181-182; Hughes 2006: 26).  
12  Ole Kashu was succeeded by ole Kubain in 1925 (KG 1927: 106) who held this position for a short 
period until Senteu took over the position of headman in 1929. 
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1929: 1320). At this time, Loita’s sectional territory coincided with Loita Location and 
was firmly bound and identified with the southern Loita Hills. Sectional territorial 
boundaries were not supposed to change anymore. Loita Location was defined as the 
appropriate and exclusive place for the Loita Maasai, tying the Loita Maasai section to 
the territory that they occupied at that time in a context where sectional identity was 
more fluid and territorial use and occupation fluctuating (see Chapter 3). In 1938, the 
legal status of land in Loita, along with all land in the Maasai districts, was reclassified 
from Crown Land to Native Land held in trust by the state and to be governed according 
to customary law (Matter 2010b: 108-111; Rutten 1992: 187).13 This definition of Na-
tive Land with its affirmation of customary tenure and its idea of land held in trust by 
the state is important because it continued to apply after independence under a new 
name, namely Trust Land (Matter 2010b: 111).14 
For state administrators, the Loita were now socio-territorially defined. However, 
although they were granted a location of their own, they still lacked the position of PA 
chief that supposedly went with their administrative unit. The reason why this anoma-
lous situation (i.e. the combination of a location with a headman rather than a PA chief) 
remained unchanged for more than 25 years is unclear. From the perspective of the cen-
tral state, this meant that even though the Loita were now incorporated in the system, 
they still remained politically distant. The situation of indirect ‘indirect rule’ would per-
sist for as long as the political layer embodied in a Purko PA chief remained in place.  
 
A PA chief of their own 
Senteu is another example of a double authority in Loita. He was the chief laibon for a 
number of sections, including the Loita, and also a headman in the colonial state. Sen-
teu’s case is interesting because he seems, or his sons seem, to have tried to apply rules 
of succession that pertained to the position of chief laibon to the position of headman. 
Senteu’s position as chief laibon endowed him with ritual authority in Loita Maasai 
society and his position as headman added to this a political authority vested in the 
state. His double authority undoubtedly made him an influential man in Loita. After 
Senteu’s death in 1933/1934 (Mol 1996: 363; Berntsen 1979: 138), his leadership func-
tions were divided between his sons. One of them, Simel ole Senteu, inherited the posi-
tion of chief laibon and another, Kone ole Senteu, became the head of the lineage of 
Senteu (Enkang e Senteu, House of Senteu), a more political position (Voshaar 2012 
personal communication). And yet a third son, Sangweyan or Sankoiyan, seems to have 
inherited the position of headman (Waller 1995: 46). After Sangweyan/Sankoiyan’s 
sudden death in 1938 (Ibid.; KG 1938: 899), a string of Inkidongi and non-Inkidongi 
Loita became headman until the position of headman was later abolished.  
  
                                                 
13  With the 1938 Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance and the 1938 Native Lands Trust Ordinance.  
14  See Matter (2010b: 99-113) for the historical transmutations of Crown Land, Native Land and Trust 
Land. See also Klopp (2001: Ch. 2). 
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Photo 4.1 Kone ole Senteu, painted by Joy Adamson 
 
Source: Adamson (1967: 299) 
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The state-vested leadership position accorded to the Loita was upgraded in 1955 
when they finally got their own PA chief (KG 1955: 615). This suggested closer incor-
poration into the state apparatus and a more direct relationship with it. Senteu’s son 
Kone, who as head of the House of Senteu had established himself as Loita leader, be-
came the first official chief of Loita Location (KG 1955: 615). Kone’s double authority 
combined the position of PA chief and leader of the House of Senteu and he also ap-
pears to have been a much-consulted laibon.15 The state project of mapping and match-
ing tribal units (the Loita Maasai section) to administrative areas (the Loita Location) 
and appointing a native authority (the PA chief) through which to rule the Loita was 
now complete. Further adjustments would be made in the future but at this point the 
Loita Maasai and the territory they inhabited had been made administratively legible to 
the colonial state. 
Embodied contradictions (1956-1965) 
Kone would occupy the office of PA chief for almost two decades until his retirement in 
1973 (Kronenburg 1986: 278 n. 75), a decade after Kenya’s independence. By virtue of 
his position as PA chief, he also became a Loita councillor in the new African District 
Council of Narok (KG 1956: 759, 810; KG 1959: 1033; KG 1960: 408; KG 1965: 1467; 
KG 1966: 715), the forerunner of the present-day Narok County Council. Prior to this, 
Loita headmen had also been councillors (like ole Kashu, see note 10) but his case is 
exceptional because he would hold the position of councillor for about a decade from 
1956 to 1965. In that period, he had, in effect, a double state authority combining the 
positions of PA chief and councillor. Such a double state authority would never occur 
again in Loita.16 In addition, Kone also held authority in Loita as a laibon and as the 
leader of the House of Senteu and became a key political figure in Loita during the latter 
part of the colonial period.17 He was a highly esteemed leader, something that not only 
derived from the leadership positions he occupied but also because of the role he played 
vis-à-vis the state and other outsiders. With the political Purko layer out of the way, 
Kone, as PA chief and councillor, now became the main link between the Loita and the 
state. This role as intermediary, a position he monopolized during the colonial period 
and possibly afterwards as well, would largely determine the nature and character of 
interaction between the Loita and the state, a topic that is touched upon here and there in 
this section but will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
This section takes Kone’s two state positions as a point of departure to explore how 
they fitted in the colonial state as it developed over time. The positions represented dif-
ferent state institutions, namely Provincial Administration and Local Government, and 
each had their own ways of making people and land legible. The state institutions were 
involved in a tug-of-war concerning control and authority over the governing of various 
                                                 
15  During Senteu’s tenure as chief laibon, for example, Kone had ritually directed and blessed small-
scale cattle raids by warriors, for which he received a five-year prison sentence from the British 
(Berntsen 1979: 144 n. 11; Waller 2010: 611 n. 114).  
16  Although Kone’s successor as PA chief, the non-Inkidongi Alfred ole Meipuki, would hold these 
positions successively. He would become a PA chief first and later on a councillor in Loita.  
17  Not only in Loita but also at the district level by virtue of being a member of the District Agricultural 
Committee (KG 1961: 1250; KG 1962: 327).  
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areas of the colony. Their processes of formation and development were, therefore, in-
tertwined.  
  
The place of the PA chief in Provincial Administration 
The positions of PA chief and headman were the first state posts to be occupied by Af-
ricans in colonial Kenya. They were integral to the emerging state bureaucracy as the 
most local offices of Provincial Administration. Provincial Administration was set up in 
1900 after the British took over the territory from the Imperial British East Africa Com-
pany in 1895, which came to be known as the British East Africa Protectorate (Branch 
& Cheeseman 2006: 18; Stamp 1986: 23).18 Together with Central Administration, it 
became the core institution of the early colonial state.19 Its main function was to estab-
lish political control, initially by using conquest and ‘deadly force’ (Berman 1990: 204) 
towards the population of the newly acquired territory (Stamp 1986: 23). Exercising 
control and maintaining order would remain the main responsibilities of the Provincial 
Administration throughout the colonial period (Berman 1990) and beyond (Branch & 
Cheeseman 2006), a role that would be carried out in a typically paternalistic and au-
thoritarian way (Berman 1990: 104-115). To achieve control, the territory of the British 
East Africa Protectorate was divided into administrative areas, each headed by a central-
ly appointed officer in a hierarchy of command with the colonial governor, himself an 
appointee of the British government, at the top (see Figure 4.2). Provinces were the re-
sponsibility of provincial commissioners (PC); districts were run by district commis-
sioners (DCs) and divisions by district officers (DOs). All these positions were held by 
British officials. PA chiefs and headmen staffed the lower echelons of the Provincial 
Administration’s structure and administered locations and (groups of) villages respec-
tively. The men to occupy these positions were recruited from the local community and 
efforts were made to appoint native authorities, as was seen in the previous section. This 
hierarchical structure, which was set up fairly early on in the colonial period, continues 
more or less unchanged today although the governor was replaced by a president fol-
lowing independence.20 
The organizational structure of Provincial Administration was quite effective in that 
it became the arm of the central state and could reach out to all corners of the country. 
However, the effects of this ubiquitous state presence were varied, with much depend-
ing on the role played by the PA chief as he formed a crucial link between the state and 
the local people. 
 
                                                 
18  The British East Africa Protectorate became Kenya in 1920 when it was officially annexed as a British 
colony (Lonsdale & Berman 1979: 495). 
19  Berman (1990) identified Provincial Administration as the most important institution in the Kenyan 
colonial state. As such, his book on the development of the colonial state of Kenya offers an 
instructive and exhaustive history of Provincial Administration there. 
20  It is unclear for how long and in what form, Provincial Administration will continue to exist. Kenya’s 
new constitution has established a devolved system of government called ‘County Government’. The 
constitution states that Provincial Administration shall be ‘restructured’ in accordance with this new 
system of government (Constitution of Kenya 2010, Part 4, 17). This ‘restructuring’ is still in process.   
86 
  
Figure 4.2 Provincial Administration in colonial Kenya 
 
Adapted from Klopp (2001: 46) 
 
 
Kone as PA chief: an exception to the rule 
PA chiefs are generally portrayed in the literature on colonial Kenya as corrupt agents 
that collaborate with the state. These scholarly works are, however, based on the agri-
cultural areas in central and western Kenya surrounding the so-called White Highlands 
that were inhabited by white settlers (Berman 1990) and they focus in particular on the 
experiences of the Kikuyu (Tignor 1971; Mungeam 1970). PA chiefs were paid meagre 
salaries in relation to the unpopular tasks that they were expected to carry out, such as 
collecting taxes21 and recruiting unpaid communal labour and forced wage labour for 
white-settler estates (Tignor 1971; Berman 1990: 60-62, 66-67, 128-198, 205, 209, 212; 
Mungeam 1970: 129, 138-139). Backed by gangs of young men that they organized and 
that were initially entirely funded from their own means, PA chiefs were able to go be-
yond their official powers due to corruption and oppression (Tignor 1971; Berman 
1990: 212-214, 249 n. 36). PA chiefs thus came to dominate local political and judicial 
institutions, which primarily affected their adversaries and the most vulnerable members 
                                                 
21  PA chiefs formally collected taxes from 1901 until 1911 but continued to play an important role 
afterwards (Tignor 1971: 346). 
Headman 
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of the community (Tignor 1971: 341; Berman 1990: 213). Apart from advancing the 
interests of the colonial state, PA chiefs were also able to amass great wealth by using 
their new powers (Tignor 1971; Berman 1990: 212). The practice of using their power 
for their personal benefit lies behind PA chiefs being called ‘political brokers’ in the 
literature (Bierschenk et al. 2002: 11-16). During the period known as the Emergency 
(1952-1960), most of the PA chiefs actively sided with the colonial authorities to defeat 
the Mau Mau rebels. In fact, by being part of the security forces, such as the home guard 
units, the district tribal police and the tribal police reserves, they committed ‘[t]he worst 
abuses and violence against the civilian population’ (Berman 1990: 357-358). In addi-
tion, they participated in the brutal ‘rehabilitation’ programme for detainees (Ibid.: 359-
361) and in the ‘reconstruction’ programmes in Kikuyu society that aimed to reassert 
control of the ‘passive’ Mau Mau supporters in the reserves (Ibid.: 361-371). Unsurpris-
ingly, the PA chiefs and other ‘loyalists’ were the principal victims of the Mau Mau 
rebels (Ibid.: 337-338, 349, 352).22 They were rewarded materially by the colonial au-
thorities for their role during this violent period and given first access to any benefits 
from subsequent development and land reform programmes (Ibid.: 365, 368-369, 370-
371). During decolonization, they would also be rewarded politically. Political power 
was transferred to the group and members or supporters of the loyalists would ultimate-
ly come to dominate the top positions in the executive, the bureaucracy, the legislature 
and the Provincial Administration in independent Kenya (Branch & Cheeseman 2006: 
15, 17, 19-20; Branch & Cheeseman 2009: 6).  
The portrayal of colonial PA chiefs as corrupt and oppressive collaborators, which is 
based on research on more populous agricultural communities of central and western 
Kenya, does not extend to the pastoral areas of Kenya, like Maasailand.23 In fact, ac-
cording to Tignor’s (1971) very brief account of PA chiefs in Maasailand, the British 
failed to establish collaborating PA chiefs among the Maasai (Mungeam 1970: 140; 
Tignor 1972: 287), which is why social change in Maasailand was slow in comparison 
with, for example, the Kikuyu where the strong collaborationist PA chiefs served as 
agents of change. PA chiefs in Maasailand were unable or unwilling to enforce commu-
nal labour (Tignor 1971: 359; 1972: 287) or the payment of taxes (Mungeam 1970: 140; 
Rutten 1992: 224). The events mentioned above, i.e. the forced labour and the Emer-
gency, that contributed to the portrayal of PA chiefs as corrupt collaborationists appear 
to be of little significance in Maasailand, and even less so in Loita. One factor was 
Loita’s distance from Nairobi and the White Highlands where labour was needed. So 
too was their pastoral economy that was neglected by the Provincial Administration 
and, more generally, by colonial policy that focused more on the agricultural economies 
of central and western Kenya (Berman 1990: 219, 276, 296 n. 68). Only the rudimen-
tary structures of Provincial Administration were introduced in Loita: the position of PA 
chief and the accompanying demarcation of the location. These structures were not fol-
                                                 
22  The official casualty figures were 1920 ‘loyal’ Africans killed and 2385 wounded during the Mau Mau 
Movement. By contrast, only 95 Europeans and 29 Asians were killed and 127 and 48 were wounded 
respectively (Berman 1990: 352).  
23  The literature on the role of Maasai PA chiefs in the colonial period is scant. Apart from Olonana’s 
case, Tignor’s article (1971) and sporadic comments (for example, Waller 1984), very little, to my 
knowledge, has been written on the subject.  
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lowed by the emergence of collaborationist PA chiefs through whom coercive state 
measures and policies could be implemented. 
Distance and colonial economic disinterest in the area gave political space to the 
Loita. Rather than extending state control, Kone, the PA chief in Loita, seems to have 
used his intermediary position between the state and Loita to resist unwelcome state 
interventions. In this regard, Kone, as the official link between the Loita and the coloni-
al state, acted as an important gatekeeper. ‘Gatekeepers’ are a specific group of inter-
mediaries who use their room for manoeuvre to position themselves as a ‘screen’ be-
tween two worlds, guarding the entrance in both directions (Bierschenk et al. 2002: 14; 
Osborn 2003: 41). Kone’s gatekeeping practices had two important and related conse-
quences for Loita. First, it insulated Loita even more from state intrusion and, as a re-
sult, Loita retained a certain degree of political autonomy, allowing its leaders to con-
tinue governing Loita without much outside interference. It was thus a case where the 
legibility that the rudimentary structures accomplished was not followed up with effec-
tive state interventions, partly because Loita was far away and economically uninterest-
ing to the state but also because this distance and disinterest made it possible for Loita 
leaders, including the PA chief, to evade any unwelcome state interventions. 
The Loita would not be as affected by increased state intervention and accompanying 
state control as other Maasai sections closer to the new political centre for the duration 
of the colonial period (Voshaar 1998: 103). The Loita were also spared the new inter-
ventions the state started to implement in the name of development (see Chapter 5). 
Kronenburg (1986: 17) summarizes it as follows: ‘There was little inclination of the 
Loitas to invite outsiders for activities in their location and also the government had few 
incentives to get involved in development efforts in Loita’ due to its ‘relative physical 
and political isolation’. The same pattern seems to hold for the work of missionaries in 
the field of education. It was only towards the end of the colonial period that missionar-
ies started to introduce schools in Maasailand (Voshaar 1979: 257). In Loita at the time 
of independence, there was only one school, Morijo Loita Primary School, and it was 
run by African Inland Church missionary teachers (Voshaar 1998: 102). This was the 
only school in Loita until 1973 (LNECTC 1994: 2) and is apparently one of the oldest 
in Maasailand (Holland 1996: 12). The school was not very effective: it had few pupils 
and stopped functioning altogether during the Second World War (Ibid.: 12, 358 n. 12). 
King (1972: 406), who surveyed education in Narok District, saw Loita as ‘the most 
remote and least-schooled sector of the Maasai’. 
That Loita Maasai retained a degree of political autonomy and were able to negotiate 
state interventions is nicely illustrated by the case of Kone’s appointment as PA chief. 
Although it was officially the state that appointed him as PA chief, he had apparently 
already been nominated by the Loita to occupy this position (Kronenburg 1986: 17). 
Kone’s appointment was thus certainly not a one-way state action. The pattern in Loita 
seems to have been that the state would appoint a PA chief only after consulting the 
local people, a procedure that was practised at least until the late 1990s (Voshaar 1998: 
103). Although the Provincial Administration appointed PA chiefs to further the inter-
ests of the colonial state, the Loita appointed Kone to deal with the state in the interests 
of the Loita. From the point of view of the Loita, Kone was appointed to govern the 
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relationship with the state. Outsiders visiting Loita, such as missionaries or European 
travellers,24 who were associated with the same new ‘outside’ world from where the 
state hailed, always seem to have come into contact with Kone. This suggests that either 
they were referred and directed to Kone or they were approached by him directly. Kone 
seems to have been able to juggle this important intermediary and ambiguous position 
in favour of the Loita.25 He was a highly respected, charismatic and influential leader 
(Voshaar 1979: 80; 1998: 111; Kronenburg 1986: 17; Waller 1995: 42) and this seems 
to have been quite exceptional (Voshaar 1979: 80).26 Voshaar (Ibid.) and Tignor (1971: 
357) both noted that Maasai PA chiefs did not generally have much influence in their 
own communities. Today, people who knew Kone still speak positively about him and 
describe him as a good Loita leader who had the wellbeing of the section uppermost in 
his mind. Kone, and more widely the Inkidongi family to which he belonged, had a rep-
utation among state officials (Kronenburg 1986: 17) and missionaries (Voshaar 1998: 
110) alike for resisting outside intervention in Loita. He was by no means a collaborat-
ing PA chief. It is therefore quite remarkable that he was awarded a badge of honour by 
the governor in 1963 shortly before independence (KG 1963: 642) and that he remained 
in office for 18 years until his retirement in 1973 (Kronenburg 1986: 278 n. 75). 
 
Competing state institutions: Provincial Administration  
and Local Government in the colonial period 
Kone became a councillor because he was already a PA chief. The Provincial Admin-
istration, which was the arm of the central state in the countryside, in fact nominated 
Kone to become a councillor. Kone was a state-nominated councillor. This was indica-
tive of growing tension between the Provincial Administration and a newly emerging 
state institution, namely Local Government, that was starting to set up local authorities 
– or councils – all over the country from 1928 onwards.27 Seeing its authority chal-
lenged, the Provincial Administration attempted to keep the new government bodies 
under its control by nominating their own PA chiefs as council members. To understand 
the place of the councillor in the colonial state, it is necessary to look into the history of 
competition between Provincial Administration and Local Government in the colonial 
period.  
Until 1945, Provincial Administration was virtually the only state institution that had 
a consistent presence in the rural African areas of the colony and, as such, was a key 
                                                 
24  Like Joy Adamson (1967: 230-234, 299) who painted a portrait of him when she visited the area 
sometime after 1946 (see Photo 4.1). 
25  This was ambiguous in many ways. The state expected PA chiefs to be agents of the state 
implementing state policy as well as acting as ‘representatives’ and ‘spokesmen’ for their communities 
(Berman 1990: 209). The Loita Maasai also expected them to mediate state interventions but on behalf 
of the Loita. 
26  Even outsiders, like Adamson (1967: 234), noticed his powerful personality: ‘I could well imagine 
what power he could exercise over subjects less independent than myself, and how easily they would 
succumb to his forceful personality’. 
27  Both Provincial Administration and Local Government are based on European models of governance 
and were introduced by the colonizing state, namely Britain. For an illuminating study of the origins 
of the British model of Local government, its introduction in Kenya and its impact on Kenya’s 
political history, see Stamp (1986). Provincial Administration is based on a French prefectural system 
of governance (Berman 1990: 73-75). 
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link between the colonial state and the African people (Berman 1990: 432). The situa-
tion in the European-dominated urban and rural areas was different. Starting in the up-
coming urban centres from 1919 onwards and later extending to the districts that were 
settled by white farmers, Provincial Administration had to gradually cede some of its 
control to the municipal, town and district councils set up by white settlers that were 
increasingly being run by elected councillors and not by those nominated by the state 
(Stamp 1986: 23-24; Southall & Wood 1996: 503; Berman 1990: 84, 159). The fact that 
councils were ideally composed of locally elected members stood in sharp contrast to 
the top-down and hierarchically organized Provincial Administration that appointed its 
staff. Urban and district councils came to serve primarily the needs and interests of the 
growing European settler population, which often conflicted with state imperatives 
(Stamp 1986: 23; Southall & Wood 1996: 503). From the very start, tensions between 
the Provincial Administration and Local Government became evident. With the creation 
of the post of ‘Commissioner for Local Government’ in 1928, a forerunner to the Minis-
try of Local Government, Local Government started to establish councils all over the 
colony (Stamp 1986: 24). 
Having lost some of their control to Local Government in the urban and rural areas 
inhabited by white settlers, provincial administrators were determined not to lose their 
grip over the rural African areas as well by ensuring that they tightly controlled the (in-
evitable) formation of councils and their development in the African areas. The creation 
of ‘local native councils’ in 1924, as councils in the rural African areas were called, was 
more an instrument of co-optation and the containment of emerging African political 
activity rather than genuine and effective institutions of Local Government given their 
limited legislative and executive powers (Berman 1990: 216-218; Southall & Wood 
1996: 503-504). They were first introduced in politically sensitive districts, such as the 
largely Kikuyu district of Kiambu (Berman 1990: 216; Klopp 2001: 92). One way in 
which the Provincial Administration ensured control over the local native councils was 
by appointing PA chiefs and headmen as councillors.28 Kone was such a state-
nominated councillor. In the Local Native Council for Maasai Province, which was es-
tablished in 1925,29 for example, more than a third of the councillors were headmen and 
were all nominated by the central state, while the rest were nominated by Maasai at an 
open meeting (KG 1925: 506-507).30 When Narok District established its own local 
native council in 1935, there was one more state-nominated councillor (13) than elected 
councillors (12) (KG 1935: 1067). 
The half-hearted introduction of Local Government in the rural African areas did not 
prevent the emergence of the feared inter-ethnic colony-wide political associations in 
the mid-1930s. Provincial Administration reacted with harassment and repression 
(Berman 1990: 226-255). Nationalistic political activity halted for the duration of the 
Second World War with the detention of 22 African political leaders in 1940, most of 
                                                 
28  Another way was by endowing the DC with a key role in the local native councils (Southall & Wood 
1996: 504). The DC became the automatic chairman of the local native councils. He was also the chief 
executive of the councils (Stamp 1986: 23) and the person who prepared the council budgets (Berman 
1990: 216). 
29  The Maasai Reserve was renamed Maasai Province in 1924 (Rutten 1992: 187). 
30  Fourteen were nominated and twenty-two were elected.  
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them from the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups (Ibid.: 244). When political activity re-
started amid African unrest (Ibid.: 301-307), the colonial state responded by extending 
political participation to Africans in the late 1940s. They renamed the local native coun-
cils as African district councils and expanded their authority and responsibilities (Ibid.: 
301-307, 309-314, 329; Stamp 1986: 24; Southall & Wood 1996: 504). This was evi-
dent in the councils’ composition. For example, although Narok Local Native Council 
was not renamed the African District Council of Narok until 1956 (KG 1956: 475), 
Narok Local Native Council in 1947 had substantially more elected councillors (over 
two-thirds) than state-nominated councillors (KG 1947: 185). According to Berman 
(1990: 309-314) and Stamp (1986: 24), these concessions were part of a conscious po-
litical strategy to counter a resurgence of nationalistic political movements by attempt-
ing to contain African politics at a local level to limit their political access to central 
state institutions.  
Even at this local level, genuine political expression was highly constrained due to 
the strict control exercised by Provincial Administration over council activities (Berman 
1990: 310-312, 314).31 Discontent over this state of affairs resulted in a radicalization of 
African politics and eventually exploded with the emergence of the clandestine Kikuyu-
dominated Mau Mau Movement that advocated anti-colonialism and violence (Ibid.: 
322-338, 437-438). Provincial Administration responded with habitual rigidity and re-
pression, and the political struggle between African politicians and the state escalated 
and spiralled into violence. Most of the PA chiefs actively participated in the violence 
against their own people when a state of emergency was declared. The Emergency 
(1952-1960) heralded what Berman (Ibid.: 347) called the ‘renaissance of Provincial 
Administration’ when controlling the African population became imperative once 
again. 
The brief upsurge of Provincial Administration during the Emergency was not to last. 
The defeat of the Mau Mau Movement in 1956 did not subdue anti-colonialist senti-
ments and calls for independence among the African population. African nationalism 
resurfaced once again in 1955 at a time when political changes were being introduced 
on the initiative of metropolitan Great Britain in order to open up the central state insti-
tutions to African participation (Berman 1990: 378, 395-396). This period of political 
reform would see a decline in the status and authority of Provincial Administration 
(Ibid.: 378-379, 402). One of these reforms saw the unitary system of the state, of which 
the Central and the Provincial Administration were the backbone, broken up to form 
ministries of equal ranking, thereby ‘upgrading the status of the specialist and technical 
departments and reducing the Administration to the status of one department among 
many’ (Ibid.: 402). At the same time, reforms were also carried out to strengthen the 
autonomy of the councils in the African areas (Stamp 1986: 18, 22-25) and streamline 
the dual system in settlers’ and African districts (Southall & Wood 1996: 504). By 
1952, the district councils in the White Highlands had already been renamed ‘county 
councils’ (Stamp 1986: 24; Southall & Wood 1996: 503). African district councils be-
                                                 
31  Such as retaining veto powers over any measure passed by a council; restricting the election of 
undesirable individuals to councils; appointing a sizeable minority of members to councils; 
controlling council finances and preparing council budgets (Berman 1990: 310-312).  
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came county councils alongside the county councils in settlers’ districts. County coun-
cils were given the responsibility of providing primary education and public health ser-
vices, drawing up an electoral roll and acquiring revenue through a reformed tax system 
(Stamp 1986: 25). Most importantly, with independence, they acquired jurisdiction over 
and became legal trustees of Trust Land, as the old category of Native Land was re-
named (Matter 2010b: 111).32 In 1963, prior to Kenya’s independence, new regulations 
provided for a first tier of municipal and county councils with a second and third tier of 
urban area and local councils to cover the whole of Kenya (Stamp 1986: 24-25; Southall 
& Wood 1996: 504; Klopp 2001: 93). 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Local Government in 1963 
 
Adapted from Klopp (2001: 93) 
 
 
The new structure of government and administration shown in Figure 4.3 was added 
to the existing Provincial Administration structure and is still used today albeit in a 
slightly amended form.33 
The institutional arrangements made shortly before independence created two sepa-
rate and antithetical state institutions governing and administering the people of Kenya 
in parallel. Local Government was modelled on a form of government that was a direct 
challenge to the highly centralized and authoritarian mode of government of the colonial 
state, enshrined as it was in Provincial Administration. It proposed an alternative struc-
ture of government based on a number of ideals and principles: democratic and ac-
countable Local Government with a certain degree of autonomy from central govern-
                                                 
32  These legal reforms were at the root of the conflict with the Narok County Council over the Naimina 
Enkiyio Forest in Loita three decades later (see Chapter 8). ‘The Trust Land Act, which superseded the 
Native Lands Trust Ordinance at independence in 1963, practically reproduces the Ordinance, 
providing a similar nationally harmonized framework for land administration while maintaining the 
status of locally relevant “customary law” on all lands where the Ordinance still applied’ (Matter 
2010b: 111).   
33  As with Provincial Administration, it is unclear what the future will bring for Local Government in the 
context of the new 2010 Constitution. ‘All local authorities established under the Local Government 
Act (Cap. 265) existing immediately before the effective date shall continue to exist subject to any law 
that might be enacted’ (Constitution of Kenya 2010, Part 4, 18).  
Municipal Councils
Local Councils
Area Councils Urban Councils 
County Councils
Ministry of Local Government
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ment (Stamp 1986: 20-23). Local Government bodies were ideally comprised of locally 
elected officials called councillors who represent the needs and interests of their constit-
uents. The contrast with the other local state official, the PA chief, is telling. PA chiefs 
were centrally appointed, represented the interests and needs of the central state, fol-
lowed the instructions of their immediate superiors and were ultimately answerable to 
the governor. Although the two state institutions shared the same interests, i.e. govern-
ing the population of Kenya, their models of government were very different. Provincial 
Administration represented a centralized and authoritarian form of government that ap-
pointed its officials, while Local Government represented a local, more decentralized 
and (ideally) democratic form of government composed of elected officials.34 
For the duration of the colonial period, any institutional distinctions between Provin-
cial Administration and Local Government must have been devoid of meaning in Loita, 
embodied as they were in one and the same person. After independence, when Kone 
stepped down as councillor and the positions of PA chief and councillor came to be oc-
cupied by different persons, the difference between Provincial Administration and Local 
Government would gradually become clear as PA chiefs and councillors came to play 
different roles in Loita. Chapter 10 discusses how a PA (assistant) chief became in-
volved in a land dispute meeting and Chapter 8 considers how councillors were part of 
the politics surrounding the forest conflicts.  
Legacies of making land legible  
Whatever the ideological and practical differences between Provincial Administration 
and Local Government, they had similar ways of making people and land legible. Both 
institutions introduced a structure of authority that was linked to territorial jurisdiction. 
These structures also incorporated newly created offices representing the institution 
locally that would be occupied by local residents: the PA chief in the case of Provincial 
Administration and the councillor in the case of Local Government. Both institutions 
introduced new land categories that covered the whole Kenyan territory to go with these 
new leadership positions. In this respect, they (sub)divided the country into manageable 
geographical areas whose boundaries were, and sometimes still are, coterminous but 
often overlap and crisscross each other.  
The new land categories of Provincial Administration and Local Government were 
added and superimposed on an existing set of categories in Loita. The land category 
based on sectional territorial control, and discussed in detail in Chapter 3, belongs to 
this existing set. People in Loita are thus simultaneously part of a sectional territory as 
                                                 
34  During the colonial period, the tug-of-war between Provincial Administration and Local Government 
over the control and authority to govern the countryside displayed an alternating pattern: one state 
institution would grow in strength in one area (and thus succeed in putting forward its concerns), 
while the other would see its power and authority reduced, and vice versa. Since independence in 
1963 and up until 2013 when the new constitution came into effect, this alternating pattern created 
space for a regular unilinear pattern that would see Provincial Administration increasingly grow in 
strength to the detriment of Local Government. Provincial Administration would even acquire powers 
that allowed it to control and supervise Local Government authorities. This resulted in major 
consequences for their autonomy vis-à-vis central government. See Stamp (1986); Smoke (1993); 
Southall & Wood (1996); Horowitz (2008); Amadi (2009); Barkan & Chege (1989); Tamarkin (1978); 
Steeves (2006); Rutten (1990); Branch & Cheeseman (2009) and Klopp (2001: 80-101).  
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well as of a land unit that pertains to Provincial Administration and another belonging 
to Local Government. This section presents the shape of these colonially introduced 
land categories in Loita during field research. 
 
Seeing like Provincial Administration: Loita Division, locations and sub-locations  
Provincial Administration divides Kenya into eight provinces.35 From east to west and 
north to south these are: North Eastern, Coast, Eastern, Central, Nairobi (the city of Nai-
robi enjoys the status of a full administrative province), Rift Valley, Western and Nyan-
za. The provinces are then subdivided into numerous districts and these are in turn made 
up of divisions that are further broken down into locations. Locations may contain one 
or more sub-locations.  
 
 
Map 4.1 Loita Division 
 
Adapted from ole Saitabau (http://www.ipmpcc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/B-4-SAITABAU-Henry-Ole-lr.pdf 
accessed 18/11/14) and Narok base map  
(http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitar
ianresponse.info/files/Narok.pdf accessed 18/11/14). 
 
                                                 
35  As of 2013 when the newly devolved system of government came into effect, the category of 
‘province’ ceased to exist. 
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Loita, as a relatively small Maasai section, was initially accommodated in the small-
est administrative unit at the time, namely the ‘Loita group of villages’. Later when this 
category was abolished, Loita was subsumed in the Loita, L’Atayok and Salei Location, 
and eventually the land inhabited by the Loita became ‘Loita Location’. Various admin-
istrative changes would take place over the years and, by 1997, Loita Location had been 
divided into two locations (Morijo and Entasekera) that were part of Osupuko Division 
(Voshaar 1998: 103). The District Officer (DO) of Osupuko Division was based in 
Narosura, northeast of Loita at the foot of the Narosura Escarpment in Purko country. 
Of all the provincial administrators in Loita, only the PA chiefs and their assistants, who 
were all Loita Maasai, had a permanent presence in Loita. This changed in 1997 when 
the administrative status of Loita was upgraded to that of division.36 The former Loita 
Location became Loita Division comprising several locations.  
An important implication of the reclassification of Loita as a division was the arrival 
of a new kind of officer, the next one up in the hierarchy of Provincial Administration, 
the DO of Loita. The DO’s headquarters were constructed in Entasekera at the heart of 
Loita territory. Unlike PA chiefs, DOs are not recruited from the local community. Two 
DOs were posted to Loita during the field research for this thesis: one replaced by the 
other after his transfer and both were from Central Province and from the Kikuyu ethnic 
group. Thus with the arrival of the DO in Loita, a new leadership position was intro-
duced. It did not, however, come to be occupied by a local Loita Maasai but by a person 
without any social or cultural ties to the area.  
The arrival of a DO in Loita could have translated into closer state control. However, 
he was hardly ever in Loita during my field research visits there. The DO’s office and 
house were not far from where I lived and more often than not they looked deserted. In 
fact, both DOs were unhappy with being stationed to what they considered a remote and 
undeveloped area where they had never been before. And both actively sought a trans-
fer. The first DO actually managed to be transferred to another area in the middle of my 
field research period. So although the DO of Loita Division became the immediate su-
perior of the Loita PA chiefs and assistant chiefs, it was the latter who provided a con-
stant and consistent central-government presence in Loita. 
Loita Division comprises five locations: Morijo Loita, Entasekera, Ilkerin, Olorte and 
Olmesutie. Loita thus has five PA chiefs, one for each location. According to the 2009 
Kenya census, four of these locations are further divided into sub-locations: Morijo 
Loita and Olngarua Sub-locations (in Morijo Loita Location); Olorte and Mausa (in 
Olorte Location); Olmesutie and Imartin (in Olmesutie Location); and Nkopon and Il-
marae (in Ilkerin Location). Although every sub-location should, in principle, be admin-
istered by an assistant chief, this is not always the case in practice. For example, the PA 
chief of Entasekera Location, the only location that does not have sub-locations, still 
had an assistant chief. The official function of the PA chiefs and assistant chiefs is to 
                                                 
36  The political struggles that resulted in this administrative change are linked to the forest conflicts and 
are described in Chapter 8. 
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maintain order and control crime (Mbuba & Mugambi 2011). Loita Division is located 
in Narok District in the southwestern corner of Rift Valley Province.37 
Loita Division is still primarily inhabited by Loita Maasai but over the years as 
Purko Maasai continued their encroachment of the area, some parts of Loita Division, 
especially along the western and northeastern boundaries, have become settled by Purko 
families. Today, the administrative boundaries drawn by the Provincial Administration 
in the colonial period to parallel sectional territories no longer match the current spatial 
occupation of the Maasai sections in the region. Loita Division does not correspond 
with the actual territory occupied by the Loita Maasai. Voshaar (1998: 102) estimates 
that Loita territory comprises approximately 900 km2, including the Naimina Enkiyio 
Forest. Thus while Loita Division covers an area of 1676 km2 (according to the 2009 
Kenya Census), only about 900 km2 are actually occupied and controlled by the Loita 
Maasai. Apart from Purko, there are a handful of Somali and Kikuyu families living in 
Loita Division too. These non-Loita are confined to the trading centres where they run 
businesses: they do not use land for agriculture or pastoralism. Individuals from other 
ethnic groups, such as Kisi, Turkana and Samburu, are employed in schools, in the En-
tasekera Health Centre and in local NGOs, such as the Ilkerin Project, or they work as 
tourist guides. 
 
Seeing like Local Government: counties and wards 
There were four types of local authorities in the Local Government system during my 
field research. City, municipal and town councils covered urban areas,38 while county 
councils oversee the rural area of an administrative district that does not come under an 
urban council. The boundaries of counties are thus mostly coterminous with the Provin-
cial Administration district boundaries (Stamp 1986: 28; Southall & Wood 1996: 504; 
Smoke 1993: 903; Rutten 1990: 157). This dates back to the late-colonial period when 
the territorial jurisdictions of the reformed county councils were based on newly re-
drawn administrative districts (Southall & Wood 1996: 504). Loita is in Narok County, 
which falls under Narok County Council. The boundaries that delineate the area of ju-
risdiction of Narok County Council are exactly the same as those of Narok District. 
Narok District also has another local authority: Narok Town Council. So although the 
boundaries of Narok County and Narok District are coterminous, their areas of jurisdic-
tion are dissimilar. Narok County Council’s area of jurisdiction is the land area of 
Narok District minus the area of Narok Town. 
The area under the jurisdiction of a county council is divided into electoral areas 
called wards. During civic elections, which are held every five years at the same time as 
presidential and parliamentary elections, voters registered in a ward elect a councillor to 
represent them in Local Government. Elected councillors make up two-thirds of each 
local authority. The Minister of Local Government appoints the remaining third, who 
are known as ‘nominated councillors’. Sometimes unelected councillor candidates are 
                                                 
37  Narok District was briefly divided into two districts (Narok North and Narok South) in 2008 until the 
High Court outlawed this administrative change in 2009.  
38  The sole city council in Kenya was Nairobi City Council. There were 45 municipal councils, 62 town 
councils and 67 county councils. See www.localgovernment.go.ke accessed 20/11/12. Municipal 
councils covered large urban areas and town councils were in smaller urban areas. 
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co-opted by the elected and nominated councillors into the council. These councillors 
are ‘co-opted councillors’. City and municipal councils are headed by a mayor, and 
town and county councils by a chairperson who is elected by the councillors following 
local elections (CLGF 2009: 93). 
 
 
Map 4.2 Loita Wards 
 
 
 
Wards often have common boundaries with administrative locations. Between 1997 
and 2002, Loita had five wards that coincided with their five locations. So in that period 
there were five elected councillors in addition to the five PA chiefs in Loita (KG 1998: 
95-96). This was different from the situation prior to 1997 when Loita comprised only 
one ward and thus only had one councillor. Shortly before the 2002 elections, the situa-
tion changed again: the five wards were merged to create only two wards. These wards, 
called Morijo Loita and Loita West, were the two wards in Loita during fieldwork and 
only two councillors represented the Loita Maasai community on Narok County Coun-
cil.39 Loita councillors therefore constitute a minority on the council and because the 
                                                 
39  The situation as from March 2013 when County Government came into force has changed. The two 
wards in Loita have merged to form one ward called Loita Ward. Loita Ward is represented by a ‘ward 
representative’ (formerly the councillor) in the Narok County Assembly (instead of the Narok County 
Council). The size and boundaries of Narok County have remained the same.  
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majority come from the Purko section, they therefore control the decision-making. 
Chapter 8 discusses the creation of the new wards and the merger of the existing wards 
which has led to a decrease in the number of councillors representing Loita. This was 
linked to the political struggles that surrounded the forest conflicts. 
Conclusion: the effects of legibility and the politics of marginality 
Governmental interventions in Loita in the colonial period were instrumental in making 
the Loita Maasai and Loita land legible. Practices that increase legibility are part of the 
process of state-making (see Chapter 2). Under the auspices of the emerging state, in-
terventions of legibility were first introduced as part of a colony-wide project to estab-
lish indirect rule by appointing native authorities to clearly defined and demarcated eth-
no-territorial units. New leadership positions and land categories were introduced in 
Loita that reconfigured and modified social life in two ways.  
First, the introduction of the state positions of PA chief and councillor gave rise to 
the phenomenon of double authorities that shaped and transformed the political land-
scape of Loita. As was seen in the case of Kone, holding double positions of authority 
has allowed people to become particularly powerful leaders. Chapter 8 considers the 
forest conflicts and how a clash between two double authorities can create lasting social 
divisions. A second transformation is related to the establishment and demarcation of 
Loita Location, which has been reclassified as Loita Division. With the creation of this 
land category, the Loita section as a social unit was pegged more firmly to the geo-
graphical area marked as their designated location. As a result, sectional identities be-
came territorialized and lost their former fluidity and flexibility in the process. The 
emergence of double authorities and the strengthening of an ethno-territorial Loita iden-
tity are two effects of state interventions of legibility, or ‘legibility effects’ as Trouillot 
(2001: 126) calls them. 
The third effect to highlight here is not a direct result of an intervention but rather the 
result of an absence of interventions. Apart from the interventions of legibility, few 
state interventions took place in Loita during the colonial period. Unlike other areas that 
were closer to colonial centres, for example Purko country, and that were economically 
more interesting, such as the agricultural areas of western and central Kenya, interven-
tions of legibility were not followed up with state policies and regulations. As a result, 
the presence of the state and state control were much less pronounced in Loita than in 
other areas. The laxity of the state, fed by economic disinterest and Loita’s distance 
from Nairobi, appears to have created a peculiar dynamic. First, it gave Loita leaders 
(particularly double authorities) the space to politically manoeuvre their relationship 
with the state. Second, it made it more difficult for the state to intervene, with the result 
that no meaningful state interventions were carried out in Loita for the duration of the 
colonial period. Loita leaders were thus able to successfully avert unwanted state inter-
ventions and remained relatively autonomous from the state in comparison to other are-
as. Their marginality from the state was not then a matter that the Loita lamented but 
was rather a ‘political choice’ not to be governed (Scott 2009: 8). Their marginality was 
political (Ibid.: 29- 31) and this was the third colonial ‘state effect’ (Ibid.: 8) in Loita. 
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How this political latitude, which was gained and nurtured during the colonial peri-
od, was deployed by Loita’s leaders after independence when mounting pressure of 
(outside) governmental initiatives could not be contained is the topic of the next chap-
ter. 
 
 
 
5 
Territorializing development: 
An emerging pattern (1966-1974) 
PK: And then in the 1960s when the colonial government left and Mzee Jomo 
Kenyatta took over, things changed. And then development started in small 
scale, dipping was introduced and the number of schools increased. And then 
land use also changed because the government made a policy, group ranches 
were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Angela: But not in Loita, isn’t it? 
PK:  Not in Loita. The Loitas did not actually accept. They didn’t agree to subdivide 
their land. But the Purkos did, up to Narosura. 
TM:  They started to demarcate the group ranches. 
PK:  And individual ranches. Because the Purko leaders at that time, in the 1960s and 
1970s, they started grabbing the land. (...) 
Angela:  How did the Loita manage to resist land adjudication at that time? 
PK:  Leaders at that time, they were organized. 
(Interview PK and TM: 30/8/09) 
 
Enhanced state capacity in the early modern European state ‘made possible quite dis-
criminating interventions of every kind, such as public-health measures, political sur-
veillance, and relief for the poor’ (Scott 1998: 3). Although Loita had become legible to 
the state by 1955, it was only around the time of independence in 1963 that these kinds 
of interventions started to make their presence felt. Different from colonial state inter-
ventions of legibility that pursued order and control, these new interventions were im-
bued with a ‘will to improve’ and fell under the name of ‘development’ (Li 2007a). The 
state was not, however, the only actor or ‘trustee’ (Ibid.) driving development interven-
tions. Others, such as missionaries and NGOs, became important agents of development 
work in Loita. The diversification of trustees active in the business of development, 
though often understood as a ‘retreat’ or ‘rolling back’ of the power of the state associ-
ated with a global move to neoliberalism (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 989), entails an ex-
tension of the practice of government to non-state actors and not a transfer of power 
from the state to non-state actors (Sending & Neumann 2006). In Loita this meant that, 
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in addition to the state, they now had to reckon with new kinds of powerful actors and 
their governmental interventions.1 
How Loita leaders negotiated, mediated and even capitalized on development inter-
ventions to secure control of Loita territory in the face of ongoing Purko territorial pres-
sure and state appropriation of land is the central question in this chapter. An under-
standing of how this dynamic emerged and evolved is relevant and vital in appreciating 
the forest conflicts that are discussed in Chapter 8. This chapter shows how the will to 
improve articulates with and creates ongoing and new threats of land loss by focusing 
on the role played by Loita leaders. 
Reversing the gaze 
The perspective in this chapter is the opposite of that adopted in the previous one where 
some of the ways in which Loita came to be seen by the state were described. The pre-
vious chapter followed the direction of the intervention, positioning the state at the cen-
tre (the one who ‘sees’) and Loita on the receiving end (as the ‘seen’). This chapter re-
verses the previously held view and explores how the Loita see the state, and how they 
interact with it. This reversed perspective guides the analysis in both the remainder of 
this chapter and the rest of the book and allows an exploration of how Loita leaders 
have seen, reacted and developed strategies in response to ever-growing governmental 
interventions.  
The change in perspective is possible because of the different kind of data available 
for analysis. For the period covered in the previous chapter, I relied on archives and 
secondary literature (itself also largely based on archival research) to trace the way the 
emerging colonial state intervened in Loita. Given the long timespan and hazy collec-
tive and individual memories of this past, the use of ethnographic data was minimal. 
Instead, sources were used that were readily accessible, such as the archives of the Ken-
ya Gazette, the official journal that is published by the state (and thus naturally advanc-
es state interests) and where legislative notices and public announcements are placed. 
The perspective advanced by Scott (1998) in Seeing Like a State lends itself seamlessly 
to an analysis of this kind of material. (This should come as no surprise given that 
Scott’s book appears to be based solely on archival and secondary literature.) The 
choice of engaging with a ‘seeing like the state’ approach was thus partly steered by the 
sources available but also because such an approach elucidated the central role of the 
state in making Loita legible. 
The situation in this chapter, which considers the recent past, is different. The shorter 
period of time involved and the personal recollections of past events by key informants 
allow for the inclusion of more ethnographic material. This makes it possible to exam-
ine how Loita see the state. The idea of ‘seeing the state’ is borrowed from Corbridge et 
al. (2005). 
                                                 
1  As outlined in Chapter 2, the word ‘governmental’ here does not refer to the ‘government of Kenya’ 
but it is used in the sense advanced by Li (2007a, 2007b) and based on Foucault’s (2001) concepts of 
government and governmentality. Interventions are governmental because they intend to govern or 
control people’s behaviour. 
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A caveat of relying on sources written by state officials is that they may portray ‘an 
orderly bureaucratic reality’ that does not coincide with the practical realities in the field 
(Geschiere 2007: 129).2 Scott’s Seeing Like a State indeed portrays such an orderly pro-
cess of state formation and stands in stark contrast to his later The Art of Not Being 
Governed (2009) that focuses on the strategies of those who do not want to be subjected 
to the state (see Chapter 2). Insights from this latter work inform the analysis in the sec-
ond half of this chapter that examines how the Loita have dealt with the diversification 
of trustees and the increase in development interventions. 
Seeing the state: intermediaries and ilashumpa 
One of the stated aims of Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India is 
to understand how a wide variety of people, ranging from the rural poor to development 
experts advising the state, but also people ‘inside’ the state such as state employees and 
politicians, view the state of India (Corbridge et al. 2005: 9). The aim of this section is 
more modest. Some of their insights are used to discuss a few of the ways in which the 
state is seen in Loita. One way is through the men and women who represent the state 
‘at home’ (Ibid.: 29-30). This is the decentralized and personified state. In Loita, the 
men and women who represent the state ‘at home’ can be divided into two groups: those 
state representatives who belong to the Loita community (like the PA chief and the 
councillor) and those who do not belong to the Loita community (like the DO). The 
distinction between Loita and non-Loita is important because it shapes the way people 
there see the state through them.  
The most influential Loita state representatives are the PA chief and the councillor.3 
Until 1965, the positions of PA chief and councillor were occupied by the same person, 
namely Kone (see Chapter 4). Before being appointed by the state, Kone had actually 
been mandated by the Loita to fill the office of PA chief (which automatically conferred 
on him the position of councillor), with the understanding that he would handle state 
issues in the interests of the Loita. For the local people then, Kone was seen as the key 
intermediary, the middleman between themselves and the state. Later, when the posi-
tions of PA chief and councillor were occupied by different persons, the men in these 
positions would still continue to be seen as state intermediaries. After independence, 
literacy and some mastery of English and Swahili became important. When Kone, who 
was himself illiterate, retired in 1973, it was decided to promote better educated men for 
the positions of PA chiefs and councillor (Kronenburg 1986: 278 n. 75; Voshaar 1998: 
111). 
                                                 
2  Geschiere (2007) uses the notion of the ‘autistic’ state, borrowed from Spittler (1981), to highlight the 
limitations of Scott’s ‘seeing like a state’ perspective. ‘[A] bureaucracy will develop autistic 
tendencies if it has to deal with illiterate or semi-literate peasant societies. Modern bureaucracies’ 
standards require a steady flow of reports. But the communication gap with the peasants hampers the 
collection of sufficient information. Thus civil servants tend to repeat the reports of their predecessors, 
creating an illusionary world of reports; a bureaucracy which talks only to itself’ (Geschiere 1993: 170 
n. 3).   
3  There are a few others, mostly civil servants employed by the ministries (like the Area Education 
Officer from the Ministry of Education) but their political influence in Loita is negligible. Their 
positions do not bestow the status of ‘Loita leader’ on the occupants in the way the positions of PA 
chief and councillor do.  
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The role of state intermediary is ambivalent: PA chiefs and councillors are both Loita 
Maasai and agents of the state. As low-level state officials or representatives who also 
belong to the local community, their social roles overlap (Corbridge et al. 2005: 35) as 
they have double membership and a double network of relationships (Bierschenk et al. 
2002: 14, 30). There is thus no clear-cut state-Loita dichotomy and these two categories 
are interwoven. Located as they are at the interface of the state and the Loita, PA chiefs 
and councillors are simultaneously integrated in the structures of authority of the state 
as well as being part of the political organization of the Loita. To maintain their position 
of authority, PA chiefs and councillors have to juggle expectations in Loita with expec-
tations that derive from the state. And this sometimes puts them in compromising situa-
tions. PA chiefs risk being dismissed by the state if they are perceived by their superiors 
as having tampered with state interests, and councillors need to channel tangible bene-
fits and resources from the state to Loita if they wish to be re-elected by their constitu-
ents. In Loita, these men are seen and treated as Loita leaders by virtue of being a PA 
chief or a councillor yet this status as a leader depends on their perceived performance 
as state intermediaries. They are expected to act as intermediaries for the benefit of the 
Loita. PA chiefs and councillors in Loita generally do so as best as they can because if 
they are perceived to fail, they damage their reputation and lose prestige in Loita and 
risk being side-lined by other Loita leaders and the community in general. This could 
have major consequences for their position of authority locally and being ostracized by 
one’s own community is highly undesirable. This happened to a former Loita councillor 
who was seen to be siding with Narok County Council against Loita interests during the 
forest conflicts (see Chapter 8). This particular councillor was never re-elected and is 
currently excluded from Loita leaders’ meetings and other major functions, such as 
Prime Minister Odinga’s visit to Loita, which are commonly attended by former coun-
cillors who are treated as special, honoured guests. 
‘The state’ is also seen in encounters with non-Loita state representatives: DOs giv-
ing instructions to PA chiefs, a DC touring his district, the police carrying out an arrest, 
an MP at a political rally, and Prime Minister Odinga addressing the people of Loita. It 
follows that the state and state power are seen in their personification. During the colo-
nial period, these persons were white, male, European state officials and were referred 
to as ilashumpa (sing. olashumpai) or the white ones. But even though other whites or 
light-skinned caravan traders, missionaries (Voshaar 1979: 268) and European settlers 
were called this, the term would come to include all that refers to the state. It encom-
passed state officials but also the rules, policies and projects that state officials wanted 
to enforce and implement.4 After independence when higher-level state posts became 
Africanized, state officials continued to be called ilashumpa even though they were 
clearly not white (Ibid.). If state representatives are ilashumpa, then the rules and poli-
cies that they enforce and the projects they want to implement are, therefore, ‘the way 
of the ilashumpa’. Chapter 11 discusses how state law is seen as an alternative legal 
system and, with all that is associated with it, i.e. the police, the courts and magistrates 
and prisons, it is referred to as ‘the way of the ilashumpa’. This leads us to a second 
important way in which the state is seen. ‘The state’ is not only seen and encountered in 
                                                 
4  In some contexts, Maasai school-going boys are also referred to as ilashumpa (King 1972: 396). 
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its personifications (for example, the non-Loita DO) or through Loita state intermediar-
ies (PA chiefs and councillors) but it is also experienced in its concrete interventions 
(see Corbridge et al. 2005: 6-7).  
Studying the state by examining the way people in Loita see it is in line with an an-
thropological understanding of the state that focuses on people-state encounters (Trouil-
lot 2001) and on its everyday and localized forms (Hansen & Stepputat 2001). This ap-
proach rejects the idea of the state as a unified entity ‘out there’ (Trouillot 2001: 126) 
or, Scott’s all-seeing repository of power ‘up there’ (Li 2005: 384-385; see also Ges-
chiere 2007: 130). By discussing the role of state intermediaries (the PA chief and the 
councillor), I propose that the boundary between the state and the Loita is more blurred 
than a state-Loita dichotomy would suggest, hence further questioning the idea of the 
state (or for that matter, ‘the Loita’) as a separate entity.   
The nexus of leaders, development and territory 
It is important to realize that PA chiefs and councillors are part of a larger group of 
Loita leaders that includes section leaders, age-group chiefs and clan chiefs. In the three 
‘Loita leaders’ meetings that I attended during my fieldwork,5 most of the matters dis-
cussed, deliberated and decided upon related to issues concerning Loita’s external rela-
tions.6 Each significant social domain concerning internal Loita affairs is governed by 
its own designated chief or leader. For example, clan chiefs mediate issues that pertain 
to the clan such as problematic marriages; age-group chiefs take the lead in matters re-
lating to their age-group; and locality leaders are – in principle – responsible for land 
disputes (see Chapters 6, 10 & 11). PA chiefs and councillors do not have the final say 
with respect to state issues like clans and age-group chiefs do respectively within the 
clan or age-group domain, or as locality leaders do with locality affairs. One reason is 
that their domain (the state) belongs to ‘external relations’ and, due to the lack of a cen-
tralized Loita political leader, this domain pertains to all Loita leaders as a collective. 
This is also the case because, as intermediaries, they are expected to communicate im-
portant matters such as development initiatives by the state to the rest of the Loita lead-
ership. It is in this sense that Voshaar (1979: 80) observed that Maasai PA chiefs were 
‘no more than messenger boys’ for the wider Maasai community. When examining the 
way outside interventions are negotiated, it is important not only to examine the role 
played by state intermediaries who, though important, are not the only ones to decide 
                                                 
5  A sub-DDC (sub-District Development Committee) Loita leaders’ meeting convened by the DO and 
held at his office in Entasekera on 21 July 2008; a Loita leaders’ meeting at the Ilkerin Project on 26 
and 27 September 2008 and a Loita leaders’ meeting convened by the DO at his office on 22 
December 2008. 
6  For example, the cutting of timbers for illegal sales to outsiders, boundary issues with neighbouring 
communities, land demarcation taking place among the neighbouring Purko, the inter-sectional theft 
of livestock and murder, the issue of Loita youngsters being jailed in Tanzania and how to get them 
released, the construction and organization of cereal banks to prevent maize being sold to outsiders 
after harvesting and then local people experiencing food shortage in the area if subsequent harvests 
fail, NGOs wanting to undertake new projects, what to do with the state policy on Female Genital 
Mutilation (FGM), which projects to request donor funds for and the construction of a holding ground 
to facilitate livestock marketing. 
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what course of action to take. Loita leaders as a group (including the PA chief and the 
councillor) typically meet to decide on major issues that affect the Loita as a whole. 
Towards the end of the colonial period, outside initiatives and interventions started to 
fall under the rubric of development, reflecting a much earlier refocus of state policy on 
development that had started shortly after World War II (Berman 1990: 256-299, 437-
438; Rutten 1992: 243-263) and also the arrival of missionaries who were particularly 
active in the field of education (Ibid.: 225, 240, 246, 262; Voshaar 1979: 257). The state 
had enrolled the existing structure of Provincial Administration that conveniently 
reached out to all corners of the country to implement and coordinate development work 
in the districts during the colonial period (Berman 1990: 257, 276-282, 291; Rutten 
1992: 243-263).7 Local native councils and their successors the African district councils 
became agents of development activity too.8 As Provincial Administration and Local 
Government assumed the task of facilitating development, PA chiefs and councillors as 
the lowest-level state representatives were the first locals to become acquainted with 
development discourse and practice. When interventions by the state or missionaries 
were envisaged to take place in their jurisdictions, they were typically the first people to 
be approached in the local arena. PA chiefs and councillors became the contact persons 
for trustees wanting to realize a development project.   
There is another link between Loita leadership and development. As the arrival of the 
state introduced new leadership positions (the PA chief and the councillor) so too did 
development. What are called ‘development leaders’ here are Loita Maasai men who 
became leaders in Loita because they occupied key positions in local NGOs.9 Many 
development leaders operate as ‘local development brokers’ (Bierschenk et al. 2002) 
and as intermediaries between donors and the potential beneficiaries of development aid 
that, far from being passive communication channels, actively engage in the practice of 
brokerage by doing other tasks such as ‘draining off a portion of the “development rent” 
in the direction off [sic] one’s village or region’ (Ibid.: 29). Councillors too may play 
the role of local development broker if they try to channel state funds for development 
to their own wards. Much of the status of a development leader (and councillor) in Loita 
depends on their success as development brokers and the mediation of externally funded 
development initiatives. The first local NGO in Loita, initiated in 1968 and funded by 
the Dutch donor agency Cebemo (later Cordaid), was the Ilkerin Loita Integral Devel-
opment Project, which will be referred to as the Ilkerin Project from now on. More re-
cently, other smaller NGOs and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) have 
emerged in Loita and some of their staff are emerging as development leaders. The fo-
                                                 
7  Field staff from the technical departments, such as the Agriculture Department, the Education 
Department and the Veterinary Department, that would later become ministries in independent Kenya, 
and from the newly established state Development and Reconstruction Authority (DARA) were also 
involved in implementing development projects. 
8  For more on development projects by the local native council and the African district council in 
Kajiado District, see Rutten (1992: Ch. 6). 
9  The current Ilkerin Project director, though Maasai is not from Loita origin, yet because of his 
position and because he has worked and lived in Loita for decades, he is still considered a Loita 
leader. 
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cus here is on the Ilkerin Project and the leaders who emerged after being employed on 
it. 
The Ilkerin Project’s longevity has, with the state, contributed to the change and 
transformation of land and leadership in Loita as a result of its interventions. It even 
played a central role during the forest conflicts. All these relationships will be discussed 
in the analyses to come but I want to highlight just one observation at this point. In a 
similar way to Provincial Administration and Local Government, the Ilkerin Project 
engaged in practices that would develop legibility by introducing a new land category in 
Loita: the ‘sub-centre’.10 The sub-centre was created in the early 1980s to improve the 
project’s effectiveness and to reach out to the rest of the Loita community from the pro-
ject’s central office in Ilkerin that was on the edge of Loita territory. To facilitate the 
implementation of its programmes, six sub-centres were established in Loita. ‘Each cen-
tre was to have facilities for primary education, health care for humans and livestock 
and a food store. Each would also have its own development committee, consisting of 
members chosen by the inhabitants of the area around the centre’ (Voshaar 1998: 112, 
see also Kronenburg 1986: 34-35). According to Ferguson & Gupta (2002: 988), this 
‘outsourcing of the functions of the state to NGOs’ is a key feature of what they identi-
fied as the rising salience of transnational governmentality, whereby transnational net-
works of ‘local’ actors and international funding agencies bypass the state to intervene 
with governmental programmes and development projects. 
The establishment of sub-centres also appears to have reinforced a feeling of belong-
ing to a particular (sub-)location, a land category introduced by Provincial Administra-
tion. Six sub-centres were constructed in the five sub-locations that would later acquire 
the administrative status of location: Entasekera, Morijo, Olmesutie, Olorte and Ilkerin. 
In Morijo Sub-location, which covered the largest area, two sub-centres were estab-
lished: Morijo and Olngarua. Although sub-centres referred to places, the inhabitants of 
the surrounding area came to be seen as belonging to a particular sub-centre and hence a 
particular (sub-)location. The Ilkerin Project thus facilitated the internalization of state-
introduced land categories and identities. As scholars like Ferguson (1994) and Bryant 
(2002) have shown, development and conservation interventions that are keen to em-
power and reduce poverty have frequently ended up extending mechanisms of control 
associated with the state ‘intrud[ing] ever more systematically into the lives of margin-
alized peoples’ (Bryant 2002: 287).11    
The advent of development in Loita coincided with a deep fear of losing more land to 
the neighbouring Purko Maasai. This concern is a combined ripple effect of two state 
interventions, as was discussed in earlier chapters. The first dates back to the Maasai 
Moves of 1905 and 1910-1913 that resulted in the Purko Maasai, the arch-enemies of 
the Loita during the War of Morijo, becoming their immediate neighbours (see Chapter 
3). And the second effect, which was discussed in Chapter 4, involved state interven-
tions of legibility such as the demarcation of Loita Location, which would later become 
                                                 
10  Sub-centres were later transformed into Pastoral Community Development Associations (PCDAs) as 
part of the decentralization policy of the Ilkerin Project. 
11  See Bähre (2007) for a discussion on the practices of legibility inherent in a state-driven development 
project in Cape Town, South Africa that failed to achieve its aim of empowerment and democracy. 
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Loita Division. On the one hand, the demarcation of Loita Location hardened sectional 
identities by correlating the Loita Maasai people to a fixed and specific territory. On the 
other hand, it confined the Loita Maasai to the southern Loita Hills and in effect weak-
ened their claim to land that had been previously used and controlled by them, such as 
the northern Loita Hills and the Loita Plains. This stretch of land came to be occupied 
by Purko families. Together, these two processes enhanced an awareness that territorial 
boundaries and land needed to be defended against further dispossession and appropria-
tion by the Purko. The gazettement of the Maasai Mara National Reserve in 1961 con-
firmed this need when evicted Purko, who had occupied these lands, started pushing the 
western Purko-Loita boundary eastwards (Knowles 1993: 20). Gradually the perception 
of the Purko being a threat to their land would be projected onto other external actors, 
such as Narok County Council and IUCN, whose representatives were seen as wanting 
to appropriate large parts of their territory, in this case the Naimina Enkiyio Forest (see 
Chapter 8).  
At the time of independence, questions about development, Loita territory and the 
role of Loita leaders as intermediaries articulated in interesting ways that would form a 
pervasive pattern. The next section discusses how Loita’s leaders would take the task of 
protecting Loita land seriously by utilizing and reworking development interventions 
with the specific aim of safeguarding Loita territory from further appropriation by out-
siders.  
An emerging pattern 
Increased pressure by both the state and missionaries regarding the implementation of 
development projects and programmes brought home the realization that development 
interventions were inevitable. The Loita reacted by trying to turn development interven-
tions to their own advantage and their leaders, particularly PA chiefs and councillors as 
the designated intermediaries with the outside world, would play an active role in this. 
Land and territorial control were high on their agenda. 
Plans for a second school in Loita emerged after independence. It was built by the 
Catholic Church and Loita leaders consented to its construction after it was agreed that 
it would be built at a place of their choosing: 
In 1967 the Loita allowed the Catholic Church to build a second primary school. The Loita councillors 
decided that Leshuta would be its location. It was situated near the border zone with the Purko. It was 
a strategic choice. The Loita school was to stop the further intrusion of Purko into Loita. (Voshaar 
1998: 102)    
Loita leaders gave in, not so much because they wanted Loita children to go to 
school but because they hoped that a permanent structure in the form of a ‘Loita’ school 
– and not a ‘Purko’ school – would function as a ‘territorial marker’ (Sikor & Lund 
2009: 14) and a barrier to further land encroachments by the Purko. In the end, however, 
their strategy failed. Ironically, the school attracted more Purko to the area who, unlike 
the Loita, were more interested in sending their children to school (Voshaar 1998: 102). 
Purko children soon outnumbered Loita children at the school and the area eventually 
became more populated with Purko than Loita. Today, Leshuta lies in Purkoland.  
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Although their plan failed, it did set an important precedent for future action. What 
the Loita leaders had done was to use the new discourse and practice of development as 
a strategy for staking a claim to land. Using their new relationships with the outside 
world (whether with the state or missionaries in the name of development or with inter-
national organizations for purposes of nature conservation) to prevent alienation and 
dispossession of their land would become a recurring practice employed by Loita lead-
ers. Chapter 8 illustrates how this strategy was ingeniously used by (one group of) Loita 
leaders when they brought in IUCN in the 1990s to set up a Loita forest management 
project as the best available option to avoid Narok County Council appropriating the 
forest. Until then, the biggest threat to land loss had been the persistent appropriation of 
former Loita land by the neighbouring Purko Maasai. The Ilkerin Project had also been 
embraced for the same purpose. 
The Ilkerin Project was born out of the friendship and collaboration between Kone 
and the Dutch missionary Jan Voshaar from the Catholic Mill Hill Society (Voshaar 
1998: 106; Kronenburg 1986: 16-17).12 Kone’s intermediary position between the Loita 
and the outside world most likely led to his acquaintance with Voshaar. Although no 
longer a councillor, Kone’s tenure as PA chief and councillor undoubtedly meant that 
he was familiar with the world of development as both Provincial Administration and 
Local Government had emerged as state institutions that were active in development 
programmes. Despite Kone’s reputation as being a ‘stumbling block’ for development 
in Loita (Ibid.: 17), he was one of the first to argue in favour of the Ilkerin Project. To 
understand this contradiction, the reasons for resisting or accepting development efforts 
need to be understood. The effect that a particular development intervention was 
thought to have on land access and land control seems to have been a consideration of 
utmost importance. Deliberations on particular development initiatives were based on 
the effects observed elsewhere in Maasailand. Development policies introduced there 
would be implemented much later in Loita, if at all, because of its isolation and distance 
from the administrative centre. The Loita were thus in the fortunate position of being 
able to evaluate the effects of these development projects and programmes elsewhere in 
Maasailand. Interventions that had led to a loss of access and control over land were 
thus opposed. Voshaar (1998: 106) explained how the leaders of Loita formally dis-
missed the setting up of private wheat farms in the early 1980s because they had seen 
that elsewhere they had led to a loss of prime grazing land for the majority, while only a 
few were benefiting from them (see also LNECTC 1994: 2). It is in this light that the 
acceptance of the Ilkerin Project in Loita is examined here. 
When Voshaar visited Kone in the late 1960s, Kone heard from him that the Purko 
had refused to set aside land for an educational, health and animal husbandry develop-
ment project that Voshaar had proposed (1998: 106, 109-110). Kone must have seen the 
chance to address the problem of Purko encroachment.13 The choice of the project site 
                                                 
12  See http://ilkerinloita.org/introduction.php accessed 19/9/14. The initiative came, however, from 
Voshaar and Cebemo (later Cordaid), the Dutch donor agency that agreed to fund the project 
(Kronenburg 1986: 18, 21).  
13  ‘Development’ concerns must have also been on his mind. Voshaar, who makes no mention of the 
land-claim strategy in his book but confirmed it during a conversation with me in 2007 elaborated on 
the development concerns of Kone. According to Voshaar (1998: 100-110), Kone’s support for the 
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was telling. After Loita leaders gave the go-ahead to the project,14 it was decided to lo-
cate it on the slopes of the Ilkerin Hills in the west of Loita, hence the name the ‘Ilkerin 
Project’ (Kronenburg 1986: 16-17). Voshaar would have actually preferred Entasekera 
in the centre of Loita on the edge of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest because of the availa-
bility of permanent water there (Kronenburg 2012, personal communication). The Ilker-
in Hills are in the lowlands in the same border area as Leshuta, which was being en-
croached on by Purko. It is a place with good wet-season pastures but with no water in 
the dry season (Kronenburg 1986: 17, 19). Settlements there were thus only temporary 
and Loita had weak claims to the land (Ibid.: 17). They feared that the encroaching 
Purko might slowly take over the area.  
Around 1970 the process of encroachment by the Purko Maasai into the areas where traditionally the 
Loita Maasai grazed their livestock had reached not far West from the Ilkerin hill. By staking out the 
boundary with a project the Loita leaders hoped to prevent the loss of more grazing grounds to the 
Purko.15 (Kronenburg 1986: 18)  
For exactly the same reasons as with the choice of the site for the new school, Loita 
leaders decided on the Ilkerin Hills as the location of Voshaar’s newly proposed project. 
A permanent claim to land can be achieved by building permanent structures. And the 
tentative project plan that was drawn up at a meeting with Kone, amongst others, did 
indeed detail the construction of infrastructure, including offices, staff houses, class-
rooms and a cattle dip (Kronenburg 1986: 15; Voshaar 1998: 111).16 The Ilkerin Project 
has always succeeded in its unofficial goal of being a Loita ‘flag post’ and stopping 
Purko appropriation of former Loita land on that side of the Loita-Purko border.  
As the case of Leshuta School has shown, not all the development strategies to pro-
tect the land from Purko encroachment succeeded. The World-Bank-funded land adju-
dication programme, which was introduced by the Kenyan state in the late 1960s, was 
designed to set up group ranches in Maasailand. The process of land adjudication in-
                                                 
Ilkerin Project stemmed from a realization that the changes that had been triggered by colonialism 
were making ‘traditional pastoralism’ an unviable and unsustainable way of life. The Ilkerin Project 
was seen as the best way to respond to these changed circumstances. It was set up as an avenue for 
managing change and development proactively ‘to train, prepare and empower the Loita Maasai 
pastoralists to do their own development’ (ILIDP 1995: 1). Other options in Maasailand that were 
available at the end of the 1960s were the division of land into group ranches and individual ranches, 
and the creation of private wheat farms. It has already been seen that individual and private wheat 
ranches had been discounted as an option by the leaders of Loita. 
14  This was by no means a smooth process. Both Voshaar (1998: 111) and Kronenburg (1986: 17, 20) 
documented how there had been considerable initial resistance to the project on the side of the non-
Inkidongi Loita Maasai. One of the reasons for this was that it was believed that ‘“that European” … 
was taking the land from Loita’ (Voshaar 1998: 111). Trust in Kone, who was a strong proponent of 
the project and who in turn trusted Voshaar, seems to have led them to accept the project (Kronenburg 
1986: 17).   
15  See also Knowles (1993: 22). 
16  After setting up the Ilkerin Project, Voshaar left Kenya in 1974. Management of the project was taken 
over by another Dutch missionary and an expatriate animal husbandry expert, Jos Kronenburg (my 
father). The project’s leadership and management was Africanized in 1983 and a Loita Maasai was 
appointed as project leader. Voshaar wrote several books on the Maasai, one of which was on the Loita 
Maasai (1998). He went back to live in Loita many years later to build the first secondary school 
there. We were virtually neighbours during my field research period before he moved back to the 
Netherlands in 2009. Voshaar passed away in 2014. 
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volved setting aside certain tracts of land after surveying, drawing and recording the 
boundaries, as well as identifying and registering the members of the group ranch. All 
this would be filed in legal documents. Group ranches, therefore, provided a certain 
degree of tenure security that policymakers hoped would encourage landowners to in-
vest in land and livestock but that Maasai saw primarily as a way of stopping further 
land alienation. Tenure security seems to have been one of the main reasons why the 
Maasai welcomed group ranches: they secured access to the land in the face of growing 
external and internal threats of land appropriation (Rutten 1992: 266, 272-273, 286, 
309, 324-325; Kimani & Pickard 1998: 203-204, 210, 211; Mwangi 2007b: 896, 903).17 
These threats included steady infiltration by agricultural neighbours, such as the Kikuyu 
and the Kamba; the creation of game reserves and national parks by the state; and the 
growing number of individual ranches established by some Maasai who were taking 
large chunks of prime grazing land without the general consent of the community. The 
Kaputiei Maasai of Kajiado District, the first Maasai section to accept the group ranch 
scheme, also seem to have wanted to adjudicate the land because they feared losing 
more of it to the politically well-connected Kisongo Maasai in the south (Rutten 1992: 
272). In this respect, the Kaputiei are very similar to the Loita.  
Fear of losing land to neighbouring Purko Maasai, who had been successful in push-
ing the Loita-Purko boundary back to the disadvantage of the Loita, and the possibility 
of losing land to powerful Loita and non-Loita individuals seeking individual title, as 
was happening elsewhere in Maasailand, are the main reasons given by Loita inform-
ants for the initial acceptance of the group ranch scheme in the 1970s (see also Kronen-
burg 1986: 51; Voshaar 1998: 112). Its acceptance was a ‘defensive strategy’ (Mwangi 
2007a, 2007b), as a way of securing the borders with the Purko in a legal manner and 
preventing future land losses.18 However, given the limited size of Loitaland and the 
fact that the lowland lacked permanent water, it was feared that dividing the Loita into 
several group ranches would negatively affect the mobility upon which their transhu-
mant pastoralism was predicated, threatening the very continuity of the livelihoods of 
many (see also Voshaar 1998: 108). It was thus agreed to form one group ranch encom-
passing the whole Loita area (Kronenburg 1986: 51). When this proposal was rejected 
by the DC of Narok on the grounds that it was too big and unmanageable, an alternative 
of three group ranches was discussed (Kronenburg 1986: 51; Voshaar 1998: 112). The 
boundaries were drawn from lowland (the grasslands) to highland (the forest) so that 
each group ranch would have wet- and dry-season pastures. Disagreements between the 
Loita and Purko over the perimeter boundary hampered the process of land demarcation 
at this stage (Kronenburg 1986: 52). Loita interviewees blame the Purko for continually 
and deliberately boycotting the demarcation of the Loita-Purko boundary because a fi-
nal boundary would put a stop to their encroachment on Loitaland.19 The ultimate aim 
                                                 
17  Calls by group ranch members a decade later for the subdivision of these group ranches would be 
based on the same grounds (Mwangi 2007b; Kimani & Pickard 1998: 205).  
18  In the forest conflicts two decades later, this same reasoning was reiterated during the court case: 
‘Have our land, which we currently own and use communally, adjudicated and demarcated in an 
appropriate manner and as a matter of agency (sic: urgency?) in order to stop land loss and alienation’ 
(CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (l, 2)). 
19  Purko Maasai claims to Loita territory were not investigated.  
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of the more numerous and politically well-represented Purko was, they claim, to push 
the Loita out of Loitaland and to appropriate the valuable forested Loita highlands. New 
attempts to adjudicate the land into group ranches were made in the 1980s but this time 
it was agreed to divide Loita into two group ranches. Efforts failed once again but this 
time due to internal quarrels among Loita’s leaders about where the boundary should 
lie. The divisions that this internal quarrel generated would simmer for years until they 
resurfaced once again during the forest conflicts (see Chapter 8).  
As a result, Loita was not divided into group ranches. In fact, the Loita section is 
unique as the land has not been demarcated and/or registered to either group or as indi-
vidual holdings. While the rest of Maasailand has been effectively adjudicated and le-
gally privatized, Loita remains classified as Trust Land, a legal category that provides 
ambiguous and insecure tenure (see Chapter 1 & 8). The failure to adjudicate and de-
marcate the land in Loita is popularly interpreted as Loita resistance to government in-
terventions and linked to a reputation of being the most traditional of all Maasai sec-
tions (LNECTC 1994: 2; Kantai 2001: 41; Karanja et al. 2002: 4, 19, 21; Ngece et al. 
2007: 178; Péron 2000: 385-386, 393; Holland 1996: 7-8, 11-12, 85, 357 n. 1).20 As 
discussed above, the research material presented in this thesis reveals instead a willing-
ness to formally demarcate Loita but continued failure to do so due to unresolved exter-
nal and internal boundary disputes, a point also made by Kronenburg (1986: 50-52) and 
Voshaar (1998: 106).  
In one case, a group of Loita elders and other elders from the Loodokilani section 
and influential individuals from areas further away (14 elders in total) succeeded in 
forming a group ranch.21 It was set up on the slopes of the Nguruman Escarpment in the 
east of Loita beyond the Naimina Enkiyio Forest in an area called Kamorora. This is a 
border area between the Loita and Loodokilani Maasai who live on the floor of the Rift 
Valley. It was previously uninhabited because of the presence of tsetse fly but was used 
periodically by both Loita and Loodokilani Maasai for grazing during periods of 
drought. Kamorora was thus a shared drought refuge area and a border zone for both 
Loita and Loodokilani. There are different versions as to why the group ranch was 
formed. Some say that it was simply an opportunity seized by a group of progressive 
and literate Maasai who succeeded in setting up a ranch because it was an area whose 
ownership was ill-defined and was of little value for permanent residence and therefore 
did not generate much protest from fellow section members. Another version suggests 
that political strategy was the main concern, namely the utilization of development initi-
atives to prevent a loss of land. According to this version, the group of elders quickly 
established a group ranch of 65,000 acres in Kamorora in 1973/1974 when they learned 
that Philip Leakey, a white Kenyan who worked for the Kenyatta government, had ob-
tained a concession of 10 acres for a lodge in the area (see Kronenburg García 2003: 
132-133). It also appears that Narok County Council had plans to turn the area around 
Leakey’s concession into a wildlife park.22 Forming a group ranch was the best availa-
                                                 
20  This is sometimes the initial response in interviews with Loita Maasai too. 
21  See Galaty (2011, but also 2013b) for a brief account of this case from the point of view of the 
Loodokilani. 
22  This move was part of a larger plan of creating a southern tourist circuit linking this new park with the 
Maasai Mara National Reserve and Amboseli National Park. 
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ble option at hand at the time. The Kamorora Group Ranch did succeed in preventing 
Leakey from acquiring the land, but subsequent developments have resulted in a legal 
conflict with a new player, Herman Stein (of German/Namibian origins), to whom the 
land was leased for 20 years in 1986 but who now claims ownership of the area. The 
complicated legal battles that this fight triggered between two Loodokilani group ranch-
es in Kajiado and Stein, between the two group ranches and the original members of the 
Kamorora Group Ranch, between the original members and Stein, and between Stein 
and a former friend called Jan Bonde Nielsen (the same man who accompanied Prime 
Minister Odinga on his visit to Loita in 2010, see Chapter 1)  to whom he sold part of 
the Kamorora lands, are still ongoing. The occupation of Kamorora by the hostile and 
politically well-connected Stein has effectively prevented the Loita and the Loodokilani 
Maasai from entering and using the land for their pastoral needs in times of drought for 
the past three decades. Chapter 8 elaborates on this case in greater detail.23  
Conclusion: negotiating development 
to secure control of Loita territory 
 
Individuals can and do negotiate the processes to which they are 
subjected. For governmentality scholars, then, it is important to look 
not just at the forms of collective and individual identity promoted by 
practices of government, but also at how particular agents negotiate 
these forms – at how they embrace, adapt, or refuse them.  
(Inda 2005: 10-11) 
 
Loita leaders have sometimes embraced development interventions, sometimes they 
have refused them but they have mostly adapted them, as will be seen in the following 
chapters. This chapter has considered how Loita leaders have cautiously negotiated and 
creatively reworked development initiatives with the strategic aim of keeping Loita land 
in Loita hands. But this is not only about land, it is also about being autonomous, about 
‘not being governed’ (Scott 2009). At times, leaders have succeeded in this attempt and 
are able to set the terms of engagement with trustees, shaping the way development in-
terventions play out in Loita. But on other occasions they have not succeeded and are 
overwhelmed by the power of the intervention and the perseverance of the trustee. In 
any case, the consistency of this stubborn attempt (to use development interventions to 
territorialize) has resulted in a recurring pattern that will be encountered again in Chap-
ter 8 that discusses the forest conflicts. 
The strategic territorialization of development interventions by Loita leaders needs to 
be understood in the light of two antecedents. First, it has to be seen against the back-
ground of ongoing old (see Chapter 3) and new threats to Loita territorial control. In this 
regard, development interventions have become stakes in the territorial struggle against 
the Purko and new, outside actors. Second, it is important to recognize that the political 
strategizing by Loita leaders was made possible by the political space that they enjoyed 
during the colonial period when they were ‘forgotten’ on a piece of Trust Land (Chapter 
                                                 
23  This case merits a more in-depth investigation, which I hope to realize in future. 
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4). These two antecedents, the ongoing struggle to safeguard the integrity of Loita terri-
tory and the unlocking of political space during the colonial period, are themselves the 
result of earlier articulations with (colonial state) interventions. 
The previous chapter looked at the articulations and effects of governmental inter-
ventions from the point of view of the state, while this chapter has reversed the gaze and 
considered them from the point of view of the Loita. By focusing on the complexity and 
interactivity of articulations, it is clear that interventions are certainly not one-way ac-
tions with predictable effects. The effects are the result of the articulation of interven-
tions with existing processes and struggles that may in fact have been formed by earlier 
interventions. 
This chapter considered how PA chiefs, councillors and development leaders, as the 
designated intermediaries with state and development actors, govern Loita relations 
with the outside world. The next chapter explores how Loita leaders govern Loita inter-
nally. 
 
 
 
6 
Maasai leadership positions in focus 
Leadership is one of the three themes investigated in this thesis. The previous chapter 
explored how Loita leaders govern (outside) development interventions, while this 
chapter focuses more on how leaders govern Loita internally. This will be done by ex-
amining a number of leadership positions and the nature of their authority. Since these 
leadership positions have deep socio-cultural Maasai roots, as opposed to, for example, 
the positions of PA chief and councillor that derive from the Kenyan state, I call them 
Maasai leadership positions.  
So far, this study has put two Loita leaders in the spotlight: ole Maine and Kone. 
Chapter 1 described how age-group chief ole Maine received and addressed Prime Min-
ister Odinga during his visit to Loita in 2010. Kone was introduced as an influential 
Loita leader with multiple positions of authority, namely PA chief, councillor and leader 
of the House of Senteu, as well as being a practising laibon (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 then 
showed how he acted as a key intermediary with state and development interventions 
during the late colonial period and after independence. In the coming chapters, other 
Loita leaders will also be presented. These include the current chief laibon of Loita, 
Mokompo ole Simel, and two double authorities: a clan chief who was also a councillor, 
and another who doubled as a development leader (Chapter 8).1 Age-group chief ole 
Maine will appear again in the dispute meeting in Chapter 11. The positions of PA 
chief, councillor and development leader have already been discussed. For a thorough 
understanding of the roles played by the leaders that appear in the forthcoming chapters, 
it is essential to understand the positions of chief laibon, age-group chief and clan chief 
too. 
These positions derive their authority from the age-group system, the clan system 
and the laibon institution respectively. These leadership positions will, therefore, be 
examined by placing them in the context of the respective institutions that authorize 
them. One of the issues that such an undertaking illustrates is that Maasai leadership is 
both about political authority and ritual authority. Another is that the age-group system, 
                                                 
1  These two men are important players in the forest conflicts. Due to the delicate nature of the conflicts, 
I do not refer to them by name but instead by leadership position.   
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the clan system and laibonism define the ascribed and achieved qualifications a particu-
lar person needs to have to occupy the various positions. Membership of the social 
group of which a person is made leader is, obviously, a key condition. The sphere of 
influence of a particular leadership position is also determined by its authorizing institu-
tion, which defines the group of people over which a leader has authority, but also the 
social domain in which his authority extends. For example, an age-group chief only has 
authority over men who belong to his age-group, and then only over those who also 
belong to the Loita section. His jurisdiction over this group is thus formed by the inter-
section of a socio-territorial unit (section) and a gendered social category (age-group). 
But an age-group chief will have nothing to say in a meeting that addresses a homicide 
case, for example, because this falls under the sphere of authority of clan chiefs. The 
age-group chief may speak in the meeting, like anyone else, if the killer or the person 
killed belongs to his clan. He will then speak as a member of that clan but not in his 
capacity as age-group chief. 
The age-group system, the clan system and laibonism are not institutions specific to 
Loita but pertain more widely to Maasai culture and society. Of these, the age-group 
system and the clan system stand out because they underpin Maasai social identity 
(Spencer 1993: 145-146) and social life.2 Both systems cut across sectional territories, 
integrating Maasai who may live as far apart as 800 km and whose livelihoods can ap-
pear very different in a mutually understood framework that organizes and structures 
social relations between men and women, young and old, and people of different line-
ages.3 Maasai sections may speak in different dialects (Sommer & Vossen 1993), differ 
in the timing and details of ceremonies performed, in the palettes of colours used in 
their beaded ornaments and in the length of their dress, but what they all share is a 
common Maasai identity that is based on a shared socio-cultural framework.  
The clan system organizes men and women into patrilineal descent groups. There are 
five clans that are divided into two or more sub-clans and whose members live dis-
persed across Maasailand. The age-group system organizes all circumcised men into 
circumcision-groups that move successively through the different grades of warriorhood 
and elderhood as they mature. Eventually, two successive circumcision-groups will 
unite to form one age-set. I use the word ‘age-group’ as a general term to refer both to 
circumcision-groups and age-sets. The ceremonies associated with the age-sets are syn-
chronized across the various sections in Maasailand and this ensures that the age-group 
system remains an integral crosscutting Maasai institution (Spencer 1993: 145-146). 
Women are not part of the age-group system but are affiliated in age with the members 
of the age-group with whom they danced as young girls as the warriors’ ‘sweethearts’ 
(Talle 1988: 94). Girls and women are linked to the male age-group system via their 
positions as the daughters, wives and mothers of men in the various age-groups 
                                                 
2  Of the two, the age-group system is considered to be the more important (Mol 1996: 11; Voshaar 
1979: 46, 58; Spencer 1988: 208). 
3  A clear example of how age-group and clan affiliation structure daily life can be seen in the way 
people greet and address each other. 
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(Voshaar 1979: 62, 84). Although they do not formally participate in the age-group sys-
tem, they do play a key role in the age-group ceremonies of their male relatives.4  
Age-group and clan leadership, although deriving from these pan-Maasai socio-
cultural institutions, does not exist at the pan-Maasai level: there is no single age-group 
chief or clan chief for all Maasai sections. Instead, leadership is organized at the level of 
section. Each age-group or, to be more precise, circumcision-group, in Loita has its own 
age-group chief who is proclaimed approximately every eight years when a new cir-
cumcision-group is initiated. Likewise, each clan in Loita has its own clan chiefs. The 
Loita section is thus politically autonomous in its age-group and clan affairs from other 
Maasai sections.5 The age-group ceremonial cycle, for example, is organized and coor-
dinated at the level of section. The epitome of this autonomy is the collective age-group 
ceremony as all members of an age-group in a certain section are promoted at the same 
time. Clans too manage their affairs at section level. This usually involves disciplining 
clan members who have broken clan rules and/or endangered (inter)clan harmony. In 
Loita, it is the job of clan and age-group leaders to ensure adherence to the rules within 
the section and to maintain peace and harmony in their groups as well as leading and 
representing their groups vis-à-vis other groups. Unlike informal clan and age-group 
leaders who handle minor matters locally, the formal clan and age-group leaders chosen 
at sectional level hold official leadership positions that they assume after being instated 
during special ceremonies. The group of people over which a Loita age-group chief or 
Loita clan chief exercises his authority is therefore clearly delimited by the socio-
territorial confines of the Loita section. It follows that a particular age-group chief has 
the power to command and discipline only those who belong to both the Loita section 
and to the age-group of which he has been made chief. The same applies for a clan 
chief, who can only punish and fine fellow clan-mates if they are also Loita Maasai. 
The unique contribution of this and the next chapter to Maasai scholarship is that it 
presents original material on the leadership position of clan chief. To my knowledge, 
the clan chief has never been discussed in the academic literature. 
The age-group chief and the ceremonial age-group leaders 
Each circumcision-group in Loita has its own appointed leaders.6 Of these, only the age-
group chief exercises political authority. The others, who I have collectively called the 
‘ceremonial age-group leaders’,7 exercise ritual authority. To understand the political 
authority of the age-group chief, it is necessary to contrast it with the ritual authority of 
                                                 
4  See Spencer (1993: 152-154, 1988: Ch. 10 & Ch. 11) and Talle (1988: 91-123) for a discussion of the 
age-group system and gender relations. 
5  This only refers to the Loita in Kenya. The Loita in Tanzania have their own age-group and clan 
leaders, although there are close links between them and the leadership in Kenya. As far as leadership 
is concerned, the Kenya-Tanzania border has definitively divided the Loita section.   
6  Each circumcision-group naturally has numerous unappointed and unofficial age-group leaders too. 
Here, I describe only the formal leadership positions. 
7  In Maa, the ceremonial age-group leaders are called inkasisin o lporror (the office-bearers of the 
circumcision-group) (Mol 1996: 37). Another name for them is ilmurran loo ntaasa (the warriors of 
the occasion). 
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the ceremonial age-group leaders. This section therefore considers both the position of 
age-group chief as well as the various ceremonial age-group leadership positions.   
Age-group leaders hold positions with clear tasks and responsibilities that pertain to 
their age-group. To outsiders, the authority of the age-group leaders is most visible at 
collective age-group ceremonies where they form an unmistakeable presence in their 
bright-blue ritual garments and/or leather capes (see Photo 6.1). But their authority also 
extends beyond ceremonial periods of time. The age-group chief plays a prominent role 
at age-group meetings and during preparations for ceremonies. There are six leadership 
positions in total, five of which are ritual positions that are linked to specific ceremonies 
in the age-group system. The ceremonial age-group leaders include the olotuno (the 
established one), the oloboru enkeene (the cutter of the strap), the olorrip olasar (the 
guardian of the sacrificial fire), the olorripu olkila (the guardian of the cloak) and the 
olopising olkiteng (the smotherer of the ox). The sixth position is that of age-group 
chief, who is sometimes referred to as the age-group spokesman (Waller 2010). This is 
a more political position and he is addressed as olaiguanani or, in English, as ‘chief’.8 
To differentiate this position from clan chief and PA chief, who may also be addressed 
as olaiguanani in Maa, I refer to this leader as the ‘age-group chief’.  
Apart from a brief description by Mol (1996: 37-38), I have found inconsistent refer-
ence and information in the literature on ceremonial age-group leaders.9 There is no 
mention of the positions of olorrip olasar, olorripu olkila and olopising olkiteng, apart 
from in Mol (1996). The other two ceremonial age-group leaders, olotuno and oloboru 
onkeene, are discussed in a number of works (Spencer 1988; Galaty 1983; Voshaar 
1979; Waller 1978; Mol 1996).10 
Circumcision-groups are referred to as either belonging to the ‘right-hand’ or the 
‘left-hand’ side and alternate with each successive group. The right-hand circumcision-
groups all have six age-group leaders, while left-hand circumcision-groups have only 
three (olotuno, oloboru enkeene and the age-group chief). This is because, as the senior 
                                                 
8  The full title in Maa is olaiguanani lo lporror, literally ‘chief of the circumcision-group’. 
9  Fr. Mol’s book Maasai Dictionary: Language & Culture (1996) provides valuable information on 
ceremonies and aspects of Maasai culture. Given the sectional variations in the details and timing of 
ceremonies and specific cultural practices, his descriptions are of particular interest to this study 
because they are based on the Loita section since his main informant is a Loita Maasai called Peter 
Nyarket. Mol’s book provides the original description in Maa as given to him by Nyarket, and an 
English transcription by Fr. Mol himself. 
10  There could be three reasons for this. First, knowledge about olotuno and oloboru enkeene might be 
related to the fact that their ritual roles pertain to the most famous of all Maasai ceremonies, the 
eunoto ceremony, which closes active warriorhood and brings all members of an age-group in the 
section together. The disproportionate attention that the eunoto ceremony has received from 
anthropologists (including myself), filmmakers and photographers, and tourists may account for the 
fact that olotuno and oloboru enkeene have made it into the scholarly literature. The Maasai 
themselves also refer to the eunoto ceremony as the most colourful of all ceremonies and the olotuno 
and oloboru enkeene as the most important ceremonial leaders. A second reason might be that since 
the positions of olorrip olasar, olorripu olkila and olopising olkiteng are only occupied by alternate 
circumcision-groups, as will be explained shortly, they are considered less important. A final reason 
for their scholarly invisibility could be that they possibly only exist in Loita, or it is only in Loita that 
they are considered to be in the same league as olotuno and oloboru enkeene. This argument might 
find some support in the fact that the only author to briefly mention them, i.e. Mol, got this 
information from a Loita informant. 
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half of an age-set, the initiation of a right-hand circumcision-group entails the starting 
of a future age-set (when two successive circumcision-groups merge). This is marked 
and celebrated in a separate ceremony where the three extra ceremonial leaders have a 
role to play. A detailed description of the five ceremonial leadership positions and their 
ritual role in the ceremonial cycle of the age-group system can be found in the Appen-
dix. Here I concentrate on some of the key differences between the ceremonial age-
group leaders and the age-group chief to substantiate my argument that the age-group 
chief should be seen as the political leader of the age-group. 
 
 
Photo 6.1 Five of the six age-group leaders in the Iromboi circumcision-group. From left to 
right, the olorrip olasar, the olorripu olkila, the age-group chief, the oloboru en-
keene and the olotuno. The picture was taken during a ‘raiding party of the brisket’ 
ceremony (enjore e nkiyieu) at the ‘manyata of the feathered headdress’ (emanyata 
oo nkorrenkel) (April 2008) 
 
© Angela Kronenburg García 
 
 
Choosing the ceremonial age-group leaders 
The status and respectability of the ceremonial age-group leaders is derived from the 
importance of their role in the age-group ceremonies. Their flawless participation and 
the successful completion of their tasks and responsibilities are vital to the transition of 
their age-group, which is at the heart of all age-group ceremonies. Should they err in 
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their role, it would be seen as an inauspicious omen that could put the wellbeing of the 
whole age-group in danger.11 Ceremonial age-group leaders hold office for life and not 
only for the duration of the ceremony, like most ritual functionaries. This means that, 
even after carrying out their ritual roles, they are bound by their ceremonial position and 
should behave accordingly for the rest of their lives. Given these demands and the high 
expectations of them, ceremonial age-group leaders are chosen with the utmost care and 
candidates’ personal characteristics are taken into consideration. 
Ceremonial age-group leaders are selected in advance of the ceremonies at which 
their leadership will be made public. Typically, the firestick elders (with whom they 
have a special relationship) present two or more potential candidates to the younger age-
group at a meeting where they decide collectively on one of them. In the case of olotuno 
and oloboru enkeene, even the chief laibon is consulted on the matter. For a person to 
be eligible for any ritual function, he must possess certain qualities. When choosing a 
ceremonial age-group leader, particularly the olotuno who is considered the most im-
portant of all but to a lesser degree the oloboru enkeene as well, these requirements are 
followed to the letter. When talking about the positions of olotuno and oloboru enkeene, 
Spencer (1988: 145) wrote that: ‘[t]he ideal candidate should be unflappable, unblem-
ished and with pure Maasai ancestry’. And Galaty (1983: 369) explained:12  
Their offices are defined by qualities of purity and perfection; it is required that the ritual officers 
themselves be morally and physically whole and symmetrical, without blemish or blame, in short, ‘ho-
ly’ (osinya). They should be first sons, born of upright, prosperous and pure Maasai parents, and 
should never have injured or killed another person or have been themselves injured.  
In a similar vein, Voshaar (1979: 91-92) wrote that:  
The person chosen must be a person who is healthy in mind and body, who is neither left-handed, nor 
impotent. There must be no blemish attached to his birth (e.g. being born feet first) nor to his family. 
He may not be one-eyed or grey-eyed. He must be a quiet man, waiting for his olporror [circumcision-
group] to act, a person who has not shed blood nor one who will do so. In short he must be a holy per-
son (esinyari). 
People in Loita describe holy men in similar terms. In short, the person chosen as 
ceremonial age-group leader should be a ‘pure’ Maasai from a wealthy family and with 
parents who are respected members of society. He should be a firstborn son, with no 
physical deformities, anomalies or injuries, and should be of high moral and mental 
calibre, be virtuous and a calm man of sound mind. 
Ceremonial age-group leaders are expected to behave wisely and in a manner appro-
priate to their position, which in fact prevents them from exercising real political power. 
When talking about the olorrip olasar of his age-group, one young man explained to me 
how he was barred from arguing with others: ‘he cannot have problems [with others], he 
cannot go to [dispute] meetings, he cannot abuse anybody’.13 Especially the olotuno, 
                                                 
11  Spencer (1988: 158), when writing about the leather strap that the oloboru enkeene keeps supple and 
in good condition (in Loita it is the olotuno who looks after it), warns that: ‘If it were to become dry 
and crack, then this could threaten his whole age-group’.  
12  See also Waller (1978: 204-205). 
13  Interview LK: 7/10/01. See also Mol (1996: 37): ‘They are severely ordered never ever to fight or 
quarrel with members of their circumcision-group. The members of the circumcision-group too are 
ordered to respect the Officebearers and to uphold them’. And Galaty (1983: 370) wrote: ‘They must 
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with a powerful curse at his disposal, has to avoid situations where he could be angered 
by his age-mates and tempted to use his curse.14 The consequences could be fatal. When 
firestick elders choose candidates for the ceremonial age-group positions they therefore 
also ensure that such a person is naturally kind-hearted and friendly. By finding some-
one with these qualities, they hope to limit the chances as far as possible of them ever 
becoming involved in future conflicts and controversy. This also means that they should 
abstain from behaving as a ‘real’ warrior: ‘No longer may they manifest the conven-
tional norms of moranhood [warriorhood], including intense verbal exchanges, wran-
gling and fighting, travelling in groups and participating in cattle raiding expeditions. 
By representing the “fathers” of the age-group – the “horns” of the set who precede the 
others – they must prematurely adopt the norms of elderhood’ (Galaty 1983: 370). 
In spite of all these precautions, some ceremonial age-group leaders with exceptional 
leadership qualities and political ambitions can break through these behavioural con-
straints. The olorripu olkila of the Iromboi circumcision-group, for example, was an 
active and talented debater who did not shy away from conflict and his opinion carried 
considerable weight. But the most conspicuous example is the olorrip olasar from the 
Ilkishili circumcision-group who, having completed school and after a job at the Ilkerin 
Project, became a councillor in 2001. His re-election as councillor of the Morijo Loita 
Ward in 2007 was explained to me in relation to his ceremonial position. It was claimed 
that he had secured the majority of the votes of his age-mates not only because he was 
their age-mate (at least one other candidate belonged to the same circumcision-group) 
but because he was also one of the age-group’s ceremonial leaders. It was suggested 
that his standing as olorrip olasar and the respect that it commanded gave him a head 
start in the competition for votes. 
Finally, there is historical evidence to suggest that the position of olotuno might have 
wielded wider ritual authority in the past and that it used to even hold political authori-
ty. Waller (1978: 205) reported joint sectional eunoto ceremonies in the early twentieth 
century (and possibly also in the nineteenth century) when a single olotuno was elected 
for all participating sections. This would imply that the ritual authority of this age-group 
leader would have extended beyond the section level to encompass several sections. The 
importance of the position of olotuno probably declined as the ritual position of (chief) 
laibon increased (Ibid.: 206). Elsewhere, Waller (1976: 547; 1978: 205-207) suggested 
that the olotuno might have had political influence. He mentioned two cases, one in the 
1880s and another in the early twentieth century, when both the position of olotuno and 
age-group chief were held concurrently by one person, which raises the possibility that 
the position of olotuno may have had a more political role in the past. One of these dou-
ble authorities was even recommended as PA chief in the Naivasha area.  
  
                                                 
henceforth adopt a humble demeanour, may never fight or be involved in conflict, may not attend 
councils at which abusive words are spoken, and if abused may not reply’.  
14  This curse relates to the necklace of dark blue beads that he possesses and that was made by women. 
Each bead represents a member of his circumcision-group in Loita. If he is angered, he has the power 
to cause an age-mate’s death by removing a bead and throwing it away while uttering the offender’s 
name. 
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The age-group chief as the political leader of the age-group 
While ceremonial age-group leaders are expected to shun politics, the age-group chief is 
chosen precisely to deal with controversies, conflict and other age-group affairs (Spen-
cer 1988: 167). When firestick elders are looking for a suitable person to fill the posi-
tion of age-group chief, they look for a man of principle with a strong personality but 
someone who is also sensitive to the nuances of custom and culture, aware of the winds 
of change and the tide of public opinion, and who is a good negotiator. The point is that 
his position lacks all the ritual and symbolic connotations and associations that the cer-
emonial age-group leaders carry. The position of age-group chief is not, I argue, cere-
monial but political, as he is not linked to any transition ceremony in particular. He is 
not responsible for the manufacturing of a certain ritual artefact (like the olorripu olkila) 
or charged as its keeper (like the olopising olkiteng and the olotuno). He is not required 
to undergo an endurance test for the sake of his age-group (olorrip olasar) or represent 
his whole age-group symbolically (like the olotuno or, to a lesser extent, the oloboru 
enkeene). The age-group chief is appointed precisely to handle the matters the ceremo-
nial age-group leaders are barred from dealing with. His position authorizes him to 
command and punish: he is the main mediator of disputes among age-mates; he has the 
authority to discipline and fine age-mates who disrespect age-group ideals; he is in a 
position to demand obedience; he runs the manyatas of his age-group; he is the main 
decision-maker and takes the lead during the preparations of all major ceremonies of his 
age-group; he may call his age-mates to fight neighbouring communities if land dis-
putes arise; he is the commander during these fights; and he speaks and negotiates on 
behalf of his age-group with other age-groups as well as with visiting politicians (see 
Chapter 1) and tourists who visit their ceremonies and manyatas. The age-group chief 
leads deputations to manyatas of other age-groups and to the chief laibon in preparation 
for age-group ceremonies (Spencer 1988: 144-145) or, as in the past, before cattle raids 
(Berntsen 1979: 140-141; Spencer 1988: 104, 127). After cattle raids, he was the one 
who divided up the loot, of which he was entitled to claim a share (Waller 1978: 95). 
The age-group chief serves as a link between his age-group and the firestick elders and 
holds meetings with them to hear their complaints (Spencer 2010a: 24) and receive their 
instructions. 
The position of age-group chief is therefore the most powerful position in the age-
group and, as such, an age-group chief is chosen before any of the other leaders. At a 
later time, after his age-group has been ceremonially initiated, there is a less important 
ceremony when the age-group chief is given a heifer by his age-mates and a special 
black wooden club or baton (orinka, pl. irinkan) by the firestick elders that was previ-
ously blessed by them. This club symbolizes his new position of authority and his polit-
ical leadership. As will be seen in the next section, clan chiefs are also given such a club 
when they are installed as the chiefs of their clan.  
A final difference between ceremonial age-group leaders and the age-group chief is 
that the position of age-group chief is not for life as it is for the ceremonial age-group 
leaders, but depends on his performance as a chief. Replacing an age-group chief is not 
common and is a complicated and difficult matter that can create deep cleavages in the 
community. It is said that there was an attempt in the past to depose the age-group chief 
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of the Ilkiseeyia circumcision-group but that it failed and this made him an even strong-
er and more determined leader. Today he is a powerful age-group chief. The epilogue at 
the end of Chapter 8 notes how one ramification of the forest conflicts was that the au-
thority of a particular age-group chief was challenged on the grounds that he was not 
performing well as leader and how this deeply divided his circumcision-group. 
The age-group chief wields political power in his age-group unlike the ceremonial 
age-group leaders whose power is of a more ritual nature. There are a few differences 
between the age-group chief and the ceremonial age-group leaders that I will elaborate 
on briefly because they point to a more nuanced understanding of political authority in 
general. First is the idea that while ceremonial age-group leaders should avoid (dispute) 
meetings, these fall under the express domain of the age-group chief. The age-group 
chief is expected to mediate and be the ultimate decision-maker in (dispute) meetings. 
In fact, the word for chief, namely olaiguanani, seems to be closely related to the word 
for meeting, i.e. enkiguana.15 Meetings are political arenas. Second, this responsibility 
is symbolized by the chief’s baton, the black wooden club that he is given during his 
installation and that he holds every time he speaks at meetings as a stern reminder to 
others of his legitimate power. In the next section on clan chiefs, these two elements − 
the dispute meeting and the chief’s baton − and how they pertain to political authority 
come to the fore. Age-group chiefs and clan chiefs are amongst the group of leaders that 
exercise political authority in Loita. 
Clan chiefs and the clan system 
Just as each age-group has its own leaders, so too each clan has its own clan chiefs.16 In 
Maa, a clan chief is called olaiguanani lo lgilata (the chief of the clan) or olaiguanani le 
nkaji (the chief of the sub-clan), depending on the context. He derives his position and 
authority from the clan system that, like the age-group system, is a social structure 
common to all Maasai sections. While the age-group system divides Maasai society 
horizontally into groups of men according to age, the clan system groups Maasai society 
vertically into clans according to descent. 
Clans (ilgilat, sing. olgilata) organize all Maasai men and women into groups of pat-
rilineal descent. However, although the framework of clanship is the same across Maa-
sailand with its divisions into moieties, clans and sub-clans, the exact place of each clan 
in this configuration varies across the sections (Spencer 2010a: 5). This explains why 
different writers, whose information comes from different sections, give alternative list-
ings, as Spencer (Ibid.) explains: ‘[s]egment A may appear as a clan in one account, as a 
sub-clan of clan B in another account and even a sub-clan of clan C in a third’. I will 
describe the clan configuration that belongs to the Loita Maasai. 
Loita consists of five clans: Ilaiser, Ilukumai, Iltaarosero, Ilmolelian and Ilmakesen. 
The right-left duality that is found in the age-group system also comes back in the clan 
                                                 
15  Olaiguanani (chief) is derived from the verb iguan (to advise or take council), which is close to the 
verb aiguana (to discuss) and the noun enkiguana (meeting).   
16  Each clan chief has an assistant clan chief who is installed in the same ceremony as the clan chief. 
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system. This was explained to me by an elder in 2001 who, when I questioned him 
about the clan system, recounted the following myth:17 
There was a man called Naiterukop. He is the Adam of the Maasai. He had five wives. One wife was 
called Nkaserri and another one Lukum. These two wives belonged to the left-hand gatepost. (...) On 
the right we have Molel, Mokesen and Tarosero. [These wives belong to the right-hand gatepost.] (…) 
So the division of clans is based on this: the right-hand gatepost and the left-hand gatepost. You have 
a round enclosure with a gate [i.e. a traditional homestead]. The houses are built next to the gate: the 
first wife will build her house on the right-hand side [as one enters the gate]. (...) The second wife will 
live on the left-hand side of the gate. (...) As a man you will bring your third wife to the first wife’s 
house, until she builds her house next to the first one. The fourth you bring to the second wife’s house. 
The fifth goes to the third until she builds her own house. Thus, some wives belong to one side [and 
others to the other side]. There is a close relationship between people on one side. Inheritance and pro-
tection will be done along these lines. (...) So there is a little clan on every side, protecting themselves 
and inheriting among themselves. Nkaserri begot Ilaiser; Lukum begot Ilukumai. These two clans are 
close together; they are called Orokiteng [The Black Ox]. Molel begot Ilmolelian; Mokesen begot Il-
makesen; and Tarosero begot Iltaarosero. This side is called Odomongi [The Red Oxen]. These five 
wives begot the five Maasai clans. They multiplied.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Homestead 
 
 
 
This Maasai myth explains the origin of clanship and is modelled on the spatial or-
ganization of the ideal homestead (see Figure 6.1).18 The right-left duality is translated 
                                                 
17  Interview ML: 1/10/01. 
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here into the clans that belong to the right-hand gatepost (entaloishi e tatene) and the 
clans that belong to the left-hand gatepost (entaloishi e kedianye). The group that is 
called Odomongi, which means the Red Oxen, belongs to the left-hand side and is com-
posed of the Ilmolelian, Ilmakesen and Iltaarosero clans. The other group, Orokiteng 
(The Black Ox) that belongs to the right-hand side, comprises the Ilaiser and the Iluku-
mai clans.19 The five clans can thus be grouped into two groups or moieties. The con-
stituent clans of a moiety have a closer affinity with each other than with the clans of 
the other moiety. 
Clans are further divided into sub-clans (inkajijik, sing. enkaji) and some even fur-
ther into sub-sub-clans. Figure 6.2 depicts the organization of moieties, clans and sub-
clans in Loita. Four of the five clans have two sub-clans (Ilaiser, Ilukumai, Ilmolelian 
and Iltaarosero) and one, the Ilmakesen clan, has three. 
Each sub-clan is headed by a clan chief. In the case of the Ilmakesen clan, two of the 
three sub-clans (the Empirda and Iloigir sub-clans) share one chief, but the clan chief is 
always chosen from the Iloigir sub-clan. So although the Ilmakesen clan has three sub-
clans, it still has two clan chiefs, just like the other clans. With each of the five clans 
having two chiefs, this brings the total number of clan chiefs in Loita to ten. All clan 
chiefs have the same responsibilities with regard to the clan and sub-clans they repre-
sent. There is no hierarchical system within them: everyone is equal in status.  
Unlike the age-group system, the clan system is not linked to a regulated system of 
ceremonies. The periodic celebration of collective age-group ceremonies confirms and 
affirms the positions of the age-group leaders on a regular basis. The clan system lacks 
this mechanism. Instead, clan chiefs assert their authority during their occasional clan 
meetings, which are held when disputes or certain practices threaten inter- and intra-
clan harmony.20 It is the job of the clan chiefs to ensure that peace is restored and they 
can discipline clan members who have violated clan rules or lead and represent their 
clan when conflicts arise with other clans. 
 
 
                                                 
18  For other versions of the origin myth, see Mol (1996: 20-21); Kipury (1983: 39-40); Spencer (1988: 
19); Voshaar (1979: 52, 1998: 64-65) and Waller (1978: 157).  
19  Triangulation with other informants and comparison with the literature suggests that my informant 
may have mistakenly reversed the right-left duality. I have rectified this slip of the tongue in the quote. 
20  I visited a manyata that had been built on behalf of the Loita Iltaarosero clan in both Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998. One of the Iltaarosero clan chiefs explained that the purpose of the manyata was to 
discuss clan affairs and reformulate its rules and prohibitions. One point that was being discussed was 
the issue of cattle-raiding that had led to the death of some of the clan’s warriors. I was told that these 
kinds of clan manyatas are rare. 
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There are certain social issues that fall under the domain of clan chiefs if they cannot 
be resolved locally by clan elders. This could, for example, include a serious marital 
problem, i.e. if a wife runs away from her husband.1 Among the Loita, clan exogamy is 
the norm.2 It follows that when problems arise between a husband and wife, it is not 
only two individuals who are involved but two families and, ultimately, two clans.3 In a 
context where most marriages are arranged between the bridegroom and the father of 
the bride, a solution to any marital problems is initially sought between these two indi-
viduals. If the marriage cannot be saved,4 discussions revolve around the terms of di-
vorce settlement, i.e. the repayment of the bridewealth (and possibly other livestock 
gifts) by the father-in-law to the husband. If the husband and the father-in-law cannot 
reach an agreement, a meeting can be called and clan elders, usually elders from the 
neighbourhood or close friends and relatives, from both sides are invited. At this stage, 
the matter is taken out of the hands of the husband and the father-in-law, and it is the 
clan elders who decide on the outcome (Spencer 2010a: 9). If such a meeting also fails, 
the matter can be referred to the clan chiefs for mediation but they will only be called on 
if matters escalate or are particularly complicated. They get involved because, at this 
stage, the relationship between the two clans involved as wife-givers and wife-receivers, 
is under strain and the reputation regarding the ‘marriageability’ of the clan is at stake 
(Spencer 1988: 33, 199, 228-232, 237).5 Conflicts between a husband and wife that are 
mediated by clan chiefs are usually open to all circumcised male members of the respec-
tive clans at the level of the section. Although the decisions taken at such meetings may 
affect the lives of the wives, they and other women are not allowed to attend. 
                                                 
1  They may return to their parental home, to a brother, a lover, an influential clan elder or an influential 
age-mate of the husband for support and protection. See Talle (1988: Ch. 6). 
2  Clan endogamy is not impossible, although highly undesirable. Clan endogamy is only permitted 
when the man and the woman are from different sub-clans. In such a case, the man must pay a ‘fine’ 
(a heifer) to the bride’s family to clear the way for the union. This fine is in addition to the 
bridewealth. In practice, it is actually the sub-clan that is the exogamous unit. Among the Maasai, 
marriage is also regulated by what Spencer (1988: 194, 1993: 153) calls ‘age-set exogamy’, which is 
the avoidance of marrying categorical ‘daughters’ from their age-set. 
3  That marriage and marriage problems are not only a matter between a husband and wife and between 
their families but also pertain to the clan becomes evident from the following explanation by an elder: 
‘I have a daughter who is married and lives in Tanzania. If she is mistreated [by her husband], she 
doesn’t have to come here. She will contact a clan-mate of mine and he will act as a father to her. I am 
not worried about her’ (Interview ML: 1/10/01).  
4  Divorce is a last resort, especially if there are children involved because the rules dictate that as the 
children belong to the father’s clan, they have to remain with him. This is why mothers rarely initiate 
divorce. It is also in the interests of the wife’s family to avoid divorce: ‘It is in the interest of the father 
and brother(s) that a girl remains married because the father may not have sufficient animals to 
compensate the husband and release her from the marriage contract. In such cases, the only thing to do 
is to find another husband who is willing to reimburse the previous one, or to substitute the wife with 
another woman’ (Talle 1988: 137). It is not uncommon that a reluctant wife is beaten by her relatives 
and forced to go back to her husband. Divorce only becomes an option when recurrent beatings lead to 
nothing (or a more severe beating could end in death), or if the woman threatens to kill herself. See 
Talle (1988: Ch. 6). 
5  See Talle (1988: 139) for a case where clansmen became involved in a meeting between a husband 
and his father-in-law with the sole aim of protecting the reputation of the family’s (and their clan’s) 
‘marriageability’. See also Spencer (1988: 237) for a case where clansmen beat up a fellow clan-mate 
who neglected his wife and children for the same reason, i.e. to protect the reputation of their clan’s 
marriageability. 
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The most serious issue threatening clan and inter-clan peace, and the one that always 
involves clan chiefs, is homicide. Homicide within a section, i.e. when the killer and the 
person killed are both from Loita, is an issue that involves both clans. Clan chiefs are at 
the forefront of the series of gatherings arranged to address the issue and restore a good 
relationship between the two clans. This is a period of redress: all ceremonies in the 
section are suspended, whether they be large-scale and collective or small-scale and 
individual (see Voshaar 1998: 87). Homicide destroys the peace between two clans and 
a clear protocol must be followed involving the clan of the killer paying a fine of 49 
head of cattle to the clan of the deceased (and not only to the family of the deceased).6 
This needs to be followed by a ceremony to cleanse and bless the killer (by his clan) and 
a peace ceremony between the two groups.7 Clan chiefs are responsible for raising the 
fine and distributing it, depending on whether they are on the giving or receiving end, 
and they make sure that the correct ritual procedures are followed. If the killer and the 
person killed belong to the same clan but are from a different sub-clan, payment goes 
from sub-clan to sub-clan. However, if the killer and the killed belong to the same sub-
clan, the 49 head of cattle are released into the forest for the wild animals. They usually 
end up in the hands of the poorer families in the section.  
A new role for clan chiefs has recently emerged. Clans chiefs have been calling 
meetings to mobilize clan-members to contribute money for, for example, a young, 
bright clan-mate who wants to go to university but whose family cannot pay the fees. 
The Ilaiser clan in Loita started this trend and now the other clans have followed suit. 
The Ilaiser clan also started monetizing fines collected from clan-members who break 
rules and keeping them in a bank account to be used to sponsor clan-mates at university. 
The chief laibon 
Chief laibons are territorial because they claim sectional domains. Mokompo ole Simel, 
the current chief laibon of Loita, also claims authority over the Damat and Matapato 
Maasai sections (CCD ‘Affidavit’: 2).8 His authority as chief laibon thus reaches be-
yond the territorial boundaries of the Loita section. However, because of the historical 
relationship between his lineage the House of Senteu and the Loita (see Chapter 3) and 
because he lives in Loita and is identified as a Loita Maasai, his authority in Loita is 
particularly strong. This section describes the nature and character of this authority, 
based on my fieldwork findings.     
Mokompo belongs to the Inkidongi family. The Inkidongi form a sub-clan of the Il-
parsimaro sub-clan of the Ilaiser clan and its members can be found grouped in various 
                                                 
6  According to one informant, if the death resulted from an accident, the fine can be reduced to 29 head 
of cattle. Another informant explained that if the murdered person was a pregnant woman, 5 of the 49 
head of cattle should also be pregnant to account for the loss of the unborn child. 
7  Until a cleansing ceremony has been held, a killer is barred from full participation in ceremonies. 
8  His claim over the Matapato is being challenged though. In 2001, a delegation from Matapato visited 
a brother of Mokompo called Sanya when preparing their eunoto ceremony. This visit indicated that 
the Matapato recognized Sanya and not Mokompo as their chief laibon. According to Mokompo, the 
chief laibon of the Kaputiei is called ole Koyiaki, who is a stepbrother of his father; the chief laibon of 
the Keekonyokie is Neiliang; and the Purko and Kisongo Maasai have chief laibons that come from 
the lineage of Olonana, Senteu’s brother. 
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parts of Maasailand.9 All the men in the Inkidongi family have been born with the ex-
ceptional ability ‘to see’ or ‘foresee’, as was explained to me on several occasions (see 
also Spencer 1991: 334, 341; Fratkin 1979: 56, 1991: 320). But not all of them develop 
this capacity and become practising laibons, and even fewer become successful and 
powerful. The Maasai (and Samburu) institution of laibonism has received considerable 
academic attention. In this vast body of work, laibons have been variously portrayed as 
‘prophets’ (Fratkin 1979; Berntsen 1979; Spencer 1991; Waller 1978), ‘diviners’ (Spen-
cer 1991; Waller 1978), ‘sorcerers’ (Fratkin 1991), ‘ritual experts’ or ‘ritual innovators’ 
(Waller 1978) and ‘war-leaders’ or ‘war-prophets’ (Waller 1978, 1995). In Loita, all 
these labels make sense to varying degrees and in different contemporary and historical 
contexts. Yet drawing from my own ethnographic material, I believe that the word 
‘seer’ best describes the innate skill of a laibon in Loita today.   
‘Seeing’ can be done in two ways. Laibons can see things spontaneously in dreams 
or during an induced trance. This is, for example, how Senteu is said to have seen that 
Loita was a good place for him to settle. Laibons may also see an inauspicious future 
situation for a group of people or a whole section that needs rectifying ritually. (This 
capacity is the reason why laibons have been called ‘prophets’ in the literature.) Only a 
few laibons have the ability to ‘see’ in this way. In Loita, one of these is the chief lai-
bon. The second way in which seeing can be achieved is with the help of divining 
stones that are kept in a gourd or cattle horn that the laibon handles and interprets dur-
ing a divination session.10 (This is why laibons have been called ‘diviners’.) Laibons 
consult their stones on behalf of individuals or groups of people who visit them with a 
particular problem or dilemma, a disease (which may be related to sorcery or a curse), 
recurrent misfortune or simply with a question about what the future holds for them. If a 
remedy is needed, the laibon provides charms and amulets containing ritual medicines 
(intasimi, sing. entasim) made from herbs, barks and roots that have protective and/or 
healing powers. In serious cases, a laibon might also need to perform a ritual ceremony. 
For example, the women of Loita visited a laibon called Letutui in 2008 (see Chapter 2 
& 3) when they were concerned about their fertility. It was decided to hold a series of 
ceremonies that were presided over and blessed by Letutui and held throughout Loita in 
the month of August. Divination requires practice and is an ability that needs to be 
learned, ideally under the supervision of the novice’s father (Spencer 1991: 334; 
Berntsen 1979: 135; Waller 1995: 32). The success of a laibon that divines is partly 
based on his skill and expertise and partly on his ability to build a personal clientele 
(Waller 1995: 32; Spencer 1991: 334; Berntsen 1979: 142). Clients that consult laibons 
pay for divination and remedial services in the form of money, honey beer, a goat or 
cattle. 
                                                 
9  The foundation myth of the Inkidongi that was recounted to me describes how the first laibon called 
Kidongoi was found wandering on the Oldoinyo loo Laiser (the hill of the Ilaiser, also known as the 
Ngong Hills) and was adopted into the Ilaiser clan (see also Waller 1995: 28). In this way, the 
Inkidongi, the descendants of this apical forefather, became a sub-sub-clan of the larger Ilaiser clan. 
10  The Inkidongi appear to be named after these divining gourds or horns called inkidongi (sing. 
enkidong) in Maa (Mol 1996: 179-180).  
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Apart from the chief laibon, there are other practising laibons in Loita, such as the al-
ready-mentioned Letutui, who was a popular and much-consulted laibon in Loita. When 
I visited his homestead one day, he was busy attending to a client, a young man who 
had come from the other side of Loita. The chief laibon holds divination sessions for 
people from Loita but also for people from other Maasai areas and beyond: ‘the white 
people come, Purko, Kisongo, Kaputiei, even if there are laibons [in their places] … 
they all come to get medicines’,11 he told me. On one of my visits I was asked to come 
back on another day because there were already two groups of people waiting for a con-
sultation with him. When I went back two days later, he offered me a spontaneous divi-
nation session. My research assistant who had accompanied me that day, Papiyio ole 
Muntet, was also given the opportunity to ask questions in the same session. This was in 
2001 during my field research for my Masters degree. The following is an excerpt from 
my field notes: 
  
Divination session with Mokompo ole Simel, chief laibon of Loita 
5 October 2001 
Ilkujuka, Kisokon 
A woman (I suspect one of his wives) takes out the gourd, wrapped in a cloth, and a black and white 
hide from the room next to his ‘office’. I see a bed there, maybe it is his bedroom. Mokompo removes 
his sandals and sits down on the hide. He uncovers the gourd, spreads out the cloth on the hide in front 
of him and places his walking stick along the furthest edge of the cloth to keep it in place. The gourd 
is simple, not decorated. After removing the cap of the gourd he starts speaking softly into the gourd, 
his lips almost touching the opening of the gourd. We can’t understand what he’s saying; he’s mutter-
ing. He then shakes out the stones, piling them up in groups on the cloth. Amongst the stones, I see 
metal objects and even glass marbles. He counts and piles, joins two piles and again removes more 
stones from the gourd. Then he says that he can see that my stay in Loita will be very good. Whenever 
I’ll come here, it will be good. (...) He then throws the stones again and says that the gourd can see 
Zaira [my daughter] moving around; she will have a good life. It is now Papiyio’s turn. Mokompo 
gives him the gourd and Papiyio asks a question to the stones. (...) I ask if I can also pose a question to 
the stones. I ask the stones about the future of my family. (...) When piling, counting and joining the 
stones, he asks Papiyio what my question was. He then answers my question: we [my family] will be 
very happy and we will become very rich. He notices the stones are similar to Papiyio’s. 
The interpretation of the divining stones involves piling, counting and joining piles 
‘according to a complicated numerology’ (Waller 1995: 32), which I did not try to un-
derstand but for which Fratkin (1991: 322), who interviewed Mokompo’s father Simel 
when he was the chief laibon of Loita, offers an explanation. We gave the chief laibon a 
container with honey beer that we had brought as a gift and that could now function as 
payment for his divination session.  
In addition to his services as diviner for individual and group clients, the chief laibon 
also divines on behalf of the Loita section as a whole, particularly during age-group 
ceremonial times. This is an exclusive relationship that is vested in the position of chief 
laibon, which Mokompo inherited from his father after his death. Instead of the gourd, 
of which he had two in 2001 and ten in 2008 and that are destined for use in private 
consultations, the chief laibon uses a cattle horn. In his words: ‘[the horn] is the one that 
gave birth to all these other ones [i.e. the gourds], it is from God (Enkai)’.12 Mokompo 
                                                 
11  Interview MS: 21/11/08. 
12  Interview MS: 21/11/08. 
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claims that this horn was the original horn that Kidongoi, the mythical ancestor of the 
laibons, was carrying when he arrived from heaven.13 Through Mokompo’s great-
grandfather, Mbatiany, this horn was handed down to him via the patrilineal line.14 The 
horn, like the black club given to the age-group chief and the clan chief, is a symbol of 
his position of authority in Loita. By virtue of possessing the original horn, Mokompo 
claims superiority over all other laibons in Loita, and in the whole of Maasailand.  
The authority of a chief laibon over a sectional territory is based on his special ability 
to see and foresee (harmful) events that might affect his territorial domain (Spencer 
1991: 338-339). Mokompo, who claims he can see Loitaland (including the Naimina 
Enkiyio Forest) in this way, interfered during the forest conflicts when he saw that the 
forest needed protection to ward off the threat of alienation. He used his horn to divine 
and ritual medicines to ‘tie’ (aen) the dangerous outsiders and prevent them from carry-
ing out their plans. ‘Tying’ in this context refers to the use of ritual medicines to ‘inhibit 
some adverse force from a distance’ (Ibid.: 335). An important task for Mokompo as 
Loita’s chief laibon is thus to protect the section from misfortune.  
The position of chief laibon is an inherited leadership position. It passes from father 
to son and Mokompo’s line of succession can be traced back historically to Supeet, the 
father of Mbatiany,15 who in turn was the father of Senteu (Waller 1978: 195) (see Fig-
ure 6.3). The position of chief laibon does not pass automatically to the eldest son. Mo-
kompo, for instance, is not Simel’s firstborn son.16 
The special link between the Loita and this particular lineage of the Inkidongi dates 
back to the end of the nineteenth century when Senteu became the chief laibon of the 
Loita, ritually directing their raids against other sections, particularly the Purko, who 
followed Senteu’s half-brother and rival Olonana as their chief laibon (see Chapter 3). 
Senteu settled permanently in Loita with his extended family and dependants after the 
intersectional War of Morijo ended and established the Inkidongi community that still 
lives in Loita today and is known as the House of Senteu.17  
Though identified as ‘Loita’, the Inkidongi is a group that is slightly different from 
the rest of the Loita community, particularly when it comes to settlement patterns (see 
Chapter 11). Another difference is that, with the exception of the eunoto ceremony, they 
do not participate in the collective age-group ceremonies of the Loita, a pattern that 
seems to apply more widely to other Inkidongi communities (Berntsen 1979: 137). In 
fact, they hold their own ceremonies separately.18 The eunoto ceremony is, as the only 
age-group ceremony that the Inkidongi of Loita hold jointly with the non-Inkidongi 
Loita, crucial for their identity as Loita Maasai. It is one of the largest age-group cere-
                                                 
13  For versions of this Maasai foundation myth, see Waller (1978: 198; 1995: 28) and Berntsen (1979: 
135). 
14  Berntsen (1979: 138), who interviewed some Loita elders, Inkidongi and non-Inkidongi alike, gives a 
brief account of the politics surrounding Mokompo’s inheritance of the position of chief laibon. 
15  Some scholars question whether Mbatiany was Supeet’s biological son (Waller 1978: 196) but in oral 
history he is certainly described as such. 
16  And neither were Mbatiany, Olonana, Senteu or Simel for that matter (Waller 1995: 39). 
17  My research on the Inkidongi was limited to this group of Inkidongi. 
18  I describe and analyse one of these ceremonies in my Masters thesis (Kronenburg García 2003: 59-
84). 
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monies, bringing together the Loita from Tanzania, the Loita of Kenya and the House of 
Senteu. It is visible confirmation of a common Loita Maasai identity among these three 
groups.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Genealogy of succession of the chief laibons 
 
Although Inkidongi do not join their fellow non-Inkidongi Loita as ritual participants 
in the other age-group ceremonies, they do pay formal visits to some of their manyatas. 
For example, they formed one of many delegations that visited the manyata of the 
‘stool’ (Chapter 1). At other manyatas, however, they are not welcome. Unknowingly, 
one day when I went to visit the manyata for the ‘raiding-party of the brisket’ ceremony, 
I took along an Inkidongi friend and neighbour who was curious about the manyata and 
saw this as a nice sightseeing trip on his day off. Lenaai, my research assistant, was also 
unaware that, for this particular manyata, Inkidongi men were supposed to remain at a 
distance. Lenaai was considered responsible for this infraction and was later severely 
reprimanded by the age-group chief for allowing it to happen, and specifically for bring-
ing our Inkidongi friend all the way to the ritual house in the middle of the manyata. 
This mistake did not become a major issue because our Inkidongi friend had attended 
school and his father, being a devoted pastor, had prohibited his family from participat-
ing in Maasai rituals and ceremonies, including those belonging to laibonism. It was 
concluded that our Inkidongi friend posed no ‘danger’. In this case ‘danger’ referred to 
the idea that he might have been sent ‘to curse’ the ceremony. This perceived danger 
and mistrust could have been related to the association of laibons with sorcery (Fratkin 
1979, 1991; Spencer 1991; Waller 1978, 1995). Laibons are viewed ambivalently by 
other Maasai. Their supernatural powers to prophesize, divine, heal and protect, includ-
ing protection from sorcery (Kronenburg García 2003: 76), are highly valued but there 
are suspicions surrounding their involvement in malevolent sorcery either by inflicting 
sorcery themselves or by providing others with poisons (Waller 1978: 246-247, 1995: 
Olonana
Mokompo
Simel
Senteu
Mbatiany
Supeet
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31-32; Fratkin 1979: 56, 1991; Spencer 1991). It is believed that laibons’ knowledge of 
herbs, roots and barks for healing purposes and protection extends to knowledge about 
harmful substances (Fratkin 1979: 56-57, 1991: 319-320; Spencer 1991: 335). However 
in Loita and apart from the incident described above, I have never heard people accus-
ing or suspecting laibons of sorcery. And sorcery in general is only incidentally men-
tioned. This is in contrast to Spencer (Ibid.: 337) who talks about a ‘chronic and endem-
ic concern over sorcery’ in Maasai society. 
The eunoto ceremony is not only important for a common Loita identity, celebrated 
jointly as it is with the rest of the Loita, but also because it is the most salient and public 
event at which the chief laibon confirms his special relationship to Loita and where the 
Loita reaffirm their recognition of his position as their chief laibon. Although also in-
volved in at least one other age-group ceremony, the eunoto ceremony is the only one 
that the chief laibon attends personally. In fact, there is one episode during this week-
long ceremony that is wholly dedicated to him. After the arrival of the warrior groups 
from Kenya, Tanzania and the House of Senteu at the manyata, they all proceed to greet 
the chief laibon who, seated in view of everyone next to the ritual house in the centre of 
the manyata, is introduced formally to this new batch of circumcised Loita men. All the 
warriors greet him personally, bending to touch his right shoulder with theirs, the most 
respectful form of greeting there is and that, at the same time, is a form of blessing by 
the chief laibon. The performance of the chief laibon in this ceremony is more that of 
honourable guest than of ritual expert presiding and officiating at a ceremony. The pro-
ceedings were firmly in the hands of the firestick elders. 
Another aspect that linked the chief laibon to this ceremony was his responsibility to 
protect the ritual participants, including himself, from ‘danger’. By chance, I had wit-
nessed how Mokompo had seen and remedied ‘danger’ prior to the ceremony. I had 
been asked to pick up the chief laibon by car that day but when I arrived at his home-
stead, he and a group of fellow kinsmen were gathered in one of the houses, intoxicated 
and in a trance, and after some time the chief laibon announced that he had seen ‘dan-
ger’ along the road to the manyata.19 I was ordered to drive one of his sons, who was 
present at the gathering, to a particular spot along the road, where two tracks met, and I 
was strictly instructed not to stop on the way. There, his son carried out some ritual ac-
tions with a white powder (probably white chalk) to clear the path of ‘danger’. That day 
was not a good day for the chief laibon’s journey and he did not travel to the manyata 
until the following day. Ritual protection using medicine against danger (from sorcery, 
according to Spencer 1991: 338-339, 1988: 140, 167) during transition ceremonies 
when an age-group is particularly vulnerable seems to be one of the tasks of the chief 
laibon in relation to age-group ceremonies (Fratkin 1991: 320, 1979: 58; Waller 1978: 
241-244, 1995: 47-48; Berntsen 1979: 137, 139-140). Our discussion on the ceremonial 
age-group leaders has also shown that the chief laibon is consulted as to the choice of 
the two ceremonial age-group leaders (olotuno and oloboru enkeene) that are chosen for 
                                                 
19  I do not know what this ‘danger’ consisted of or what its ritual remedy accomplished. My questions 
were ignored.  
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the eunoto ceremony. For his ritual services during the eunoto of the Iromboi in 2005, 
Mokompo was paid 49 head of cattle. 
The chief laibon also played a role during the preparations for the manyata of the 
‘stool’. I recall a conversation with age-group chief ole Maine on the ongoing debate 
over where to construct the manyata. Although the age-group chief had a clear prefer-
ence and was confident that he could push this choice through during meetings with his 
age-mates, he reminded me that the final decision lay with the chief laibon, whose ritual 
guidance (through prophesy, divination and protective medicine) would be sought dur-
ing a formal visit by a special delegation to his homestead.20  
In the past, chief laibons combined their ritual authority with political authority; di-
recting cattle raids in the nineteenth century or by becoming a double authority when 
the colonial state introduced the more political positions of headman and PA chief. To-
day, however, the role of the chief laibon is solely ritual. This claim has additional 
strength in that he was not invited to the several Loita leaders’ meetings that took place 
during my stay in Loita. These large-scale meetings, which brought together PA chiefs, 
councillors, development leaders, age-group leaders and clan leaders, discussed Loita’s 
external affairs (see Chapter 5). What all these leadership positions have in common is 
that they hold political authority. Meetings, such as these Loita leaders’ meetings, are 
political arenas where political authority is asserted and exerted. These are considered 
socially inappropriate arenas for the chief laibon to exercise his authority. His own true 
arena is the divination session and the age-group ceremony.   
To sum up, Mokompo’s area of influence as chief laibon of Loita covers two specific 
ritual spheres. The first is in relation to age-group ceremonies. We have seen that the 
chief laibon offers protection against ‘danger’ in ceremonies and his advice is sought 
regarding major decisions. He is at the centre of a ritual performance in the eunoto cer-
emony. The second sphere involves his responsibility ‘to protect those living in his do-
main from … widespread misfortunes’ (Spencer 1991: 338), as he did during the forest 
conflicts (see Chapter 8). 
Conclusion: governing social relations in Loita 
One of the points that this chapter has highlighted is that ritual and ceremony are central 
features of Maasai leadership. Powerful rituals during ceremonies endorse and confirm 
the authority of leaders. We have seen how the carefully selected men are officially in-
stalled in office on ceremonial occasions when they are given a ritually blessed artefact 
that symbolizes their new authority (the black club in the case of the age-group chief 
and the clan chief, the divining horn for the chief laibon) or how they are responsible for 
a particular ritual act or performance during a ceremony (such as the ceremonial age-
group leaders). It also became clear that Maasai leadership is not only about political 
power but also about ritual authority. The discussion concerning the age-group chief 
and the ceremonial age-group leaders clearly demonstrates how these different types of 
authority pertain to different arenas. This is a point that needs highlighting because it is 
of particular relevance in the following chapters. Ritual authority and political authority 
                                                 
20  For more information on delegations visiting chief laibons in preparation for age-group ceremonies, 
see Waller (1978: 229-230), Spencer (1991: 338-339) and Berntsen (1979: 139-140). 
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are neatly distributed amongst the ceremonial age-group leaders on the one hand and the 
age-group chief on the other hand. Ceremonial age-group leaders are endowed with 
ritual authority by virtue of their role in the ceremonial cycle of the age-group system 
and the age-group chief is specifically chosen to politically lead his age-group. The 
meeting is an arena par excellence for the age-group chief to exercise his political au-
thority. But most importantly, we saw that meetings should be avoided by the ceremo-
nial age-group leaders, especially if they are convened to settle a dispute or discuss a 
problem. The appropriate arena for the ceremonial age-group leaders is the age-group 
ceremony, where unity rather than dissension is conveyed. Ceremonies and rituals are 
thus moments to preserve unity and celebrate Loita identity, and ceremonial age-group 
leaders (as well as other ritual leaders) are there to symbolize this sense of unity. Meet-
ings are the political arenas where important decisions are taken that can create dissen-
sion, where challenges that need to be addressed take centre stage and where fights are 
fought out. Age-group chiefs (as well as other political leaders) are there to take the lead 
in these matters. Given the focus of this research on struggles surrounding land and for-
est areas, meetings rather than ceremonies and rituals figure more prominently in this 
thesis and political rather than ritual authority is therefore central. 
The distinction between political power and ritual authority is not always clear-cut, 
as the case of the chief laibon shows. If I limited my consideration of the chief laibon to 
my fieldwork period, then I would conclude that the authority of the chief laibon in 
Loita is solely ritual. For one thing, he did not attend the Loita leaders’ meetings, which 
all the other (political) leaders in Loita did, including the PA chiefs, councillors, devel-
opment leaders, age-group chiefs and clan chiefs. The chief laibon’s authority was in 
fact only exercised during divination sessions and at age-group ceremonies, which are 
typical ritual arenas. However, if we look back into the past, it becomes clear that at 
different historical conjunctures, chief laibons also exercised political influence and 
power (see Chapters 3 & 4). The ambiguity of the chief laibon’s authority will be seen 
again in Chapter 8 on the forest conflicts.  
Meetings are the settings where political leaders decide what to do with outside in-
terventions. But they are also the place where leaders decide how to punish or fine fel-
low Loita Maasai. In both cases, leaders engage in the practice of governing. In the first 
case, they try to govern relations with the outside world, while in the second, they at-
tempt to govern the behaviour of the Loita. The discussion on the PA chiefs, councillors 
and development leaders in the previous chapter showed how Loita leaders govern ex-
ternal relations. The analysis of the positions of age-group chief and clan chief in this 
chapter have shown how social dynamics inside the Loita section are governed as these 
leaders channel age-group and clan relations and processes in the right direction when 
social boundaries and rules are crossed within their respective age-group and clan do-
mains. Age-group chiefs and clan chiefs govern internal social relations. Separately, 
they only have authority over a segment of the Loita population but, together, their au-
thority covers the whole clan and age-group domain of the Loita section. 
Age-group chiefs and clan chiefs are not the only governors of internal Loita social 
relations. Chapters 10 and 11 consider how locality and section leaders exercise politi-
cal authority and govern relations of use, access and property in land. 
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Double authorities are interesting since they occupy a position as outside intermedi-
ary and internal governor. We have seen how this happened in the colonial period when 
age-group chiefs ole Kashu and ole Moti were appointed to the new state position of 
headman (Chapter 4). Chapter 8 discusses two more examples of double authorities. 
Such double authorities have much more power than single authorities because their 
spheres of influence are double. They can, therefore, be particularly powerful Loita 
leaders.  
Having introduced and discussed the most relevant leadership positions in Loita in 
this and in the previous chapters, it is now time to turn to why most of the Loita leaders 
belong to – and are expected to belong to – the ‘governing age-group’. We will see in 
the next chapter that although political authority is distributed amongst the numerous 
leaders in Loita, it is still concentrated in one age-group. The following chapter explains 
how the modus operandi of the age-group system shapes leadership by prescribing 
which age-group has the authority to govern the section. 
  
7 
The governing age-group: 
Configuring leadership through  
the age-group system 
Very broadly, the period when the elders of an age-set are in their politi-
cal prime corresponds to the span of about fifteen years when the privi-
leges of moranhood [warriorhood] are claimed by their firestick wards in 
their physical prime (as right and left age-groups). 
(Spencer 1988: 215) 
 
A clan chief that I was interviewing on the history of Loita started answering one of my 
questions in the following manner: ‘the time when the Ilterito, our fathers, were the 
ones governing Loita …’.1 This short phrase captures what this chapter is all about. 
‘Ilterito’ is the name of an age-set and this age-set was governing the Loita section at 
the particular period in time that the clan chief was referring to. Not an individual leader 
but a whole age-set was alluded to as having political authority. This chapter considers 
how the temporality inherent in the age-group system dictates which particular age-
group is charged with the task of governing the section and for how long. This, in turn, 
is important for understanding why most of the leaders in Loita, including PA chiefs, 
councillors and development leaders, belong to (and are expected to belong to) one and 
the same age-group. The chapter explores why leadership and power are concentrated in 
one age-group. 
The clan chief referred to the Ilterito as ‘our fathers’. This is significant because it 
points to the special relationship between the Ilterito and the age-set to which the clan 
chief belongs. This relationship, which is called the ‘firestick relationship’ here, links an 
older age-set with a younger age-set as if they were ‘fathers’ and ‘sons’.2 An important 
point in this chapter is that when the ‘fathers’ govern the section, the ‘sons’ protect the 
section as warriors. This means that the clan chief was a warrior during the time he was 
                                                 
1  Interview PK: 29/8/09. The interview was conducted in English and ‘governing’ was the word that he 
used.  
2  Though not necessarily biological fathers and sons. 
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referring to. The firestick relationship is integral to the age-group system and crucial for 
understanding how the age-group system organizes political leadership in Loita. As a 
first step, the firestick relationship and the age-group system need to be explained and 
described in detail. This will be done in the first section of this chapter.  
To develop the argument, I build on the work of Spencer (1988, 1993) and Voshaar 
(1979, 1998) who have analysed the firestick relationship in detail. Their work does not 
refer to political leadership per se but some of their comments give important clues as to 
how the age-group system structures sectional leadership. At a certain point in his book, 
Spencer (1988: 215-216) uses the term ‘the ruling age-set’. Inspired by this term, but 
adjusted to conform to Loita evidence, this thesis uses the term ‘the governing age-
group’ to refer to the age-group that has been allocated power to govern the section. The 
choice for the more general ‘age-group’ rather than Spencer’s ‘age-set’ is deliberate. 
This chapter will show that, depending on how closely one looks at the dynamics at 
hand, one either discerns a governing age-set or a governing circumcision-group. Both 
Spencer and Voshaar focus on age-sets, which is compatible with a long-term view of 
the workings of the age-group system. I will show that, by zooming in at the level of the 
circumcision-group, patterns that were hazy from a long-term age-set perspective be-
come sharper and dynamics that were previously unclear become more visible. The 
chapter’s second and third sections discuss political leadership based on age-set, as ad-
vanced by Spencer and Voshaar. The fourth section looks at political leadership based 
on circumcision-group as it is revealed by my own data and the final section considers 
the governing age-group from a historical perspective. 
What I hope to clarify in this chapter is that the temporality and rhythm inherent in 
the age-group system makes it a very dynamic complex that is constantly in motion and 
that the political landscape that one encounters at a certain point is not the same some 
years later. When I was in Loita in 2005 filming the eunoto ceremony of the Iromboi, 
their firestick elders (the Ilkitoip) were, without a doubt, the governing age-set in Loita. 
Five years later, the Ilkitoip’s successors, the Ilkisaroni age-set, had started to claim 
political leadership publicly, for example during Prime Minister Odinga’s visit to their 
manyata (see Chapter 1). Two years later, their political authority as the governing age-
set in Loita was confirmed when members of the Ilkisaroni were ceremonially installed 
as the new clan chiefs of Loita.  
The political landscape that I encountered while doing fieldwork from mid-2007 to 
the end of 2008 is the point of departure for the analysis in this chapter. It was as fol-
lows: the Ilkitoip age-set, aged between 52 and 64, dominated the political scene of 
Loita. They were the designated governing age-set. Most of the Loita leaders (such as 
the PA chiefs, clan chiefs, one of the two councillors) belonged to this age-set. In this 
period, the Loita warriors belonged to the Iltumusika circumcision-group and, together 
with the circumcision-group that had been the warriors before them (the Iromboi), they 
would form a single age-set in the future. This future age-set linked with the Ilkitoip 
age-set in a firestick relationship. My main PhD fieldwork period fell in the second half 
of Ilkitoip’s political term. 
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The age-group system and the firestick relationship 
Apart from providing the basis for the leadership positions of the age-group chief and 
the ceremonial age-group leaders, as we saw in the previous chapter, the age-group sys-
tem also configures leadership in another way.3 To understand this, it is important to 
understand how the age-group system actually works and what the firestick relationship 
is. Here I present my own understanding of the workings and machinations of the age-
group system in Loita. Despite some minor differences in nuance, detail and interpreta-
tion, this understanding is very similar to, and was greatly assisted by, the excellent 
work of Spencer (1988, 1993) and Voshaar (1998: 72-77, 91-99, 1979: 58-85) on the 
subject. 
 
Circumcision-groups, age-sets and age-grades in a nutshell 
The age-group system organizes all circumcised men into age-groups. Two types of 
age-groups are distinguished in Loita: the circumcision-group (olporror, pl. ilporori) 
and the age-set (olaji, pl. ilajijik).4 A circumcision-group comprises a generation of men 
within an age-span of about eight years. This means that between the oldest and the 
youngest members of a circumcision-group there is an age difference of approximately 
eight years. Two consecutive circumcision-groups form an age-set and so the age-span 
of an age-set is about 16 years. Circumcision-groups and age-sets are distinguished by 
their own names. Membership is for life and men are simultaneously members of a cir-
cumcision-group and an age-set, although the emphasis of identity changes over time. 
Age-groups advance through the different grades of warriorhood and elderhood as 
they mature. These transitions are marked by ceremonies that together form a regulated 
cycle of ritual promotions or graduations. The age-group ceremonial cycle officially 
starts with the initiation of a circumcision-group at their enkipaata ceremony and ends 
with the formation of an age-set at the ‘stool’ (olorika) ceremony about 26 years later 
for a right-hand-side circumcision-group and about 19 years later for a left-hand-side 
circumcision-group.5 Ceremonies can be either large-scale collective ceremonies held at 
                                                 
3  The age-group system not only structures political leadership but also the way people greet and 
address each other, it regulates the division of labour in the pastoral economy (Voshaar 1998: 72-79, 
1979: 72, 76-85), shapes gender and sexual relations (Talle 1988, 2007) and involves a particular way 
of perceiving time (Spencer 1993; Rigby 1983). The synchronization of age-groups across 
autonomous territorial sections is crucial for a common Maasai identity (Spencer 1993: 145-146). The 
age-group system has also come to shape the allocation of individual ranches, membership of group 
ranches and conflicts over membership in the process of group ranch subdivision (Galaty 1992: 29, 
30, 1994a: 111-112; Mwangi 2007b: 901-902; Rutten 1992: 303, 305-308). Tignor (1972) attributes 
early-twentieth-century Maasai conservatism to the age-group system. Chapter 3 discussed how the 
age-group system was key to Maasai expansion in the past. 
4  Not all Maasai sections have circumcision-groups and age-sets. The Kisongo, for instance, only have 
age-sets as I learned when I travelled through Kisongoland in 2010 (see Voshaar 1979: 61; Spencer 
1988: 95). In Loita, the word olaji is not commonly used, but is known. Instead, the word olporror is 
used to refer to both the circumcision-group and the age-set. Usually the context in which the word is 
used clarifies whether someone is referring to a circumcision-group or an age-set. To avoid any 
confusion or ambiguity, I have held on to the distinction between the two names. See Spencer (1988: 
188-189) for the various connotations attached to the words olporror and olaji. 
5  Among the Maasai, there are many more ceremonial cycles than just the age-group ceremonial cycle. 
Voshaar (1998: 82-85) calls these ‘systems’ or ‘series’ (also Voshaar 1979: 97-101). Some of the series 
identified alongside the age-group series are the mother & child series, the individual series, the 
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the level of the section or individual ceremonies at around the same time that are held 
by all members of an age-group. I use the word ‘age-grade’ (or simply grade) to identify 
the states or stages that an age-group occupies between transition ceremonies.6 Transi-
tion ceremonies typically mark a new status for the members of an age-group that is 
associated with the acquisition of certain privileges and avoidances.7 Alternatively, a 
transition ceremony may be held to lift a taboo or relax an avoidance that is associated 
with warriorhood.8 
The journey through the age-group system of an average Maasai boy born in Loita 
would be as follows. With circumcision, the boy officially enters the age-group system 
by joining a circumcision-group. Circumcision also marks the beginning of warriorhood 
for him. After a period as warrior or in the ‘warrior grade’ if he doesn’t become a warri-
or in the full sense, he will perform successive ceremonies, collectively or individually, 
that lift taboos and rules associated with warriorhood one by one as he gradually be-
comes an elder. The final ceremony of the age-group system will confirm his status as 
elder. It is also at this last ceremony that two successive circumcision-groups will join 
to form an age-set. For a man, his age-group identity will from then on be dominated by 
his age-set rather than his circumcision-group. 
It is important to note at this point that, despite all the rules associated with the age-
group system and the importance of ceremonial sequencing, the system is quite flexible 
and there are ways to accommodate unforeseen or changed circumstances or to make 
exceptions in individual cases. For example, collective ceremonies are often planned to 
occur during the school holidays so that school-going youth can attend, or ceremonies 
that have already started can be halted because of the visit of a prominent personality.9 
One of Spencer’s many examples of ‘recognised loopholes in the age system’ (1988: 
                                                 
‘owner of the homestead’ series, and the husband & wife series. Certain ceremonies fit into different 
series. An example is the circumcision ceremony, which is part of the age-group series, the mother & 
child series, the owner of the homestead series and the individual series. Spencer (1988, 2003) only 
distinguishes between age-group ceremonies and a sequence of ‘personal ceremonies’, one for men 
and one for women (Ibid.: 57; Spencer 2010a: 34 for an overview of the personal ceremonies). 
6  ‘Age-grade’ is an analytical term and there is no word in Maa for ‘age-grade’. This definition of the 
term ‘age-grade’ is different from what is used in much of the literature on age-group systems (see 
Foner & Kertzer 1978). These works emphasize the social roles of the different age-grades and age-
grades thus go beyond the age-group ceremonial cycle to encompass the whole life cycle of an 
individual. Such a view of age-grades would tell us that the social role of Maasai ‘boys’ (who have not 
yet joined an age-group) is to herd the livestock, that of the ‘warriors’ is to protect the section, and that 
of the ‘elders’ is to take decisions. These categories may in turn have several sub-categories such as 
small boy and old boy, junior and senior warrior, or junior and senior elder. The problem is that as 
more sub-age-grades are identified, the social roles become less clear. The transition ceremonies that 
supposedly mark a person’s passage to a new age-grade also disappear. 
7  With circumcision, a boy ceases to be a boy and becomes a young man or warrior. For an extensive 
discussion of the privileges and avoidances of warriorhood and the dynamics and process of acquiring 
and losing them, see Spencer (1988: Ch. 5 & 6). 
8  See Note 27 for an overview of warriorhood avoidances and taboos, and the ceremonies that relax 
these rules. See also Table 7.2. 
9  This happened in 2012 during the eunoto ceremony of the Iltumusika age-group. The eunoto 
ceremony has a strict sequence of rituals that need to be performed over the course of several days. 
The eunoto of the Iltumusika had already started when an aspiring politician − Narok County senate 
candidate Andrew Sunkuli − wanted to visit the manyata and the ceremony had to be suspended for 
two days to accommodate his visit. 
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75) are the so-called ‘premature elders’ (Ibid.: 80-82).10 We shall see later that, like the 
premature elders, there are also ‘premature leaders’.      
 
Circumcision-groups and the right-left duality 
Circumcision-groups are either from the right-hand or the left-hand side, and alternate 
in time.11 The Iltumusika circumcision-group that was officially inaugurated in 2008 
and constitutes a left-hand-side circumcision-group was thus preceded by a right-hand-
side circumcision-group (the Iromboi) that in turn followed a left-hand-side circumci-
sion-group (the Ilbuluka) that was itself preceded by a right-hand-side circumcision-
group (the Ilkishili), and so on (see Table 7.1). 
Right-hand-side circumcision-groups are more prominent than left-hand-side ones: 
they have more members, their period as warriors is slightly longer, they have six rather 
than three formal age-group leaders (see Chapter 6), and they have more ceremonies to 
perform and these are often more intricate.12 During the ‘stool’ ceremony, which is the 
last ceremony in the age-group ceremonial cycle, two successive circumcision-groups – 
a right-hand-side circumcision-group that is always the most senior of the two and a 
left-hand-side or junior circumcision-group – unite to form a single age-set.13 In 2008, 
there were four existing age-sets in Loita: the Ilnyangusi age-set that combined the 
Ilkalikal and Ilkamaniki circumcision-groups; the Iseuri age-set that was composed of 
the Ilteregeyiani and Ilmauya circumcision-groups; the Ilkitoip age-set combining the 
Ilkiseeyia and Irandai circumcision-groups, and the Ilkisaroni age-set that was recently 
established with the celebration of their ‘stool’ ceremony in 2010 (see Chapter 1) and 
united the Ilkishili and Ilbuluka circumcision-groups. The Iromboi and Iltumusika, the 
circumcision-groups that follow the Ilkisaroni age-set, are still circumcision-groups but 
will unify to form an age-set in future when they hold their ‘stool’ ceremony. The name 
of the age-set that they will form is already known: the Ilmeshuki. 
 
                                                 
10  ‘Premature elders’ perform a ceremony that is normally held after the eunoto ceremony and marks a 
significant step towards elderhood (the ‘milk-drinking’ ceremony) shortly after circumcision, thus 
skipping warriorhood altogether. Spencer (1988: 80-82) explained how, among the Matapato Maasai, 
‘premature elderhood’ is often imposed by the father to force the son to stay at home and help his 
father with their herd and not wander around with other warriors. In Loita, holding the ‘milk-drinking’ 
ceremony prematurely is usually more associated with the young man’s own wish to get married 
during his official period of warriorhood. Men are only supposed to marry after performing the ‘milk-
drinking’ ceremony.  
11  The Maa word for right-hand-side circumcision-group is emurata e tatene and for left-hand-side 
circumcision-group is emurata e kedianye. 
12  Spencer (1988: 95-96) argued that the prominence of right-hand-side circumcision-groups is related to 
the prestige they acquire from the ‘stiffer test of gaining the [warriorhood] privileges for their age-set’ 
from the preceding (left-hand) circumcision-group in a context where rivalry between adjacent 
circumcision-groups that also belong to different age-sets is quite fierce. Because of this prestige, ‘the 
van tends to be extended by older boys whose initiation has been delayed and the tail-end by younger 
boys whose initiation has been brought forward’ (Ibid.: 95), increasing the numbers of warriors as 
well as the period of warriorhood for right-hand-side circumcision-groups.  
13  In other sections, such as the Matapato Maasai (Spencer 1988: 182), this happens during a ceremony 
called olngesher. 
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Table 7.1 Age-groups in Loita in 2008 
Approximate age-span in 
200814 
Circumcision-group Side Age-set 
 
83-90 Ilkalikal Right  
   Ilnyangusi 
75-64 Ilkamaniki Left  
68-75 Ilteregeyiani Right  
   Iseuri 
62-69 Ilmauya Left  
53-61 Ilkiseeyia (official name: Ilkitoip) Right  
   Ilkitoip 
47-54 Irandai (official name: Ilkiropi) Left  
40-47 Ilkishili (official name: Ilkisaroni) Right  
   Ilkisaroni 
33-40 Ilbuluka (official name: Ilmejoole) Left  
20-29 Iromboi (official name: Ilmeshuki)15 Right  
   (Ilmeshuki) 
16-19 Iltumusika (official name: Ilkinya-
ku)16 
Left  
 
 
Circumcision-groups and age-sets have their own names. In Loita, a circumcision-
group is best known by its nickname rather than by the official name it receives at ini-
tiation. Age-sets are only known by one (official) name. With time, only the age-set 
names are remembered. As can be seen in Table 7.1, age-sets are often named after the 
official right-hand-side circumcision-group that it is made up of. To avoid confusion, I 
will therefore use the everyday names of circumcision-groups when writing about them 
rather than their official names. As noted above, Loita counted four age-sets in 2008. 
There were then ten existing circumcision-groups. The oldest surviving circumcision-
group in Loita, with fewer than ten members, was the Ilkalikal circumcision-group. The 
                                                 
14  Ages are based on Galaty’s (1992: 39) calculations for 1990 except for the Iromboi and Iltumusika 
circumcision-groups that are based on my data in Loita. I took the age of 16 as the average age at 
which boys are circumcised. 
15  The first boys were circumcised in December 1995 and the last in December 2004. 
16  The first boys were circumcised in April 2005 and the last in April 2012. 
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youngest circumcision-group, the left-hand-side Iltumusika, was initiated in 2008 and 
they were the warriors in Loita at the time of my fieldwork.17 
 
Ceremonies and the process of becoming an elder 
With circumcision at around the age of 16, a boy becomes a man and joins a circumci-
sion-group, formally entering the age-group system by stepping into the grade of warri-
or. Today, not all circumcised young men become warriors and dress and decorate 
themselves as warriors and follow the rules and taboos that go with warriorhood. This is 
especially so for those youngsters that go to school. There is a word in Maa that de-
scribes these young men who do not become warriors in the full sense: ilngosanek (sing. 
olngosaneki).18 But even if ilngosanek do not become full warriors, they are still con-
sidered full members of the age-group and actively participate in age-group ceremonies 
whenever possible. 
As age-groups mature, they successively advance through the different grades of 
warriorhood and elderhood. In this sense, the age-group system marks the passage of 
time while at the same time structuring the process of individual ageing in ‘an endless 
stream of ageing age-sets’ (Spencer 1993: 149). In the literature, warriorhood is com-
monly divided into junior warriorhood and senior warriorhood (Galaty 1983: 368; 
Spencer 1988: 139; Mol 1996: 247-248). According to Mol (Ibid.: 247, 265), olkilia (pl. 
ilkiliani) means junior warrior and an olmorijioi (pl. ilmorijo) is a senior warrior. The 
eunoto ceremony, which is the most popular, well-known and best-documented Maasai 
ceremony, marks the difference between junior and senior warriorhood. Some authors, 
therefore, prefer to divide warriorhood into ‘before eunoto’ and ‘after eunoto’ (Voshaar 
1979: 71). Elderhood is often divided into different phases as well. Voshaar (Ibid.: 60), 
for example, makes the following distinction: junior elderhood and senior elderhood. 
But he also talks about ‘firestick elderhood’ (Voshaar 1998: 72) and a category of ‘ven-
erable elders’ (Voshaar 1979: 82-83). In practice, however, not all these neat and ele-
gant distinctions are as clear and unproblematic as they seem. It is particularly unclear 
when senior warriorhood ends and (junior) elderhood starts. In Loita, I have not heard 
people using the words olkilia (junior warrior) or olmorijioi (senior warrior) in the sense 
that Mol reports and many authors use too.19 Instead, they use the more general word 
olmurrani (warrior). Junior/pre-eunoto warriors are simply called ilmurran (warriors). 
After the eunoto ceremony, men can be either referred to as ‘warrior’ or ‘elder’ (olpay-
ian, pl. ilpayiani) depending on the context. My interpretation is that, after the eunoto 
ceremony that closes active warriorhood, men become less of a ‘warrior’ and more of 
an ‘elder’ with every subsequent ceremony that they perform. This is why a young man 
                                                 
17  The Iltumusika closed their warriorhood with the eunoto ceremony in April 2012. By December 2013, 
the first warriors of a new circumcision-group had already been circumcised.   
18  I could not find the word in Mol’s dictionary. Spencer (2003: 21, 1988: 80) translates the word 
ilngosanek as ‘premature elders’. For ‘premature elders’, see Spencer (1988: 80-82). 
19  In Loita, olmorijioi (senior warrior) refers to a warrior who has been circumcised before the official 
initiation of his circumcision-group and olkilia (junior warrior) refers to a warrior who has been 
circumcised after the formal initiation of his circumcision-group. The distinction is thus made to refer 
to the more junior and more senior members of the same circumcision-group. This is thus different 
from Mol’s interpretation in terms of age-grades (that are held successively by circumcision-groups 
rather than simultaneously by the same circumcision-group). 
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who had recently performed his ‘milk-drinking’ ceremony shortly after the eunoto cer-
emony insisted that he had become an elder20 and another man claimed exactly the same 
after his ‘meat-eating’ ceremony that follows the ‘milk-drinking’ ceremony a few years 
later. And on yet a third occasion during the preparatory phase of the ‘stool’ ceremony, 
one participant explained to me that this ceremony was to show that he and his age-
mates were now elders.21 These initially confusing claims of having attained elderhood 
after three different ceremonies in the ceremonial cycle of the age-group system make 
sense when one considers the relative transformation that is accomplished each time. 
After the ceremony, one is an ‘elder’ in comparison to before the ceremony when one 
was still a ‘warrior’. Viewed from a long-term perspective, one has shed more ‘warrior-
ness’ and acquired more ‘elderness’. In fact, with every transition ceremony after warri-
orhood, a certain rule or taboo associated with warriorhood is lifted (see Table 7.2 and 
Note 27). The ‘stool’ ceremony, the last age-group ceremony that unites two circumci-
sion-groups, confirms the status of elderhood and men then finally become elders in the 
full sense of the word. I follow the usage in Loita and will use the word ‘warrior’ to 
refer to junior pre-eunoto young men (between 16 and 24 years of age) and for the peri-
od after the eunoto ceremony I will specify the context as well as possible to understand 
where on the continuum between warrior and elder a man is located in terms of the cer-
emonies performed. When a man has already performed his ‘stool’ ceremony, I refer to 
him as an elder. 
Every transition to a new grade is marked by a ceremony. Ceremonies can be held 
individually at home or collectively at the level of the section with the whole age-group. 
Some collective ceremonies are hosted by one of the age-mates at his home but a spe-
cial ceremonial settlement, the manyata, is built specifically for the preparation and exe-
cution of the rituals for most collective ceremonies and the celebration of the ceremony 
itself.22 At any given time, there may be only one of these ceremonial settlements in 
Loita.23 Table 7.2 shows the main transition ceremonies of the age-group system, i.e. 
                                                 
20  Spencer (1988: 175) was told exactly the same but it would seem that he assumed that there was a slip 
of the tongue as he inserted a ‘sic’ after it: ‘Kunaiju expressed his disorientation somewhere between 
moranhood and elderhood after the ‘milk-drinking’ ceremony. “On that day, I became an elder 
[sic] …”’. 
21  There was a fourth ceremonial occasion when I was told something similar. This was at an olkiteng 
loo lbaa ceremony, which is an individual ceremony that has to be performed by each elder before the 
circumcision of any of his children. This ceremony does not belong to the age-group ceremonial 
cycle. See Spencer (1988: Ch. 14), Voshaar (1979: 218-252) and Talle (1988: 144) for a discussion of 
this ceremony.  
22  Warrior manyatas in the sense that Spencer (1988) mentions them do not exist in Loita. Spencer 
describes the ‘manyata village’ in opposition to the villages of the elders (the homesteads) as being a 
separate settlement where warriors live together for the duration of their warriorhood and not as a 
temporary ceremonial settlement specifically built for a particular age-group ceremony, as is the case 
in Loita. It is possible that these warrior villages existed in Loita in the past before the Kenyan state 
intervened to abolish or curtail them (Waller 2010). Voshaar (1979: 65) suggests that ‘the governments 
of Kenya and Tanzania are not keen on manyatas. In fact they have forbidden them except where a 
manyata is necessary immediately before the great age-group ceremonies: enkipaata, eunoto and 
olngesher’. 
23  Three manyatas were built during my PhD field research period in Loita. At the beginning of 2008 the 
Iromboi circumcision-group built their ‘manyata of the feathered headdress’ that lasted for about five 
months and soon afterwards the Iltumusika circumcision-group built the manyata for their enkipaata 
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those that are performed by all circumcision-groups. A number of age-group ceremonies 
are only performed by right-hand-side circumcision-groups, some of which are dis-
cussed in the Appendix. 
 
 
Table 7.2 Main age-group ceremonies 
Ceremony Description 
Enkipaata Initiation of the circumcision-group, a collective ceremony per-
formed at a manyata. 
Circumcision An individual ceremony held at home when a boy becomes a 
man. 
Ceremony of 
the emanyata e 
ntirpe 
A collective ceremony at a manyata that lifts the rule that forbids 
warriors to brush their teeth in front of circumcised women. 
Promulgation of the ceremonial age-group leaders olotuno and 
oloboru enkeene. 
Eunoto The confirmation of the circumcision-group, a collective ceremo-
ny at a manyata. Marks the end of warriorhood and the start of 
becoming an elder. Sexual avoidance with circumcised married 
women is then relaxed. 
Milk-drinking Individual ceremony at home that lifts the milk-drinking rule. 
From now on, men can drink milk alone. 
Ceremony of 
the emanyata e 
nkeene 
A collective ceremony at a manyata. Rings made out of the strap 
of hide kept by olotuno are put on the finger of every age-mate. 
Now they prepare for meat-eating. 
Meat-eating A collective ceremony hosted by an age-mate at his home that 
lifts the meat-eating rule. From now on, men may eat meat in the 
presence of circumcised married women.  
The stool 
 
The unification of a right- and a left-hand-side circumcision-
group to form an age-set happens at a collective ceremony at a 
manyata. It confirms the status of elder. 
 
 
The firestick relationship 
The ceremonies of a particular age-group are presided over by elders from a designated 
older age-group. The relationship between the age-group that holds the ceremony and 
the age-group of the elders that officiates at the ceremony is called firestick (olpiron, pl. 
ilpironito). I will therefore call these elders the ‘firestick elders’ and the younger men 
whose ceremonies they oversee the ‘firestick youngsters’.  
From the ceremony initiating a new circumcision-group (the enkipaata ceremony) 
until the ‘stool’ ceremony that completes the age-group ceremonial cycle and amalgam-
ates two successive circumcision-groups, the firestick elders play an important role in 
every transition ceremony of their firestick youngsters, be it an individual ceremony at 
home or a large-scale collective ceremony at a manyata. Firestick elders not only act as 
guides, mentors and sponsors but their blessing is required to accomplish each transi-
tion. The relationship between firestick elders and their firestick youngsters is so called 
                                                 
ceremony, which lasted between one and two months. In 2009, the Ilbuluka and Ilkishili circumcision-
groups built the manyata for their ‘stool’ ceremony. 
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because the firestick elders use a firestick to kindle the first fire for their youngsters 
when they are still boys to open their circumcision period (Mol 1996: 331; Spencer 
1988: 66, 69-70). This happens collectively for the whole age-group at the enkipaata 
ceremony when they initiate a new circumcision-group, and individually at the circum-
cision ceremonies of each and every boy. The firestick elders thus ritually bring to life a 
new circumcision-group and a new man by kindling their first fire (Spencer 1993: 144, 
1988: 66).24 In many cases, the biological fathers of the boys belong to the age-group of 
the firestick elders, which differ on average by about 32 years. 
The relationship between firestick elders and firestick youngsters is an intense one of 
respect and close affinity. Respect and obedience to older people is a widespread and 
pervasive cultural practice among the Maasai that is instilled in children from a very 
early age (Spencer 1988: 47, 1993: 141),25 but the respect and obedience of firestick 
youngsters to their firestick elders is special. A young man in his warrior grade ex-
plained this to me as follows: ‘The firestick elders … make fire at every boy’s circumci-
sion. I respect these elders. If they tell me I have to go by footing [sic] to Holland, I will 
go!’.26 This declaration clearly shows the positive side of respect and obedience that 
originates in the high esteem held for the ritual role of the firestick elders. It is associat-
ed with the blessing of these men during ceremonies. But there is also a negative side 
that is based on the fear of a potent curse that firestick elders can have over their young-
sters. If the firestick elders feel that their youngsters are not showing enough respect, 
they may threaten to break a firestick as a curse over them (Spencer 1988: 220). I have 
never heard or read of a case where the firestick elders actually performed this curse but 
there are numerous recorded instances of the threat to do so or, less seriously, the threat 
of withholding a blessing. This led to general anxiety and was enough to restore disci-
pline. For a case in Loita, see Waller (2010: 148). Belief in the blessing and the curse of 
the firestick elders is deeply rooted and powerful. It expresses the ritual dependence of 
the firestick youngsters on their firestick elders and forms an important basis for the 
latter’s ritual power over their youngsters. 
The firestick relationship is structurally based on age-sets rather than circumcision-
groups: the firestick elders are from the second age-set above (older) the first circumci-
sion-group that they initiate. The first circumcision-group that they initiate belongs to 
the right-hand side. The same firestick elders will also kindle the fire for the left-hand-
side circumcision-group that succeeds the right-hand-side circumcision-group about 
eight years later. It should be noted than this pair of right-hand and left-hand-side cir-
cumcision-groups will merge in future to form an age-set. The firestick relationship that 
is forged at the initiation of a new circumcision-group is thus between an age-set (the 
firestick elders) and a future age-set (the firestick youngsters). This relationship is for 
life. After initiation, they will lead and guide the youngsters through the age-group cer-
emonial cycle as they mature until they complete the age-group cycle with the ‘stool’ 
                                                 
24  In fact, fire and fire-making at Maasai ceremonies generally ‘symbolize[s] new life or the birth into a 
new stage of life’ (Voshaar 1998: 81; see also Spencer 1988: 70).  
25  See Voshaar (1979: 73-74) for the broad meaning of respect (enkanyit) among the Maasai. 
26  Interview MM: 16/9/2001. 
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ceremony. After this, the firestick youngsters will themselves become the firestick el-
ders of a (future) age-set that is two age-sets younger than them. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Lines of firestick relationships in 2008 
Ilnyangusi 
 
 
Iseuri 
 
 
Ilkitoip 
 
 
 
     Ilkisaroni 
 
 
 
(Ilmeshuki) 
 
 
Alternate age-sets linked to each other in firestick relationships form two ‘streams’ 
(Spencer 1976), ‘traditions’ (Voshaar 1979: 68-69) or ‘lines’ of affinity (see Figure 7.1). 
These lines have names and are called after the trees from which the firestick elders 
make their firestick to kindle fire (Mol 1996: 331). The line of the Ilnyangusi, Ilkitoip 
and (the future) Ilmeshuki age-sets is called olpiron le sepeperua. The Ilnyangusi are 
therefore the firestick elders of the Ilkitoip and the Ilkitoip are the firestick elders of the 
Ilmeshuki. The Ilmeshuki, when they become an age-set and in turn initiate a new age-
set, will also become firestick elders. The alternative line of the Iseuri and Ilkisaroni 
age-sets is called oreteti. The lines of alternate age-sets become relevant in certain so-
cial domains. For example, only the right-hand-side circumcision-groups that belong to 
the line of olpiron le sepeperua perform the ‘raiding-party of the brisket’ ceremony. As 
we will see, clan leadership is also handed over along the lines of firestick relationship. 
Political leadership based on age-set  
The firestick relationship that was introduced in the previous section is key to under-
standing how the age-group system structures leadership and authority. Spencer (1988: 
214-219, 1993: 144) and Voshaar (1979: 66-70, 79-82, 1998: 72, 73) discuss the 
firestick relationship in some detail and give important leads as to how the relationship 
is related to political leadership.  
Spencer (1988: 66, 1993: 144) calls the relationship between firestick elders and their 
firestick youngsters a ‘firestick alliance’. He explains how a firestick alliance between 
two alternate age-sets is most tangible and visible when the younger age-set is in its 
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warrior grade. Since this younger age-set is not yet formed and the age-groups are still 
circumcision-groups that occupy the warrior grade successively, this means that either 
the right-hand or the left-hand-side circumcision-group is in its warriorhood period. It is 
in this period, when one of the two circumcision-groups dominates ‘the arena of warri-
orhood’, that the firestick elders dominate ‘the political arena’ in the section (Spencer 
1993: 144, 1988: 215; see also Voshaar 1998: 72, 73n, 1979: 70, 79-80). In this period, 
the firestick alliance between these two age-sets outshines the age-set between them. As 
Spencer (1993: 144) put it:  
Thus, as the murran [warriors] of an age-set mature and retire into elderhood, passing through their 
physical prime, so their firestick patrons, who are broadly thirty years older, pass through their politi-
cal prime, eventually retiring into old age. During this period of about fifteen years, there is a notional 
‘firestick’ alliance between these two age-sets in opposition to the intervening age-set, who are 
eclipsed during this period but will emerge as firestick patrons in their own right to a new age-set of 
novice murran in due course. When this occurs, they come out of eclipse, and power in the arena of 
Maasai affairs switches to this age-set and the novice murran as the alternative firestick alliance for 
about fifteen years. 
This power not only refers to the ritual authority that firestick elders have over their 
youngsters but also to their dealings with ‘the affairs of the [section] as a whole’ and 
‘all affairs that have to do with the outside-world’ (Voshaar 1979: 79). This is political 
power and it is exercised within and on behalf of the section. 
For Voshaar (Ibid.: 70), the dominance of one firestick alliance at the expense of the 
intermediate age-set, as identified by Spencer, is more a matter of emphasizing and pri-
oritizing the section (or the public sphere) rather than the homestead (or the domestic 
sphere). This observation adds a valuable nuance to the perceived hegemony of a par-
ticular firestick alliance in a section. Warriors and their firestick elders dominate public 
life in Loita. The ritual constraints, i.e. the taboos and rules, that go with full warrior-
hood push warriors out of the homestead and family life into the forest or more public 
places like markets, manyatas and ceremonies such as circumcisions and weddings 
where they form a conspicuous presence.27 Warriors are also at the forefront of violent 
                                                 
27  Warriors should not have sexual relations with circumcised married women (but they may with 
uncircumcised girls). This sexual restriction is reinforced by food taboos that keep warriors away from 
circumcised married women, their houses since they are the domain of women par excellence (Talle 
1987) and domestic life and drives them into the bush and their manyatas and into each other’s 
company for their daily needs.  
(i)  Warriors may not eat meat that has been seen by circumcised women. The clearest response to 
the meat-eating taboo is the ‘meat feast’ (olpul, pl. ilpuli) that is typically held in the forest as it is 
the most unlikely place where they will run into circumcised women who might spoil their meal. 
Warriors may remain secluded in the forest for weeks. An animal can also be slaughtered in the 
bush closer to the homestead. This is a less ritualized slaughter called olpejet (pl. ilpejeta). Today, 
warriors prepare and eat their meat in separate houses within the homestead (like the small house 
next to the pen where goats and sheep are kept at night) that women do not enter.  
(ii) Warriors are barred from eating solid food like rice, beans, ugali (maize cooked with water to a 
dough-like consistency) and even biscuits in the houses of women but they can eat these 
foodstuffs out of sight of women, for example in the bush.  
(iii) Warriors can drink liquids (milk, water and tea but no blood or sodas) at the houses of women but 
only if they are in the company of another warrior. This rule obliges warriors to seek out each 
other’s company for daily needs and to move around in groups or at least in pairs. If there are no 
fellow warriors around, a firestick elder or any elder who observed warrior rules during his 
warriorhood, or a small uncircumcised girl, may stand in symbolically for an age-mate and join 
148 
 
clashes with neighbouring communities if they arise. Other key public events include 
the numerous meetings held in Loita, such as the land dispute meeting analysed in 
Chapter 10 and the section meeting in Chapter 11. The firestick elders are the most ac-
tive group in these meetings: they take the lead during dispute meetings as mediators 
and are responsible for making important social and political decisions. Indeed, the 
Ilkitoip age-set that dominated the political arena of Loita during fieldwork were the 
firestick elders of the warriors (the Iltumusika circumcision-group) at that time.  
The intermediate age-set is more involved in the homestead sphere (Voshaar 1979: 
70, 1998: 78-79). During my fieldwork period in Loita, this intermediate age-set was 
formed by the Ilkishili and Ilbuluka circumcision-groups.28 These are men whose oldest 
members had young families, possibly with some school-going children, and whose 
youngest members had only recently married. The men were in the process of settling 
down, forming a family and increasing their capital to provide for them. Marriage, 
building a homestead, clearing a field, expanding their herd, livestock trading, starting a 
business, finding a job and paying school fees are thus the main concerns of this age-set. 
Its members are too busy at home dealing with family matters to attend to collective 
issues in time-consuming meetings, unlike the older Ilkitoip, who have already settled 
down and have older children to take over tasks at the homestead, such as herd man-
agement that allows their fathers to focus on the political matters of the section. 
Although they place the emphasis differently, both Spencer and Voshaar arrive at the 
same conclusion: it is the firestick elders of the age-group that is in its warriorhood that 
dominate the political landscape of a section. This is how the age-group system, via the 
firestick relationship, shapes and structures political leadership in Loita.  
To explore the matter from a different angle, I propose shifting from looking at the 
firestick relationship between elders and warriors to focusing on the career of firestick 
elders in the age-group system and their time as the leaders of a section. To recapitulate, 
the members of an age-group become firestick elders when they kindle the first fire for 
a new age-group of warriors-to-be during their enkipaata initiation ceremony (Spencer 
1988: 70). But the firestick elders can only do this when they themselves have complet-
ed their age-group ceremonial cycle with the performance of the last age-group ceremo-
ny, the ‘stool’ ceremony, that institutes their age-set by uniting two successive circum-
cision-groups. The ‘stool’ ceremony also confirms their status as ‘full elder’, which im-
plies that they are ready to initiate, mentor and lead a new age-group and become 
firestick elders. Full eldership also signals that these men are ready to lead and guide the 
community as a whole. When the members of an age-group become firestick elders, 
                                                 
him in drinking. The rule of drinking in pairs applies beyond the homestead as well but here too 
there are ways of bending the rules. Thus, when a lone warrior wants to drink water from a river 
and there is no one in sight, he may, as a last recourse, hang his hair-cover on a tree next to him 
and pretend this is a fellow warrior. 
Starting with the eunoto ceremony that closes warriorhood, all these taboos, rules and avoidances are 
relaxed one after another during ceremonies. With the eunoto ceremony, the sexual avoidance between 
warriors and circumcised married women is relaxed (Galaty 1983: 369, 376; Spencer 2010a: 25). With 
the ‘milk-drinking’ ceremony, the ban on drinking milk, tea or water alone is lifted. The young man 
drinks ‘alone’ at this ceremony. During the ‘meat-eating’ ceremony, men are fed by their wives and 
may subsequently eat meat that has been seen, touched and cooked by circumcised women. 
28  In the meanwhile, they have taken over political leadership from the Ilkitoip. 
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they start their political term. Its end is determined by the ceremonial timing of their 
firestick youngsters. When the youngsters hand over the warrior grade to a new age-
group at their eunoto ceremony, a new age-set of firestick elders will also take over the 
political leadership of the section. The former political leaders will, however, remain 
firestick elders to their graduated youngsters and continue being ritually responsible for 
them until they complete the ceremonial cycle and become full elders. It is only in their 
early career as firestick elders that men dominate the political landscape of a section. 
Political leadership based on age-set in practice 
The previous section explained how the age-group system organizes leadership in Loita 
society by allocating political power to the age-set whose firestick youngsters are the 
warriors of the moment, the so-called governing age-set. We shall now see how this 
principle affects clan leadership. 
 
The rules of clan leadership succession 
The degree of institutionalization of clan leadership in Loita appears exceptional. 
Whereas age-group leadership is widespread in Maasailand with every age-group in 
every section having its own formal age-group leaders, clan leadership at the section 
level generally seems to ‘range (...) from minimal to non-existent’ (Voshaar 1979: 53).29 
I do not consider this to be the case for the Loita section. As we have already seen 
among the Loita, all five clans have their own clan chiefs. Clan leadership appears to be 
regulated by clear rules of succession. 
Unlike age-group leadership positions, clan leadership is not for life but is instead 
handed over to a younger person as clan chiefs grow older. This handover is celebrated 
at a blessing ceremony called emputoto olaiguanani le nkaji (the nomination of the sub-
clan chief) when the retiring clan chief hands over the black wooden club that symbol-
izes authority and power to the new clan chief. Photo 7.1 shows the retiring clan chief 
of the Ilukumai clan (Ilkokoyo sub-clan) (with his back to the camera) handing over the 
black club to the new clan chief.30 The timing of the transfer and the choice of a new 
clan chief is regulated by the workings of the age-group system. 
The two clan chiefs of each clan must belong to different, yet adjacent, age-groups. 
Age-set membership rather than circumcision-group membership is relevant here. The 
clan chiefs in Loita during my research either belonged to the Iseuri age-set or the 
Ilkitoip age-set. Each clan had one clan chief that belonged to the Iseuri age-set and one 
that belonged to the Ilkitoip age-set (see Figure 7.2). This balance in age-group affilia-
tion within a clan is considered imperative. We will see later what is believed to happen 
if this balance is upset. 
                                                 
29  This explains why I have come across virtually no references to Maasai clan chiefs in the literature, as 
was mentioned in the previous chapter. 
30 Though invited, I was not able to attend this ceremony. My nephew Gregoire, who was visiting us in 
Nairobi, travelled to Loita and was permitted to attend and document this five-day ceremony on my 
behalf. He was assisted by Lenaai, my research assistant, who took this photo on Gregoire’s mobile 
phone. 
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Note that the two age-sets providing clan chiefs (i.e. the Iseuri and the Ilkitoip age-
sets) either dominated the political scene of Loita in 2008 (i.e. the Ilkitoip age-set as the 
firestick elders of the warriors) or had dominated the political scene a generation earlier 
(the Iseuri age-set). The clan chiefs who belong to the Iseuri age-set, as the most senior 
age-set, were thus next in line to hand over their leadership position. As a rule, leader-
ship will be handed over to a member of the age-set of whom the clan chief is firestick 
elder, which is an alternate age-set below (i.e. younger than) the age-set of the clan 
chief. This is the firestick relationship discussed earlier. Since the Iseuri are the firestick 
elders of the Ilkisaroni age-set, clan chiefs belonging to the Iseuri age-set will hand over 
the black club to a member of the Ilkisaroni age-set.  
 
 
Photo 7.1  Handing over the black club to the new chief of the Ilukumai clan (June 2012) 
 
© Gregoire Soria & Lenaai ole Mowuo 
 
The time is ripe for this handover after two ceremonies in two different age-group 
ceremonial cycles have taken place. The Ilkisaroni age-set needs to have completed the 
last ceremony of their age-group ceremonial cycle (the ceremony of the ‘stool’) that 
confirms their status as full elders and marks their readiness to enter the political scene.  
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This ceremony also signals that they are ready to become firestick elders and can initiate 
a new age-group that they will ritually guide through the age-group ceremonial cycle. 
However before they can start recruiting and circumcising boys into a new age-group 
and into the warrior grade, the warrior grade needs to be vacated. The second part of the 
age-group ceremonial cycle that needs to be completed is, therefore, the eunoto ceremo-
ny that will close the warriorhood of the age-group occupying the warrior grade at the 
time. It is after this eunoto ceremony that the series of ceremonies for handing over the 
chieftaincy can start.1 In summary, the timing of the handover of clan leadership hinges 
on the pace and progress of the age-group ceremonial cycle: the clan chiefs that belong 
to the Iseuri age-set can only hand over their leadership position to the Ilkisaroni age-set 
when the latter are ready to receive it and when the warrior grade has been vacated. 
Clan leadership is handed over and inherited along the lines of alternate age-sets 
based on the firestick relationship (see Figure 7.1).2 In the line formed by the Iseuri and 
Ilkisaroni age-sets, the Iseuri will hand over the chieftaincy to the Ilkisaroni who will in 
turn hand over the chieftaincy to the age-set of whom they will later become firestick 
elders. This latter age-set does not yet exist and still needs to be initiated. The same in-
heritance and handover pattern occurs in the lines of the Ilnyangusi, Ilkitoip and the 
future Ilmeshuki age-set. The Ilnyangusi age-set handed over the chieftaincy to the 
Ilkitoip who, being in their political prime at the time of my fieldwork, firmly held the 
positions of clan chief. The Ilkitoip will hand over the chieftaincy to their firestick 
youngsters (the Ilmeshuki) in the future when they are ready. We can therefore see how 
the choice of a new clan chief depends on his age-group affiliation and on the firestick 
relationship, and how the timing for handing over the chieftaincy depends on the partic-
ular temporal juncture of the age-group ceremonial cycle in Loita.  
 
The story of the Ilaiser clan 
Rules surrounding the transfer and choice of clan leadership are sometimes broken, as 
the following account from the Ilaiser clan, the most numerous clan in Loita, shows. A 
generation ago, clan leadership in the Ilaiser clan was how it was supposed to be: the 
leadership of the Ilparsimaro sub-clan was in the hands of the Ilnyangusi age-set and the 
leadership of the Ilmusere sub-clan in the hands of the Ilterito age-set. According to the 
rules, the clan chief of the Ilmusere sub-clan was supposed to hand over the chieftaincy 
to a man in the Iseuri age-set. Instead, however, he handed it over to his own son who 
did not belong to the Iseuri age-set but to the younger Ilkitoip age-set. The other sub-
clan of the Ilaiser decided to stick to their line and the clan chief of the Ilnyangusi age-
set handed the chieftaincy over to a man from the Ilkitoip age-set. A situation therefore 
emerged where two men from the Ilkitoip age-set concurrently ruled the Ilaiser clan, 
which upset the equilibrium of age-set affiliation. When the clan chief of the Ilparsima-
                                                 
1  The Ilkisaroni age-set celebrated their ‘stool’ ceremony in April 2010. Two years later, the Iltumusika 
circumcision-group celebrated their eunoto ceremony (in April 2012) that closed their warriorhood, 
after which Ilkisaroni elders started circumcising boys into the warrior grade as firestick elders. Not 
long after the eunoto ceremony, the first ceremony to hand over the clan chief position to the 
Ilkisaroni age-set took place, in May 2012. 
2  Something similar appears to have occurred in the succession of the position of chief laibon (Waller 
1995: 41). 
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ro sub-clan suddenly died in the prime of life,3 his death was blamed on this inauspi-
cious situation. The elders of the Ilparsimaro sub-clan sought to repair the situation by 
appointing a new clan chief from the Iseuri age-set rather than choosing someone from 
the Ilkitoip age-set so that the two sub-clans had chiefs from different age-sets again. 
This resulted in an inversion of lines in the sub-clans: the line of age-sets that previously 
ruled the Ilparsimaro sub-clan now provided chiefs for the Ilmusere sub-clan, and vice 
versa. The story of the rule-breaking Ilaiser clan and the subsequent death of one of its 
clan chiefs serve as a reminder of what the consequences of tampering with the rules of 
succession can be. In fact, the story confirms a wider belief, namely that breaking clan 
rules can lead to death. Breaching clan rules upsets the balance and peace within and 
between clans and sub-clans and when this happens, actions must be undertaken to re-
verse the situation. The story also shows more generally that, although there are clear 
rules surrounding leadership, in practice, things do not always happen as the system 
prescribes. 
Political leadership based on circumcision-group  
In the introduction to this chapter, it was stated that the Ilkitoip age-set ruled Loita as 
the governing age-set during the main period of my fieldwork research. They dominated 
the political scene of Loita at the time and the firestick youngsters of the Ilkitoip were 
the Iromboi (right-hand) and the Iltumusika (left-hand) circumcision-groups. The first 
warriors from the Iromboi circumcision-group were circumcised in December 1995 and 
the age-group closed its warriorhood with the celebration of their eunoto ceremony 
about nine years later in February 2005. Shortly after this ceremony, the first warriors 
for the next circumcision-group, the Iltumusika, were circumcised. Their eunoto cere-
mony was celebrated more recently, in April 2012. Note that the warriorhood of the 
Iromboi was slightly longer (nine years) than that of the Iltumusika (seven years). My 
main PhD fieldwork period fell roughly halfway between the warriorhood of the Il-
tumusika, which is why their firestick elders, the Ilkitoip, had already completed about 
75% of their political term. 
This analysis of the political landscape in Loita during fieldwork takes the long-term 
age-set angle favoured by Spencer. However, there is another dimension to the reading 
of the state of affairs that breaks the Ilkitoip age-set up into its circumcision-groups and 
the right-left duality becomes relevant. This is a more detailed description in the sense 
that it looks at circumcision-group dynamics rather than at age-set dynamics. When 
viewed from this angle, my fieldwork period did not fall in the middle of the political 
term of the Ilkitoip age-set but rather in a transitional period. And this changes the 
whole picture. Although from an age-set view, authority was indisputably exercised by 
one age-group (the Ilkitoip age-set) that suggests peace and harmony in the political 
domain, from a circumcision-group view it was a period of tension as the two circumci-
sion-groups that formed the Ilkitoip were jostling for power and control of the section’s 
affairs. 
                                                 
3  He was the father of my research assistant Lenaai who recounted this story to me. 
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The Ilkitoip age-set is composed of the right-hand-side Ilkiseeyia circumcision-group 
and the left-hand-side Irandai. There is a general tendency for the right-hand side of an 
age-set to kindle the first fire for a new right-hand-side circumcision-group and the left-
hand-side firestick elders for a left-hand-side circumcision-group (Mol 1996: 331-332). 
In this case, elders of the Ilkiseeyia kindled fire for the Iromboi and the Irandai for the 
Iltumusika. This means that there is a closer firestick relationship between the Ilkiseeyia 
elders and the Iromboi youngsters and between the Irandai elders and the Iltumusika 
youngsters. Although the first individual warriors of the Iltumusika were circumcised in 
2005, shortly after the eunoto of their predecessors, the official initiation of their cir-
cumcision-group only happened during the enkipaata ceremony in August 2008. The 
enkipaata ceremony of the Iltumusika not only marked the official birth of this new 
circumcision-group but was also a turning point for their closest firestick elders, the 
Irandai. It is at this point that the Irandai elders assumed their collective role as firestick 
elders. And it is also from this point on that they started to be part of the political scene 
of Loita. In this sense, my fieldwork period fell in a transition period. It covered about 
four years from early 2005 when the Iromboi closed their warriorhood and their closest 
firestick elders, the Ilkiseeyia, officially ended their political term in mid-2008 when the 
Irandai officially inaugurated the Iltumusika circumcision-group that heralded the be-
ginning of their political leadership.  
As the Iromboi opened the way for a new circumcision-group to become warriors 
with the celebration of their eunoto ceremony, the enkipaata ceremony of this new cir-
cumcision-group four years later triggered the gradual entry of their firestick elders into 
the political scene of Loita alongside the firestick elders of the right-hand-side Iromboi 
to take over political leadership from the latter. This transition period was composed of 
two smaller but linked transitions. The first pertains to the warriorhood domain that, as 
a ripple effect, introduces a change in the political domain. It is marked by ceremonies 
and characterized by a relatively smooth and swift handover of warriorhood; the second 
is a processual, overlapping and informal (i.e. not marked by a ceremony) passage to 
political leadership.4 
In practice, however, the right-hand side of an age-set tends to overshadow the left-
hand side in terms of political leadership.5 Right-hand-side elders have a longer political 
term because their youngsters have a slightly longer warriorhood. They also claim and 
retain control of the political scene during the transition period identified above. So 
while the Iromboi had already handed over the warrior scene to the following circumci-
sion-group, their firestick elders, the Ilkiseeyia, still prevailed on the political scene. 
This reduces the time left for the left-hand-side elders as the governing circumcision-
group. As a consequence, the latter generally fail to deliver weighty leaders, while right-
hand-side elders have the time to develop strong and experienced leaders. Some leaders 
of the right-hand side manage to retain power and authority until the eunoto of their left-
hand-side youngsters, and sometimes beyond. An example is the age-group chief of the 
                                                 
4  Spencer (1988: 218) makes a similar observation: ‘The precise transfer of power from one age-set of 
elders to the next is not as clear-cut as the transfer of privileges from one age-group of moran to the 
next’. 
5  This may be related to the higher status of right-hand-side circumcision-groups over their left-hand-
side successors more generally, as explained earlier. 
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right-hand-side Ilkiseeyia, who asserted his authority and influenced the choice of the 
age-group chief for the Iltumusika youngsters. This was actually a choice that pertained 
more to the left-hand-side Irandai elders, and particularly their age-group chief. The 
issue became a tug-of-war between the two age-group chiefs and appears to have been 
won by the (right-hand-side) Ilkiseeyia age-group chief. It can thus be seen that it is 
particularly the right-hand-side circumcision-group of the Ilkitoip age-set, the 
Ilkiseeyia, that more often than not controls social, political and ritual matters in Loita. 
Loita politics was characterized by this state of affairs during my fieldwork period. 
Change and continuity 
What we have seen so far is that the age-group system organizes men into circumcision-
groups (that successively occupy the various age-grades of the age-group ceremonial 
cycle as they mature) and age-sets, and that this framework allocates political leadership 
to the age-group that are the firestick elders of the warriors at the time. In other words, it 
is during the warriorhood of their firestick youngsters that firestick elders are considered 
to be the governing age-group of the section. This analysis is based on the situation I 
encountered during my fieldwork. However, it is important to realize that the age-group 
system is not a self-contained system that replicates itself in perpetuity without any 
form of change or transformation. It is, like all other social institutions discussed in this 
thesis, a historically produced phenomenon.  
Changed circumstances, new encounters and interventions of all sorts have moulded 
and transformed the Maasai age-group system over the years. Waller (1988: 109-111) 
briefly describes the effects of the pre-colonial Disaster on the age-group system. Of 
particular importance in this chapter, however, is the question of whether and how 
changes in the age-group system have modified the way political leadership and authori-
ty is regulated and distributed in Maasai society. Waller (2010), who focuses on the 
Purko but gives some Loita examples, discusses this in a chapter on colonial state inter-
ventions targeting warriorhood. He describes how changing policy targeting the practice 
of cattle-raiding and the formation of manyatas had an effect on the workings of the 
age-group system and how, in the process, power relations between warriors, elders and 
colonial administrators were restructured.6 Both Maasai elders and colonial administra-
tors shared concerns about what they regarded as undisciplined warriors: ‘[e]lders were 
more concerned with disobedience and lack of respect, whereas the colonial administra-
tion focused on raiding as a particularly outmoded feature of murranhood [warriorhood] 
that merited stern punishment’ (Ibid.: 137). As a result, state interventions to control 
warriors were often supported by Maasai elders. The gradual marginalization of warri-
orhood that ensued not only strengthened the authority of the state but also bolstered the 
authority of the (firestick) elders and, possibly, also enhanced the institution of the gov-
erning age-group. 
The idea that the notion of a governing age-group might have been a colonial inven-
tion finds support in Spencer (1988), whose research was conducted in 1976-1977 after 
the colonial period. He briefly describes what he considered to be a new practice, hav-
                                                 
6  See also Tignor (1972: 282-283). 
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ing noted that the positions of PA chief and assistant PA chief among the Matapato 
Maasai were often filled by firestick elders who were in their political prime (Ibid.: 215-
216).7 He also indicated that the firestick elders even ‘claim a right to these appoint-
ments as the age-set who “rule the country”’ (Ibid.: 215). Spencer gathered that the 
claim to rule and the claim to state appointments were a ‘recent innovation’ that might 
have emerged out of articulation with the state and particularly the willingness of state 
officials ‘to accept that there is one “ruling” age-set in principle for new appointments’ 
(Ibid.). 
Based on the contemporary observation that most PA chiefs and their assistants in 
Loita derive from the age-group that are firestick elders of the warriors at the time, it 
appears that this practice developed in Loita as well. It has even been extended to in-
clude councillors and development leaders. The pattern is clear but there are, of course, 
exceptions.  
In some instances, men in official leadership positions belong to a younger or an old-
er age-group. The younger leaders have to constantly prove themselves in the eyes of 
the community, as they are not considered ready for leadership because they are not yet 
‘full elders’. Paralleling Spencer’s ‘premature elders’ (1988: 80-82), they could be 
called ‘premature leaders’. A good example is the Morijo Loita councillor who served 
two consecutive terms and, ironically, lost his seat as councillor when his age-group 
finally became the governing age-group in Loita. As a premature leader he had to con-
tend with members of the governing age-group proper who were not pleased with his 
leadership position. In all the cases I have encountered, premature leaders had personal 
qualities (often a combination of formal schooling, a mastery of the English and Swahili 
languages, work experience outside Loita, charisma, personal leadership talents and, 
importantly, political skills) that made them stand out from others and that compensated 
for their youth. It also helps if their families have a good reputation and their fathers 
were strong leaders before them. On the other hand, there were also cases of ‘overdue’ 
leaders. These were men, often double authorities, belonging to older age-groups who 
were simply able to cling to power after their political term had ended, remaining strong 
leaders and retaining a sizable following. An example is Kone (see Chapters 4 & 5). 
Conclusion: leaders, political authority  
and the governing age-group 
Leaders in Loita in their various leadership positions belong, in most cases, to the gov-
erning age-group. Focusing on an individual man with political aspirations, this means 
that, according to the age-group system, he has to wait until he becomes a firestick elder 
to legitimately become a leader. For him to become a firestick elder, he first needs to 
complete the ceremonial cycle of his age-group. This happens with the ‘stool’ ceremony 
that, apart from merging two circumcision-groups, also confirms full elderhood. When a 
man becomes a full elder, he is considered ready to lead others and can then develop 
into a Loita leader. His term as a political leader further depends on his firestick young-
sters: when they close their warriorhood, his political term also closes. In this sense, the 
                                                 
7  King (1972: 404) made a similar observation. See also King (1971: 133, 135-136). 
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political career of a leader not only depends on his own position in the age-group sys-
tem but is also tied to the age-group ceremonial cycle of his firestick youngsters. We 
saw that the firestick relationship, one of the key relationships of the age-group system 
that is based on alternate age-sets, functions as a key mechanism in organizing political 
leadership.  
This chapter also discussed how the temporality inherent in the age-group system 
distributes political power in Loita. Political leadership is allocated to a particular age-
group and the period that this age-group governs the section depends on the progress 
and pace of the ceremonial cycle of the age-group system. A broad view, as favoured by 
Spencer (1988, 1993) and Voshaar (1979, 1998), sees political leadership allocated to 
age-sets. A detailed view, as revealed by my own data, notes political leadership allo-
cated to circumcision-groups. The former reflects a longer-term perspective based on 
the age-set whose timespan covers sixteen years and the latter a shorter-term perspective 
based on the eight-year timespan of the circumcision-group. I have shown that where 
the longer temporality of the age-set view tends to generalize and homogenize, the 
shorter temporality of the circumcision-group view allows a more fine-grained dynamic. 
For the age-set view, political leadership is thus held by the age-set of elders, the gov-
erning age-set, whose firestick youngsters are in their warrior grade. The circumcision-
group view looks at the circumcision-group dynamics of the age-groups involved, i.e. 
the two circumcision-groups contained in the age-set of the firestick elders and the two 
circumcision-groups that form their firestick youngsters. In addition to the firestick rela-
tionship, the right-left duality is also important here. When the firestick youngsters of 
the right-hand-side circumcision-group are the warriors of the section, the right-hand-
side circumcision-group of the age-set of their firestick elders is in power. Consequent-
ly, when the firestick youngsters of the left-hand side take over the warriorhood arena 
from their right-hand-side predecessors, the left-hand-side firestick elders then also take 
over the political scene from their right-hand-side seniors. From this perspective, it is 
the circumcision-groups that govern.  
Although the main purpose of this chapter was to show how the system works, some 
of the examples given demonstrate that not everything happens according to the rules. 
The story of the Ilaiser clan is a clear example of leadership rules being broken. We also 
saw how the right-hand-side elders of the Ilkitoip age-set (i.e. the Ilkiseeyia circumci-
sion-group) encroached on the political term of the left-hand-side Irandai. And the phe-
nomenon of ‘premature’ and ‘overdue’ leaders highlights the fact that political leader-
ship sometimes exists outside the governing age-group. Notwithstanding these exam-
ples, the pattern is clear: most leaders belong to the governing age-set and political au-
thority is concentrated in the governing age-group.  
The preceding chapters, as well as this one, have shown how leadership is structured, 
how political authority is distributed and how leaders govern. They may have given the 
impression that Loita leadership is all about harmony and consensus but this is, of 
course, not the case. Disagreements exist and may develop into serious confrontations, 
particularly when new interventions target Loita and the stakes are high. Chapter 9 notes 
how age-groups in the various age-grades have different agendas when it comes to state 
interventions targeting land tenure, which can result in tensions between the governing 
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age-group and younger age-groups. But tensions also exist within the governing age-
group. Chapter 8 shows that the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts can only be under-
stood when friction and conflict inside the governing age-group are taken seriously and 
attention is paid to rivalries and competition between particular Loita leaders. 
  
8 
The Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts 
When taken chronologically, the controversies surrounding the Naimina Enkiyio Forest 
can be seen as two different yet closely interlinked conflicts. Each was associated with a 
governing actor that drove a forest management intervention that triggered the conflict. 
The first round, the Narok County Council conflict, erupted in 1993 when Narok Coun-
ty Council publicly announced its plan to gazette the Naimina Enkiyio Forest as a na-
ture reserve. The struggle came to an end in 2002 with an out-of-court agreement that 
saw the County Council rescind its proposed plan. The second round of conflict, the 
IUCN conflict, was sparked off in 2004 when IUCN returned to Loita after carrying out 
preparatory work concerning the implementation of a community-based forest man-
agement project in 1998-1999. One person died in violent demonstrations surrounding 
the IUCN project, after which it was halted. In 2005, IUCN pulled out definitively when 
conflict broke out again when they wanted to resume the project. This chapter puts the 
articulation of these forest interventions with the existing social and political dynamics 
in Loita centre stage to disentangle the various political struggles that make up the 
Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the theoretical entry point to studying the forest conflicts 
is political ecology: the notion that socio-environmental dynamics are shaped by power 
relations and political struggles and, the other way around, that power and politics shape 
socio-environmental interaction and change. Insights are drawn here from the ‘conflict 
over access’ (Bryant 1992), ‘conservation and control’ and the ‘environmental conflict’ 
(Robbins 2004) subfields of political ecology, as well as the political ecological inter-
pretation of ‘environmental violence’ (Peluso & Watts 2001) to highlight the various 
aspects of these conflicts. As point of departure, I consider the forest conflicts as politi-
cal processes. The analytical strategy employed is to approach the issue from two an-
gles, each of which emphasizes a particular side to the conflict. One angle focuses on 
the concept of access and sees conflict over access as being at the heart of the problem. 
The rationale of this approach is that resource conflicts reflect a politicization of access 
(Robbins 2004: 173; Bryant 1998). Access is about who is included/excluded, about 
‘who does (and who does not) get to use what, in what ways, and when’ (Neale 1998: 48 
in Ribot & Peluso 2003: 154 original emphasis). Focusing on the material benefits de-
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rived from access (Ribot & Peluso 2003), this view raises the question of whether the 
Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts can be explained as a ‘livelihood struggle’ (Bryant 
1992: 25).  
The second approach moves the focus away from the resource to the power politics 
surrounding the conflict, including the violent manifestations of conflict. Was (violent) 
conflict really related to the forest or perhaps it ‘reflects or masks other forms of social 
struggle’ (Peluso & Watts 2001: 6)? If the first angle emphasizes ‘the politicization of 
ecology’, then this second angle could be termed ‘the ecologization of an existing polit-
ical struggle’ approach (Robbins 2004).  
The value of analysing the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts from these two angles is 
that it discloses the various political struggles that were at the heart of the conflicts. I 
identify four major political struggles that were intertwined and explain the forest con-
flicts. The first struggle, elucidated from the angle of ‘the politicization of ecology’, is a 
conflict over access and access control. The second angle uncovers three political strug-
gles: one involving personal rivalries between double authorities; the second linked to 
Kenya’s electoral politics; and the third that refers to the century-old territorial struggle 
between the Loita and the Purko. The text in this chapter is organized around the two 
angles and these four struggles, which will be discussed in turn in the order in which 
they are mentioned here. A chronological order of the main events is followed as far as 
possible. 
The contribution of the analysis presented in this chapter to the existing scholarship 
on the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts,1 which will be discussed in detail in the con-
clusion to this chapter, is that it will show that the four political struggles identified 
above crystallized along an internal line of division in Loita’s leadership. This means 
that intra-Loita conflict was primarily a male affair fought out within the governing age-
group of Loita at the time, namely the Iseuri. The separation of Loita leadership into 
two groups runs as a thread throughout this chapter but receives closer treatment in the 
second part. One of the two leadership groups was informally known as ‘the Ilkerin 
group’ because of its close association with the Ilkerin Project.2 The majority of the 
Loita leaders belonged to this group. The other group was known by various names but 
I will call it the ‘Olorte group’,3 after the home area of the group’s key figure. I will 
                                                 
1  Péron (2000); ole Siloma & Zaal (2005); Zaal & ole Siloma (2006); Adano et al. (2012) and Zaal & 
Adano (2012). See also Voshaar (1998: 113-114); LNECTC (1994); Kantai (2001); Karanja et al. 
(2002) and Ngece et al. (2007). The examination of the forest conflicts presented here is based on data 
gathered since 2001. A first analysis is taken up in my Masters thesis (Kronenburg García 2003).   
2  They were nicknamed ‘Mashindano’ by the other group, which means ‘competition’ in Swahili. 
3  Such as ‘the anti-Ilkerin group’ (Kronenburg García 2003) and ‘Opposition’. There was a third group 
that organized around some outspoken and educated individuals and called themselves the ‘Concerned 
Citizens of Loita’ or CCL (see ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 275-276, 280; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 7, 11). 
As they shared the same stance with regard to the forest issue as the Olorte group, these two groups 
merged. The Olorte group then started to present itself to outsiders, especially to the media, as the 
CCL (see ‘One killed in fight for traditional forest of Maasai, implicating controversial IUCN Project 
with EU funding’, ‘Kenya: The Maasai stand up to IUCN displacement attempts from their forest’: 
www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 24/2/14; ‘Loita and Purko Maasai resist IUCN 
plans for the Naimina Enkiyio forest’: www.culturalsurvival.org/news/michael-ole-tiampati/loita-and-
purko-maasai-resist-iucn-plans-naimina-enkiyio-forest accessed 24/2/14 ). Karanja et al. (2002), in an 
IUCN publication, mention many more Loita sub-groups: ‘Inkidongi Development Society’, ‘Olmaa 
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show how the division in Loita’s leadership is key to understanding the course and out-
come of the forest conflicts. Although individual leaders switched sides in the process, 
the two leadership groups remained remarkably consistent in composition and size. As 
the analysis of the forest conflicts unfolds, it will be clear when and how these groups 
were formed and how their rivalry evolved.4 
The links between these leader groups and the rest of the Loita population are im-
portant. During the Narok County Council conflict, protest against their plans was orga-
nized by the Ilkerin group, with the majority of the Loita population supporting them. 
The Olorte group, on the other hand, were on the side of Narok County Council. During 
the IUCN conflict, there was an interesting inversion as it was the Olorte group that 
mobilized to demonstrate against outside intervention (which was supported by the 
Ilkerin group) and they were backed by many Loita Maasai. Not only the rivalries be-
tween the groups of leaders are important here but also the relations between them and 
the rest of the Loita people. The distinction between leaders and followers is also signif-
icant in connection with the four struggles identified above. We will see that some 
struggles were more meaningful to the followers, while others were more relevant to the 
leaders. 
Part one: the politicization of ecology through the lens of access 
The opposition of the Loita majority to Narok County Council’s plan can be seen as an 
‘environmental movement’, defined as a political ramification of environmental change 
in the sense of a reaction by a socially disadvantaged group to the disproportionate so-
cio-economic costs of environmental change that emerged as a result of, for example, 
commercial tree plantations or hydro-electric dams (Bryant 1992: 24-27). Such an un-
derstanding of the Narok County Council conflict would hinge on Loita concerns about 
the environmental state of the forest. This explanation, however, does not hold if one 
takes the second round of the conflict into consideration. In this second instance, oppo-
sition was directed at IUCN, an environmental organization whose main interest was the 
environmental status of the forest. Though tempting at first sight, opposition to Narok 
County Council’s plan cannot be convincingly described as an environmental move-
ment. 
                                                 
Development and Welfare Association’, ‘Middle Ground Group’ and ‘Osupuko Oirobi Development 
Group’. I have never heard of these groups and their proliferation might have more to do with the 
authors’ (and IUCN’s) attempts at being inclusive and mapping all forest management stakeholder 
groups. During the IUCN conflict, yet another group emerged in press notices called the ‘Forest 
Morans’, but people interviewed in Loita had never heard of them (‘The Maasai stand up’: 
www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 24/2/14; ‘Loita and Purko Maasai resist 
IUCN’: www.culturalsurvival.org/news/michael-ole-tiampati/loita-and-purko-maasai-resist-iucn- 
plans-naimina-enkiyio-forest accessed 24/2/14). Ngece et al. (2007: 176) make mention of a splinter 
group of CCL called the ‘Forum for Maa Development’. 
4  The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on the intra-Loita conflict for which both leadership 
groups (and followers) were interviewed. Alliances between the leadership groups and outside actors, 
such as Purko politicians or IUCN officials, are reviewed from the perspective of Loita interviewees 
and therefore reflect neither a Purko nor a IUCN side of the story. Repeated attempts were made to 
approach some of these outside actors for an in-depth interview but, apart from fleeting conversations 
such as that with Purko Minister Ntimama, none materialized.    
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Fortmann (1990), who studied a series of conflicts about a forest in Adamsville in the 
US was faced with a similar situation as one of them seemed at first sight to be a clear 
instance of rural environmentalism. Protests against Megavoltz, a firm that intended to 
build a wood-fired power plant in Adamsville, were started at the instigation of a small 
group of local environmentalists but the subsequent protest – the Great Commute – 
against a forest-management plan turned this interpretation upside down because ‘com-
munity members, who had turned out in unprecedented numbers on the “pro-
environmental side” of the Megavoltz issue, also turned out on the “anti-environmental 
side” of the Great Commute’ (Ibid.: 206). Fortmann (Ibid.) shows that this apparent 
inconsistency, rather than people’s ‘ideological flipflops’, disappears when the protests 
are seen in terms of people defending their claims to a right to use forest resources for 
subsistence, the right to a livelihood from forest resources and a right to exclude outsid-
ers. All these assertions express claims to access and access control of a resource used 
by people as a source of livelihood. This was one of the issues at play in Loita’s forest 
conflicts. 
It was not the environmental condition of the forest but access, and particularly con-
trol over access, that was one of the key issues at stake in the Naimina Enkiyio Forest 
conflicts. People in Loita were afraid of loss of access to the forest. The belief that ‘the 
County Council was trying to snatch the forest’ and that ‘IUCN wanted to grab the for-
est’, as one interviewee put it,5 was widely shared in Loita and this became clear from 
the many conversations and interviews I had in Loita. The plan proposed by Narok 
County Council and the project devised under IUCN’s expertise were often described as 
ways of ‘taking away’ the forest from the Loita.6 It was thought that if these outside 
agencies succeeded in their endeavours, the Loita would ‘lose their say’ over the forest 
and this could jeopardize their long-held access to the forest.7 Maintaining access to the 
forest is vital for the Loita Maasai way of life. The forest has a central ritual value, en-
sures the ceremonial continuity of the age-group system and structures social life more 
widely (Kronenburg García 2003). In a more material sense, the forest conflicts reflect a 
‘livelihood struggle’ (Bryant 1992: 25) and the Loita Maasai’s opposition is a ‘liveli-
hood protest/resistance’ (Bryant 1998: 84). The ‘conflict over access’ research area in 
political ecology ‘illustrates how those “without” power fight to protect the environ-
mental foundations of their livelihood’ (Bryant 1992: 14). From this angle, the overt and 
almost collective resistance by the Loita Maasai to Narok County Council’s plan and 
the IUCN project can be seen as a reaction by the Loita Maasai in defence of the envi-
ronmental foundations of their livelihood and culture. 
A discourse, which may or may not have been sincere and/or strategic, on access 
loss, threats to livelihood and a culture at peril was adopted by Loita leaders to win 
backing from the Loita population. During the Narok County Council conflict, the Ilker-
in group used it to ‘sensitize’ and ‘train’ the community in workshops. They also dis-
tributed printed shirts and cassettes with songs about the forest struggle. The Olorte 
                                                 
5  Interview MN: 21/9/01. 
6  Interview SS: 11/3/08. 
7  Interview SS: 11/3/08. 
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group considered this to be ‘brainwashing’,8 although during the IUCN conflict they 
used the same rhetoric at rallies and demonstrations. These political arenas and means 
of communication were also exploited to accuse the opposing side of ‘selling the forest 
to so and so’.9 This is one way, i.e. in terms of those leaders ‘selling’ and those ‘defend-
ing’ the forest, that people in Loita talked about the intra-Loita conflict. Although the 
Loita supported a different group of leaders on each occasion, their rationale for sup-
porting one or the other group remained, remarkably, the same. Interests between lead-
ers and followers may converge in one context but diverge in another. 
The rhetoric was not only used by Loita leaders to rally the Loita into opposition but 
also to frame their problem for the outside world. This is nicely reflected in a booklet 
that was widely distributed by the Ilkerin group during the Narok County Council con-
flict:  
For generations, we the Loita Maasai have protected and conserved our Naimina Enkiyio indigenous 
forest through our traditions and culture. We are its custodians under African customary law and, as 
the centre of our spiritual lives and the source of water which maintains our livelihood, the forest is 
sacred to us. Our future survival and the survival of our children and grandchildren depend upon it. 
Yet our future and that of the forest is in jeopardy. Narok County Council, one of the richest local au-
thorities in Kenya, wants to turn the forest into a reserve for the development of mass tourism. If the 
plan goes ahead we will lose access to the forest for our sacred ceremonies and the use of critical wa-
ter resources in the dry season and times of drought. (…) We are fighting through the Kenyan courts 
to save Naimina Enkiyio but the “power politics” are against us. 
(LNECTC 1994: 1 emphasis added) 
Although the wording was carefully chosen to appeal to an international community 
preoccupied with biodiversity conservation and the rights of indigenous peoples, what 
was at stake was not so much the ecological or environmental status of the forest, but 
access to and particularly access control over a key environmental resource for their 
agro-pastoral and cultural way of life. The use of the language of nature conservation by 
some Loita leaders by presenting the Loita as the indigenous custodians of the forest, as 
is evident in the quote above, was not necessarily because they were concerned about 
the ecological status of the forest. It was part of a political strategy to attract (in-
ter)national support and funding in their fight to maintain control and access. 
Forest use and access 
As seen in Chapter 3, the Loita settled in the vicinity of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest 
around 1800. Due to their historical proximity, they have always been intensive users of 
the forest.10 As mixed pastoralists combining livestock keeping and crop cultivation, the 
Loita live in the open areas on the western side of the forest where their livestock graze 
according to the seasonal availability of grass and water and they only enter the forest 
for specific purposes when the need arises. The forest is of critical importance to their 
pastoral livelihood in times of drought as it provides perennial water sources, evergreen 
                                                 
8  Interview ML: 22/8/01; Interview ML: 5/9/01. 
9  For example: ‘Minister Ntimama wanted to sell the forest to the County Council’ (Interview MM: 
16/9/01) or ‘Ntimama is selling the forest to South Africans’ (Interview ML: 22/8/01) or ‘[the co-
opted councillor, see below] is selling the forest’ (Interview ML: 5/9/01). 
10  For a more detailed description of the various uses and meanings of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest for 
the Loita Maasai, see Kronenburg García (2003: Ch. 4 & 5). 
164 
 
pastures and, in extreme cases, leaves for the cattle. During prolonged periods of 
drought, as was the case at the beginning of 2009, Purko herders and also other Maasai 
drive their cattle to the southern glades of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest (ole Siloma & 
Zaal 2005: 271). Access to this critical resource is not denied as it is understood that 
there is no other place where they can go. However, as soon as it rains, they are ex-
pected to leave and the territorial boundaries between Maasai sections close again. Maa-
sai sections do not fight over pastoral resources in periods of scarcity but in periods of 
abundance.11 
When grass is available elsewhere, the pastures in the forest and the highlands more 
widely are left to recover. This social norm demands that forest and highland pastures 
be reserved for drought grazing only, and there is also the wish to graze animals on the 
new nutritious grass that grows on the lower plains following rainfall. It is in this sense 
that access to the pastoral resources in the forest is regulated to some extent. In fact, 
entering the forest for grazing has been the only use that was controlled to any extent for 
a long time. This came about by virtue of the transhumant pastoralism that the Loita 
practised in the past (see Chapter 3) and still attempt today (see Chapter 9) whereby 
they move to the lowlands during the rainy season and to the highlands in the dry sea-
son. The forest is part of the landscape that they use as pastoralists. Control of access to 
the forest as a separate and well-defined land unit by a clear social body or institution is 
not the case here. It is only relatively recently, and partly in response to the forest con-
flicts, that attempts have been made by Loita leaders to set up so-called ‘forest commit-
tees’ to regulate access to the forest. And this access is only for the specific purpose of 
cutting down trees for timber. 
Access to the forest for uses other than grazing is not restricted. People can enter the 
forest freely to extract resources like plants, trees, fruits, seeds, tubers, herbs, barks, 
bulbs and roots for medicines, food and ritual purposes as well as honey, firewood, 
fencing posts and timber for housing.12 Only when there is food scarcity do people enter 
the forest to hunt game for food. The forest is also a place where warriors have their 
secluded meat feasts. Various age-group ceremonies and ritual blessings for women are 
conducted at sacred trees and secret sites inside the forest that are considered conducive 
to a generalized notion of fertility. For example, there is a sacred place in the forest 
called Loitokitok where the manyata is built that celebrates the birth of a new age-set 
(see the Appendix). The forest is thus seen as being key to the continuity of the age-
group system. It is also believed that, due to the abundance of large trees, it attracts 
clouds that bring much needed rain that is crucial for the fields and livestock, and the 
reproduction of life in general. The abundance of green and water is linked to hope and 
life (LNECTC 1994: 1). This brings a sense of proximity to God (Enkai) that is revealed 
                                                 
11  When there is a scarcity of water and grass, inter-sectional problems are set aside to allow for 
solidarity and hospitality. Commenting on the 1993 drought, one elder, who had seen his home 
invaded by Purko, explained: ‘You cannot refuse a Maasai in hardship. If you restrict, God (Enkai) 
will punish you’ (Interview ML: 22/8/01). Differences based on section fade in importance and 
instead, the value of relationships based on clanship and age are stressed. One young man phrased it in 
this way: ‘When it is dry, we [Purko and Loita] are friends’ (Interview MM: 16/9/01). 
12  See Maundu et al. (2001: 17-24, 35-54) for an extensive, though not exhaustive, list of plant uses in 
Loita. See also Legiliso-Kiyiapi (1999: 65-68). 
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in the observation that the forest ‘pulls the rain [also called enkai]’.13 More recent, but 
still on a small scale, are the earnings some Loita are generating from engaging in tour-
ism activities, for example as porters and guides or by providing camping areas near 
their homesteads (Shelley & Lempaka 1999: 9, 10).14 Tourist access to the forest is not 
denied as long as they come in with someone from the area. Another development that 
started in the 1980s but that has accelerated since the 1990s is the spread of homesteads 
to the edges and in the glades of the forest, while previously they were exclusively lo-
cated away from the forest towards the plains. This is a result both of population growth 
and declining resources in the grassland areas, such as firewood, construction materials 
and good grazing land (Maundu et al. 2001: 26). Linked to this are the twin develop-
ments of the adoption of agriculture and sedentarization that are encouraging families to 
settle in the fertile highlands along the edge of the forest where rainfall is less erratic 
than in the lower areas (Kantai 2001: 42). The use of the forest as a drought refuge has 
increased over the years due to growing livestock numbers that are finishing the grass 
on the plains earlier in the year (Maundu et al. 2001: 26). How these developments have 
changed land tenure practices and ideas of landed property in Loita is the focus of 
Chapter 9. 
Specific forest user-groups include laibons, medicine (wo)men and expert honey 
harvesters said to descend from the forest-dwelling and hunting-and-gathering Dorobo 
but who are now assimilated Maasai agro-pastoralists. These specialized user-groups 
are associated with the forest because they enter it regularly to extract resources they 
need for their profession. Laibons, for example, look for ingredients like roots and bark 
for the protective charms and amulets they make but they also occasionally perform 
rituals in the forest. In addition, laibons are closely identified with the forest because 
they live along the edge of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest in the northern half of Loita.  
For the Loita, continued access to the forest ensures a stream of benefits that are im-
portant for their agro-pastoral livelihood, social reproduction, ceremonial life and physi-
cal well-being. The benefits are numerous, often socially differentiated and seasonally 
dependent. They can be tangible and intangible, and are found across the whole forest, 
in particular zones or in site-specific locales. Access to the forest is allowed for particu-
lar purposes such as ceremonies and needs like collecting medicinal plants, and for 
Maasai pastoral practices such as drought refuge. This access became endangered when 
the County Council and IUCN came with plans and projects, and explains why the Loita 
Maasai vehemently opposed these plans. 
                                                 
13  Interview JK: 15/9/01. 
14  In about 2007, one Loita family began to work with a tour company called Maasai Trails that 
constructed a semi-permanent camp in the vicinity of the family’s homestead next to the forest. It 
serves as a base for organized group hikes in the forest. The engagement of the Dutch founders of this 
tour company with this particular Loita family dates back to 2001 and they set up an NGO called 
Loita Development Foundation (LDF). In 2004/2005, LDF wanted to construct an eco-lodge inside 
the forest but the plans were cancelled after some Loita leaders protested. The LDF forest lodge plan 
constitutes yet another forest intervention that triggered resistance and court cases (Zaal & ole Siloma 
2006: 11), though not of the same magnitude as the Narok County Council and IUCN conflicts. Other 
minor forest interventions have pre-dated and followed the ones by Narok County Council and IUCN. 
Although some are mentioned in this chapter, in-depth analyses have not been included here due to 
space constraints. See Kronenburg García (2003: 96-98) for more information.         
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Narok County Council: claiming access  
through state law (1978-2002) 
Narok County Council aimed to achieve access control by transforming the tenure of 
the forest. More specifically, it tried to change the legal status of the forest from that of 
Trust forest to a nature reserve. This is what Ribot & Peluso (2003: 162-163) call state-
law-based ‘legal access’, i.e. access that is sanctioned by statutory law and enforced by 
the state, but may mean the exclusion of and denial of access to those who previously 
enjoyed benefits. The forest in Loita, as well as the rest of the land in Loita, is officially 
Trust Land under state law (see Chapter 1).15 Trust Land falls under the jurisdiction of 
the local authority.16 Land in Loita is thus vested in Narok County Council, which acts 
as its legal trustee. Narok County Council is holding the land in trust for the benefit of 
the Loita until land tenure has been formalized, which can either happen through land 
demarcation and adjudication or the setting aside of land by central or local government 
for public purposes. In the meantime, Trust Land continues to be governed under ‘Afri-
can customary law’.17 
By using the provisions in Kenya’s Constitution on Trust Land and the Trust Land 
Act, Narok County Council attempted to set aside the Naimina Enkiyio Forest by using 
their right to allocate and use such land (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 272).18 In June 1993, 
it published the Narok County Council 1994-1998 Development Proposal Plan 
(LNECTC 1994: 5; CCD ‘Statement’: 6(j)) that included a plan to gazette the Naimina 
Enkiyio Forest as a nature reserve. A month later, the development proposal plan ap-
peared in newspaper supplements (CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (j); Karanja et al. 2002: 10, 30). 
‘Gazettement’, i.e. when a legal notice is published in the Kenya Gazette, which is the 
state’s official publication, would accomplish the legal tenure transformation of the for-
est, after which it would be regarded as a legal government resource (ole Siloma & Zaal 
2005: 269). The announcement of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest plan was made without 
proper prior consultation or communication with the Loita, as stipulated in the Trust 
Land Act.19 This was one of the grounds on which the County Council was challenged 
in court by the Ilkerin group.20 
The 1993 Narok County Council plan was not the first time that it had claimed ac-
cess control over the forest. Back in 1978, the County Council first allocated a tract of 
                                                 
15  Since 2013 when the new 2010 Constitution of Kenya came into effect, Trust Land has been replaced 
by the new land category of ‘Community Land’, which is held in trust by the newly devolved 
governing bodies, the ‘County Governments’ (Constitution of Kenya 2010, Chapter 5 on ‘Land and 
Environment’ (63)).  
16  ‘All Trust land shall vest in the County Council within whose area of jurisdiction it is situated’ 
(Constitution of Kenya, revised edition 1998 (1992), Chapter IX ‘Trust Land’, Section 115 (1)). 
17  The effects of this legal implication are discussed in Chapter 11. 
18  See CCD (‘Notice of Motion’: 1 (a, 2)). The Constitution of Kenya, revised edition 1998 (1992), 
Chapter IX ‘Trust Land’, Section 117 (1) states that: ‘Subject to this section, an Act of Parliament may 
empower a county council to set apart an area of Trust land vested in that county council for use and 
occupation’. And the Trust Lands Act (Cap 288), Section 13 (1): ‘In pursuance of section 117 (I) of 
the Constitution, a council may set apart an area of Trust land vested in it for use and occupation’.  
19  ‘The following procedure shall be followed before land is set apart under subsection (1) of this 
section … (...)… the council shall bring the proposal to set apart the land to the notice of the people of 
the area concerned’ (Trust Land Act (Cap 288), Section 13 (2) (b)). 
20  See CCD (‘Statement’: 6(k)). 
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forest land to outsiders as a tourist campsite (Karanja et al. 2002: 12). A second alloca-
tion was made in 1984 (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 272; CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (n)). The 
Loita claim that they were neither notified nor consulted about the campsite allocations 
but the County Council insists that it communicated with some Loita leaders, although 
it is unclear exactly which ones (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 272). The plan to set aside the 
Naimina Enkiyio Forest seems to have existed for a while. Péron (2000: 384, 390) and 
Voshaar (1998: 113) report that, in 1984, a first resolution was passed by Narok County 
Council to turn the Naimina Enkiyio Forest into a game and nature reserve. The bound-
aries of the forest for this plan appear to have been demarcated in 1983 (Karanja et al. 
2002: 13; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 275). 
Apart from citing the Trust Land Act, Narok County Council also referred to the Lo-
cal Government Act that empowers them to establish and maintain forests along the 
lines of game parks, such as the famous Maasai Mara National Reserve.21 Unlike most 
national parks and reserves in Kenya, which are managed by the Kenya Wildlife Service 
(KWS), the Maasai Mara is managed by a local authority. Until 1994, it was entirely 
managed by Narok County Council.22 The future of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest was 
repeatedly compared to the Maasai Mara, positively by the County Council and nega-
tively by the Ilkerin group.23 Narok County Council proposed the establishment of a 
Naimina Enkiyio Forest nature reserve as a way of solving Maasai Mara’s environmen-
tal problems that have been caused by the growth of tourism.24 The idea was to develop 
the Naimina Enkiyio Forest to ease the pressure that mass tourism was putting on the 
Maasai Mara (LNECTC 1994: 5; CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (j)). Narok County Council 
stressed the benefits of commercializing the Naimina Enkiyio Forest, i.e. revenue gen-
eration for local and district-level development, and local jobs. However the Loita were 
deeply suspicious of these promises after what they had seen happening to the Purko 
Maasai group ranches that neighbour the Maasai Mara. Not only had these Maasai 
communities lost access to pastures inside the park but promises of jobs and revenue 
sharing had not been kept by Narok County Council (LNECTC 1994: 5; Péron 2000: 
396). 
If the County Council had succeeded in converting the Naimina Enkiyio Forest into a 
nature reserve or game park,25 they would have acquired legal ownership and exclusive 
management rights to the forest with the power to control who entered it, when and for 
what reason. Nature reserves in Kenya seek to preserve the flora and fauna in them and 
typically exclude all forms of human land use considered damaging to the environment, 
                                                 
21  ‘Every county, municipal or town council shall have power (e) to establish and maintain game parks, 
including accommodation for visitors thereto; (f) to establish and maintain forests’ (Local Government 
Act (Cap 265), Section 155 (e) (f)). 
22  In 1994, Trans-Mara District was carved out of the westernmost part of Narok District (Rutten 2001: 
434). The western part of the Maasai Mara came under the management of the new Trans-Mara 
County Council, while the eastern part remained under Narok County Council.   
23  For an analysis of the ecological and social risks of turning the Naimina Enkiyio Forest into a new 
Maasai Mara, see Péron (2000: 394-396). 
24  Narok County Council had come under fire after the publication of an EU-commissioned report that 
exposed the mismanagement of the Maasai Mara by the County Council (LNECTC 1994: 5). 
25  In the court case (CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (s)), ‘Notice of Motion’: 1 (a3)), reference is made to a game 
park rather than a nature reserve.  
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such as cutting, grazing and the removal of forest produce.26 This includes restrictions 
on entering a forest for cultural and religious reasons unless in possession of a special 
permit.27 These legal provisions could have been used by the County Council as 
grounds for denying forest access to the Loita and this would have meant a loss of free 
access for the Loita to the forest and the ‘criminalization’ (Peluso 1992) of their long-
standing use of it. It would have placed their legal access or non-access to the forest in 
the hands of an outside agency. To access the forest, they would have needed to apply 
and pay for permits, or bribe and cultivate good relations with the controlling state ac-
tors. They would, in effect, have needed to practise what Ribot & Peluso call ‘access 
maintenance’ (2003: 158-159), i.e. keeping a resource access open by expending time 
and resources on the agency or actor that controls it. Alternatively, they could choose to 
access the forest illegally but risked being caught and the subsequent consequences. 
Strategies of opposition by the Ilkerin group 
Loita Maasai resistance to Narok County Council’s attempt at taking over access con-
trol of the forest was organized under the leadership of the Ilkerin Project. Four strate-
gies of opposition can be identified. One consisted of organizing Loita’s diffuse leader-
ship into a single body that was named the Loita Council of Elders. A second move was 
to counter the County Council’s legal claim by playing along and setting up a legal enti-
ty called the Loita Naimina Enkiyio Conservation Trust Company, hereafter referred to 
as the Trust Company. A third strategy was to lobby for support at national and interna-
tional level, which involved tapping into discourses of indigeneity and nature conserva-
tion, and reinventing the position of the chief laibon. And last but not least, it was de-
cided to actively participate in district politics in an attempt to influence the outcome of 
the conflict. The first three of these strategies are discussed in this section and the last 
one will receive ample attention in a later section.  
 
The Loita Council of Elders: performing leadership unity 
All the Loita leaders introduced and discussed in the previous chapters were brought 
together under the Loita Council of Elders: the PA chiefs and the councillors (Chapter 
4); the development leaders of the Ilkerin Project (Chapter 5); and the age-group chiefs, 
the ritual age-group leaders, the clan chiefs and the chief laibon (Chapter 6).28 
One of the reasons for forming the Loita Council of Elders was the realization that 
Narok County Council, as a state institution, could not be challenged through any des-
ignated state intermediaries, i.e. the PA chiefs and/or the councillors, without them risk-
                                                 
26  ‘No cutting, grazing, removal of forest produce, hunting or fishing, shall be allowed in a nature 
reserve except with the permission of the Director granted in consultation with other conservation 
agencies, which permission shall only be given with the object of facilitating research’ (Forest Act 
2005 (Cap 385), Section 32 (3)). 
27  ‘Any forest community, or person who is use of desirous of utilising or conserving any grove or forest 
which is part of a nature reserve for cultural, religious, educational, scientific or other reasons shall 
submit an application, in the prescribed form, to the Board through the forest conservation committee 
for the area in which the nature reserve occurs’ (Forest Act 2005 (Cap 385), Section 33 (1)). 
28  According to ole Siloma & Zaal (2005: 265), the DO, though not a Loita Maasai, was also a member 
of the council because of his formal function in Loita Division. 
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ing reprisals by their superiors. The state was the institution that granted them the au-
thority on which their leadership position rested and, as state representatives, they were 
expected to further state interests, not oppose them. PA chiefs faced being sacked if they 
stood up against the state that, as their ultimate employer, expected their loyalty. Coun-
cillors faced political intimidation or exclusion from district and national political are-
nas. It became clear that the usual channels of interaction with the state could not be 
mobilized because this time it was not a question of adapting and reworking a state in-
tervention (see Chapter 5) but of fighting it. The Loita Council of Elders offered an al-
ternative avenue for voicing Loita complaints over the County Council’s plan and a 
certain degree of immunity from state reprisals. This ‘untouchability’ was due to ‘the 
inclusion of traditional leadership’ that, different from the PA chiefs and councillors, 
was not directly answerable to the state (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 280-281). As one 
leader put it: ‘the government cannot sack an elder!’29 Loita PA chiefs and councillors 
still belonged to the Loita Council of Elders but their active participation was optional, 
depending on the political climate and the risks they were perceived to run.  
Ole Siloma & Zaal (2005: 263, 280) describe the Loita Council of Elders as the 
‘most powerful institution in Loita’ with ‘a key role in development activities and the 
management of natural resources’.30 By merging ‘locally developed traditional forms of 
leadership systems’ and ‘formal western-style’ governance systems (Ibid.: 255, 258), 
the Loita Council of Elders, they suggest, was instrumental in resolving the forest con-
flict due to its participatory form of ‘neo-African governance’ (Ibid.: 255). Though I 
agree that the Loita Council of Elders was set up as a new hybrid form of government, I 
believe that ole Siloma & Zaal put too much emphasis on the role played by this institu-
tion in the Narok County Council conflict. Other than referring to a certain balance of 
power and to links between the Loita Council of Elders and the various institutions in-
volved in the conflict (Ibid.: 278), they do not clearly explain what that role was. When 
talking about roles, it is the role of the Ilkerin Project that they are discussing (Ibid.: 
279). My argument is that it is more on account of the Ilkerin Project and not so much 
because of the Loita Council of Elders, as ole Siloma & Zaal (Ibid.: 281) claim, that 
Narok County Council was prevented from proceeding with its forest plans. The crea-
tion and mobilization of the Loita Council of Elders was actually part of a larger plan 
devised by the Ilkerin Project leaders.31  
After the Narok County Council conflict was settled, the Loita Council of Elders, as 
a corporate body managing development and natural resources in Loita, virtually disap-
peared and during my various periods of fieldwork from 2001 onwards, seemed to exist 
                                                 
29  Interview JK: 26/8/01. 
30  See also Zaal & ole Siloma (2006: 7, 12). 
31  In a second paper by the same authors (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006), the fixation on the Loita Council of 
Elders persists. Though much more moderate on the impact of this neo-African governance institution 
than before and recognizing that it was set up and heavily influenced by the leaders of the Ilkerin 
Project, they still present the Loita Council of Elders, and not the Ilkerin Project, as the driving force 
behind the opposition to Narok County Council. 
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in name only.32 But this is the point: it was not about development and natural-resource 
management but about contesting the appropriation of the forest.  
By forming the Loita Council of Elders, Loita leadership was made more visible by 
its centralization in a single institution. The idea was to present the Loita and their lead-
ership as a united block fighting Narok County Council. But not all the Loita leaders 
(and not all Loita) opposed the County Council. In this sense, Loita leadership and 
hence the Loita Council of Elders was not united. The (majority of the) leaders who did 
oppose it were those who came to be known as the Ilkerin group because of the central 
role that the leaders of the Ilkerin Project played in organizing, planning, (securing) 
funding and facilitating opposition. The leaders from the Olorte group who, according 
to the Ilkerin group, were opposing the interests of the Loita community, appear to have 
been excluded from the Loita Council of Elders (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 9-10). If so, 
then the Loita Council of Elders, though projecting Loita unity and inclusivity, was 
synonymous with the Ilkerin group and represented only one part of the Loita leader-
ship. In any case, it was the Ilkerin group, and not a united Loita leadership in the form 
of the Loita Council of Elders, that led Loita Maasai opposition to Narok County Coun-
cil. 
Although the Ilkerin group took great care to present the Ilkerin Project, the Loita 
Council of Elders and the Trust Company as separate and independent institutions, they 
were seen in Loita as one and the same, as the same people were involved, they were 
housed in the same buildings (in the case of the Ilkerin Project, the Trust Company and 
later IUCN), they held meetings and workshops in the Ilkerin Project, and were funded 
by the same donors (in the case of the Ilkerin Project, the Trust Company and the pre-
phase of the IUCN project) (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 273, 279-280; Zaal & ole Siloma 
2006: 8-10, 12; Ngece et al. 2007: 176, 179, 181). As a result, those against the Ilkerin 
group automatically opposed the Loita Council of Elders, the Trust Company and, later, 
IUCN (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 280; Ngece et al. 2007: 181). 
The reason why the Ilkerin Project was able to take the reins so prominently was 
partly due to the constrained room for action for PA chiefs and councillors as interme-
diaries. The development leaders of the Ilkerin Project, as the other Loita intermediaries 
specialized in the outside world, were best prepared to take over the intermediate space 
made available. They were educated and thus spoke English; were familiar with life, 
work and politics outside Loita; had a wide network of contacts; and were well aware of 
trends in the international NGO scene.  
 
The Trust Company’s legal fight 
When the Ilkerin group found out about Narok County Council’s plans, they took their 
protests to the state representatives at district level, i.e. Narok County Council’s chair-
man and the DC, but to no avail (Karanja et al. 2002: 10, 13, 30, 31). At national level, 
direct appeals to President Moi, the Minister of Environment and the Minister of Local 
                                                 
32  Occasionally and only with a great deal of effort did the Loita Council of Elders come together, but 
then only at the instigation of organizations, like the LDF, that were seeking approval for their 
development initiatives in Loita. Loita leaders did, however, meet regularly but these meetings were 
not referred to as ‘Loita Council of Elders meetings’ but as ‘Loita leaders meetings’. 
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Government also failed (see CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (l); Péron 2000: 391; ole Siloma & 
Zaal 2005: 276; Karanja et al. 2002: 11, 13-14).33 So, following legal advice, they set 
up a company in the form of a trust – the Trust Company – as an organizational struc-
ture and a legally recognized and registered body to stage a legal fight against the gazet-
ting of the forest and to attract funding (Karanja et al. 2002: 30; Zaal & ole Siloma 
2006: 10).34 Although this was officially an action by the Loita Council of Elders (Ibid.: 
9), it was an initiative by the Ilkerin Project director and his deputy (Péron 2005: 402), 
and confirms the key role played by Ilkerin Project leaders in the County Council’s op-
position. 
The Trust Company was set up in 1992 in response to the earlier campsite allocations 
to outsiders by the County Council and leaked information about the County Council’s 
plan for the forest (MoA LNECTC 1992: 7; CCD ‘Statement’: 6(n)(q); Karanja et al. 
2002: 12, 30; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 272-273; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 8-9). It was 
seen as the best option available at the time to legally represent the interests of the Loita 
population regarding the forest (Karanja et al. 2002: 30; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 9). 
Though cast in the language of conservation and development,35 its main objective was 
to secure legal ownership of the forest to prevent the County Council and others in the 
future from appropriating the forest (LNECTC 1994: 6; Karanja et al. 2002: 30; ole 
Siloma & Zaal 2005: 272-273, 277, 279; Péron 2000: 402-403; Ngece et al. 2007: 173). 
Using the state’s own legal apparatus in an attempt to prevent the loss of the Naimina 
Enkiyio Forest was in line with the well-honed practice by Loita leaders of territorializ-
ing development interventions (see Chapter 5). 
The Trust Company was run by nine Loita leaders who acted as the trustees (MoA 
LNECTC 1992: 7; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 279) and were all from the Ilkerin group.36 
Membership was defined as ‘all bona fide residents of the administrative Loita loca-
tion’, which at that time was estimated at being about 15,000 (CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (w); 
CCD ‘Affidavit’: 3).37 By including all Kenyan Loita Maasai as members of the Trust 
Company, it was believed that collective Loita Maasai ownership of the Naimina Enki-
yio Forest could be legally achieved and a title deed would be obtained. 
                                                 
33  It seems that the Minister of Environment, Philip Leakey, later supported the Ilkerin group (Zaal & ole 
Siloma 2006: 8, 9; Adano et al. 2012: 75). Leakey has a longer history of involvement in Loita. 
Earlier, his interest in Kamorora, which is across the Naimina Enkiyio Forest on the Nguruman 
Escarpment, had triggered the formation of the Kamorora Group Ranch (see Chapter 5 and also Zaal 
& ole Siloma 2006: 8).   
34  The Trust Company was registered under the Companies Act (2. 486), as a company limited by 
guarantee and not having share capital (MoA LNECTC 1992: 1). According to ole Siloma & Zaal 
(2005: 275), it was registered under the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act. Through the Trust 
Company, the Ilkerin group received funding from the Dutch Cordaid and the Directoraat-Generaal 
Internationale Samenwerking (DGIS) for the court case.  
35  The Memorandum of Association of the Loita Naimina-Enkiyio Conservation Trust (1992: 1-5) cites 
29 objectives, all related to the conservation, management, development and (tourism) exploitation of 
the Naimina Enkiyio Forest and the natural environment of Loita Location more widely.    
36  Ten according to the LNECTC (1994: 6) and Péron (2000: 402).  
37  17,000 according to LNECTC (1994: 6). 
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The Trust Company provided a way to sue Narok County Council.38 A case was filed 
at the Kenyan High Court after the second resolution by Narok County Council was 
passed in 1993 that confirmed their gazettement plans (Péron 2000: 403). It was heard 
twice in 1996 and once in 1998 after which the case was adjourned indefinitely (Karanja 
et al. 2002: 10). The applicants included the Trust Company (i.e. all 15,000 bona fide 
residents) and six Loita leaders. They challenged Narok County Council’s interpretation 
of the Trust Land Act (LNECTC 1994: 6; CCDs) and sought to block the resolutions 
taken by the County Council in September and November 1993 that confirmed their 
Naimina Enkiyio plans (CCDs; Péron 2000: 391; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 275).39 
 
Indigeneity, nature conservation and the reformulation of the chief laibon 
While the narrative on access, livelihood and culture loss was enough to gain wide-
spread support from the Loita population, for national and international support, it was 
decided, in addition, to tap into the discourses on indigenousness or ‘indigeneity’ 
(Friedman 2008; Merlan 2009) and nature conservation.40 This was evident in the way 
the issue was portrayed in the media and on the Internet after journalists were contacted 
about the story and the Trust Company’s booklet was widely distributed to international 
networks, support groups and organizations.41 At a national level, the Ilkerin group 
found backing from state institutions, such as the KWS and the Forestry Department, 
through the Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation (KIFCON) programme (Péron 2000: 
402; Karanja et al. 2002: 13-14, 30-32; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 276) as well as NGOs 
like Africa 2000, Kenya Energy and Environment NGOs (KENGO) and East Africa 
Wild Life Society (EAWLS) (Péron 2000: 402; Karanja et al. 2002: 10-11, 14, 31-32). 
At an international level, the Ilkerin group actively participated in forums on indigenous 
people and biological diversity (Péron 2000: 396-401; Karanja et al. 2002: 11; ole Si-
loma & Zaal 2005: 276),42 received assistance from anthropologist Xavier Péron (2003) 
and adeptly embraced the relevant discourses.  
                                                 
38  The court case documents (CCD) consulted are: ‘Notice of Motion’, ‘Statement’, ‘Affidavit of the 
First Applicant’, ‘Replying Affidavit’. 
39  The Narok County Council resolution of 3 September was recorded under Minute 52/93 ‘Naimina-
Enkiyio Forest – Narok County Council -vs- Naimina-Enkiyio Trust Company’. The second 
resolution, taken on 26 November 1993 concerned Minute 69/93 ‘Resolution on deregistration of 
Naimina-Enkiyio Trust Company’.  
40  Indigeneity implies ‘first-order connections (usually at small scale) between group and locality. It 
connotes belonging and originariness and deeply felt processes of attachment and identification, and 
thus it distinguishes “natives” from others’ (Merlan 2009: 304). 
41  See www.ubcic.bc.ca/files/PDF/Chapter11.pdf accessed 27/2/14; 
  http://unauthorised.org/anthropology/anthro-l/november-1993/0049.html accessed 27/2/14. 
42  In 1994 at the second session of the Intergovernmental Committee on the Convention of Biological 
Diversity at Nairobi and in 1995 at a UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva. The 
UN conference in Geneva became an arena of direct confrontation between the Ilkerin group and the 
County Council; on hearing of two Loita leaders going to the conference, the Minister of Local 
Government, who was seen as the brain behind the Narok County Council plan (see later), hastily sent 
an envoy of 24 people, including three members of Narok County Council and his own son who, 
under the auspices of an NGO called the Maa Development Association, presented themselves as the 
true indigenous Maasai people. According to Péron (2000: 400), who accompanied the Ilkerin group 
delegation (Péron 2003), the Narok County Council envoy succeeded in outshining the Loita 
delegation. 
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An interesting component in this strategy was the reformulation of the position of 
chief laibon. This role, understood in Loita in terms of protecting the people against 
danger and misfortune (see Chapter 6), was recast in the language of indigenous peo-
ple’s rights and forest conservation. The Ilkerin group described laibons as being 
‘charged with the inherited responsibility of protecting and preserving Naimina Enkiyio 
in perpetuity’ and the chief laibon as the ‘keeper and cultural conservator’ of their sa-
cred forest to emphasize the success of their own indigenous institutions of forest con-
servation and hence their right to self-management (LNECTC 1994: 4).43 An important 
reason for presenting the chief laibon in this way was that Loita lacked an identifiable 
institution charged with conserving the forest as a bounded and separate entity. In Loita, 
the forest was not viewed as a discrete resource to be conserved but as an integral part 
of the wider landscape used for their agro-pastoral and ritual life. However, to strike a 
familiar note internationally and promote a stronger argument, an explicit institution of 
forest conservation was needed. This is why the functions of the Loita Council of Elders 
and the Trust Company were explained and articulated to outsiders using terms such as 
‘natural resource management’ and ‘conservation’. The position of the chief laibon had, 
in comparison to the Loita Council of Elders and the Trust Company, an additional ad-
vantage: its identity, in the sense of being a long-standing Maasai institution, could 
nicely be made to conform to the ‘indigenous slot’ (Li 2000; Karlsson 2003). The indig-
enous slot, which is advanced and defined by the international indigenous rights move-
ment, states that ‘indigenous people derive ecologically sound livelihoods from their 
ancestral lands’, that they possess ‘environmental wisdom’ and have a ‘spiritual attach-
ment to the landscape’ (Li 2000: 155, 165). Claiming the indigenous slot in the kind of 
fora that the Ilkerin group attended is a common strategy among groups competing 
against the state for natural resources (Ibid.).44  
The strategic capitalization of a global concern with nature conservation and indige-
nous people’s rights bore results. The idea of the chief laibon as a cultural protector of 
the forest appealed strongly to activists and international development donors. In the 
grey and academic literature, this idea was also taken up enthusiastically (Maundu et al. 
2001: 12; Karanja et al. 2002: 2, 4, 12, 35; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 264, 270; Zaal & 
ole Siloma 2006: 5; Adano et al. 2012: 74; Zaal & Adano 2012: 201; Ngece et al. 2007: 
172; Péron 2000: 386). Here, the position of chief laibon, even laibonism in general, is 
described as an institution with managerial and conservational functions with regard to 
the Naimina Enkiyio Forest. The conservational interpretation of the role of the chief 
laibon, crafted by the Ilkerin group and adopted uncritically by others, started to live a 
life of its own. By going along with it, not only did this interpretation become widely 
documented and known, but it also favoured the side of the story promulgated by the 
Ilkerin group. In the process, it silenced and marginalized other versions of the Narok 
County Council conflict, particularly those of the Olorte group.  
                                                 
43  This argument is nicely captured in the title of the Trust Company’s booklet: Forest of the Lost Child 
(Entim e Naimina Enkiyio): A Maasai Conservation Success Threatened by Greed. 
44  See for an illuminating case, Karlsson (2003). 
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Chief laibon Mokompo (see Chapter 6) became the public face of the fight against 
Narok County Council. For example, at the second session of the Intergovernmental 
Committee on the Convention of Biological Diversity in Nairobi in 1994, he addressed 
the audience directly (Péron 2000: 398). The chief laibon was the head of the Loita 
Council of Elders, the chairman of the Trust Company and was also the first applicant 
in the legal suit against the County Council (CCD ‘Statement’: 1). This prominent posi-
tion was more in response to an (inter)national fascination with his office than because 
of his political authority. As we have seen, the chief laibon is a highly respected ritual 
leader in Loita but his authority is not political (see Chapter 6). Given his illiteracy, the 
fact that he did not speak English and his unfamiliarity with life outside Maasailand and 
with the state’s legal system, he had undoubtedly been coached by others. Thus, behind 
the scenes, it was other leaders, particularly those from the Ilkerin Project, who were 
pulling the strings. But even if his contribution to the Ilkerin group’s struggle was not 
political, his public position did have the desired effect on the public. To outsiders, he 
not only personified an indigenous institution of forest conservation but, by being for-
warded as the ‘cultural spiritual leader’ of the Loita (CCD ‘Affidavit’: 2), he also repre-
sented Loita unity. 
As the chief laibon’s role was being reworked to conform to the indigenous slot, it 
was taken out of context and became something that people in Loita could not relate to 
anymore. This became evident during my fieldwork when I inquired about the relation-
ship between the chief laibon and the forest. In Loita, the chief laibon is seen as being 
responsible for protecting and ensuring the well-being of the Loita people. This is based 
on his powers to predict future events that may harm his territorial domain, i.e. Loita 
territory including the forest, as was explained in Chapter 6. Through divination, rituals 
and the manufacturing of protective charms, he can then avert or repair misfortune. It is 
in this general sense, as the protector of Loita, that he is seen as the protector of the 
Naimina Enkiyio Forest: not of the forest as a discrete thing but as part of his wider ter-
ritorial domain. 
The connexion that people made in Loita between the chief laibon and the forest was 
not of someone with authority preserving the nature of the forest but in terms of his rit-
ual intervention to avoid the loss of the forest. He was variously credited with the fact 
that the County Council and IUCN had not succeeded in ‘taking’ the Naimina Enkiyio 
Forest. I was told that: ‘we won [against the County Council] because of the [chief] lai-
bon’.45 And ‘IUCN was chased by these people of Inkidongi’.46 The chief laibon con-
firmed this when explaining to me that he had used the divining horn during this forest 
conflict.47 He reminded me of the quarrel between Olonana and Senteu over Olonana’s 
intentions to ‘give away’ land to the British (see Chapter 3). Since land had been the 
reason behind their fight and land and territory loss increasingly had become matters of 
concern, the laibons of Loita were sensitive to issues involving land (LNECTC 1994: 
4), especially regarding the forest since it is a place where laibons perform rituals and 
gather the ingredients needed for their ritual medicines. It is thus a key resource for lai-
                                                 
45  Interview MM: 16/9/01. 
46  Interview LM: 26/10/08. 
47  Interview MS: 21/11/08. 
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bon practitioners. The chief laibon singled out Senteu (his grandfather), his father Simel 
and his uncle Kone (who was a PA chief and councillor in the colonial period, see 
Chapter 4) for inculcating in him this concern for the forest. Quizzing him on how he 
protected this vast forest while living on one side of it, the chief laibon referred to his 
ability to see the whole area of the forest, in the same way he was able to see all Loita 
land. To explain how he could predict future events, he ingeniously made an analogy 
with a mobile phone (‘someone talks in Nairobi and you can hear it in Loita’) and a 
torch that ‘lights up’ something. Like a phone, he could ‘see’ something at a distance 
and, like a torch, he could set apart a particular (harmful) event. By using the divining 
horn in divination sessions during the Narok County Council conflict, he ‘knew’ what 
to do. The chief laibon did not specify what he had done but another laibon explained 
that he had used ritual medicines to ‘tie’ the dangerous outsiders and prevent them from 
carrying out their plan.48  
It is in this context that the chief laibon claims to be the protector and guardian of 
Naimina Enkiyio, having protected the forest against misfortune, which in this case in-
volved threats of alienation. His special powers enable him to monitor the human activi-
ties affecting the forest and stop unwelcome intrusions. His concern was land loss, not 
nature conservation. When I referred to the timber-cutting problem in Loita, he replied 
that this problem was not for him to solve.49 
The forest committees mentioned earlier, but not the chief laibon, are concerned with 
the issue of timber harvesting.50 Set up for every forest-neighbouring administrative 
(sub-)location and composed of locality leaders, it is their responsibility to control and 
supervise this activity. The idea that laibonism is key to forest conservation does not 
stand up in this light. If anything, it is the forest committees, by attempting to regulate 
and control logging, that should be seen as environmental institutions. And still, even in 
                                                 
48  Interview NS: 19/11/08. 
49  But see Maundu et al. (2001: 11, 12) who claim otherwise. At the beginning of my PhD fieldwork 
period (in mid-2007), cutting timber was a slow and arduous process done with a two-man crosscut 
hand saw in a saw pit. It was easily controlled. Making timber is allowed for local use only and for the 
purpose of construction (such as for building a school or a house) in Loita, not for business and it may 
certainly not be done by or for outsiders. Six months later, non-Maasai individuals with chainsaws 
were brought into Loita as woodcutters. The job of cutting timbers quickly escalated out of control. 
Soon, Loita Maasai individuals acquired chainsaws for themselves. Rumours of Loita individuals 
working together with outsiders started to circulate. It was claimed that timbers were being cut on a 
large scale and transported outside Loita for commercial sale. The issue was discussed during a sub-
DDC Loita leaders’ meeting that I attended on 21 July 2008. 
50  On 17 October 2008 I attended a meeting convened by the Entasekera assistant PA chief, who had 
received orders from his superiors in Narok to set up an Entasekera ‘environmental committee’ to 
work together with the new state institution − the Kenya Forest Service (KFS) − towards the 
sustainable management of the resources in the forest. The KFS was established in February 2007 
under the Forest Act 2005 and through the administrative structure in Loita was trying to incorporate 
the Naimina Enkiyio Forest under its mandate. In reaction to this new policy, the old forest committee 
of Entasekera morphed into the new environmental committee and because the KFS directive was not 
followed up with a physical KFS presence in Loita, the environmental committee gradually came to 
fall under the sphere of influence of the PA chiefs and the DO. What happened was that people started 
to bypass the environmental committee with their timber applications, instead handing them in 
directly to the DO. The locality leaders that composed the environmental committees disliked the 
growing influence of the (non-Loita) DO and it was a point of discussion at the sub-DDC Loita 
leaders meeting on 21 July 2008. 
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the case of the forest committees, it is questionable whether they were set up because of 
conservation concerns. It seems they were initially established with the explicit aim of 
preventing the state from new attempts at appropriating the forest. Their primary inter-
est appears not to be conservation but the prevention of land loss. As one member of the 
Entasekera forest committee put it:51 
When the government cancelled its plan of taking this forest of Loita, they said that if Loita did not 
take care of the forest they would come [again] and take it from us. So we said: ‘let’s take care of it 
because it is the only way to avoid another fight with the government’. There are people from outside 
who will come and destroy it, so let’s organize people to look after [the forest]. So we decided ‘this is 
the committee that can look after the forest and then the government will not take it’. Because if there 
is no [committee] and it is destroyed, the government can easily say ‘the forest has been destroyed’. 
So that is one of the reasons why the committees were formed. 
The forest committees are not long-standing indigenous bodies responsible for forest 
management. Their creation was in reaction to the Narok County Council conflict and 
was part of a strategy to prevent future attempts at appropriating the forest. It was not 
deforestation, sustainable use or the ecological status of the forest but the strengthening 
of their claim to land in the face of tenure insecurity that was the main issue behind their 
creation. The same goes for the chief laibon: land loss, not nature conservation of the 
forest, motivated his involvement. Péron (2000: 403), who criticizes modern nature and 
wildlife conservation practices as exemplified by the Maasai Mara and champions the 
traditional ones of the Loita Maasai, was puzzled when IUCN was brought in by the 
Ilkerin people. This apparent contradiction disappears when one sees it as a political 
strategy, just like ascribing a conservational role to the chief laibon and the setting up of 
the forest committees were strategies to avoid land loss. Involving IUCN secured a 
strong international physical presence in Loita backed by EU financial resources, and 
one that it was difficult for the County Council to ignore. The goal was to gain political 
weight vis-à-vis the County Council in the fight for authority to govern the forest. It was 
the best option available at the time and strengthened the Loita claim to the forest and 
aimed to prevent the County Council from taking it over. This manoeuvring, of using an 
environmental organization, initiating a new conservation project and avoiding territori-
al loss, is a continuation of the political pattern discussed in Chapter 5. This is, once 
again, an example of Loita leaders territorializing a governmental intervention. The new 
element in this situation was that ‘development’ had made place for ‘nature conserva-
tion’ as the new slogan of the will to improve. 
  
                                                 
51  SL: 17/10/08. 
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IUCN: access in the name of  
nature conservation (1993-2005) 
At bottom then, even as social forestry and other collective means of 
co-management developed to cope with the failures of conservation 
forestry, conservation represents control, largely because the overall 
model of development does as well. 
(Robbins 2004: 163 emphasis added) 
 
IUCN appeared on the scene as a supporter of the Ilkerin group in their fight against the 
County Council as early as 1993.52 It presented itself as an expert in modern conserva-
tion practices.53 Later, they were invited by the Ilkerin group to assist in the develop-
ment of a forest management plan (Ngece et al. 2007: 177).54 This eventually resulted 
in a project that was officially called the Loita Forest Integrated Conservation and Man-
agement Project but was informally known in Loita as ‘the IUCN project’. The term 
‘integrated’ refers to the idea that the project integrated indigenous Loita Maasai man-
agement systems with modern conservation and forestry practices. Even though and as 
IUCN officials admit, ‘[a]t first glance there seems to be little reason for any interven-
tion in Loita. There is no environmental degradation, no erosion, no serious rangeland 
degradation, no overstocking, no overgrazing, no large-scale agriculture, no severe for-
est encroachment, no commercial exploitation of the forest resources, and no threat to 
the wildlife’ (Ibid.), it was deemed that Loita’s traditional management institutions were 
no longer adequate in the face of new pressures and demands on the forest 
(L/PNEFICDP undated: 4). IUCN’s technical advice was therefore needed to deal with 
this ‘modern’ situation (Ibid.: 18-20). 
The IUCN project was planned as a project with two phases. The first was a one-year 
preparatory phase that was carried out in 1998-1999. It was funded by Bilance (formerly 
Cebemo and now Cordaid), which had long-term involvement in the Ilkerin Project. 
IUCN mediated and facilitated a participatory planning process involving the majority 
of the stakeholders in order to develop a management structure for the forest (Karanja et 
al. 2002: 9, 34). IUCN also commissioned a number of short-term studies. One of the 
effects of these was that the forest started to become defined as a distinct and separate 
entity that needed intervention. As it was being mapped, its features classified and its 
value more clearly described in a nationally and internationally understood discourse, it 
                                                 
52  See ‘Letter to the editor: IUCN & the Loita/Purko Naimina Enkiyio forest’:  
www.culturalsurvival.org/news/dr-eldad-tukahirwa/letter-editor-iucn-loitapurko-naimina-enkiyio-
forest accessed 25/2/14. 
53  Information on the IUCN project comes from various documents obtained from Loita informants and 
the Internet, including IUCN-commissioned studies of Loita as part of the IUCN project: ‘Loita Forest 
Project proposal summary’ date unknown; www.unesco.org/most/bpik9.htm accessed 27/2/14; Survey 
of Tourism Activities in the Loita Forest and Environs (Shelley & Lempaka 1999); Preliminary 
Biodiversity Assessment of Loita Naimina-Enkiyio Forest (Legilisho-Kiyiapi 1999); Loita/Purko 
Naimina Enkiyio Forest Integrated Conservation and Development Project ‘Project Document’ date 
unknown; ‘Conflict Management and Community Development, Projects as Incentives for Partners to 
Participate In Participatory Forest Management (PFM) - The Case of Loita and Lembus Communities 
in Kenya (Ngece et al. 2007). 
54  By the Trust Company according to IUCN, by the Loita Council of Elders, according to Zaal & ole 
Siloma (2006: 11). 
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became increasingly ‘legible’ to outsiders (Scott 1998). For example, the biodiversity 
assessment by Legilisho-Kiyiapi (1999) championed the Naimina Enkiyio Forest as one 
of the few remaining and traditionally preserved indigenous forests in Kenya with great 
ecological and biodiversity value, and an important water catchment area for the re-
gion.55 But it also described potential human-induced threats to its ecological integrity 
and put the forest on the (inter)national environmental agenda, justifying IUCN’s inter-
vention. On a similar note, Shelley & Lempaka’s (1999) survey of tourism activities 
clearly show the forest’s growth potential as a tourist attraction and the need for donors, 
NGOs and private-sector partners to develop community-based tourist enterprises. As a 
result, the forest started to become better noticed in the tourism sector. 
Phase 2 was planned as the implementation phase. There would be the formulation of 
a long-term management plan for the forest and an effective institutional structure and 
mechanism to implement the management plan would be developed (L/PNEFICDP un-
dated: 4). After this three-year project, a sustainable and community-based forest man-
agement structure would be in place and IUCN would withdraw. However, the second 
phase of the IUCN project never took off. Even though IUCN was invited by the Ilkerin 
group to develop a forest management plan and despite its role in bringing the different 
players in the conflict together to find common ground and its commitment to ensure 
local community participation in a joint management body (Ngece et al. 2007: 173, 177, 
180; Maundu et al. 2001: 4, 31), resistance to the project had mounted when it was time 
to implement the second phase of the project. 
People in Loita had initially welcomed IUCN and applauded its participatory and 
transparent method of working (Kantai 2001: 42). Nevertheless, opposition grew after 
news started to circulate in Loita about IUCN’s involvement in the Ngorongoro Con-
servation and Development Project in Tanzania where it had collaborated with the Tan-
zanian state in the 1980s and 1990s (McCabe et al. 1992).56 In spite of the area’s multi-
ple land use policy and dual mandate of combining conservation with development, the 
relationship between the local Kisongo Maasai and the managing authority has been 
characterized by mutual mistrust and conflict (Homewood & Rodgers 1984; McCabe et 
al. 1992; McCabe 1997, 2003). Since the demarcation of the conservation area, the 
Kisongo have been restricted in their use of fire (Maasai burn grasslands to stimulate 
                                                 
55  Legilisho-Kiyiapi (1999) classifies the Naimina Enkiyio Forest as a moist to dry upland forest, 
partially to closed canopy forest, with open glades, bush and small forest blocks along the edge of the 
core forest block. The forest is further characterized by three forest formations: ‘Afromontane dry 
conifer forest’ dominated by the African Pencil tree on the hilltops and lower down ‘moist mid upland 
semi-deciduous forest’ and ‘mixed species low upland forests’. Naimina Enkiyio has some of the 
largest trees of any species in Kenya. The core forest block constitutes 320 km². Its western edge is 
marked by the Olngarua Swamp. The highest hills in the southern part of the forest have an latitude of 
almost 2000 m, while they reach 2600 m in the north. The temperature varies from 17.7°C to 20°C 
and annual rainfall is between 600-1200 mm. The forest harbours a rich birdlife and a considerable 
diversity of animals, especially of megafauna (elephant, buffalo, hippo, antelopes, lions and leopards), 
and is part of the larger Maasai Mara wildlife dispersal zone. The Naimina Enkiyio Forest is a source 
of several rivers that drain south to Tanzania and east into the Ewaso Ngiro River that flows through 
the dry Magadi rangeland ecosystem providing fresh water to Lake Natron in Tanzania. This is 
extremely important for the East African flamingo, whose only known breeding site is Lake Natron. 
56  ‘Maasai reject IUCN project in Loita forest’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 
24/2/14. 
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the growth of new grass after rainfall), they have been prohibited from settling in certain 
areas, have experienced periodic bans on cultivation and have lost access to grazing 
areas and watering places (in some cases allowed under permit) including crucial dry-
season forest refuges (Homewood & Rodgers 1984; McCabe et al. 1992, 1997: 58). 
This news reached the Loita in Kenya through their fellow Loita in Tanzania who 
neighbour the Kisongo and through Kisongo labourers who are typically employed in 
Loita to prepare fields for cultivation. The unpopularity of IUCN among the Kisongo 
(McCabe et al. 1992: 362-363) raised doubts among the Loita who feared they would 
experience the same fate and share the predicament of the Kisongo. The studies com-
missioned by IUCN during the pre-phase of the IUCN project recommended similar 
measures be taken with regard to the Naimina Enkiyio Forest: forest-use zoning with 
varying degrees of access, a wildlife sanctuary, boundary identification to control forest 
extraction, settlement and cultivation encroachment as well as possible settlement evic-
tion (Shelley & Lempaka 1999; Legilisho-Kiyiapi 1999). These recommendations were 
incorporated in the Phase 2 project proposal (L/PNEFICDP undated) and confirmed 
Loita fears about IUCN intentions (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 11). The most problematic 
issue appears to have been the demarcation of the boundary of the forest, as suggested 
by IUCN, because it implied that those families living in it would need to relocate. Re-
sistance in Loita started to build against IUCN. 
Both Narok County Council and IUCN attempted to gain access to the forest, and ul-
timately control over other people’s access to the forest. Narok County Council’s main 
purpose was to commercialize tourism and IUCN’s interest was biodiversity conserva-
tion. In any case, their aims jeopardized the free access to the forest that the Loita had 
enjoyed since they had settled the area.57 The Loita majority’s opposition to Narok 
County Council and IUCN was, mostly, a fight to maintain that status quo. Recalling 
Ribot & Peluso’s definition of access as ‘the ability to benefit from things’ (2003: 153, 
155), the Loita Maasai were afraid of losing the ability to benefit from the forest’s nu-
merous resources that they needed for their livelihoods and ritual life. They therefore 
protested: firstly against Narok County Council and later against IUCN.   
Part two: the ecologization of pre-existing struggles 
Bryant (1992: 14, 21-23, 1998: 85) insists that, to understand contemporary location-
specific conflicts over access, a historical perspective is best adopted. Indeed, tracing 
the history and digging into the background of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts 
brings to light new vantage points that are worth exploring. Historical examination of 
practices, processes, struggles and relations that already existed when the forest inter-
ventions took place reveals that the latter became enmeshed with various existing politi-
cal struggles that were not so much about the forest but about other related and unrelat-
ed issues. From this angle, the forest conflicts were just one of the many times when 
ongoing and long-standing quarrels came to a head. This resonates with the ‘ecologiza-
tion of a political conflict’ theory that Robbins (2004: 176) describes as follows: 
                                                 
57  Maundu et al. (2001: 30) call this the ‘free-access-for-all-Loitans policy’.  
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[T]he way pre-existing political differences become ‘ecological’ – in the sense that longstanding 
struggles over social and economic power (e.g. labor movements, ethnic territorial disputes, or wom-
en’s struggles for decision-making autonomy) are newly expressed or reframed as fights over the en-
vironmental (e.g. disagreements over conservation policy, finger-pointing over land degradation, or 
seizure of environmental goods).  
The way the forest conflicts unfolded cannot be understood if these struggles are not 
taken into account. Three main long-standing struggles can be singled out: the territorial 
struggles between the Loita and the Purko; a personal rivalry between two Loita leaders; 
and the recurring politics surrounding Kenya elections every five years. My aim here is 
to show how these struggles and quarrels merged with the forest interventions and crys-
tallized into one large conflict pitting two groups against each other. This will enable 
me to explain why and how some Loita leaders (the Olorte group) and their Loita sup-
porters sided with Narok County Council while the majority of the Loita Maasai op-
posed its forest plans and how, in the next round of forest conflicts, the earlier group 
that supported the County Council garnered widespread support from the Loita popula-
tion to oppose the IUCN intervention, while the group that had earlier led the opposi-
tion, the Ilkerin group, backed this new forest intervention.  
Personal rivalry between double authorities 
Opinions in Loita were divided regarding Narok County Council’s proposal to turn the 
forest into a nature reserve. Although the majority opposed it and stood behind the 
Ilkerin group’s active opposition, a small group of Loita Maasai supported the County 
Council’s plan. They rallied behind a very wealthy man who had been a Loita council-
lor. He had lost his seat in the December 1992 elections to someone who opposed 
Narok County Council’s forest plan, becoming the only councillor to oppose the 
gazettement plan (Péron 2000: 391). The defeated councillor was, however, able to get 
back on the County Council via the back door thanks to the influence of the other coun-
cillors who wanted the forest plan to succeed and needed his support. He became a co-
opted member of the Council, i.e. a co-opted councillor as opposed to an elected coun-
cillor. I will henceforth refer to this man as ‘the co-opted councillor’. His stronghold in 
Loita was his homeland of Olorte, an area in the south of Loita on the Kenya-Tanzania 
border, which is why I have called the Loita group that organized around him the ‘Olor-
te group’. 
Co-option, which is different from ‘nomination’ (see Chapter 4), is not very com-
mon. Key informants argue that he had been co-opted because he was a crucial Loita 
ally for Narok County Council and necessary for making the forest plan happen. As one 
of the key players of the Ilkerin group put it: ‘he was co-opted [with the aim of] de-
feat[ing] Loita resistance to the forest issue’.58 More political manoeuvring was done in 
the County Council meetings held in Narok town to include the co-opted Loita council-
lor and exclude the elected Loita councillor (Péron 2000: 391). The crucial meeting in 
September 1993, when the resolution on the Naimina Enkiyio Forest was adopted, was 
changed without prior notice at the last minute, from being an open public meeting to a 
closed meeting with the sole aim to excluding the press and Loita protestors from at-
                                                 
58  Interview MK: 17/8/12. 
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tending (Ibid.: 392; CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (d)(e)). Two important observations can be 
made: both the Loita Maasai and the County Council were divided, with alliances 
crosscutting the local and district level; and the majority of the Loita joined the elected 
Loita councillor and the Ilkerin group in their opposition to the Narok County Council 
plan. The co-opted Loita councillor and a small group of Loita followers sided with the 
majority of the Narok County Councillors who were proponents of the plan.  
These coalitions reached high levels, going in fact right to the heart of the state’s 
central government, i.e. the Cabinet. According to Péron (2000: 391), Rutten (2001: 
424), Adano et al. (2012: 75), Zaal & Adano (2012: 202-203) and many of my Loita 
informants,59 Narok County Council’s forest plan was masterminded by the Member of 
Parliament (MP) for the Narok North constituency at the time, a Purko Maasai and po-
litical heavyweight called William ole Ntimama. At a national level, he was known to 
be a ‘hawkish’ politician (Rutten 2001: 410, 411) who did not shun using state power to 
ensure his re-election and who was accused of triggering interethnic conflicts, killings 
and evictions by using inflammatory tribal speech (Ibid.: 413-416, Matter 2010a: 77-78, 
2010b).60 Apart from being an MP, Ntimama also held the powerful post of Minister of 
Local Government (from 1988 until the end of 1996) and, as such, was responsible for 
all the local authorities in the country, including Narok County Council. This is im-
portant because, as Minister of Local Government, he had the power to approve or re-
ject certain decisions by local authorities, including the Naimina Enkiyio Forest plan. In 
the court case brought by the Ilkerin group, it was thus vitally important to prevent him 
from approving the plan, which is why he was also sued by them (CCD ‘Notice of Mo-
tion’: 3; LNECTC 1994: 6). 
Politics in Maasailand, as in Kenya more widely, is characterized by a system of po-
litical patronage or neo-patrimonialism (Péron 2000: 388). And issues surrounding land 
and forests have become imbricated with the dynamics of patron-client networks, the 
politics of patronage and violence, and struggles among the political elite, particularly 
during elections (Matter 2010a, 2010b; Klopp 2001). Having been proclaimed as a ‘su-
per-leader’ and ‘Supreme Spokesman of the Maasai’ (Péron 2000: 389-390), Ntimama 
was probably the most powerful political patron of Narok District, and possibly even 
Maasailand.61 His network of political clients was extensive. One reason advanced for 
                                                 
59  Ole Siloma & Zaal (2005: 274) and Zaal & ole Siloma (2006: 8) are more careful and see claims of 
Ntimama’s involvement as speculation and rumours that, although contributing to the understanding 
of the conflict, have not been proven. 
60  Ntimama also played a key role in the politically motivated evictions and violent clashes at 
Enoosupukia in 1993 and 2005, including the reclassification of the land in Enoosupukia, which 
formed part of the Mau Forest, as a conservation forest. This occurred around the same time as the 
forest conflicts in Loita. However, the Loita forest case never reached the scale of violence seen in the 
Enoosupukia case. See Matter (2010a, 2010b). 
Ntimama first entered district politics during the colonial period in 1954 as a councillor on the Narok 
African District Council (Rutten 2001: 433). In 1974 he became the chairman of Narok County 
Council (Ibid.: 409, 433). In the 1988 elections he became MP for Narok North, a position he held 
until he was defeated in 2013. Later, in 2013, he announced his retirement from politics at the age of 
87, see www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-135798/i-am-leaving-politics-young-blood-ntimama accessed 
19/2/14. 
61  He was still an influential politician during my fieldwork period: at district level as the uncontested 
MP for Narok North and at national level by holding the post of Minister of National Heritage and 
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Ntimama’s interest in the Naimina Enkiyio Forest was that he wanted to empower the 
Purko: ‘[s]trengthening the Narok County Council by acquiring the Loita forest would 
consequently mean strengthening the Purko Maasai, while weakening the Loita Maasai 
by limiting access to the Loita Naimina Enkiyio forest which acts as one their main 
sources of livelihood’ (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 274-275). It was alleged that the Purko 
had planned this a long time ago but, expecting resistance, had waited for the Loita to 
be politically weak (and for themselves to be strong enough) to carry out this plan 
(Ibid.: 275). Indeed, interviewees insist that in the late 1970s/early 1980s, the County 
Council had approached the Loita PA chief and councillor with the nature reserve plan 
(Karanja et al. 2002: 31) but Loita leaders had refused, suggesting that Loita political 
power was strong enough at that time to resist Narok County Council. Kone appears to 
have played a key role in this resistance (Voshaar 1998: 113). The Purko had been mov-
ing slowly towards the coveted forest and some families had already managed to occupy 
the area around the northern tip of the forest: ‘[t]he gazettement was thus seen by some 
as a move by certain Purko Maasai to occupy the forest and alienate it from the Loita 
people’ (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 9). Analysis by Adano et al. (2012) and Zaal & 
Adano (2012) of the Narok County Council conflict saw Ntimama’s manoeuvres and 
the collective interest by his fellow Purko as the main process underlying the conflict. 
Another, more individualistic, explanation was, however, also given for Ntimama’s 
involvement. Having benefited personally from the touristic exploitation of the Maasai 
Mara,62 it is claimed that Ntimama had a vision of turning Naimina Enkiyio Forest into 
a similar park (Péron 2000: 391, 396; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 274; Zaal & ole Siloma 
2006: 8). It was rumoured that he had already had talks with investors from South Afri-
ca about commercializing tourism in the forest (Péron 2000: 396; Karanja et al. 2002: 
32; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 274). Through political patronage, Ntimama found mas-
sive support within Narok County Council, where councillors were already savouring 
the economic benefits that would be opened up for their appropriation as tourist reve-
nues would go to the County Council (Péron 2000: 391, 396; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 
274; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 8). The fact that the majority of the councillors were 
Purko like himself was important.63 To ensure support in Loita and give the impression 
that all Loita were supportive, he allegedly bribed their representative, the co-opted 
councillor, who was at that time the elected councillor of Loita (Péron 2000: 391).64 
Rumours had it that, in 1992, the co-opted councillor, the Narok South MP ole Tuya 
                                                 
Culture. During the grand coalition between ODM and PNU following the 2007 violent elections, 
Ntimama was an important ally of Prime Minister Odinga, the ODM presidential candidate. Ntimama 
was part of the delegation that accompanied Odinga in his visit to the manyata in 2010 (see Chapter 
1). 
62  As the owner of tourist lodges (Rutten 2001: 433; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 8; Adano et al. 2012: 75).   
63  This bears striking resemblance to how some Dorobo of Enoosupukia understood the role of Ntimama 
and his links to the Purko and Narok County Council in the context of the 2005 evictions, as can be 
seen in the words of a Dorobo man that Matter (2010b: 244) interviewed: ‘…Enoosupukia is a 
Dorobo area, but the County Council is mostly Purko, and they’re jealous of Dorobo land. Perhaps 
they attempted to clear the land so Purko can take over’.    
64  Some say he was promised a political position after the following elections, others claim he was 
promised private land. This latter claim finds some evidence in that Ntimama is said to have 
structurally rewarded councillors with prime plots of land in Nairobi for their political support (Rutten 
2001: 435).  
183 
 
(whose constituency covered Loita) and Ntimama were already planning the gazette-
ment of the forest (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 8-9).65 The co-opted councillor then mobi-
lized his supporters in Loita, forming what I have called the Olorte group, and sided 
with the County Council and these two MPs in an effort to bring the forest under the 
control of the County Council (CCD ‘Statement’: 6). 
The central figure in the Ilkerin group was the Ilkerin Project’s director, who was al-
so one of the nine elders running the Trust Company and one of the two Loita repre-
sentatives who went to the 1995 UN conference on indigenous people in Geneva (Péron 
2000: 401). This wealthy, educated man was involved in a long-standing feud with the 
co-opted councillor (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 7). It was said that a long time ago these 
two men, who belonged to the same age-group (Iseuri age-set), had been inseparable 
friends. Around the same time, when their age-set became the governing age-group in 
Loita,66 they obtained powerful positions and became Loita leaders. The co-opted coun-
cillor became a councillor in 1987 until he retired in 1997, having served one term as an 
elected councillor and another as co-opted councillor. The project director became a 
development leader of the Ilkerin Project after expatriate project leadership and man-
agement were handed over to the Loita Maasai in 1982 (Knowles 1993: 24). One as a 
councillor and the other as a project director, they both had authority in the field of de-
velopment: the co-opted councillor with regard to development policies coming from 
the state and the project director with respect to NGO-driven development. They both 
acted as intermediaries in development interventions, as local development brokers 
(Bierschenk et al. 2002) and, in a way, became competitors in this field. The first clash 
between the two men occurred in the 1980s at a time when pressure to adjudicate the 
land and make group ranches had increased (see Chapter 5).67 It was decided to turn 
Loita into two group ranches. The co-opted councillor (then elected councillor) was 
associated with one group ranch and the project director with the other. They disagreed 
about the boundary and, in the end, the group ranches never materialized. The story 
goes that from this first clash onwards, the Loita were divided into two groups: those 
behind the co-opted councillor and those supporting the project director. Every time 
either of the two came with a new plan or initiative, whether in the field of development 
or culture (see the Epilogue), the other group would automatically oppose it, and vice 
versa. The Narok County Council conflict provided yet another arena for these two men 
to fight out their long-standing feud (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 11). 
 
                                                 
65  The Narok South MP is not a Loita Maasai as Adano et al. (2012: 75) and Zaal & Adano (2012) claim. 
He belongs to the Ilkunono blacksmith community of Leshuta, which is affiliated to the Purko section, 
and therefore identifies as a Purko.  
66  I deduce this from the information I got on the enkipaata ceremony of the Ilkishili, Iseuri’s firestick 
youngsters, which was around 1984. The enkipaata ceremony of the Ilkishili marked this age-group’s 
beginning of warriorhood and thus the beginning of the political term of their firestick elders, the 
Iseuri (see Chapter 7).   
67  Zaal & ole Siloma (2006: 7-8) refer to another conflict: ‘[I]n the late 1980s, a number of projects were 
initiated such as a cattle dip and dairy facilities in the sub-centres of the project area. Much of the 
proceeds of those facilities were kept in the coffers of ILIDP project [the Ilkerin Project]. After 
allegations that these funds had been misused, there developed a rift between the two individuals and 
their allies, and it was this rift that was mirrored in the factions in the later Loita Forest conflict.’ 
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The view of the Olorte group 
Against this backdrop, the Narok County Council conflict can be seen in a different 
light: it was just one battle in a longer-standing political war between two Loita leaders 
over authority and control in Loita. Supporters of the co-opted councillor claimed that 
the project director and his group had actually provoked the whole forest conflict as part 
of a deliberate campaign to discredit the co-opted councillor in the run-up to the 1992 
elections, which he lost. It was not the new councillor who was to blame for his defeat, 
but the project director: ‘[the co-opted councillor] was not seeing the hand of [the elect-
ed councillor] anywhere, he was seeing the hand of [the project leader]’.68 The personal 
vendetta between the two men, and not the forest, was, according to the Olorte group, 
the main motivation behind this political attack. The campaign against the co-opted 
councillor hinged on a letter that the co-opted councillor had allegedly drafted after 
agreeing with Ntimama and the Narok South MP that the Naimina Enkiyio Forest was 
to be demarcated for gazettement (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 8, 11; Adano et al. 2012: 
75; Zaal & Adano 2012: 203). The letter stated that the Loita had agreed and it was to 
serve as proof that the Loita had been consulted on the Narok County Council plan. The 
Olorte group, however, claimed that the whole campaign was based on groundless ru-
mours and had a different explanation for the famous letter. 
It all started with another intervention by a different environmental organization 
called the Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation programme (KIFCON) that had been 
established in 1991 and was supported by the UK’s ODA (now the Department for In-
ternational Development or DfID) (Kronenburg García 2003: 93-94). KIFCON was a 
component of the Kenya Forestry Development Project (KFDP) and its mandate was 
the management of indigenous forests, which is why it was interested in the Naimina 
Enkiyio Forest.69 It appears that KIFCON approached the Ilkerin Project in 1992, as-
suming that the project leaders were the representatives of the Loita community, with 
the idea of developing a forest management and conservation project (Karanja et al. 
2002: 30). After consulting the leaders of the Ilkerin Project, KIFCON proceeded to 
send out a letter to the legal trustees, i.e. Narok County Council, requesting an alloca-
tion of nearly 400 km2 of forest land for the project. The Ilkerin people later photocop-
ied this letter and circulated it within Loita in the run-up to the 1992 elections, while 
spreading rumours that the co-opted councillor, who was the elected Loita councillor at 
the time, had drafted this letter and was ‘selling the forest’.70 
From this long-term perspective, the KIFCON programme, and not the Narok Coun-
ty Council plan, was the first forest intervention to trigger conflict in Loita. The Olorte 
group claims that Narok County Council only became a player in the fight when their 
authority over the forest was challenged by the formation of the Trust Company (see 
also ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 273; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 10). The County Council’s 
                                                 
68  Interview NB: 17/8/12. 
69  The KFDP started much earlier, in 1987. Apart from ODA/UK, the KFDP was also financed by the 
World Bank, the Swiss Development Corporation, the Finnish Development Association (Finnida) and 
the Government of Kenya.   
70  Interview ML: 1/10/01. The KIFCON programme stopped its activities in June 1994. The reason for 
its early termination was mainly political (Forster et al. 1997: 19). One informant of the Olorte group 
suggested that Ntimama had been behind the termination of KIFCON.    
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indignation is evident from Minute 52/93 of the September 1993 Narok County Council 
meeting: ‘The Clerk to Council informed the Council that a private company has been 
formed with intention to take over the responsibility of Management of the above forest 
from the Narok County Council’ (CCD ‘Notice of Motion’: (1a)), and the motive for 
requesting the deregistration of the Trust Company during the court case (see Ibid.: 
1(b)). The County Council’s forest gazettement plan was a way of reaffirming their au-
thority over the forest. According to the co-opted councillor, the Trust Company intend-
ed ‘to give’ the job of forest conservation to Richard Leakey, the then director of the 
Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS).71 His side of the story emphasizes that it was the KWS 
(and not the County Council) that wanted to take control of the forest. The KWS, the 
Trust Company and the Ilkerin people (and not himself, Ntimama and Narok County 
Council) were the ones planning the disappropriation of the forest.  
The Trust Company not only irritated Narok County Council but was also heavily 
criticized by members of the Olorte group. They questioned the assumption that every 
Loita was automatically represented in the Trust Company (Karanja et al. 2002: 33; ole 
Siloma & Zaal 2005: 275-276; Ngece et al. 2007: 177). But they were particularly un-
happy about the ‘company’ status of the Trust Company, claiming it was a way for a 
few business-minded Loita individuals to try to own the forest and exclude all others. In 
this context, interviewees referred to the Kamorora Group Ranch case (see Chapter 5). 
After having signed a twenty-year lease with Stein in 1986, its legal status was trans-
ferred to one of a company called Nguruman Limited Company, with the former group 
ranch members becoming the company’s owners. The land was divided into equal parts 
that represented shares in the company. Key informants claim that Stein had master-
minded this move so that he could gain ownership rights over the land by buying land 
shares from other members, which he did, and now virtually owns and uses the land as 
his exclusive property. He is accused of deception and manipulation by former group 
ranch members. But group ranch members point the finger at each other, and especially 
at the company’s directors, for having conspired with Stein in exchange for money. One 
of the former group ranch members who sided with the Olorte group was particularly 
vociferous about the risks involved in the Trust Company, especially because one of the 
Trust Company directors had also been a director in the former Kamorora Group Ranch. 
Forest land, he claimed, could be similarly transformed into shares to be bought or sold, 
and members could become shareholders. In a worst-case scenario, access and control 
over the forest by Loita, like Kamorora, could be lost: 
We can make a comparison now. Let us compare the history of the Kamorora Group Ranch and the 
Trust Company. The Kamorora Group Ranch started quite fair, if it had not been formed then the land 
would not have been owned by the Loita people, although a very few people. Initially, the intention 
was good. The Trust Company is of limited liability, similarly to the Nguruman Limited Company. As 
a company, shares can be sold and the Loita community can be manipulated, just as happened with the 
Nguruman Limited Company. If the intention of the Trust Company was to set aside land and obtain a 
title deed over that land, then I see a potential danger for the future. (...) If the Trust Company gets 
hold of the forest, the community could lose the forest because of corruption. (Interview ML: 22/8/01) 
During the preparatory phase of the IUCN project, when consensus had been reached 
between the Ilkerin group and the Olorte group, the issue of the Trust Company was 
                                                 
71  Interview DN: 21/5/08. 
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discussed and resolved. After two lawyers investigated the matter (ole Siloma & Zaal 
2005: 276), the Ilkerin group agreed to dissolve the Trust Company. 
 
Double authorities 
Clan leadership was another platform where the power struggle between the co-opted 
councillor and the project director was voiced. It happened at a time when the Ilterito 
age-set was handing over the offices of clan chief to their firestick youngsters, the 
Iseuri. Both the co-opted councillor and the project director belonged to the Iseuri age-
set. They had completed the last ceremony in their age-group ceremonial cycle, i.e. the 
ceremony of the ‘stool’ that confirmed their status as full elders and marked their readi-
ness to become the new governing age-group in Loita (see Chapter 7). Being installed 
as clan chief not only confirms the leadership skills of the person chosen but also en-
sures his entrance into the ranks of Loita leadership as well as endowing him with con-
trol over at least a segment – the clan – of the Loita population. The co-opted councillor 
and the project director belonged to the Ilmolelian and Iltaarosero clans respectively, 
and when one became a clan chief, the other had to become one too. The co-opted 
councillor and the project director were thus both installed as clan chiefs and became 
double authorities. 
Choosing sides in resource conflicts is often done on the basis of a common identity, 
which is flexible and accommodating but at the same time constrained by social struc-
tures, such as ethnic affiliation and clanship (Schlee 2004). In the forest conflicts, there 
were various lines of identification that played a role (but did not determine) the way 
people chose sides. There was the sectional Purko-Loita line of identification (see later). 
But there was also a geographical dimension, which is reflected in the names that I gave 
to the two conflicting leadership groups: people from Olorte (in the southeastern high-
lands adjacent to the forest) tended to support the Olorte group, and those in the western 
lowlands around Ilkerin favoured the Ilkerin group.72 Given that the intra-Loita conflict 
was predominantly a male affair within the governing age-group, age-group affiliation 
and gender do not appear to have influenced how people sided with the two groups of 
leaders. But the social category of clan (which crosscuts gender and age-group affilia-
tion) did so conspicuously. And the fact that both the co-opted councillor and the pro-
ject director were clan chiefs played a central role too.  
The positions of (co-opted) councillor and project director, which are positions 
meaningful to outsiders, ensured that they functioned as key articulation points between 
external individuals and institutions and the wider Loita community, and as such they 
controlled the flow of information. These men were intermediaries with the outside 
world and mediate the way people see and experience outside actors, such as the state 
(Corbridge et al. 2005: 29-30). How intermediaries present circumstances influences the 
way people in Loita understand the situations they are facing. The wider (illiterate) 
Loita population thus depended on its intermediaries and on Loita’s leadership more 
generally for information on the forest issue, and often followed the advice and deci-
                                                 
72  There were also some indications that people chose sides according to their level of education, with 
educated people supportive of the idea of outside forest intervention and the ‘traditional’ people 
vehemently opposed to it. 
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sions of their leaders, a point also made by Ngece et al. (2007: 173, 178). Of all the 
Loita intermediaries, the co-opted councillor and the project director were the most im-
portant: they were key ‘opinion shapers in Loita’, as one interviewee put it.73 In addition 
to being intermediaries with the outside world, they were also clan chiefs and this aug-
mented their authority in Loita considerably. As clan chiefs, both the co-opted council-
lor and the project director garnered widespread support from the members of their re-
spective clans. The Loita population fractured around this line of identification. Ties 
based on clanship were one of the most important ways in which Loita followers linked 
up with their leaders, and vice versa. In a way, the forest conflicts also became a con-
flict between clans. 
Electoral politics 
In the run-up to Kenya’s general elections every five years when a new president, MPs 
and councillors are elected, Loita’s public life is dominated by political rallies.74 These 
are mostly held by incumbent and aspirant councillors who visit each trading centre and 
locality in their ward to convince people to vote for them. But incumbent and aspiring 
Narok South MPs and sometimes even prominent national party members seeking votes 
for their presidential candidates also visit Loita. To my knowledge, however, presiden-
tial candidates have never gone to Loita themselves in the turbulent times just prior to 
election day, preferring to visit those areas with higher voter density. 
As explained in Chapter 4, councillors are elected to represent wards in local gov-
ernment. The councillors in Narok County together form Narok County Council. Na-
tional representation of Narok District is vested in the position of the MP that represents 
the constituency. There are two constituencies in Narok District: Narok North and 
Narok South. Loita is in Narok South. The position of MP is powerful, not only because 
MPs have a say at national level but also because they often dominate politics at district 
level too. A last strategy of opposition by the Ilkerin group against Narok County Coun-
cil’s forest plan was to influence the election of Loita councillor and Narok South MP in 
the run-up to the December 1997 elections. This would bear fruit and turned out to be 
decisive in their victory in the forest fight with the County Council. 
The 1997 elections resulted in a reorganization of power relations at district level.75 
Although Ntimama was re-elected MP for Narok North, he was not reappointed to the 
Ministry of Local Government and thus lost his official and powerful link with Narok 
County Council.76 Many of his political clients in Narok also lost their political posi-
tions, which reduced his hegemony in Narok even further. The incumbent MP for Narok 
South, an ally of Ntimama and a close friend to the co-opted councillor, lost his seat to a 
                                                 
73  Interview NB: 17/8/12. 
74  As I experienced in the months prior to the December 2007 general elections. 
75  See Rutten (2001) for a review of the 1997 elections in Maasailand. In 1992 Kenya held its first multi-
party elections since 1966 but the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party, which had ruled 
during the single-party era, remained the dominant party in Maasailand after both the 1992 and the 
1997 elections. Political competition was fiercer within KANU than between parties and it was not the 
general elections but the KANU primaries that were of political significance. 
76  But he became Minister of Transport and Communications (Steeves 1999: 83). According to Péron 
(2000: 390), he became Minister of Home Affairs and National Heritage. 
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rival called ole Ntutu who backed the Ilkerin group in the forest conflicts. Prior to the 
elections, he received a visit from an Ilkerin group delegation who requested that he join 
the race to become MP for Narok South because they did not want Ntimama’s ally as 
MP anymore. Ole Ntutu did so and campaigned on the forest issue and as a result, he 
got the Loita vote (Rutten 2001: 424). Issues of land loss have always been at the centre 
of Maasai politics (Rutten 2001).  
Another setback for Ntimama was that the composition of Narok County Council it-
self changed. New wards were created in Narok South constituency to total 25, which 
outnumbered the 17 wards in Narok North where Ntimama sat (Rutten 2001: 438 n. 42). 
In Loita too, the number of wards increased from one to five. This meant greater Loita 
representation on Narok County Council. There were now five elected Loita councillors 
on the 55-member-strong Narok County Council, including nominated and co-opted 
councillors (Karanja et al. 2002: 16), about 38 of whom were Purko. It seems an insig-
nificant Loita victory but, as it turned out, it would seriously affect Ntimama’s influence 
on the County Council. 
The increase from one to five wards was the result of a visit to President Moi by 
some of the leaders of the Ilkerin group who complained about Loita’s marginal posi-
tion in district politics.77 The forest issue was a major issue during the campaign in 
Loita, with some aspirant councillors allied with the Olorte group and others with the 
Ilkerin group. The Ilkerin Project appears to have supported the campaigns of the pro-
Ilkerin group councillors with resources, such as transport (Zaal & Adano 2012: 204). 
They all won the 1997 elections (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 11). One of the new council-
lors was a young man who had obtained his Masters in the UK and who was the coordi-
nator of the Trust Company as well as a former Ilkerin Project employee. As a great-
grandson of the famous chief laibon Senteu, he decided to enter politics because he 
wanted to fight for the forest.78 This new councillor became the chairman of Narok 
County Council, which is the most powerful position in a county council. He defeated a 
Purko contender, an ally of Ntimama, with the support of councillors representing other 
minority groups in Narok, such as the Keekonyokie Maasai, Damat Maasai and the 
Kipsigis. It was the first time ever that a Loita Maasai – or any non-Purko for that mat-
ter – had been chairman of Narok County Council. He had entered the previously exclu-
sive Purko ranks of political power in Narok or, it was claimed more popularly, he had 
entered the ‘Purko manyata’.79 This political victory ‘was the beginning of the end for 
the [conflict with] the County Council’.80 In his time as chairman and by making clever 
use of his new powers, the County Council officially rescinded its earlier decision to 
gazette the forest, opted for an out-of-court settlement with the Trust Company and 
supported the newly evolving forest management project under IUCN (Karanja et al. 
2002: 26; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 277; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 11). This brought clo-
sure in the fight with the County Council. The changed political constellation in Narok 
District after the 1997 elections and especially the infiltration of Loita politicians onto 
                                                 
77  This visit also resulted in the administrative upgrade of Loita Location into Loita Division and the 
creation of five locations. Instead of one PA chief, Loita now had five PA chiefs. 
78  Interview MK: 18/7/01. 
79  Interview ML: 16/4/09. 
80  Interview NB: 17/8/12. 
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the Purko-dominated County Council worked to the advantage of the Ilkerin group and 
determined the outcome of the Narok County Council conflict. 
The 2002 out-of-court settlement between the Trust Company and Narok County 
Council happened at a time when opposition to IUCN was starting to grow in Loita. The 
previously successful collaboration between IUCN and the Ilkerin group began to show 
its first cracks and there were a series of disagreements. One seems to have been about 
how the EU funds for the second phase of the IUCN project should be spent, which de-
layed its implementation.81 In 2001, during my Masters fieldwork, people in Loita were 
wondering why IUCN was taking so long to return as they had been expecting them for 
a while (Kronenburg García 2003: 96, 98). At that time, there were no signs of wide-
spread opposition to IUCN. Speculation as to what was happening eventually changed 
the tide of opinion in Loita as regards IUCN but also regarding the Ilkerin group, which 
most people in Loita had supported earlier during the Narok County Council conflict. 
When news of IUCN’s role in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area in Tanzania started to 
circulate in Loita and people considered the implications for their access to the forest 
from the studies commissioned by IUCN, doubts about IUCN’s real intentions grew and 
support for its project quickly waned.82 Fears that it was going to displace the Loita 
from the forest started to spread.83 Since IUCN had come in through the Ilkerin group, 
suspicion extended to it as well, especially when it became known how much money 
was involved in the forest project (US$ 2.56 m).84 The fact that members of the Ilkerin 
group were already positioning themselves for the jobs that would be opened up by the 
IUCN project was met with suspicion and jealousy. The popularity of the Ilkerin Project 
declined after the charismatic and popular project director died in 1999 and when accu-
sations of corruption and personal enrichment thanks to international funds intended for 
Loita’s development were increasingly voiced.85 Putting all these things together, peo-
ple soon started to accuse the Ilkerin group of being involved in ‘selling’ the forest to 
IUCN and receiving millions of dollars for it.86 
Although the project director had passed away, the antagonism between the group 
that he had led and the group around the co-opted councillor persisted.87 Whether the 
Olorte group had an active role to play in the dramatic change in public opinion or were 
                                                 
81  See also ‘Maasai reject IUCN’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 24/2/14. 
82  See also ‘Maasai reject IUCN’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 24/2/14. 
83  See ‘Loita and Purko Maasai resist IUCN plans for the Naimina Enkiyio forest’:  
www.culturalsurvival.org/news/michael-ole-tiampati/loita-and-purko-maasai-resist-iucn-plans-
naimina-enkiyio-forest accessed 24/2/14; ‘Kenya: the Maasai stand up’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-
killed.htm accessed 24/2/14. 
84  ‘Maasai reject IUCN’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 24/2/14. 
85  The project leader deputy, a Maasai but not of Loita origin, became the next project director.  
86  See ‘Letter to the editor’: https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/letter-editor-iucn-loitapurko-naimina-
enkiyio-forest accessed 25/2/14) for a response from IUCN to these allegations: ‘IUCN does not buy 
or own, nor does it intend to own, land or ecosystems of any nature, including that of the Loita/Purko 
Naimina Enkiyio forest’.  
87  It is said that, at the height of the Narok County Council conflict in 1994, the elders in Loita attempted 
to mend the rivalry between the project director and the co-opted councillor at a peace-making 
ceremony. At the heart of this ceremony was an oath between the two men referred to as olmumai (pl. 
ilmuma) to put their antagonism to rest, which was sealed with the exchange of heifers. But their 
rivalry continued and the untimely death of the project director as well as the loss of power of the co-
opted councillor are both said to have been a result of the power of the oath that was broken. 
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merely exploiting the situation opportunistically, they started campaigning vigorously 
against the IUCN project in a manner reminiscent of the way the Ilkerin group had be-
haved towards them during the County Council conflict. The implications of the pro-
posed forest management plan for Loita’s access in connection with IUCN’s history in 
the Ngorongoro project were widely divulged in press interviews, public meetings and 
demonstrations by this group, and were subsequently taken up by the media.88 The 
Olorte group believed that, even if IUCN left after the three-year project, Loita control 
of the forest would be lost forever, with the state possibly taking over the management 
functions.  
The final demise of the IUCN project happened, however, when ‘politics came in’ 
again, as one interviewee phrased it (Ngece et al. 2007: 185) and it became mixed up in 
the long-running territorial struggle between the Loita and the Purko.89 
Rekindling Loita-Purko territorial animosities 
Purko’s encroachment onto Loita territory continued at a steady pace after the Maasai 
Moves in the colonial period (see Chapter 3). This has been attributed to the difference 
in size between the two groups; the strong political representation of the Purko at dis-
trict and national level, and the fact that boundaries have never been formalized. But the 
Loita also blame themselves.  
The thing is that Loita don’t like to be near foreigners. So whenever a Purko family settles near to a 
Loita family, the Loitans will move further away. There is a saying used by Purko: ‘The Loita don’t 
like donkeys’. When a Maasai homestead decides to move, they will move their belongings, old peo-
ple and very small kids on donkeys. Donkeys are the main means of transportation. Thus, whenever a 
Purko homestead settles next to a Loita family, they arrive with donkeys. So, now, the Purko have en-
croached onto Loitaland, from Narok up to Ilkerin and Morijo. Now Loita land is very small.90 
Even though the Loita and the Purko have been neighbours for many decades now, 
they live in separate homesteads and rarely mix. During my stay in Loita, the tense rela-
tionship between the Purko and the Loita was evident from the numerous reports by 
both sides of livestock thefts in the boundary areas, incidental clashes between Purko 
and Loita warriors over pastoral resources (sometimes with casualties) and recurring 
disagreements between Loita and Purko leaders over the boundary between their territo-
ries. This Purko-Loita hostility became entangled with the political struggles surround-
ing the forest conflicts. 
The resurgence of the struggle between the Olorte group and the Ilkerin group fed in-
to district politics again. The former alliance between the co-opted councillor and 
Ntimama was reinvigorated, and Ntimama joined the opposition against the IUCN pro-
ject. Ntimama’s antagonism towards IUCN seems to have been revenge for the political 
consequences that he and his allies suffered after the 1997 elections, which was partly 
attributed to the forest conflict. The defeat of his Narok South MP ally was particularly 
                                                 
88  See also ‘Maasai reject IUCN’ and ‘The Maasai stand up’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-
killed.htm accessed 24/2/14; ‘Loita and Purko Maasai resist IUCN’:  
www.culturalsurvival.org/news/michael-ole-tiampati/loita-and-purko-maasai-resist-iucn-plans-
naimina-enkiyio-forest accessed 24/2/14. 
89  Interview ML: 8/11/07. 
90  Interview ML: 1/10/01. 
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sour. The conflict started to get out of hand when Ntimama, the co-opted councillor and 
their entourage were systematically sidelined in favour of other Loita and Purko politi-
cians in the consultation run-up to Phase 2 of the IUCN project.91 In Loita, the Olorte 
group felt that they were being left out of the proposed management body in favour of 
people who were pro-Ilkerin (Ngece et al. 2007: 180).92 The Olorte group then joined 
hands with the group of Purko who were also being excluded. 
One of the terms of the out-of-court settlement between the County Council and the 
Trust Company was that the IUCN project would incorporate and acknowledge the 
stake of the Purko families living in a place called Kirtilikini on the edge of the forest in 
the north of Loita Division in Morijo Loita Location (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 11).93 
Kirtilikini used to be Loita territory but had been settled by Purko families who came 
from the Loita Plains via the steep Narosura Escarpment as part of a territorially ex-
panding Purko front. The Narosura Escarpment had been the natural boundary between 
the Loita in the Loita Hills and the Purko on the Loita Plains when the administrative 
Loita Location (later Loita Division) was demarcated (see Chapter 4). So although they 
officially lived in Loita Division, their arrival and settlement pushed the territorial 
boundary between the Loita and the Purko sections further south. As the Purko settled 
adjacent to Naimina Enkiyio Forest, they also claimed its northern tip, especially as they 
were increasingly being approached by tourists who were off the beaten track and who 
were in search of guides to hike with them in the forest. Living along one of the two 
roads leading into Loita, they were the first people that visitors met in the Loita Hills 
after ascending the Narosura Escarpment. Loita tourist guides resented this because the 
Purko guides would enter deep into the forest with tourists into forest land claimed by 
the Loita. Having become acquainted with tourism and realizing its potential, 22 Purko 
from Kirtilikini Locality successfully applied to Narok County Council to be allocated 
22 ha of forest land for a campsite in 1984 (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 272; CCD ‘State-
ment’: 6 (n)). This was one of the two campsites referred to earlier. Later, they entered 
into a lucrative agreement with a tour company that leased the campsite and from which 
they earned US$ 8100 a year (Karanja et al. 2002: 12; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 272; 
Shelley & Lempaka 1999: 24). Constituting only 1% of the population in Loita Divi-
sion, the Purko from Kirtilikini benefited from 60% of the area’s total tourist revenues 
(Shelley & Lempaka 1999: 8; Karanja et al. 2002: 12, 17). This inequitable distribution 
of benefits has been a source of contention between the Purko and Loita (Ibid.: 17). Ac-
cording to the Ilkerin group, they only learned about this allocation in 1992 and this was 
one of the reasons for setting up the Trust Company (CCD ‘Statement’: 6 (n)). 
                                                 
91  See also ‘Loita and Purko Maasai resist’: www.culturalsurvival.org/news/michael-ole-tiampati/loita-
and-purko-maasai-resist-iucn-plans-naimina-enkiyio-forest accessed 24/2/14; ‘Kenya: the Maasai 
stand up’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 24/2/14. 
92  ‘Kenya: the Maasai stand up’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 24/2/14. 
93  This is evident in the way IUCN staff and consultants started to write about the forest and the project. 
While before the forest was referred to as the ‘Loita Forest’ (for example Shelley & Lempaka 1999), it 
was now consistently being referred to with the more impartial ‘Loita/Purko Naimina Enkiyio Forest’ 
(see for example Karanja et al. 2002). The name of the project was also adapted and became the 
‘Loita/Purko Naimina Enkiyio Forest Integrated Conservation and Development Project’ 
(L/PNEFICDP undated). See ‘Letter to the editor’: www.culturalsurvival.org/news/dr-eldad-
tukahirwa/letter-editor-iucn-loitapurko-naimina-enkiyio-forest accessed 25/2/14. 
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During the Narok County Council conflict, the Purko from Kirtilikini had been on 
the side of the Olorte group. They had been wary of the Trust Company and its defini-
tion of membership (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005: 276) because ‘bona fide residents’ carried 
the connotation of ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ and the general sentiment in Loita was that the 
Kirtilikini Purko were not ‘real’ and ‘genuine’ residents but encroachers, and were 
therefore not entitled to a stake in the forest. But in response to the out-of-court settle-
ment between Narok County Council and the Trust Company, they were now being 
invited by the Ilkerin group to IUCN meetings (Karanja et al. 2002: 14). The Kirtilikini 
Purko switched sides from the Olorte group to the Ilkerin group.94  
Meetings against the IUCN project were held in Loita by the Olorte group. There 
were also joint Loita-Purko demonstrations in Narok town, with one even attracting 
1000 demonstrators.95 More aggressive rallies were held in Purko centres neighbouring 
Loita, and Ntimama denounced the partial inclusion of the Purko in the IUCN project, 
branding it a deliberate Loita strategy to divide the Purko. He thus ignited long-standing 
Loita-Purko feelings of animosity. After a meeting between IUCN opponents, IUCN 
staff and Provincial Administration officials to solve the issue was aborted in June 
2004,96 an angry mostly Purko but also Loita Maasai crowd headed to the Ilkerin Pro-
ject where the IUCN headquarters were housed. Eyewitnesses claimed that the anti-
IUCN group had been armed with bows and poisoned arrows and carried petrol cans to 
set the buildings on fire. It is also said that project staff, in anticipation of clashes, had 
called the police and were carrying firearms to defend themselves. These preparations 
on both sides clearly ignited the threat of physical violence. Interviewees said that as the 
crowd stormed the project, policemen fired, killing one person and injuring another 
(Zaal & ole Siloma 2006: 11).97 A major clash was prevented but the damage had been 
done. The violence that broke out was what Peluso & Watts (2001) called ‘environmen-
tal violence’ because it was a politicized struggle over an environmental resource.  
Calls for the state to step in were successful and the project was halted on security 
grounds after the incident.98 This was the beginning of the end for the IUCN project, 
                                                 
94  The invitation of these particular Purko families was done under the patronage of the new Narok 
South MP, the one who had defeated Ntimama’s ally in the 1997 elections. For Ntimama, this implied 
that he was being cut out of any involvement with the forest. With all his links to Loita cut (the co-
opted councillor retired from council politics, the Narok South MP ally defeated and the Purko living 
in Loita Division siding with the Ilkerin group), Ntimama lost all his political footholds in Loita, 
which deprived him of any future benefits that might flow from the forest. This issue translated into a 
fierce fight for political power between Ntimama and the new Narok South MP: ‘the two had vowed 
to oppose each other’s agenda, whether positive or negative for the community, each group trying to 
show the other that they were stronger’ (Ngece et al. 2007: 179; see also Matter 2010b: 241). 
95  ‘Kenya: the Maasai stand up’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 24/2/14; ‘Loita 
and Purko Maasai resist’: www.culturalsurvival.org/news/michael-ole-tiampati/loita-and-purko-
maasai-resist-iucn-plans-naimina-enkiyio-forest accessed 24/2/14. 
96  ‘One killed in fight’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 24/2/14. 
97  See also ‘One killed in fight’ and ‘Kenya: the Maasai stand up’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-
killed.htm accessed 24/2/14; ‘Loita and Purko Maasai resist’: www.culturalsurvival.org/news/michael-
ole-tiampati/loita-and-purko-maasai-resist-iucn-plans-naimina-enkiyio-forest accessed 24/2/14;  
www.geographicalexpeditions.com/honey/25-6-2004%20--
%20KENYA%20Contentious%20Forest%20Plan%20Halted accessed 27/2/10.  
98  ‘One killed in fight’ and ‘ Kenya: the Maasai stand up’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm 
accessed 24/2/14. 
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which eventually pulled out because of the recurring conflicts. The final attempts to 
solve the issue culminated in a consensus-building gathering in Naivasha (Ngece et al. 
2007: 180) that, at first sight, appeared successful.99 However, when conflicts broke out 
again in 2005 when IUCN wanted to resume the project, IUCN pulled out permanently 
and, as an interviewee lamented, took with them the US$ 2.56 m earmarked for the pro-
ject.  
The violence that erupted towards the end of the forest conflicts between a Purko-
dominated group and a Loita-based institution is expressive of the century-old struggle 
between the Loita and the Purko Maasai over land and territory (see Chapter 3). The 
forest conflicts have been interpreted by many as yet another attempt by the Purko to 
displace them from their land and acquire the forest that is so dear to them. One Loita 
interviewee was openly told by a Purko politician: ‘We have pushed you from the 
Ewaso Ngiro River to Narosura, and then we pushed you over the escarpment, and now 
we are still pushing you [all the way to Tanzania]’.100  
Conclusion: a new understanding 
of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts 
The conflict with Narok County Council has been well documented (Péron 2000; 
Kronenburg García 2003; ole Siloma & Zaal 2005; Zaal & ole Siloma 2006; Adano et 
al. 2012; Zaal & Adano 2012; LNECTC 1994; Kantai 2001; Karanja et al. 2002; Ngece 
et al. 2007; Voshaar 1998: 113-114).101 The IUCN conflict, on the other hand, though 
much more explosive, has not received the same amount of attention. It is only briefly 
mentioned by ole Siloma & Zaal (2006: 11) and Ngece et al. (2007: 179).102 What is 
new in the analysis presented in this thesis is that the two conflicts have been investigat-
ed in relation to each other. By doing so, I have cast new light on the Narok County 
Council conflict and will explain here why the IUCN conflict seems to have been disre-
garded by those writing about the first conflict. 
One of the major insights from researching the two conflicts in relation to one anoth-
er is that they cannot be understood without taking into account the internal divisions in 
Loita, and particularly those within Loita’s leadership. This chapter has shown how the 
various struggles at play during the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts crystallized along 
a cleavage in the Loita leadership organized around the Ilkerin group and the Olorte 
group. 
                                                 
99  ‘Letter to the editor’: https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/letter-editor-iucn-loitapurko-naimina-
enkiyio-forest accessed 25/2/14.  
100  Interview ML: 16/4/09. 
101  It is also mentioned briefly in Shelley & Lempaka (1999: 14, 15) and Maundu et al. (2001: 25-26). 
102  The IUCN conflict did receive ample Internet and media attention. See ‘One killed in fight’, ‘Maasai 
reject IUCN’, ‘The Maasai stand up’: www.ogiek.org/indepth/break-one-killed.htm accessed 24/2/14; 
‘Kenya: contentious forest plan halted’: www.geographicalexpeditions.com/honey/25-6-2004%20--
%20KENYA%20Contentious%20Forest%20Plan%20Halted accessed 27/2/10; ‘Loita and Purko 
Maasai resist’:  
www.culturalsurvival.org/news/michael-ole-tiampati/loita-and-purko-maasai-resist-iucn-plans-
naimina-enkiyio-forest accessed 24/2/14; ‘Letter to the editor’:  
www.culturalsurvival.org/news/dr-eldad-tukahirwa/letter-editor-iucn-loitapurko-naimina-enkiyio-
forest accessed 25/2/14. 
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During the Narok County Council conflict, the Ilkerin group, which was the group at 
the forefront of the fight against the County Council, had by far the larger Loita follow-
ing. The Olorte group and their followers comprised a very small part of the Loita popu-
lation, according to Voshaar (1998: 114) as ‘only six persons and their families’ were 
proponents of the County Council’s forest plans. Due to this unbalanced division, in the 
sense that it divided the Loita into a very large group and a very small group, research-
ers on the Narok County Council conflict have tended to dismiss the Olorte group’s 
alignment with the County Council as the bizarre activities of a recalcitrant few. As a 
result, the intra-Loita conflicts have not received much attention. Instead, the focus has 
been on the claims and actions of the Loita majority, taking them as being representa-
tive of all the Loita Maasai. Only Zaal & ole Siloma (2006) have taken the internal 
leadership conflicts seriously and this stands in stark contrast to one of their earlier pub-
lications (ole Siloma & Zaal 2005). The latter, i.e. ole Siloma & Zaal (2005), focuses on 
the role played by the Loita Council of Elders, the umbrella institutional set-up that was 
intended to bring all Loita leaders together. Although ole Siloma & Zaal do mention 
conflicts ‘within the community itself’ (Ibid.: 275-276),103 the general tenor of their 
account portrays a united and effective Loita Council of Elders, suggesting a harmoni-
ous Loita leadership. Thus, in their view, the conflicts ‘within’ do not refer to conflicts 
within the Loita leadership but to conflicts within the ordinary Loita population, i.e. 
among the followers. And no mention is made of the co-opted councillor. Yet, as both a 
(co-opted) councillor and a clan chief, he was certainly a Loita leader and, as such, 
should have been seen as belonging to the Loita Council of Elders, according to this 
institution’s own principles. As a result, ole Siloma & Zaal’s analysis overlooks the 
important links between leaders and followers, and fails to note that the rifts among the 
Loita emanated from tensions in the Loita leadership.   
One of the points made in this chapter is that the Loita Council of Elders was actual-
ly created and used by the Ilkerin Project as part of a wider plan of action against Narok 
County Council. It was one of their many opposition strategies as one of the purposes of 
creating the Loita Council of Elders was to present Loita leadership to the outside world 
as a representative Loita body and a united block against Narok County Council. Ole 
Siloma & Zaal’s depiction of an undivided Loita Council of Elders that should be cred-
ited for ‘prevent[ing] the forest from being taken away from the Loita community’ 
(Ibid.: 281) seems to indicate that the analysis in this publication (but apparently not in 
their second paper, see below) was based on information obtained only from members 
of the Ilkerin group. This is in a way understandable in the sense that this group repre-
sented the Loita majority but, by so doing, they provide only one side of the story. The 
problem with this is that alternative versions of the conflict, even if from a tiny minori-
ty, are silenced and marginalized.  
The second publication by Zaal & ole Siloma (2006) after they revisited the field is 
revealing.104 It acknowledges the internal divisions in Loita’s leadership and discusses 
the role played by the Olorte group, which they call the ‘NCC camp’, with ‘NCC’ 
                                                 
103  By referring to the Concerned Citizens of Loita as siding with Narok County Council. 
104  Technically speaking, ole Siloma, himself a Loita Maasai, did not revisit the field as ‘the field’ was his 
home area. 
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standing for ‘Narok County Council’.105 They are careful to stress that they conducted 
interviews in both camps (Ibid.: 18 n. i). Their description of the Narok County Council 
conflict is much more nuanced and balanced, and generally in accordance with my own 
findings. Yet, in two later publications by one of the two authors in collaboration with 
other scholars (Adano, Dietz, Witsenburg & Zaal 2012; Zaal & Adano 2012), analysis 
of the Narok County Council conflict goes back to Zaal’s first publication with ole Si-
loma (i.e. ole Siloma & Zaal 2005) rather than working out his second piece with ole 
Siloma in more depth (Zaal & ole Siloma 2006), which provided a much more complex 
yet empirically grounded description of the forest conflict that recognized Loita’s inter-
nal leadership divisions. In Adano et al. (2012) and Zaal & Adano (2012), the internal 
Loita conflicts are downplayed again and the role of the Olorte group is presented as a 
one-man act of dissidence.  
If Loita’s internal differences are ignored, minimized or disregarded as the work of a 
single individual, the Narok County Council conflict is prone to being presented as a 
conflict between a local community on the one hand and greedy outsiders wanting to 
appropriate their forest on the other. For Péron (2000), the greedy outsider is the power-
ful and corrupt Purko Minister Ntimama who wanted to benefit from the forest’s tourist 
potential and used Narok County Council as a means of achieving this. He depicts the 
Loita as a traditional community with strong internal cohesion that was struggling to 
protect its sacred forest. Péron recognizes the Olorte group but dismisses them as a 
group of about ten individuals who were ‘bribed’ by the powerful Purko minister.106 His 
argumentation clearly mirrors the way the Ilkerin group understood the conflict and, I 
believe, wanted the conflict to be understood. Péron also argues that the harmony of 
Loita’s social organization and their spiritual bond with their sacred forest ensured the 
sustainable and collective use of the forest, and hence its conservation. He points to the 
risks of ecological and social destruction had the forest fallen under the management of 
Narok County Council. This argument resonates with that of many community-based 
management advocates who criticize state-centred conservation policies that exclude 
local people by pursuing the creation of nature reserves. Such ideas are ‘attractive’ 
(Agrawal & Gibson 1999: 633), ‘powerful’ (Ibid.: 633) and ‘charismatic’ (Tsing 2005: 
265) but, as Agrawal & Gibson (1999) have shown, those who champion the role of 
communities in resource management hold an uncritical and problematic conception of 
‘community’, one that sees communities as small-scale and homogeneous and having 
common interests.  
Péron’s version is very much in line with the claims and assertions made by the 
Ilkerin group that were part of their strategy of opposition. Of all the academic publica-
tions, Péron’s book chapter perhaps went furthest in reflecting an Ilkerin group version 
of the forest conflict. The path followed by Péron is, admittedly, tempting and one that I 
myself was drawn to initially. I first learned about the forest conflicts during a family 
                                                 
105  They refer to the Ilkerin group as the ‘ILIDP camp’; ILIDP is the acronym for Ilkerin Loita Integral 
Development Project. 
106  ‘Pour lui donner plus de poids, il a “acheté” une dizaine d’individus parmi les Loïta, tout acquis à la 
spoliation de la forêt par le gouvernement local, et qui servent de relais actif auprès des médias de 
telle sorte que l’opinion publique puisse croire que les Loïta, ou du moins une partie d’entre eux, ont 
donné leur accord à une telle solution’ (Péron 2000 : 391). 
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visit to Loita in 1998. At the Ilkerin Project, we were received by some of my father’s 
old colleagues and they soon started catching up on old times. The conversation turned 
to the Narok County Council conflict. As an anthropology student with an activist 
streak, the topic caught my attention and I was given the Trust Company’s booklet. I 
was captivated by the story that, I realize now, was actually the Ilkerin group’s version 
of the Narok County Council conflict. Three years later, in 2001, I went back to Loita to 
conduct research on the cultural meaning and value of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest for 
my Masters. I stayed in Entasekera and got in touch with members of the Olorte group. 
Gradually, I learned that the Narok County Council conflict was more complicated and 
layered than I had initially assumed. 
The article by Adano et al. (2012) is another example of an analysis that looks at the 
Narok County Council conflict in terms of a local community fighting powerful outsid-
ers.107 The outcome of the conflict is presented as a success story of local Loita institu-
tions prevailing over ‘a few rent-seekers’ (Ibid.: 77), notably Ntimama. They also refer 
to the gradual encroachment of the Purko on Loita territory towards the Naimina Enki-
yio Forest. The article debates climate change, violent conflict and common-pool re-
source institutions. For them, the age-group system and laibonism as ‘traditional’ insti-
tutions, and the Ilkerin Project, the Loita Council of Elders and the Trust Company as 
‘modern’ institutions constitute the common-pool resource institutions that manage and 
govern the Naimina Enkiyio Forest. The authors then advance the Loita case as a suc-
cessful example of how local institutions prevent violent conflict over natural resources 
in the context of increasing pressure on resources due to climate change. More precise-
ly, they point to the ingenious way the Loita Maasai used their local institutions of re-
source management to settle the conflict non-violently through a legal battle in court. 
The problem with this interpretation is that it does not hold when one considers the next 
round in the forest conflicts, the IUCN conflict. IUCN became involved in Loita at the 
invitation of the same local institutions that Adano et al. examined, more specifically 
the Trust Company, the Loita Council of Elders and the Ilkerin Project. IUCN was 
brought in for its technical expertise on conservation to take the lead in developing a 
forest-management plan. This raises questions about the management and conservation 
functions that Adano et al. (2012) attribute to the local Loita institutions. Why would 
Loita bring in an environmental organization if they already had their own institutions 
to take care of the forest? But the most important critique relates to the fact that the 
IUCN project reactivated the forest conflict that, though short-lived, this time ended in 
deadly violence. The local institutions that had been praised for the non-violent outcome 
of the Narok County Council conflict were, this time around, co-responsible for the vio-
lence in the IUCN case: not by perpetrating it but by facilitating it and excluding the 
Olorte group and their outside allies from participation in the IUCN project. The argu-
ment in their article, i.e. that institutional arrangements prevent violent resource con-
flict, lacks strength in light of the IUCN conflict. If Adano et al. had considered the 
IUCN conflict, which came to a close seven years before the publication of their article, 
                                                 
107  But also in Zaal & Adano (2012), which is based on Adano et al. (2012), and therefore makes the 
same argument.  
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they would have probably noticed this paradoxical inversion of roles and reconsidered 
their analysis regarding this particular case.  
This discussion on the article by Adano et al. (2012) points to the importance of 
studying resource conflicts from a historical perspective, especially if conflicts over the 
same resource have occurred before. Studying various conflicts over the same resource 
compels the researcher to find an interpretation that is valid for all conflicts and thus 
leads to greater accuracy. Fortmann’s (1990) publication about three successive con-
flicts in a national forest in Adamsville, US (see above) proves this point. Like the para-
dox referred to above, Fortmann (1990: 195) too was confronted by a seeming incon-
sistency: 
[P]articipation by most of the town in both the Megavoltz fight and the Great Commute poses an ap-
parent paradox. At first the Megavoltz fight appears to be a classic example of environmentalist, anti-
growth protest. The Great Commute, in contrast, seems to constitute an ideological flipflop, i.e. an an-
ti-environmentalist, pro-growth protest.  
Fortmann convincingly resolves this paradox and shows that ‘Adamsville residents 
were completely consistent in their actions’ (Ibid.: 195), explaining that: ‘[t]aken sepa-
rately, each of the protests could be explained in different ways. Taken together, it is 
clear that they are defences of local claims to customary usufructuary rights’ (Ibid.: 
206). The value of Fortmann’s article is that it provides an explanation that holds for all 
three protests.108 Like Fortmann, I have provided a valid explanation for the two 
Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts that shows that the actions of the Loita people were 
not irrational but completely consistent. In both cases, the common people supported 
protest because they believed their access to a key source for their livelihood and cultur-
al life was in danger. Without taking the internal Loita conflicts seriously, I would not 
have reached this conclusion. I have shown that the apparent paradoxical behaviour and 
inversion of roles that came to light in the discussion in Adano et al. (2012) can be re-
solved if the two conflicts are understood as different crystallizations along a long-
running cleavage in Loita’s leadership. 
To close this consideration of the literature on the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts, 
I return to the question raised at the beginning of this conclusion, namely, why the 
IUCN conflict has not received the same amount of scholarly attention as the Narok 
County Council one. Given the above discussion, I believe that the answer lies in the 
fact that such an undertaking would have unsettled a well-known success story that has 
captured the imagination of so many people (including myself at first too) and one that 
the Loita themselves like to tell. This is the story of a cohesive community with a united 
leadership that triumphed non-violently over state actors attempting to dispossess them 
of their sacred forest. I hope to have shown in this chapter that the story is much more 
complex and nuanced than this. 
Epilogue: ramifications 
My two main fieldwork periods in Loita – in 2001 and 2007-2008 – fell outside the 
most turbulent periods in the forest conflicts. In 2001, the Narok County Council con-
                                                 
108  Fortmann (1990: 195) argues that the three protests should be seen ‘as the assertion of local claims to 
non-aboriginal customary usufructuary rights’.  
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flict was coming to an end and the IUCN conflict was yet to start. And the IUCN con-
flict had already elapsed by the time I returned to the area in 2007-2008. However, alt-
hough no longer dominating the public sphere, the effects of the forest conflicts on 
Loita society during both fieldwork periods were still evident. Here, I briefly discuss 
one way in which the forest conflicts were still latently present in Loita during my two 
stays in the field. 
For this, I would like to pick up on the personal struggle between the project director 
and the co-opted councillor. It came to expression in full force during the forest con-
flicts but had actually started long before then, and was translated into Loita’s age-group 
ceremonial life in 2001 with its ripple effects still being felt during the preparatory 
phase of the 2010 ‘stool’ ceremony that would unite the Ilkishili and Ilbuluka circumci-
sion-groups into a single age-set (see Chapters 1 & 7). As we saw, even after the project 
director passed away, opposition between the leadership groups that the two men had 
led – the Ilkerin group and the Olorte group – persisted. This division had a major im-
pact on the cohesion of a younger age-group, namely the left-hand Ilbuluka circumci-
sion-group. What is of importance is that the Ilbuluka were related to the Iseuri (the age-
set to which the project leader and the co-opted councillor belonged) in a firestick rela-
tionship (see Chapter 7). The Ilbuluka were the firestick youngsters of the Iseuri and so 
the Iseuri had considerable authority over their age-group affairs, particularly their cer-
emonies but also as regards the position of age-group chief.  
In 2001, when the Ilbuluka were in their twenties and preparing for their next collec-
tive age-group ceremony for which a manyata needed to be constructed (the emanyata e 
nkeene, the ‘manyata of the strap’), a group of them wanted to remove their age-group 
chief (Kronenburg García 2003: 110-115). The reason given was that he lacked the 
leadership skills required. But for most people in Loita, the issue was understood differ-
ently: the authority of the age-group chief, who was associated with the Ilkerin group, 
was being challenged by a group of age-mates who were closely linked to the Olorte 
group. This dynamic was confirmed when the latter, seeing their case for a new age-
group chief was not being well-received, proclaimed someone else as the new age-
group chief. This man was considered to be on the Olorte side because he belonged to 
the co-opted councillor’s clan (Ilmolelian). I discussed this case in my MA thesis: ‘It 
was considered a scandal that one age-group simultaneously had two age-group chiefs. 
Especially this last point was strongly disapproved by the people’ (Ibid.: 110). The 
gravity of the case became clear when the chief laibon intervened and refused to recog-
nize the new age-group chief. Nevertheless, and to the consternation of many, the Olorte 
group ignored the chief laibon’s verdict and pushed on with their case. They started 
building their own manyata in preparation for the coming ceremony under the leader-
ship of their new age-group chief separately from the official Ilbuluka manyata that was 
being constructed at another location. ‘The fact that two imanyat, instead of one, were 
being built for the same age-group in preparation of the ceremony was seen as a very 
grave case’ (Ibid.: 111). The two Ilbuluka groups stubbornly went ahead and celebrated 
their age-group ceremony at two different manyatas.    
The issue of two age-group chiefs and two manyatas resulted in a deep rift among the 
Ilbuluka circumcision-group that mirrored the rift among their firestick elders (the 
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Iseuri). In fact, it was largely believed that the co-opted councillor had used his authori-
ty as firestick elder and clan chief to influence the dissenting group of youngsters to 
install their own age-group chief. So it appears that the Ilbuluka circumcision-group 
‘inherited’ the political division in the Iseuri age-set that, in turn, stemmed from the 
personal rivalry between the project leader and the co-opted councillor. This inheritance 
had travelled along two important social lines of identification, namely that of the 
firestick relationship and that based on clan affiliation. As was seen in Chapter 6, the 
age-group system and the clan system are two social frameworks that significantly 
shape Loita (Maasai) social life, so the issue thus also touched the wider Loita commu-
nity. For example, the Iromboi circumcision-group, not wanting to choose sides, refused 
to visit either of the two manyatas as protocol dictated, upsetting the relationship be-
tween them and the Ilbuluka as well. New marriages too are said to have been affected, 
with few Ilbuluka marrying women from families on the opposite side of the divide. 
The intra-Loita leadership division among the Iseuri, that was inherited by the Ilbuluka, 
ran deep in Loita society and affected long-held customs, age-group relationships and 
gender relations.  
The matter surfaced again during the preparatory phase of the next ceremony: the 
ceremony of the ‘stool’. This ceremony’s set-up already called for the construction of 
two manyatas, one for the left-hand-side and one for the right-hand-side circumcision-
group, constructed adjacent to each other to symbolize their future unity. Three man-
yatas, i.e. two for the divided (left-hand) Ilbuluka and one for the (right-hand) Ilkishili, 
were out of the question and a series of meetings, starting in 2008 among the Ilbuluka to 
solve the cleavage and unite their age-group, failed. A delegation even visited neigh-
bouring Maasai sections, including the Purko, for advice on the matter because no prec-
edent existed. Eventually, a joint Ilbuluka/Ilkishili meeting was held at which (a group 
of) Ilbuluka requested the age-group chief of the Ilkishili (ole Maine: see Chapters 1 & 
11) to mediate at a dispute meeting and bring peace to their age-group.109 At this long 
meeting, the possibility was raised of ole Maine taking over the leadership of the Il-
buluka to avoid the sticky matter of settling on one of the two age-group chiefs or, al-
ternatively, of even appointing a third person to the position. And this is what appears to 
have eventually happened. Two manyatas were built, one for the Ilbuluka and one for 
the Ilkishili as was required, and proceedings continued relatively smoothly. One of the 
Ilbuluka age-group chiefs declined to attend and join the manyata, while the other one 
did but his participation and leadership were nominal. It was clear at the celebrations 
that ole Maine pulled the strings – and no one seemed to object. The ceremony of the 
‘stool’ was a success and, with the creation of the Ilkisaroni age-set (uniting the Ilbulu-
ka and the Ilkishili circumcision-groups) and the end of the age-group ceremonial cycle 
for its members, the cleavages within the Ilbuluka lost their relevance. Finally, after 
decades of tension within Loita’s leadership, matters seem to have settled to a certain 
degree. The Iseuri, as the governing age-group in the 1980s and 1990s and having final-
                                                 
109  I attended and recorded this meeting that was held at ole Maine’s homestead at Ndoinyo on 15 June 
2008. I also attended and recorded an Ilbuluka meeting at Naibala on 1 July 2008 and a meeting 
between the Ilkishili and the Iseuri (the firestick elders) at Emorogi on 12 July 2008. A fourth meeting, 
which I did not attend but was recorded for me, took place at Oldoinyo on 31 May 2008 and was 
between the Ilbuluka and Ilkishili. 
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ized their job as firestick elders guiding and leading their youngsters through the cere-
monial age-group cycle in 2010, moved out of the political spotlight. Handing over the 
position of clan chief to a younger generation in 2012 marked this transition (see Chap-
ter 7). The Ilkisaroni age-set, with a strong age-group chief at its head, became the new 
governing age-set of Loita. The intra-Loita leadership division that found its origins in 
the personal rivalry between two of its strongest leaders appears to have ended now 
with the political shifts that come with the age-group system. Yet new challenges are 
rearing up, not within Loita leadership as such but between leaders and the people they 
are supposed to lead. And the Kenyan state is playing a role in this too. This dynamic is 
the main topic that will be dealt with in Chapter 11. 
 
 
  
9 
Booking and grabbing land:  
Grounding claims in the  
process of appropriation 
True, the dilapidated object in the picture does not look like much of a 
fence, but it certainly does assert something about property.  
It says pretty clearly, “This is mine.” 
(Rose 1994: 1) 
 
In September 2008, I visited a place where one of the families that I was following for 
the longitudinal study had started constructing a new homestead.1 As we walked from 
their current homestead towards the site in the bush on the other side of some hills, I 
noticed cut branches lying in straight lines that had not been there two weeks before on 
an earlier visit. The branches had been placed by neighbours who were demarcating or 
‘booking’ a piece of land for a future homestead and they functioned as the boundaries 
of the patch they had claimed for the purpose. What was going on? It had all started a 
week before when two men from the locality, including the head of the family that I was 
visiting, each started booking a tract of land for a new homestead. These two men and 
their families had been sharing homesteads with other families but now intended to sep-
arate and build their own individual homesteads at some distance from the cluster of 
homesteads in the middle of the locality. Others in the area, seeing the favourable loca-
tions that these two family heads had picked or ‘grabbed’ and fearing that they would 
miss out, started to panic and, in a matter of days, about 15 individuals had rushed to 
book and grab their own plots of land as well. This rush to stake a claim to land was not 
particular to this locality but had become a widespread phenomenon in Loita during my 
field research. This chapter explores the process of land appropriation and the practice 
of claim making during the rapid rush for land in Loita. 
‘Booking’ and ‘grabbing’ are the words that the Loita Maasai themselves used to de-
scribe this process of land appropriation in Loita. Booking land is similar to making 
reservations for its future use. Grabbing land refers to the seizing of as much of the best 
                                                 
1  See Kronenburg García (2013) for an earlier version of this chapter.  
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available land as possible and by any means, continuously challenging the limits of 
what is socially accepted. The notion of land grabbing in this chapter is different from 
the way it is used in the literature on large-scale, foreign land acquisitions (GRAIN 
2008; Evers et al. 2013; White et al. 2012; Kaag & Zoomers 2014). Nor does it refer to 
the illegal allocation of public land to the politically connected that used to be common 
in Kenya as a form of domestic land grabbing (Klopp 2000, 2001; Klopp & Lumumba 
2014). Instead, it is closer to the way Marx first coined the term (White et al. 2012: 
621), i.e. in the context of British enclosures that saw common agricultural land being 
fenced off as individual properties. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the notion of appropriation is used as a bridge between the 
concepts of access (Ribot & Peluso 2003) and property (Sikor & Lund 2009) to show 
how Loita families gain access to land for settlements and cultivation that had previous-
ly been used collectively for the seasonal grazing of livestock. In the process and by 
excluding others who used to use the land, they claim the acquired land as individual 
property, advancing the family head as the owner of the land. As it is usually the male 
family head who is seen as the ultimate owner and manager of the family herd and who 
is in charge of family affairs (Spencer 2010b: 12, 2010a: 32, 33; Voshaar 1998: 77-78) 
including matters that involve land appropriation, the focus in this chapter is on the de-
cision-making and strategies devised by heads of families and herd owners. To capture 
the ingenuity and inventiveness involved in the process of appropriation, as well as the 
tensions and controversies that it can create, the focus here is on the practice of claim 
making. Chapter 2 identified two ways in which people make claims: grounding claims 
and talking claims. This chapter looks at grounding claims, i.e. when people inscribe or 
alter the landscape with visible markers that are socially understood in Loita, such as 
those conveying individual property.2 
Anticipating land adjudication 
The process of land appropriation, demarcation and individualization described in this 
chapter occurred outside the formal state structures of land governance. There were no 
surveyors involved, land was not registered and no title deeds were issued. Instead, land 
tenure transformations evolved internally as people negotiated wider and far-reaching 
changes that affected their pastoral way of life and compelled them to revise their liveli-
hood strategies. This does not mean, however, that new ideas and practices of land use, 
access and property in Loita were not influenced by those promoted and imposed by the 
state. On the contrary, what people were doing in Loita was inseparably linked to the 
state-led land adjudication programme launched in the late 1960s. This programme of 
tenure reform was intended to replace existing tenure arrangements in Kenya’s pastoral 
Trust Lands with private property in the form of clearly demarcated, registered and ti-
tled group ranches (see Chapter 1). Although the land adjudication programme was 
never implemented in Loita despite recurrent attempts (see Chapter 5), it did have an 
important effect in Loita that became evident during my fieldwork. People felt that land 
                                                 
2  The subject of talking claims is dealt with in the next chapter. 
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adjudication was imminent and inevitable.3 It was also something that many wanted to 
happen soon because experience had shown that the category of Trust Land provided 
insufficient security against appropriation by outsiders, as became evident during the 
forest conflicts (see Chapter 8).4 The rush to appropriate land in Loita was partly in an-
ticipation of land adjudication.5 
The general expectation was that land adjudication would happen in two steps. First, 
it was believed that the boundaries of the five administrative locations would form the 
basis for the demarcation of Loita land into five group ranches. Second, the group 
ranches would then be subdivided and each eligible male resident from that group ranch 
would be allocated an individual plot.6 The expectation was that, as elsewhere in Maa-
sailand, group ranches would be subdivided among the registered, primarily male, 
members.7 People hope and anticipate that, with land adjudication, they will acquire a 
title deed for the land they occupy and own today according to Loita’s accepted tenure 
arrangements. It is with this picture in mind, that people are now rushing to book and 
grab the best places and as much land as possible. 
Why would people take the trouble to make group ranches in the first place if it had 
already been decided to subdivide them into individual holdings later? The interposition 
of the group ranch is important because it opens up the possibility of acquiring individ-
ual plots in different areas during formal land adjudication and demarcation. This is 
especially valid for the wealthy elite of large herd owners and explains why this group 
has been deliberately booking and grabbing land in different locations. The alternative, 
                                                 
3  For example, as expressed during the forest conflict court case: ‘That the County Council did not heed 
our requests to dialogue and we decided to set ourselves up in readiness for the land adjudication that 
we had been aware for some time would be done in Loita so that we could take possession of the Loita 
Naimina Enkiyio indigenous forest and be able to preserve it under the customary law that has seen it 
preserved to date and give us customary and other benefits’ (CCD ‘Statement’: 6(q) emphasis added). 
4  ‘[W]e eagerly await Loita to be declared an adjudication section so that the 7th Applicant can assume 
trusteeship in perpetuity of our sacred forest areas …’ (Ibid.: 6(z) emphasis added). The Memorandum 
of Association of the Trust Company also said it wanted the land in Loita adjudicated. One of its 
objectives was: ‘To promote the adjudication of land within Loita Location and ensure an appropriate 
and relevant land tenure system’ (MoA 1992: 3(11)). 
5  Matter (2010a, 2010b, particularly Ch. 3) describes a similar land rush and process of unofficial and 
informal land demarcation of individual holdings in Enoosupukia that started in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s in anticipation of official land adjudication. There are similarities with the Loita case but 
also important differences. Unlike Loita, imminent adjudication in Enoosupukia triggered a land rush 
not by locals but by outsiders (non-local Purko and Keekonyokie Maasai as well as Kikuyu) and saw 
the development of an extralegal land market, including cash transactions, suggesting that, 
unofficially, freehold tenure was accepted and consolidated locally. Another difference is that land in 
Enoosupukia appears to have been divided in its entirety under the guidance of (semi-official) land 
committees, while land committees in Loita are non-existent or at least not active. ‘Dividing’ the land 
surface is not accepted in Loita, as will become clear in Chapter 10. Finally, there are differences in 
the sequence of events. For example, dispersal of homesteads in Enoosupukia occurred after the land 
had been divided, while in Loita dispersal of homesteads preceded unofficial demarcation and even 
prompted it, as will be argued in this chapter. 
6  There were different opinions about what to do with the Naimina Enkiyio Forest. Some interviewees 
insisted it should be carved out first before land adjudication to keep it as a collective resource. Others 
wanted it to be included in the group ranches and divided up. 
7  By 2000, 31 of the 57 group ranches in Kajiado District had been subdivided and issued with titles, 14 
were in the process of subdivision, and only 12 had resisted subdivision (Mwangi 2007b: 889-890). 
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i.e. if the whole of Loita is taken as a point of departure for division into individual 
plots, would mean that each man would be entitled to one plot of land only.  
The value of having land in different group ranches lies, apart from the possibility of 
increasing one’s total land area, in being able to practise transhumant pastoralism. 
Transhumant cattle pastoralism was the basis of Loita Maasai livelihoods about forty 
years ago. But this has been changing and people are agro-pastoral now. A key factor in 
the change is decreasing mobility due to a limited land base. Some of the processes that 
lie behind this have already been discussed, i.e. the loss of Kamorora to Stein (Chapter 
5) and Purko encroachment since the first Maasai Move in 1905 (Chapter 3). But there 
are other reasons too, such as population growth and related changes over the last few 
decades that have affected the way people are using land. This chapter argues that 
changes in land use and a growing anticipation of land adjudication, together and in 
combination with less Loita territory (as already discussed in previous chapters), have 
shaped the process of land appropriation in Loita and this culminated in the rush for 
land that I witnessed in 2008. In developing this argument, I address research question 
one in this thesis.  
Loita Maasai pastoral ecology 
The Loita recognize three distinct ecological zones that characterize their territory and 
are significant for their pastoral livelihood: the lowland (olpurkel), the highland (osupu-
ko) and the middle zone (olaiparak).8 The centrality of the lowland and the highland 
pastures for Maasai pastoralism have been well documented in the literature (e.g. Lam-
prey & Waller 1990: 23) but the role of what is labelled here as the middle zone has 
received less attention. Each of these zonal categories reflects a mix of pastoral land use 
and landscape cover that shows an intimate knowledge of the environment’s ecology 
and its seasonal relevance for transhumant cattle pastoralism. 
 
Ecological zones: the lowland, the middle zone and the highland 
From west to east and ascending towards the Naimina Enkiyio Forest, one finds first the 
lowland, with its rolling plains of grass that are sporadically dotted with curiously 
formed hills. Here and there are pockets of small thorn trees that thrive on the black 
cotton soil that is characteristic of the lowland. The whistling thorn trees are a bit taller 
as you descend towards the seasonal water courses but never reach the height of the 
trees in the highland. In the rainy season, the lowland provides excellent pastures and 
plenty of open space for herds to graze. The grass that dominates the lowland but that is 
also found intermittently in the middle zone and the highland is called olamunyani and 
is considered to be particularly nutritious for livestock. The lowland with its olamunyani 
grass in the rainy season is where the cattle become healthy and herds grow strong. 
  
                                                 
8  The lowland of Loita is still relatively high at an altitude of between 1700 m and 1900 m. The 
lowland, the highland and the middle zone are together sometimes referred to as the Loita Highlands 
or the Loita Hills, unlike the Loita Plains that are now in Purko territory.  
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Map 9.1  Ecological zones 
 
 
 
The lowland gradually becomes the highland as the trees grow taller and more nu-
merous, thus inverting the balance of grassland and bushland found in the lowland. The 
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highland ends in the Naimina Enkiyio Forest in the east, after which the landscape drops 
sharply along the Nguruman Escarpment down to the floor of the Rift Valley. 
The third ecological zone distinguished in Loita is the middle zone, where it is not 
lowland or highland but a transitional zone between the two. This third category adds 
more nuance and detail to the Loita landscape than the lowland-highland duality that is 
frequently mentioned in the literature. The difference between the middle zone and the 
highland lies in the height of the vegetation. The highland has a ‘long forest’ (entim 
seur),9 i.e. with many tall trees, while the middle zone, which is also forested, has 
smaller trees or bushland (osero). The difference between the middle zone and the low-
land, on the other hand, lies in the availability of water. Until recently, most lowland 
areas did not have permanent water sources. Seasonal rivers and ponds filled with rain 
in the wet season and would progressively dry up as the dry season advanced. The mid-
dle zone on the other hand stretches along Loita’s main permanent river whose tributar-
ies originate in the forest and meet to form the Arus River (Olkeju Arus, literally the 
black-and-white-dotted river) that flows in a north-south direction parallel to the forest 
until it drains into Lake Natron in Tanzania. Along the river, there are various saltlick 
areas that are used by both livestock and wildlife. 
 
Pastoral use  
Loita Maasai settlements used to be located exclusively in the middle zone where peo-
ple and animals had immediate and year-round access to water. Lying between the high-
land and the lowland, the middle zone offered the best of both areas for cattle rearing; it 
did not lack water as the lowland did in the dry season and, unlike the highland, it of-
fered sufficient open pastures where cattle could feed on the nutritious olamunyani 
grass. And the numerous saltlicks along the river ensured that the animals got their re-
quired mineral intake. Large homesteads (inkangitie, sing. enkang) made up of several 
families were located on the natural open spaces on both sides of the Arus River. Each 
homestead jointly exploited and managed the resources (pastures, streams, bushland) of 
the surrounding area. The people from the homestead and the area they used were re-
ferred to as emurua (pl. imurua),10 which roughly means ‘village’, but I use the word 
‘locality’ here.11 Neighbouring localities had well-defined boundaries that followed geo-
graphical features such as streams and valleys or imaginary lines between hilltops and 
rock formations. Sometimes there were no boundary lines but border zones like a par-
ticular patch of trees or open ground. The use of the localities’ pastoral resources was 
regulated by clear rules of access that distinguished between residents and non-
residents. Border zones were open for use by the residents of adjacent localities. 
                                                 
9  Interview KM: 20/3/08. 
10  Homesteads were typically built on open and elevated land, often a hilltop. Land that is naturally open 
is usually covered by a type of grass called emurua and the word for locality in Loita (emurua) is the 
same. 
11  What is called emurua in Loita (and what I describe as ‘locality’, which should not be confused with 
the administrative category of ‘location’) is similar to what some authors identify as elatia (Coast 
2001: 27, 31), others as enkutoto (Peacock 1987: 66, 68; Ojalammi 2006: 74-76) or as a combination 
of both elatia and enkutoto (Grandin 1991). In Loita, elatia means neighbourhood; there can be 
different ilatiaritin (pl. elatia) in an emurua. Enkutoto is ‘corner’ as in the corner formed when two 
hill walls meet. 
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Photo 9.1  The lowland in the dry season (July 2008) 
 
© Angela Kronenburg García 
 
 
The few plains in the highland that typically benefited from the first rains from the 
forest, like the highland plains of Olorte, Mausa, Kerunyan and Osupuko,12 were the 
places where people would take their herds at the beginning of the wet season during 
the short rains (November-December) to take advantage of the new grass that grew after 
controlled burns. Eventually, the rains would proceed to the lowland,13 which was then 
used as wet-season grazing during the long rains (March-May). The herds would follow 
the showers in the lowland to enjoy the fresh shoots of grass as far as the Loita Plains, 
an area that is now inaccessible to Loita because Purko Maasai have settled it.14 Grazing 
in the lowland was only possible until the water supply dried up, after which the herds 
would be taken back to the middle zone until the next rainy season when they would 
again be moved to the highland plains. The forest itself, with its water, glades and tree 
leaves, was only used by the cattle herds as a last recourse in exceptionally dry spells. 
Constant movements back and forth to the lowland and highland from a base in the 
middle zone thus typified Loita Maasai pastoral use of the land, with the Naimina Enki-
yio Forest functioning as a drought refuge. 
 
                                                 
12  The highland plain Osupuko near Morijo in the north of Loita Division has been lost to the Purko. 
13  People literally say it always rains in the forest first before it moves to the plains in the west.    
14  The Loita Plains were a highly valued lowland area because of the saltlicks there, something that is 
missing in the other lowland areas of Loita.  
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Map 9.2 Ronjo and locality tenure, c. 1950 
 
 
 
The seasonal use of the pastoral resources in Loita and any related movements ap-
plied only to herds and the people who cared for them. Today, though constrained by 
several factors that will be discussed later, people still strive to practise this form of 
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transhumance. The settlements in the middle zone were permanent in the sense that 
women, older people and young children stayed there with enough milking cows for 
domestic use when the bulk of the herds moved away. Their permanency was also evi-
dent from their tenure arrangements, with the natural resources of a locality being joint-
ly used and managed. Those who left in search of water and (good) grass for the rest of 
the cattle, usually the warriors and older boys, went to ronjo, i.e. places that were not 
settled permanently and were therefore free of tenure rules connected to the locality. 
These areas were open to all Loita regardless of locality affiliation. The word ronjo re-
fers to a temporary cattle camp that is constructed by the herders. These cattle camps 
were sometimes shared by several herds. The herd and the herders would stay at the 
cattle camp for as long as it was necessary and possible: in the lowland until the water 
was finished and in the highland until it rained again in the middle zone and beyond. 
‘The land is becoming smaller’:  
narratives of change 
To find out how land use has changed in Loita, I would often challenge people to ex-
plain why there were no cultivated fields and only cows thirty or forty years ago and 
fields everywhere nowadays.15 One interviewee answered this question succinctly by 
saying that: ‘the land is becoming smaller’.16 The feeling of a diminishing land base was 
shared by many of my informants in Loita. This section describes people’s own under-
standings of what lies behind this situation and shows the interrelationship between 
population growth, economic diversification and sedentarization. 
 
Population growth 
Population growth was repeatedly mentioned in interviews as the root cause of the 
changes in land use that have been taking place in Loita.17 It was explained in terms of 
the ‘fullness’ of the land: the land has become ‘full’ because the number of people has 
grown and they are settling in places that used to be exclusively for grazing, which in 
turn is making the amount of land available for grazing ‘smaller’. In fact, the increase in 
Loita’s population is perceived as having far-reaching consequences for the viability of 
pastoralism. Due to population growth and the subsequent dispersal of settlements to the 
highland and the lowland, there is not enough pastureland left for the cattle to graze, 
which is why they ‘remain thin, even in the rainy season, and die in the dry season’.18 
This general sense that ‘cows are finishing’19 (i.e. pastoralism) due to increases in popu-
lation is what has led many to take cultivation seriously.20 
                                                 
15  The question would be formulated as follows: ‘My father told me that during his time at Ilkerin many 
years ago [in the 1970s], there were no cultivated fields. But now I see fields everywhere. How 
come?’.   
16  Interview SL: 17/10/08. 
17  According to the estimates at hand, the population in Loita grew from 6500 in 1969 (Kronenburg 
1986: 16) to 10,303 in Loita Division according to the 1989 census (Legilisho-Kiyiapi 1999: 7). The 
2009 census counted 22,873 people in Loita Division (Kenya Census 2010: 164). 
18  Interview KM: 6/9/08. 
19  Interview KM: 20/3/08; Interview S: 4/7/08; Interview LM: 26/10/08. 
20  Maundu et al. (2001: 26) also ascribe agricultural expansion in Loita to population growth. 
210 
 
This realization, strong among both large- and small-scale herd owners, seems to 
have taken root since the outbreak of two cattle diseases (lipis and oltikana) and a pro-
longed period of drought over the last couple of decades.21 In collective memory, the 
various livelihood changes that have taken place in Loita were triggered by periods of 
distress associated with these three events. 
 
Lipis and the introduction of goats and sheep 
The immediate trigger that led to the introduction of goats and sheep in Loita seems to 
have been an outbreak of lipis that ‘finished cows’ in the late 1960s.22 The outbreak was 
particularly severe because it not only killed animals but also appears to have affected 
the fertility of the surviving stock. With no medication available, it took an exceptional-
ly long time to recover and rebuild the herds. The fact that cows could not give birth is 
important because their supply of milk for the Maasai’s staple food also declined. Peo-
ple could usually cope with periodic decreases in milk supplies, such as during the dry 
season and periods of drought, by selling oxen and using the money to buy ground 
maize for food at shops run by Indian and Somali traders. The first shops in the region 
were outside Loita in Narosura on the Loita Plains in Purko territory and in Olgos Orok 
near Loliondo in Tanzania but, over time, they also opened in the emerging Loita trad-
ing centres of Olmesutie, Morijo and Entasekera. Maize could also be obtained through 
trade with Kipsigis (called Ilumbwa by Maasai). When maize supplies were exhausted, 
families who shared a homestead would contribute oxen for slaughter in turn to provide 
soup and meat for the people in the homestead until the shops or the Kipsigis had sup-
plies of maize again. During and after the outbreak of lipis however, the only way of 
generating money to buy maize flour was by selling the skins of dead animals to Indian 
traders. Some enterprising Loita elders also traded skins for goats and sheep with Kipsi-
gis and when this turned out to be a success, others soon followed in their footsteps. 
Goats and sheep, whose reproduction rates are higher than those of cattle, could be 
slaughtered to feed the people, especially when supplies of maize flour ran short, spar-
ing the cattle herd and allowing it to grow again. Although individual Loita elders ap-
pear to have had flocks of goats and sheep on the plains and beyond Loita territory, 
these were never brought to the Loita heartland in the middle zone and introducing 
goats and sheep in this period appears to have constituted the first step towards the di-
versification of the Loita economy.23 A greater emphasis on small stock followed an 
earlier trend evident elsewhere in Maasailand that started during and after the droughts 
of the early 1930s (Lamprey & Waller 1990: 24).  
When the cattle disease oltikana struck the herds later, the Loita Maasai economy 
was further diversified and cultivation was more widely adopted. The reason given for 
introducing goats and sheep to Loita, i.e. to spare the herds and ensure their recovery, 
was exactly the same as the one offered for turning to agriculture.  
                                                 
21  Lipis might be Anaplasmosis (PA undated: 3). Oltikana is East Coast Fever. 
22  Interview SL: 17/10/08. 
23  The drastic increase in small-stock numbers in the herds of the Kisongo Maasai in the Ngorongoro 
area in the 1970s seems to have been, as in the case of the Loita in Kenya, in response to cattle losses 
due to disease (McCabe 1997: 60). 
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Early experiences with cultivation  
Crop agriculture was not unknown in Loita because trading partners like the Kipsigis 
and neighbouring communities, such as the Sonjo, engaged in agriculture. In the 1950s, 
settlements associated with the irrigation agriculturalists of the Nguruman Escarpment 
were extended to what comprises Loitaland today. Ngosesia, for example, was inhabited 
by a small colony of irrigation agriculturalists called Ilkurman who lived along the 
Olopolui River, a tributary of the Arus River. I was told that they came from where the 
Sonjo lived but they appear to be different from the Bantu-speaking Sonjo because they 
were described to me as ‘non-pure’ and ‘poor’ Maasai who did not own livestock and 
only practised agriculture.24 They were compared to the Arusha Maasai in that they were 
a composite Maasai community.25 
By then agriculture was also being practised sporadically in Loita by Ilkokoyo (sing. 
Olkokoyo) immigrants who acquired cattle and became Maasai. Letutui (one of my old-
est informants who was mentioned in Chapters 3 and 6) recalled an Olkokoyo who had 
come to the Senteu family because he was related, then married a Maasai woman and 
had four sons, one of whom is still alive and lives in Kisokon. His descendants are now 
assimilated Maasai. According to Letutui, this Olkokoyo was the first to clear a field in 
Loita at a place that appropriately came to be called Elangata e Nkurma (the river cross-
ing of the field) near Entasekera. This happened ‘when the Ilterito were being circum-
cised’, sometime between 1925 and 1932.26 I am not sure whether this immigrant was in 
fact of Kikuyu origin because the words Olkokoyo and Ilkokoyo, although clearly de-
rived from Kikuyu, are commonly used for any non-Maasai cultivating stranger.  
Individual agricultural immigrants like the Olkokoyo are different from later Kikuyu 
immigrants in that they cultivated in the Loita heartland and became accepted as Maa-
sai. The Kikuyu immigrants of the 1950s, on the contrary, established colonies on the 
fringes of Loitaland and sought to establish relations with the Loita Maasai through pat-
ronage and also marriage, but maintained their own social identity by holding on to their 
language and livelihood pattern.27 
Two such Kikuyu enclaves developed in the northern part of Loita in the Emorogi 
and Morijo areas. Groups of Kikuyu immigrants started to arrive during the Emergency 
between 1952 and 1960 (see Chapter 4). This was a time when Kikuyu were being 
rounded up, incarcerated and forcibly moved into fenced and policed villages by the 
colonial authorities in a bid to control the Kikuyu Mau Mau Movement (Berman 1990: 
                                                 
24  Interview TM: 30/8/09. Adams et al. (1994: 22, 26) and Potkanski & Adams (1998: 111) refer to small 
irrigating Maasai communities living in the same area as the Sonjo. See Galaty (1982: 9) for more on 
the Ilkurman Maasai farmers. 
25  The Arusha Maasai emerged in the early 19th century from the destitute Maasai refugees who settled 
around Mount Meru in Tanzania and took up irrigation agriculture after being raided by Kisongo 
Maasai (Spear 1993: 122). In the 1880s and 1890s during the time of the Disaster and renewed 
intersectional cattle-raiding, they incorporated Kisongo, Sikirari, Matapato and Loita Maasai (Ibid.: 
124). This pattern of taking in impoverished and destitute Maasai could have been the same for the 
Ilkurman Maasai, which might explain reports of their alleged mixed background. 
26  Interview L: 30/10/07. Elderly Maasai do not think in terms of calendar years but date events by 
referring to the lifecycle phase of a specific age-group. To give approximate dates, I use Mol’s 
chronology of successive age-groups and age-sets (1996: 12-15). 
27  These two different forms of immigration − the ‘Kikuyu acceptee’ and the ‘Kikuyu alien’ − follow a 
familiar pattern of Kikuyu immigration across Maasailand (Waller 1993).  
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347-376). The Kikuyu refugees settled in Loita under the patronage of two rich and in-
fluential Loita elders, ole Kashu from Morijo and ole Parkisuaa from Emorogi. They 
were adopted in their respective clans. Those taken in by ole Kashu now call themselves 
Kashu and those who joined ole Parkisuaa’s homestead in Emorogi call themselves 
Kisuaa. The Kikuyu enjoyed a time of prosperity in the 1970s when they sold maize and 
brewed beer for the Loita elders who resorted to drinking due to the effects of the cattle 
disease lipis. By the late 1970s, their numbers had increased and so too had the land 
they tilled. When they started claiming ownership of the land they used,28 they experi-
enced increasing harassment from the Ilkitoip (warriors at the time) and the Iseuri (who 
had recently closed their warriorhood period) age-sets until they eventually moved 
away. The Kikuyu from Morijo left first and settled further down the escarpment in 
Narosura and took up irrigation agriculture near the Kanunka River.29 The Kisuaa fami-
ly moved out of the area completely and some now live in Naivasha while others went 
to Olkalao.  
Long before Kikuyu cultivation took place in Loita, Maasai cultivation of small gar-
dens was seen in isolated cases, mostly by Maasai women who had settled in Loita after 
migration or marriage. Noorkipuny, my oldest informant and originally a Siria Maasai, 
had come to Loita after a short stay in Lemek (Purko territory) with her family and ten 
head of cattle to ‘escape’ the cattle disease oltikana that seems to have been endemic in 
Siria (Waller 1984: 268).30 In Siria (or Lemek), she had already practised cultivation, 
which the Maasai there had learned from the Kipsigis (Ibid.: 245, 282), and she contin-
ued this when she settled in Loita. Noorkipuny claims she was the Maasai who intro-
duced cultivation to Loita ‘when the Ilkalikal were warriors’ (between 1939-1946).31 
Another example is Baari who, much later in 1972, used the Ilkerin Project’s tractor to 
plough a plot of land but eventually had to abandon this initiative because of fierce op-
position from his neighbours and his own father in particular. Agriculture was consid-
ered a ‘dirty’ practice that reduced the grazing space for cows.32 The perception that 
using land for agriculture undermined pastoralism touched a raw nerve. Various neigh-
bours accused Baari of wanting to grow wheat and, as some had seen in Mau, wheat 
was known to ‘take a lot of land’.33 Indeed, elsewhere in Narok District, educated Maa-
sai from the Purko, Damat and Keekonyokie sections had been able to acquire vast 
tracts of land in the process of land adjudication, which they then leased to wheat com-
panies (Voshaar 1998: 106). This small group of Maasai, who took some of the best 
grazing lands from their fellow pastoral Maasai, prospered and came to be known as the 
‘wheat elite’ (King 1972: 398).  
                                                 
28  There was a belief among the Kikuyu diaspora, such as the Kikuyu squatters on white farms, that 
labour in land earned them property rights (Lonsdale 1992: 383). For the Maasai, ‘use in itself, 
however, conferred no rights’ (Waller 1993: 233). Kikuyu and Maasai diverged greatly at this time in 
their ideas of land access and ownership. 
29  The Kikuyu from Kanunka are now growing irrigated tomatoes commercially (Shelley & Lempaka 
1999: 6). 
30  Interview NM: 4/12/08. 
31  Interview NM: 4/12/08. 
32  Interview BM: 15/9/08. 
33  Interview BM: 15/9/08. 
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Taking up cultivation was not through necessity for development-minded elders like 
Baari. The need to complement pastoralism with cultivation was only felt later. Adopt-
ing cultivation was, I was told, a way of ‘finishing the drought’ because cows alone 
could no longer sustain the growing numbers of people, especially during the dry season 
and droughts when people suffered from hunger.34 The results of a survey conducted on 
behalf of the Ilkerin Project also make a link between drought and cultivation as 88% of 
respondents explained that their main motivation for turning to crop cultivation had 
been ‘to fill the stomach during milk shortage’, i.e. in the dry season (Ter Schegget & 
Schoenmakers 1988: 52).  
 
Oltikana and the adoption of cultivation 
The realization that pastoralism was under pressure became clear in the period of hard-
ship after the cattle disease oltikana broke out ‘when Ilkitoip were warriors’ (sometime 
between 1973 and 1985) and this age-group took up cultivation en masse after they 
closed their warriorhood.35 These young men, who were now allowed to marry, had a 
bad start as new family heads and independent herd owners. During their time as warri-
ors, cattle raiding, which is one way of building up an economic base in preparation for 
married life and the chance to become independent cattle owners (Waller 1978: 93), had 
become increasingly problematic due to state interference. Thus, in combination with 
smaller herds as a result of oltikana and the reduced support from their fathers when it 
came to bridewealth, they found themselves with too few animals to provide for their 
young families’ needs, or even to get married at all. Some, whose fathers had lost all 
sense of responsibility due to serious drinking habits, had to take care of their mothers 
and siblings as well. Cultivating maize (and later beans) secured food for their families 
in the dry season and droughts without having to sell or slaughter their surviving live-
stock for food. And by engaging in livestock trade, they could slowly build up their 
herds again. Although cultivation was adopted, it was still geared towards pastoralism 
and cultivation was used with the explicit aim of building up herds. McCabe (2003: 
106) made the same observation: ‘It may seem counter-intuitive that people would 
adopt agriculture to maintain a pastoral identity, but many Maasai respondents told me 
that the principal reason they began farming was to save the livestock’.  
It was this young generation of men that increasingly attended the workshops of the 
Ilkerin Project (Kronenburg 1986: 21) that responded to new interests in agriculture 
accordingly (Maundu et al. 2001: 26; LNECTC 1994: 2). Many elders of that genera-
tion vividly recall visits to agricultural communities far from Loita that were organized 
by the Ilkerin Project and how non-Maasai agriculturalists were brought to train plough 
oxen on the project’s demonstration farm. It also appears that the Loita from Tanzania 
had by then already turned to agriculture (McCabe et al. 1992: 362). In fact, the Maasai 
in Tanzania, who had adopted cultivation by the 1960s, appear to have done so follow-
ing an earlier outbreak of oltikana (McCabe 2003: 104), which suggests that the pattern 
found in Loita, i.e. the adoption of agriculture after a cattle disease, applied more widely 
in Maasailand. All these factors together − the cattle disease oltikana, the Ilkerin Project 
                                                 
34  Interview Ld: 17/10/08.  
35  Interview L: 30/10/07. 
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and cultivation in Tanzania − steered the Loita in Kenya into adopting agriculture. Poor 
families living in Morijo, who were already familiar with crop agriculture because of 
previous Kikuyu presence there, seem to have been the first to take up cultivation. 
At first, cultivation was not taken seriously by all and yields were shared with any-
one who gave a helping hand with the harvest. More than once did the store remain 
empty and planting seasons were also skipped without much problem. Nevertheless, 
although still small, the fields spread all over Loita and, by 1988, 93% of the respond-
ents’ families were growing crops (Ter Schegget & Schoenmakers 1988: 52). It is said 
that when the following age-group, the Ilkishili, graduated from warriorhood in the 
1990s, fields increased in numbers even further. The link between the staggered spread 
and increase of fields to the ceremonial cycle of the age-group system in Loita seems to 
apply more generally: every time a new age-group graduates from warriorhood and per-
forms the ‘milk-drinking’ ceremony, a change in economic activity emerges as the 
members of the age-group settle down to married life and introduce new innovations. 
This point is relevant and will re-emerge in the discussion on the booking and grabbing 
of land. 
With increasing numbers of fields in Loita, tensions developed as to how land should 
be used. This was due to competitive methods of land use because land for fields natu-
rally resulted in a loss of pastureland for cows. This tension was evident in the elders’ 
vigilant monitoring of the sites and sizes of new fields. When a family head wanted to 
clear a field, which coincided with the establishment of a new and smaller homestead, 
he first had to announce this at a locality meeting. The local elders would then allocate 
him a place for a homestead and mark an area for the field, which was carefully chosen 
so that it would not obstruct areas used by people or livestock. In this way, settlement 
patterns and field clearing were to a certain degree controlled by the elders in each lo-
cality. But these restrictions would soon be loosened. If Maasai cultivation spread in 
Loita due to the effects of oltikana, then its intensification in the sense of spending more 
time and effort on cultivation was triggered by the 2000-2001 drought. According to 
many interviewees, this drought was one of the worst in living memory. 
 
Loosening controls on cultivation after the 2000-2001 drought 
The prelude to the 2000-2001 drought started in the previous year when the short rains 
failed. But the situation did not look too bad at the end of February 2000 when the long 
rains came and lasted until the beginning of June, even though they were not heavy 
throughout the region. With already diminished herds, things became very bad when the 
short rains failed again and it remained dry for eight months. Immediately before the 
drought, most Loita families had had small fields where they grew maize but many peo-
ple had sold the little maize they had for high prices to Loodokilani Maasai from the 
Rift Valley who had come to Loita to buy maize. All this resulted in a serious maize 
shortage in Loita by the end of 2000 and wild vegetables and fruits from the forest were 
all many people had to eat.  
The herds, which were weak and producing little milk, also suffered as grazing areas 
became exhausted and dried up. Those herds that had been driven to the forest area to 
exploit its streams and springs and to graze on open patches of grassland normally 
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found inside the forest and along the Empurputia Swamp found only water but no grass 
and so were fed leaves from the trees. Using the forest as a drought refuge of last resort 
appears to be on the increase and is a process that is undoubtedly connected to the 
mounting pressure on pastoral resources in the rest of Loita territory due to growing 
numbers of people and livestock.36 
The drought was experienced across the region and some areas in Kenya received re-
lief food, but it only arrived in Loita as the (heavy) rains started in March 2001. The 
rain created another problem because trucks with relief food could not reach the area as 
they could not cross the sand river that forms the boundary between Loita and Purko 
territories. People therefore had to travel with their donkeys to collect their maize ra-
tions, a journey that could take up to four days. Relief food was distributed once a 
month for a period of three months but the amount distributed was insufficient and peo-
ple continued to suffer from hunger, even though they could add milk to their diet of 
wild vegetables and fruits if their milking cows had survived. I was told that this period 
was especially hard because the fields needed to be prepared for the next harvest: ‘it is a 
time of hunger so you don’t have a full stomach and you are working’.37 The rains were 
late in 1993 but Loita had received plenty of relief food (Kantai 2001: 42) and did not 
suffer from hunger as was the case in 2000-2001. The 1993 experience had not been 
severe enough to force the reluctant majority to cross the threshold and embrace agricul-
ture in earnest. But after the 2000-2001 drought, the attitude of the elders in particular 
towards tilling the land changed dramatically and cultivation was considered key to 
preventing food shortages in the future. Accordingly, controls on making fields were 
significantly relaxed and the elders ‘came to declare that if you are able to make a big 
field for yourself, you are allowed [to take the land for it]’.38 Cultivation was accepted 
and adopted as security against drought (Ibid.). 
Cultivation in Loita grew dramatically after the 2000-2001 drought. If three out of 
four homesteads had a garden at the end of the 1990s (Maundu et al. 2001: 26), my im-
pression was that every married man had a field or sometimes several fields in 2008. 
These were divided up according to the number of wives he had and the fields were 
becoming larger in size. Sometimes even unmarried men were cultivating fields and 
selling their maize and beans to raise cash for their bridewealth in preparation for mar-
riage. Elders today, the same men that adopted agriculture in the 1980s, deplore the fact 
that the younger generation are more interested in having their own separate homesteads 
with their own fields than keeping cows, while they, in their day, had only taken up cul-
tivation to be able to continue pastoralism, i.e. so as not to have to sell and slaughter 
cows for food during the dry season and thus be able to increase the size of their herds. I 
was told that elders ‘like cows too much’ and enjoy staying with them at their home-
steads, while young men use them for ‘business’.39 This generational divide as regards 
                                                 
36  The forest was also used as a drought refuge during the dry seasons of 1993 (Péron 2000: 387; 
LNECTC 1994: 3, 5), 2005-2006 (ole Siloma & Zaal 2006: 4) and 2008-2009. 
37  Interview LM: 9/2/09. 
38  Interview LM: 9/2/09. 
39  Interview TM: 30/8/09; Interview PK: 30/08/09. Some Loita individuals have become successful 
long-distance cattle traders. The Dagoretti cattle market near Nairobi is a popular destination for Loita 
traders.   
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attitudes towards cattle keeping highlights an important change in Loita: there has been 
a move away from pastoralism and towards a stronger emphasis on cultivation and live-
stock marketing. 
 
Changing settlement patterns 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many permanent homesteads there were and 
where they were by 1970 but it can be inferred from interviews that there were ‘very 
few’,40 about fifteen in the whole of Kenyan Loitaland.41 In Morijo, the ‘homestead of 
the children’ (enkang oo nkera) or ‘school boma’ (Willis 1999: 352, 354; Rutten 1992: 
255) was next to the first primary school in Loita where mothers with their school-going 
children lived. In the Ilkerin Hills, there seems to have been a community of Dorobo at 
Empaash and the cultivating Ilkurman Maasai lived in Ngosesia. There were the Ink-
idongi descendants of Senteu in Kisokon and there was also a specific area called 
Emurua Olerai, which is now settled permanently, that was reserved for the construction 
of manyatas. The rest of the homesteads were inhabited by Loita Maasai families, some-
times by as many as forty families. 
Population growth and the spread and intensification of agriculture coincided with a 
break-up of these large homesteads as people began to disperse within the localities they 
belonged to in the middle zone in the 1970s. This dispersal is said to have accelerated in 
the 1980s. The congestion in the homesteads was instrumental in the disintegration of 
the large homesteads but the growing importance of having one’s own field played an 
equally important role.  
A homestead typically consisted of several families whose houses were built in a cir-
cle. The family herds were herded separately during the day but would all mingle in the 
centre of the homestead at night. The homestead was fenced and each family had its 
own entrance(s) and fenced section (olmanie) within the homestead. Homesteads built 
in this style are still found in Loita, especially in the sparsely inhabited areas of the low-
land, but they now usually accommodate no more than four families and a few depend-
ants. Initially, individual families would clear small fields attached to the outer fence of 
the homestead but as more families started to do this, the fields started to block the pas-
sage of people and livestock to and from the homestead. As a result, fields were cleared 
further away and, over time, families would also move there, which triggered the disin-
tegration of the large homesteads in the process. 
The break-up of these homesteads was the result of population growth and a need for 
fields. The overall result was a decline in the average size of the Maasai homestead and, 
nowadays, the single-family homestead is increasingly common (Grandin 1991; Hol-
land 1996: 27, 31; Coast 2001: 29-30). For example, the sole homestead in Emurua 
Olerai, with its 30 families or so, broke up in the 1980s. Three widowed co-wives 
                                                 
40  Interview BM: 15/9/08. 
41  One informant could only remember 11 permanent homesteads in the early 1970s (Interview BM: 
15/9/08). Another informant believed that the Inkidongi alone had about 11 homesteads in those years 
(Interview NS: 19/11/08). A third informant thought that there must have been at least 12 homesteads 
in the 1950s (Interview NM: 4/12/08). Two other informants agreed that during the time that the 
Ilterito governed (approx. from the late 1950s to the late 1970s) there were 15 permanent homesteads 
(Interview PK: 30/8/09; Interview TM: 30/8/09). 
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moved about 500 metres away to erect their own homestead next to their fields and two 
close age-mates moved with their families into the bush area nearby, clearing an open 
space for a shared homestead. At a later date, these smaller homesteads would disinte-
grate even further, for the same reasons as the large homesteads had done previously. 
One of the close age-mates, for example, moved away at the end of 2008 after having 
shared a homestead with his age-mate’s family for almost 25 years to form his own in-
dividual homestead. He gave overcrowding and the need for a new field as the reasons 
for his move.  
The disintegration of the large homesteads changed the appearance of localities that 
had previously housed only one homestead where all the resident families of that locali-
ty lived. But now, as families started to move away, localities came to be characterized 
by a cluster of smaller homesteads. Although these smaller homesteads initially stayed 
in each other’s vicinity in the middle of the locality, people later settled all over the area 
in an attempt to book and grab as much land as possible. But before this, people started 
to pioneer permanent settlement in the highland and the lowland. This had far-reaching 
implications for transhumant pastoralism. Permanent settlement in the highland and the 
lowland meant that these areas could no longer be used for ronjo (temporary cattle 
camps) because rules that applied to the localities were transposed to these areas as fam-
ilies built their homesteads there. The next section describes this process and its effects.  
Strategies for the appropriation of land 
The new ways of using land described in the previous section help explain why people 
are now claiming land that was previously held in common as individual property. This 
section discusses the strategies of appropriation that Loita employ when turning their 
gained access to land into recognized individual property. 
Strategies for booking and grabbing land are usually planned and carried out by the 
male family head or herd owner for the benefit of his family. The strategies of large 
herd owners differ from those of small herd owners. The large herd owners studied 
owned between 100 and 300 head of cattle, while the herds of the small herd owners 
ranged from 10 to 20 head of cattle. In general, large herd owners have more than one 
wife whereas owners of smaller herds have only one. This difference shapes the possi-
bilities and strategies devised by herd owners with respect to land appropriation, as will 
be shown in this and the next section. The first two sub-sections examine the strategies 
devised by large herd owners and the third and fourth sub-sections discuss those adopt-
ed by small herd owners. Pseudonyms have been used throughout.   
 
Dispersing wives over ecological zones 
The break-up of the large homesteads into smaller units in the middle zone and the in-
creased number of fields translated into reduced space for grazing for cattle. The effects 
of this were first felt by the large herd owners. My material suggests that the lack of 
space drove large herd owners to ‘follow cows’ to where there was space and grass, thus 
pioneering permanent settlement beyond the middle zone.42 Erecting a new homestead 
                                                 
42  Interview KM: 15/10/08. 
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elsewhere was only attractive if one could maintain a stake in the locality that one had 
left in the middle zone because although it was becoming congested, it still provided the 
benefits of permanent water and saltlicks as well as shops, markets and schools. The 
solution was to leave one wife behind in the middle zone and take another to the new 
homestead. 
The Empurputia Swamp area in the forest and the plains of the highland seem to 
have been the first choice because they provided enough space, grass and, crucially, 
year-round water. Ole Reson pioneered settlement in the highland plain called Mausa 
around 1983. However, many others followed his example and today the area is crowd-
ed with homesteads, fields, livestock, shops and a school. The plain itself is continuous-
ly overgrazed and grass is only available in faraway and inaccessible areas. And the 
reason why he moved there in the first place, i.e. because of he needed pastures for his 
large herd or for the ‘work of grass’ (esiaai oo nkujit) as he phrased it, later made him 
look for new land beyond the highland.43 Around the year 2000, he pioneered settlement 
in a particular area of the lowland where vast grassy plains offered what he needed. 
Permanent settlement had been made possible because of the construction of a mecha-
nized borehole in the vicinity. But although the ‘work of grass’ pushed him out of the 
populated highland, the agricultural potential pulled him back. The highland turned out 
to be an excellent area for growing maize and beans and as the importance of subsist-
ence cultivation had grown, he was reluctant to give up his field because if you move 
from a locality, you give up the right to live there and to use the natural resources for 
your livelihood needs. The abundant harvests twice a year in the highland in compari-
son with the rest of Loita where harvests are only once a year are attributed to its fertile 
red soil and higher rainfall compared to the lowland’s black cotton soil that does not 
retain its low and erratic rainfall long enough for crops to mature. The highland’s suita-
bility for rain-fed agriculture was again confirmed when people there had a reasonable 
harvest after the poor short rains in 2008-2009 while other areas in Loita experienced 
bad or failed harvests.  
Another reason for ole Reson’s unwillingness to leave the highland despite its re-
duced importance for pastoralism was the local primary school as all his school-aged 
children had moved in with his senior wife so they could attend school in Mausa. The 
pervasive idea that pure pastoralism is ending has forced Loita Maasai to diversify their 
livelihood strategies. Taking up agriculture is an economic answer to this, and so is 
sending one’s children to school. The attitude towards schooling has changed dramati-
cally over the last couple of decades. While sending a child to school used to be seen as 
an insurmountable loss, it is now thought to offer a child an alternative future to pasto-
ralism. This is ole Reson’s underlying reason for sending all of his children except for 
three sons to school. These boys, one from every wife, were selected (by him) to prac-
tise agro-pastoralism. They now herd the animals and in time will learn to work the 
fields. The other children (including his daughters) will, he hopes, be equipped with the 
skills required to find a non-farming occupation.  
 
  
                                                 
43  Interview KM: 15/10/08. 
219 
 
Photo 9.2  A highland plain in the rainy season (March 2008) 
 
© Angela Kronenburg García 
 
 
Having a school in the area adds value to a certain locality and this plays a role in 
deciding whether or not to establish a new homestead or to remain in an existing one. 
Recently settled areas, such as the remote plains of the lowland, do not have schools or 
shops. Other parts of the lowland with a longer history of permanent settlement, the 
middle zone and the highland are more developed in terms of schools, shops, markets, 
churches and dispensaries. For ole Reson, the highland is the ideal place for ‘taking care 
of people’ (eramatare oo ltunganak) because the field provides food for his family and 
there is a school for his children. The lowland, on the other hand, provides cattle with 
space to graze during the rainy season and is therefore needed for ‘taking care of the 
cows’ (eramatare oo nkishu). The lowland is also an excellent place for goats and sheep 
because of the abundance of olamunyani grass that, although short, forms a thickly in-
terwoven mass that is said to make goats and sheep grow well. The lowland’s openness 
prevents goats and sheep from getting lost in the bush or being taken by thieves or leop-
ards, which commonly happens in the middle zone and highland. Finally, the lowland is 
considered to be free of diseases that affect small stock. Ole Reson’s reason for moving 
to the lowland and his reluctance to leave the highland was prompted by his marriage to 
his third wife, who he then took to live at the new homestead in the lowland. 
Ole Reson was familiar with the plains in the highland and the lowland because these 
were places where he used to go to for ronjo with his father’s herd. Later, when he be-
came an independent herd owner, he continued this practice. Going for ronjo to these 
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places is not possible anymore because they are now settled and have become localities 
with defined rules of access and use for residents and non-residents. Today in Loita, 
there are only two areas left that people have not yet claimed for permanent residence 
and that can still be used for ronjo (see Map 9.3). Typically located on the edge of Loit-
aland, these areas are also both contested areas. The land west of Mount Sampu on the 
Nguruman Escarpment in Tanzania is claimed by Loita Maasai and Sonjo (see Chapter 
3) and saw the arrival of Kisongo Maasai in 2008 after their relocation by the Tanzanian 
state from the Ngorongoro area. Kisinande, also on the Nguruman Escarpment but to 
the north between Kamorora and the Naimina Enkiyio Forest, is also becoming a con-
tested region. The Loita have always considered Kisinande as theirs but, since 2007, it 
has been claimed by the new owner of a tourist destination on the neighbouring Kamo-
rora estate who has stationed armed rangers at a post there.44 During the 2008-2009 dry 
season, which lasted until February 2009, both areas were used for ronjo but its future 
use by Loita pastoralists remains uncertain. 
Ole Reson is well positioned. Having sent his wives to the three different ecological 
zones, he can continue practising transhumant pastoralism because he has access to lo-
calities in all these areas. In addition, he benefits from the school and the agricultural 
productivity of the highland. Whether he consciously dispersed his wives or just found 
himself in a favourable situation, he is one of the best positioned when it comes to fac-
ing formal land demarcation and adjudication because he has already booked three sites 
to which he has a socially acknowledged claim. These are spread over two administra-
tive locations (not to be confused with localities) that are expected to form the basis of 
the group ranches. If all goes as anticipated, he could therefore obtain legal title for two 
individual plots and, with some luck and the support of fellow large herd owners in the 
same situation, he could even obtain title deeds for his three homesteads. This would 
allow him to continue practising transhumant pastoralism for as long as possible.  
 
Dispersing wives in the same ecological zone 
Large herd owners are in a position to marry several wives because they have the means 
to pay bridewealth and can maintain a large family across several homesteads. Although 
initially it was their large herds needing space and grass that pushed them to settle be-
yond the middle zone, as was illustrated by ole Reson’s story, I argue that, today, the 
anticipated land demarcation and adjudication have become important additional mo-
tives for dispersing one’s wives to the different areas.  
Ole Kosiom is married to three wives, has one homestead in the middle zone and an-
other in the swamp area next to the forest in the highland. During my fieldwork in 
Loita, he was constructing a third homestead but instead of building it in the lowland to 
                                                 
44  Stein, who had leased Kamorora from the Kamorora Group Ranch and now claims ownership of it 
(see Chapters 5 and 8), apparently sold part of it to a Danish-British tycoon called Jan Bonde Nielsen. 
This man built an exclusive, high-end lodge and receives prominent visitors such as Prime Minister 
Odinga. When Odinga visited Loita in 2010 he came with Bonde Nielsen after having visited his 
lodge first. In March 2009, I planned to visit the Loita herders on ronjo in Kisinande. But after 
reaching Kisinande and before I arrived at the Loita cattle camps, I was stopped and sent back by 
Bonde Nielsen’s rangers. That same day I had to walk back to Loita with my companions, going 
through the forest again and only reaching the first Loita homesteads after nightfall. 
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benefit from its pastoral resources as ole Reson had done, he unexpectedly decided to 
build it close to his existing highland homestead. 
 
 
Map 9.3 Ronjo and locality tenure, 2008  
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Separated from this homestead by a steep hill and a small forested area, he started by 
fencing a cattle enclosure in an unlikely open space on the top of a hill (see Map 9.4). 
The place was an unexpected choice because of the absence of grazing space: half of the 
open area was occupied by another homestead and the other sides were blocked by a 
patch of forest that would make clearing hard as it was a steep and stony slope. Moreo-
ver, the added value of having two homesteads in the same ecological zone raised ques-
tions in light of ole Reson’s (and with him many others’) strategy of spreading his wives 
over the different ecological zones, even more so because ole Kosiom’s herds already 
had access to that land. But closer inspection reveals a strategic reason for locating the 
new homestead on this exact site. Ole Kosiom’s intention was not only to book new 
land and legitimately establish rights to it but also to prevent the expansion of the other 
homestead in the direction of his homestead down near the swamp. By spacing the new 
homestead in such a way in relation to his other homestead, he not only blocked his 
neighbour but, more importantly, discouraged others from claiming the land in between, 
thus obtaining extra land in the process. In other words, the distance between the two 
homesteads was just small enough to discourage other people from settling there as they 
would have little space and no prospect of expansion, and it would still be large enough 
for him to ‘win’ land beyond any claimable land. Ole Kosiom has even taken this strat-
egy a step further. During my visit at the start of the 2008-2009 drought, he expressed 
his intention of constructing a temporary cattle camp across the swamp in the direction 
of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest creating, in effect, a line of three homesteads in the high-
land. The reason for the cattle camp, he claimed, was that his cows needed to reach the 
grazing and water resources inside the forest more easily during the dry season. He add-
ed that if, after a while, people had not complained of his move towards the forest, he 
would ‘take a wife’ to live there.45 Indeed, I later learnt that he was involved in talks 
about marrying a fourth wife.  
An important reason for ole Kosiom to have his wives in the highland and not in the 
middle zone is because there is still space available in the highland area and since he 
worked as a tourist guide in the forest he realized that the forest had tourist potential. 
With this in mind, he has already identified scenic spots on his land for campsites. Tour-
ism can now be added to the list of possible benefits provided by the swamp area of the 
highland, such as year-round water, evergreen pastures and the irrigated agricultural 
potential opened up by the wet margins of the swamp. 
Ole Kosiom and others who apply this method to appropriate land are accused of be-
ing ‘land grabbers’. But although the name has negative connotations, it also produces 
admiration and everybody now wants to grab as much land as possible.  
Variations on the two strategies discussed so far, i.e. dispersing wives over different 
ecological zones and dispersing wives in the same zone, abound in Loita. At times, a 
widowed mother instead of a wife is used by a son to claim permanent settlement at a 
certain locality and sometimes the wives of married sons or occasionally married daugh-
ters are used by their father to spread claims. Sometimes both strategies are used by the 
same herd owner at once. An example is ole Okuluo. He divided his three wives over 
two homesteads to claim parts of a plain and a hill in the middle zone. And a plot he 
                                                 
45  Interview S: 28/11/08. 
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owns at the nearby trading centre adds additional weight to his claim to almost the 
whole hill because his field lies between the plot and one of his homesteads. He also has 
a homestead in the lowland and another in the highland where the wives of a married 
son reside. Ole Okuluo is known as a particularly successful land grabber in Loita.  
 
 
Map 9.4 Dispersing wives in the highland  
 
 
 
Ole Okuluo, ole Kosiom and ole Reson all belonged to the same age-group: the 
Ilkitoip age-set. This commonality seems to stand for a wider pattern as most of the men 
who had dispersed their wives belonged to this age-group. These men had reached an 
age where they had well-established families and had had time to build up a herd. The 
men were ‘ready’ for land adjudication. Most importantly, they belonged to the govern-
ing age-group (see Chapter 7) and, as such, would be in charge if land adjudication took 
place. This put them in a strong position because they could steer the process to their 
own advantage. 
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Tying stock-friendships 
For small herd owners, the situation is different and so are their possibilities and choic-
es. Like large herd owners, small herd owners are also trying to find ways to continue 
practising transhumant pastoralism. Ole Turuni lives in the middle zone and since his 
herd is small, it remained there during the dry seasons of 2007 and 2008 because it had 
rained sufficiently in the previous rainy season and there was enough grass. When the 
short rains had not come by early 2009, ole Turuni asked a clan-mate − ole Kosiom who 
was introduced above – for permission to take his herd to ole Kosiom’s homestead in 
the highlands for the duration of the dry spell. Ole Turuni’s herd needed water and pas-
ture resources to remain strong during the drought. Although locality boundaries lose 
their meaning at times of extreme drought and access rules are relaxed (as they are at 
the sectional level too), ole Turuni could not afford to wait given the risk of losing ani-
mals from his already small herd. Ole Kosiom accepted and, by doing so, sealed the 
beginnings of a relationship based on trust and mutual assistance in cattle management 
(Spencer 1988: 27) that is characterized by the asking and granting of favours and coun-
ter-favours. I call this relationship a ‘stock friendship’. 
Stock friendships are formed on the basis of an existing relationship. Ole Turuni and 
ole Kosiom, for example, belonged to the same clan and were also related to each other 
through a firestick relationship: ole Kosiom was a firestick elder to ole Turuni. Their 
acquaintance had grown out of ole Kosiom’s close friendship with ole Turuni’s de-
ceased father. 
Both large and small stockowners use stock friends to place their herds or parts of it 
in distant homesteads according to the needs of their livestock or the season of the year. 
This system may act as ‘life insurance in difficult times’ (Voshaar 1998: 71) and allows 
people to start anew when a disease affects their herd at home. Stock friendships can 
cross-cut sections. With access to the highland and the middle zone because he has 
homesteads there, ole Kosiom has a Purko stock friend in the lowland area of the Purko 
section where he keeps most of his goats and sheep on a permanent basis. Ole Kosiom 
is linked to the Purko through his Purko mother. Ole Keko has a stock friendship with a 
member of the Ilkunono blacksmith community in Leshuta who lives in the lowland 
area of the Purko. They know each other from the livestock-trading business and their 
stock friendship has been strengthened because they belong to the same age-group. 
Stock friendships can also go beyond cooperation in cattle management and during the 
prolonged dry season in 2008-2009, ole Keko took in two children from his stock 
friend’s family because there was insufficient milk to feed them at their own home. 
 Stock friendships are reciprocal relationships. Ole Kosiom’s underlying motive for 
giving in to ole Turuni’s request became clear when their combined herd was moved to 
ole Turuni’s homestead in the middle zone when it started to rain again in March 2009. 
Ole Kosiom, who has a homestead in the middle zone but in a different locality, had 
already expressed his wish to abandon this homestead (and with it the rights he had to 
use the resources of this particular locality) and have all his wives live in the highland 
area. But he could only allow this if he was assured of continued access to the middle 
zone in wet seasons when grass is plentiful there. The stock friendship with ole Turuni 
opened up possibilities for this. 
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Their stock friendship also created the possibility for ole Turuni to settle in the high-
land. By taking his animals to that particular locality in the highland and visiting them 
regularly, he initiated a first booking for future settlement. Both ole Turuni and ole 
Kosiom had been discussing ole Turuni’s chances of settling in ole Kosiom’s locality in 
the highland. Taking his cattle there was a first step, the next step would be taking his 
wife to ole Kosiom’s homestead. He could then call for a locality meeting and request 
that the locality elders give him his own place to live, for which he would need to mus-
ter enough support from other inhabitants in the locality first. Another option would be 
to convince ole Kosiom to give ole Turuni a piece of his own land. This would save him 
the uncertainty of going through a locality meeting.  
Ole Turuni does not intend to marry a second wife because, as a small herd owner, 
he cannot afford it but also because he attended (primary) school and considers polyga-
my to be an outdated practice. To maintain a claim in the middle zone where his current 
homestead is located, he is discussing with his brother, with whom he shares the home-
stead, about the possibility of splitting up so that one would remain in their current 
homestead in the middle zone and the other would move to the highland. His brother is 
also educated and married, and also has no wish to marry a second wife. Their bond as 
full brothers, the fact that they belong to the same age-group and the small size of their 
combined herds guarantee them both future pastoral access to each other’s locality.  
Ole Turuni’s growing interest in settling in the highland came from the need to se-
cure dry-season grazing at a time when rumours of imminent land adjudication and de-
marcation were spreading in Loita. These created uncertainty about the future and ole 
Turuni feared that his stock friendship with ole Kosiom would ultimately come under 
pressure and might not be enough to secure access to the highland in times of need. A 
permanent settlement in the highland offered more security. Like the large herd owners 
who are spreading claims across diverse ecological zones by dispersing their wives in 
anticipation of land demarcation, so too ole Turuni was trying to stake claims. He did 
this, firstly, by forming a stock friendship to gain access to a new area − the highland in 
this case – and, secondly, by mobilizing his brother (or more precisely his brother’s 
wife) to maintain valid access to his current home in the middle zone. Investing in so-
cial relations is an important strategy to gain or maintain access to land (Berry 1989, 
1993; Ribot & Peluso 2003: 172). 
 
The emergence of the field-cum-olokeri 
Cultivation is practised by owners of large and small herds alike but my material sug-
gests that small herd owners put more effort into it and have higher expectations than 
large herd owners do. The fact that small herd owners have more to lose during periods 
of disease and dry spells certainly plays a role. In times of stress, large herd owners 
have greater chances of keeping sufficient animals, acquiring foodstuffs and rebuilding 
their herds afterwards. For small herd owners, the consequences of disease and drought 
can be devastating. Ole Keko experienced such an adverse situation in 1992 when he 
was still unmarried and only one cow was left in his father’s herd to provide for the en-
tire family consisting of ole Keko, his parents and his six siblings. Their field was small 
and food was a problem. It is no surprise then that, afterwards, ole Keko focused on 
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cultivation and worked hard to expand his field every year. In good years, he was even 
able to make a profit by selling his maize surplus. His contrasting experience of slow 
and uncertain progress in increasing the herd size and his relative success in cultivation 
convinced ole Keko of the value of expanding the land he cultivated. His actions and the 
problems he faced as a result underscore this conviction. 
Ole Keko unscrupulously doubled his field in early 2007 by clearing bush and put-
ting up a perimeter boundary fence. He became involved in a heated argument with an 
uncle who accused him of ‘grabbing land’ and ‘suffocating’ the locality.46 The discus-
sion escalated and reached a point where they actually started fighting and a locality 
meeting was called to resolve the matter. It was decided that ole Keko could keep the 
land that he had demarcated but because he had committed a serious cultural offence by 
fighting with somebody from an older age-group, who was not only a clansman but was 
also categorically his father, he had to surrender six animals to ‘restore’ the various cul-
tural rules that he had broken. This was an enormous sacrifice on ole Keko’s part as he 
had painstakingly tried to expand his herd over the years.47 Extending his field had cost 
him dear but ole Keko still insisted that it was all worth it because ‘over time your herd 
can grow but not so your land’.48 Ole Keko’s demarcated field is the largest one I came 
across in Loita.49 
Ole Keko’s search for new ways of improving his livelihood makes him one of the 
trendsetters in Loita of what is called the ‘field-cum-olokeri’ here. An olokeri (pl. ilook-
eri) is a piece of land within a locality that is set aside as dry-season grazing. When the 
olokeri is closed in the rainy season, only the young, sick and draught animals can go in. 
Grazing there for other livestock is forbidden. An olokeri is officially opened during a 
locality meeting when the rest of the grazing areas of the locality have no grass left, 
usually towards the end of the dry season. Only the herds of resident families are al-
lowed to graze their animals in the common olokeri. Violation of olokeri rules used to 
be severely punished by the locality and the system was quite well respected until about 
a decade ago. People from outside the locality and from within have been increasingly 
trespassing and making unlawful use of such areas. As a result, conflicts have been on 
the rise, especially in localities in the populated middle zone. As olokeri rules are in-
creasingly being violated more openly, locality elders have been unable or unwilling to 
fine trespassers. The system has been collapsing gradually as the olokeri has increasing-
ly been encroached on by new homesteads, livestock and fields. Beneath this process of 
collapse lie the changes discussed earlier, namely population growth, the adoption of 
cultivation and the break-up and spread of homesteads across the locality. In ole Keko’s 
                                                 
46  Interview ST: 4/10/08. 
47  Ole Keko was fined two heifers by his clan; one for fighting with a clan-mate, and another one for 
fighting with a clan-mate who was also his ‘father’. Breaking somebody’s bone during a fight is 
traditionally levied with a fine and because ole Keko broke his uncle’s finger during the skirmish, he 
had to give him a heifer. Finally, a ceremony was held to restore peace (osotua) between the two 
relatives. Ole Keko, as the junior of the two, was expected to present his uncle with gifts in order to 
receive his blessing. These consisted of a heifer, blankets and beer. To afford the blankets and beer, ole 
Keko had to sell a calf, and a second calf was also sold to pay his uncle’s transport costs as he was too 
weak to come to the ceremony on foot.  
48  Interview ST: 26/5/08. 
49  Of about 5 acres. 
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locality, for instance, somebody built a new homestead next to the olokeri, ignoring 
complaints by fellow locality members and spoiling part of the olokeri with the daily 
movement of his herd. The expansion of settlements in the neighbouring locality to-
wards the edge of the olokeri makes boundary control even more problematic. 
The consequences for small herd owners are usually worse than for large herd own-
ers who tend to have second homesteads in the highland where they can send their herds 
when the grass in the olokeri is finished. The predicament of the small herd owners is 
illustrated by this example: one of the largest herd owners of a locality in the middle 
zone, whose herd is at least ten times larger than the herds of the small herd owners, 
entered the closed olokeri with his whole herd unannounced. By the time the other lo-
cality residents had realized this infraction, his herd had practically finished the grass so 
they all rushed to the olokeri so their herds could use the remaining grass before it was 
finished. The large herd owner later moved his herd to one of his other homesteads, 
unperturbed by the problems he had created for the small herd owners who had no ac-
cess to second homesteads elsewhere. The emergence of the field-cum-olokeri is an 
innovative response by small herd owners to prevent this sort of problem in the future.   
 
 
Photo 9.3  A field-cum-olokeri in the middle zone (February 2009) 
 
© Angela Kronenburg García 
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Ole Keko shares a homestead with an age-mate who, as a former livestock trader, 
had travelled far beyond Loita. Having encountered conflicts within their locality over 
the common olokeri, the age-mate introduced the field-cum-olokeri in their locality, 
something he had seen on his travels. Ole Keko soon copied him and as this happened 
during my fieldwork in Loita, I was able to follow the process closely. The land that ole 
Keko had officially demarcated as his field, and for which he was fined heavily as we 
saw earlier, was in fact only partly ploughed. On the other part, which was much larger 
than the ploughed area, he let the grass grow, creating in effect his own olokeri for his 
own exclusive use. This move did not go unopposed by his neighbours and resulted in a 
new series of locality meetings. Neighbours felt misled by ole Keko. Had the locality 
members known his intention was to make his own individual olokeri, which was a new 
idea for many, they would have never agreed to his demarcation of the land. But during 
the meetings, ole Keko stood firmly by his argument that he had demarcated the land to 
make a field but that he had not been able to plough the whole area yet. This was his 
public stance. In private, he confided to me that the individual olokeri had been his plan 
all along but he was well aware of the fact that if he had acknowledged this in public, he 
would never have won the case. And indeed, in the next ploughing season, he symboli-
cally ploughed an extra piece and left enough space to grow grass again. 
Demarcating land as an individual olokeri is not (yet) a socially acknowledged prac-
tice, so one way to do so is to demarcate a large piece of land, to claim it is for making a 
field and then simply use it as a field-cum-olokeri until having an individual olokeri 
becomes accepted practice. In the eighteen months that I was in Loita, I saw this new 
practice spreading from locality to locality. The land demarcated for this purpose be-
came bigger, pushing the limits of the accepted size of the ‘fields’. And as more people 
were making a field-cum-olokeri, or planned to do so, opposition in meetings disap-
peared because it was becoming a question of going with the flow or losing out. 
As in the case of the large herd owners, an age-group element was at play as well in 
the strategies of small herd owners. Ole Turuni and ole Keko belonged to age-groups 
that had already graduated from warriorhood but had not yet reached the full elderhood 
of the governing age-group: the Iromboi and Ilbuluka circumcision-groups respectively. 
These young men had recently married and were in the process of building their home-
steads, expanding their herds and clearing their fields. It is men from this age-group, in 
need of land to settle into family life, that appeared to constitute the majority of the 
grabbers and bookers during my fieldwork period. Almost all the men involved in the 
rush for land described in the introduction to this chapter − some recently married, oth-
ers hoping to get married soon − belonged to the Ilbuluka and Iromboi circumcision-
groups. For them, it would be better if land adjudication stalled until they had managed 
to secure access to land as recognized individual property.  
Grounding claims 
The strategies of appropriation discussed in the former section are illustrative of the 
resourcefulness of both large and small herd owners. Strategies adopted the form of 
visible landmarks that conveyed socially understood individual property claims over a 
piece of land. I have called the practice of inscribing and altering the landscape with 
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these visible markers as ‘grounding claims’ (see Chapter 2). Loita Maasai ground 
claims in various ways but it always starts with an activity that people in Loita aptly call 
‘booking land’.  
 
Booking land 
This chapter started with a case of booking. People had booked land by laying out cut 
branches on the ground in more or less straight lines to draw the boundaries of the piece 
of land that they had demarcated for themselves. Demarcating land for cultivation gen-
erally follows the same procedure: one first starts by demarcating and fencing the pe-
rimeter boundary with cut branches before proceeding to clear, plough and sow the 
land. Any intention to build a new homestead is communicated by erecting a cattle en-
closure. Taking one’s herd to a stock friend can also be a form of booking land for fu-
ture settlement, with the presence of the herd functioning as a marker, albeit a mobile 
one. Booking land is like making reservations for its future use. Plans to use the land in 
the future need to be communicated to others so that nobody interferes. This is where 
visible markers come into play (the cut branches that denote a boundary for example) as 
they tell others that the land has already been booked by someone for a particular use. 
At this stage, grounded claims are still tenuous and can be reversed, even if the claimant 
simply changes his mind and time erases the landmarks. To strengthen a claim, more 
permanent markers are needed. 
 
Beacons of permanency 
Permanent settlement is a must for a herd owner who wants a socially recognized claim 
to land. When a herd and their herders leave an area that they have used temporarily as a 
cattle camp, the herd owner loses his claim to the land he used, even if he stayed there 
for weeks or months. The only land that he might claim if he comes back is that where 
the remains of the constructed structures (olmuaate) stand, like the cattle enclosure and 
any adjacent shelters but not the land beyond. This means, in theory, that if another herd 
owner wants to settle in the area of a deserted cattle camp, no matter how many consec-
utive years that specific area has been used seasonally by another herd owner, the new-
comer has the right to do so as long as he leaves the olmuaate intact, even if he com-
pletely surrounds it with for example a field, houses and a cattle enclosure. A claim to 
olmuaate is thus practically useless without a claim to the surrounding land that is nec-
essary for (agro-)pastoral use. To have the right to land for agro-pastoral use, a herd 
owner needs to live there permanently.  
The key factor that determines the difference between a temporary homestead (ronjo) 
and a permanent one (emparnat) is the presence of a wife who has her own house. 
Women are the owners and managers of their houses (Talle 1987; Voshaar 1998: 78). It 
is this unit of wife and house that stands for permanency. Thus, a herd owner needs to 
bring in a wife who then builds her own house and comes to live permanently at that 
homestead. The house she builds should be her principal residence because a wife may, 
from time to time, join a temporary cattle camp but then she will build a smaller tempo-
rary house and her main house at the permanent homestead will remain locked until she 
returns. In the case of a permanent move, the wife’s house at the old homestead will be 
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burnt down. Having a wife residing at a homestead gives settlement there a substantial 
degree of permanency because she will be there during the wet and dry seasons. Even if 
the herd owner migrates with his animals, there will still be a visible presence and con-
tinuous use of the land. These are important justifications for a claim to land. Wives 
have, therefore, become important assets in claiming land, as we saw in the strategies of 
appropriation discussed in the previous section, and large herd owners with several 
wives have had a head start in the rush to book and grab land.  
In addition to having a wife residing at a homestead, there are other factors that add 
muscle to a claim to land. One is the material with which the wife’s house is built. Ole 
Reson’s wife in the lowland lives in a traditional Maasai house made out of branches 
and plastered with a mixture of soil and cow dung that she built herself. His wives in the 
highland and in the middle zone, on the other hand, live in more durable corrugated-iron 
and timber-roofed houses constructed by hired labourers that replaced their traditionally 
built Maasai houses. Ole Reson plans to build a cement-walled and corrugated-iron-
roofed house for his wife in the middle zone. The investments made in the houses of his 
wives in the highland and the middle zone reflect ole Reson’s intention to reside perma-
nently there. And indeed, the reason why he had not replaced his wife’s house in the 
lowland with a new-style house was because he was still unsure about staying there in 
the long term. This uncertainly is because of the unreliable water supply at the borehole 
due to a defective machine that, when it breaks down, makes life in the lowland impos-
sible for both animals and people in the dry season.  
By replacing traditional Maasai houses, which were suitable for a mobile livelihood, 
with corrugated-iron-roofed houses and cement or stone houses, Loita Maasai are pro-
gressively grounding their homesteads in specific places in accordance with their more 
sedentary lifestyle. A house with cement or stone walls is the ultimate sign of a herd 
owner’s plan to stay there forever.50 This change in house style is widespread in Loita 
and reflects a process of sedentarization that is closely related to the adoption of agricul-
ture (Maundu et al. 2001: 8-9, 18-19, 27). Ole Reson has fields in the highland and in 
the middle zone, which are also the places where his wives have new-style houses. Cul-
tivating land is another very visible way of grounding a homestead in a locality. Having 
a field in the homestead is thus another beacon of permanency that, like the construction 
of a new-style house, attests to the work and money invested and signals one’s reluc-
tance to move. In the process of grounding a homestead by building a new-style house 
and clearing a field, one is in fact simultaneously grounding a claim to a specific place 
that is visually very powerful. In other words, the more grounded a homestead is, the 
more permanent it is and the stronger a herd owner’s claim is to the land he has occu-
pied and is using.  
In summary, the presence of a wife with a (durable) house and a field that is being 
worked are visible markers of permanent settlement. They embody a process of ground-
ing markers in the landscape whose visibility is instrumental in claims of occupancy and 
                                                 
50  Moving a house with a corrugated-iron roof is possible because the materials that were bought (like 
timbers and the corrugated-iron sheets) can be dismantled and reused, but with a cement or stone 
house, one loses any investments made.  
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use of the land. These are the claims that will be used to achieve legal ownership when 
formal land demarcation and adjudication takes off. 
 
Claiming individual property in land 
The rights that a herd owner derives from permanent residency in a particular locality 
involve rights of use in areas that are used by all the inhabitants of a locality, such as 
watering places and grazing areas, including the common olokeri. Apart from these 
jointly used areas, there are also water resources like hand-dug wells (Ngece et al. 2007: 
173) and tracts of land within the locality that a herd owner refers to as ‘mine’ (enaai),51 
implying his exclusive right to its use. The size of the plot of land that can be claimed as 
individual property depends on its purported use. This is important because land cannot 
be claimed or demarcated as one’s own without good reason. Social convention has it 
that only land that serves a particular livelihood purpose can be appropriated. Land with 
buildings like houses, animal enclosures and a maize store can be claimed as a home-
stead (enkang). And the area next to the homestead where animals gather when moving 
in or out of their enclosures, where the saltlick trough is and where young and sick ani-
mals stay during the day, can be claimed as auluo as can any land under cultivation such 
as a field (enkurma or olchamba, derived from the Swahili word shamba).52 The amount 
of land that can be claimed as a homestead and auluo depends on the size of the resident 
family and the number of animals owned. Social norms state that the land should be 
enough to serve its purpose, i.e. to accommodate the number of houses required and the 
size of the herd. The criteria regarding the size of the field, on the other hand, are un-
clear but the socially accepted limits are usually attained by trial and error, i.e. until a 
new clearing or extension meets a counter-claim by another herd owner or when the 
locality complains. For example, when ole Turuni extended his field in 2007, his neigh-
bour complained that he was encroaching on his auluo. In another case, the whole local-
ity turned against a man who had cleared a field in what the rest considered was the 
common olokeri. Issues like these are resolved at meetings open to all circumcised men 
in a locality.  
  
Grabbing land: manipulating land-based categories 
In Loita, claims to land as being ‘mine’ are endowed with social meaning when this is 
made in the language of agro-pastoralism. Every herd owner has a right to claim a 
homestead, an auluo and a field. These are acceptable reasons for appropriating land. 
Land categories are glued to their agro-pastoral use. However, in view of a perceived 
decreasing land base and imminent formal land demarcation, herd owners have been 
seeking ways to manipulate these categories in order to grab as much land as possible. 
One way is by altering the content of an existing category to suit one’s personal needs. 
This is clear in the category of olokeri, which is undergoing a process of individualiza-
tion. The individual olokeri is, however, still highly contested and people with an indi-
                                                 
51  Interview K: 20/3/08. 
52  Voshaar (1998: 112) referred to the practice of referring to land used as one’s property, as something 
new in 1998.  
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vidual olokeri face subtle and repeated opposition in the form of the removal of bounda-
ry markers and trespassers during the herd owner’s absence. 
In other cases, herd owners test the limits of these land categories by appropriating 
more and more land in their name. For example, the word olale refers to the compart-
ments inside a house for keeping calves (olale loo lasho) and kids and lambs (olale loo 
lkuoo) at night. If space inside the house is limited, a small enclosure outside the house 
but within the homestead functions as an olale. Ole Kipinat fenced a small area at some 
distance from his homestead at a place where, due to a decision taken at an earlier local-
ity meeting, he had been forbidden to clear a field. This time he claimed it was his olale. 
This was fiercely contested by the locality who disputed his interpretation of olale and 
saw it as an alternative tactic to appropriate the land anyway. Due to a number of cir-
cumstances that are beyond the scope of this chapter, ole Kipinat eventually won his 
case and has since been extending his so-called olale over the years, metre by metre, 
and has now even cultivated a piece of it. What ole Kipinat did was to take out the cate-
gory of olale from the realm of the homestead and use it to appropriate land outside the 
homestead where he had not managed to do so previously by using the category of 
‘field’.53 The same tactic is used when a demarcated piece of land is claimed as a field 
when in reality it is meant to create an individual olokeri in what I have called the field-
cum-olokeri strategy. Even if a herd owner stretches the meaning of such categories or 
alters its content, the aim is, either way, to grab as much land as possible.  
Conclusion: land tenure transformations 
This chapter has investigated the indirect effects of the state-led land adjudication pro-
gramme in Loita by showing that, although the programme has not been implemented, it 
has set in motion a growing conviction that sooner or later land adjudication and demar-
cation will happen. Based on what has taken place elsewhere, the expectations of how 
land adjudication will proceed articulated with other processes affecting land access and 
control, such as the gradual decrease in Loita territory and land use changes triggered by 
population growth and the loss of cattle to disease and drought. These land-related 
changes are interlinked with wider-ranging constraints and opportunities associated with 
a gradual integration in state structures and a globalizing world that has seen the intro-
duction and growing relevance of education, shops, money as well as the market econ-
omy (as is evident from the number of livestock traders and the emergence of the wheat 
elite) and development projects. All these changes have affected the decision-making 
and livelihood strategies of Loita families and have resulted in Loita gradually shifting 
from being a pastoral area to one featuring agro-pastoralism and a more sedentary way 
of life. Along the way, a process of land appropriation evolved that culminated in the 
land rush described in the introduction to this chapter. 
Land appropriation in the highlands and the lowlands was the first stage in a series of 
land tenure transformations. It saw the tenure rules of the locality being applied to areas 
that had previously been used for open-access grazing only (ronjo), as people started to 
                                                 
53  Galaty (1992: 38 n. 3) mentions the same strategy among the Keekonyokie Maasai but with the land-
based category of olokeri that refers to what in Loita is called auluo: ‘The notion of “olokeri” or 
“olopololi” has been extended, if not distorted, by some in order to claim areas of individuated land’.    
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settle there permanently. Since about 1980, settled localities have been expanding from 
the middle zone to the lowland and highland areas of Loita and almost all of Loita terri-
tory is now organized into localities. This has pushed back the areas open for ronjo to 
the Naimina Enkiyio Forest and to a few places in the contested Loita borderlands. 
Where the lowlands and the highlands had previously been open to all for seasonal pas-
toral use, locality tenure rules that discriminate between residents and non-residents 
now apply and regulate access to any pastoral resources. The gradual spread of locality 
tenure over Loita territory soon overlapped with a second tenure transformation that 
mimicked the first, but on a smaller scale. Now, areas used collectively by the locality 
residents for grazing their livestock have started to be claimed as individual property by 
family heads. Over the last fifteen years, this development followed the break-up of the 
large homesteads typical of the past and saw locality residents slowly clearing fields and 
building smaller (individual) homesteads in all corners of the locality. The breakdown 
of the olokeri system, the dry-season grazing area reserved for the locality’s herds, is 
perhaps the latest tenure transformation taking place in Loita. Though hotly contested 
because it was still so recent during my fieldwork period, the common olokeri was 
clearly under pressure from a system of individual ilookeri in each homestead. 
The three land tenure transformations highlighted here have resulted in areas that 
were formerly jointly used undergoing a process of enclosure, individualization and 
exclusion: ronjo areas were used in common by all Loita before land started to be 
claimed by emerging localities to the exclusion of non-residents. Then the areas that 
were used collectively in the locality started to be claimed by individual locality resi-
dents as their own homesteads. Finally, the system of the common olokeri seems to be 
collapsing as individuals start demarcating ilookeri for their own use. 
This chapter has described strategies of land appropriation by large and small herd 
owners that reflect their need to secure land for livelihood activities. These strategies 
highlight a general belief in the inevitability of land adjudication but also show a desire 
to continue practising (transhumant) pastoralism despite decreasing land availability and 
a shift towards a mixed agro-pastoral livelihood. That people are striving to continue 
with pastoralism is particularly evident in the first strategy discussed and illustrated by 
the case of ole Reson, who has moved his wives to live in different ecological zones. 
Ole Reson was not the only family head who has made a claim for individual property 
in the highland, in the middle zone and in the lowland. He belongs to a privileged group 
of men who, though not necessarily well educated, were considered to be the wealthiest 
among the Loita because of their large herds. In general, they also belonged to the gov-
erning age-group. Wealth in cattle makes it possible to marry and maintain several 
wives, something small herd owners cannot afford. In the context of perceived immi-
nent land adjudication, wives are important in gaining access to places as beacons of 
permanency. Claims of permanent settlement, in turn, are expected to be key in claim-
ing individual ownership and in obtaining title deeds when land adjudication takes off. 
Having homesteads in different localities and ecological zones (and thus with access to 
varied pastoral resources) makes it possible for men like ole Reson to continue prac-
tising transhumant pastoralism. Most of the homesteads are in different (administrative) 
locations as well and this will be convenient too. So, if all goes according to plan and 
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the leaders of their age-group can favourably steer the transformation of locations into 
group ranches, they will be able to continue with transhumant pastoralism after land 
adjudication. Their wealth in cattle may translate into wealth in land. Large herd owners 
with a dispersed family and who belong to the governing age-group are set to become 
the winners of state-sanctioned land demarcation, adjudication and subdivision. 
The role of the governing age-group points to an important temporal aspect and age-
group-related dimension in the field of land appropriation. Men like ole Reson who be-
long to the governing age-group are already settled and their claims to land have been 
consolidated. It is in their interest to jumpstart official land adjudication very soon. 
Younger age-groups that are still settling and building up their herds or are about to do 
so would rather wait until they have booked and grabbed land. For the older generation, 
this would mean that land would need to be divided and shared among even more peo-
ple and it is therefore generally men from the governing age-group, who are already 
settled and with political power, that are currently agitating for the formalization of 
ownership claims. This is, in fact, a generational conflict and it could be said that each 
age-group has its own political agenda as to when official land adjudication and demar-
cation should start.   
The strategies of appropriation discussed in this chapter are characterized by a prac-
tice that I have called grounding claims, i.e. inscribing and altering the landscape with 
visible markers that communicate individual ownership by the family head (Ingold 
1986; Rose 1994). Appropriation simultaneously means dispossession because it im-
plies that others lose access (Li 2007a: 19-20). By inscribing the landscape with mark-
ers of individual ownership, a herd owner simultaneously claims the ability or power to 
control access and denies others the opportunity to use the land (Ribot & Peluso 2003: 
154). Grounded claims therefore reflect unequal power relations (Bryant 1998: 86) be-
tween large and small herd owners and between older and younger age-groups, as was 
seen above. Claiming is thoroughly political and the practice of booking and grabbing 
land expresses power relations and struggles as well. 
Visible markers range from a line of cut branches on the ground to a fully developed 
homestead with a wife, a fenced field and a new-style house. The exercise of marking 
land described in this chapter parallels some of the examples discussed in Chapter 5 on 
territorializing development. We saw there how permanent buildings (the Leshuta 
school, the Ilkerin Project) were erected at strategic places along the Loita-Purko 
boundary to function as Loita ‘flag posts’ and halt Purko encroachment in the area. 
These grounded claims were made at the level of section for the benefit of the Loita 
Maasai and to the exclusion of the Purko. They are about territorial demarcation or terri-
toriality (Sikor & Lund 2009: 13-14; Ingold 1986) and convey the collective appropria-
tion of land.    
Let us return to the grounded claims that convey individual property that were dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter. If grounded claims go unquestioned by others, they may 
be considered socially accepted and legitimized claims. Claims are consolidated and the 
process of appropriation ends here: the family will use their visible markers of perma-
nency and the fact that nobody lodged an objection to validate and legitimize their ‘cus-
tomary’ ownership. Their right to a title deed is thus assured when land adjudication 
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occurs. But when grounded claims are contested and challenged, for example by a 
neighbour who claims the same piece of land or by the locality that insists that the land 
is for collective use, the process of appropriation enters another domain: it is then in the 
arena of the land dispute meeting and will be mediated by locality leaders according to 
Loita Maasai law. The practice of ‘grounding claims’ is replaced by the practice of 
‘talking claims’. The next chapter examines the process of land appropriation when 
people talk claims in a locality meeting and analyses a dispute between two neighbours 
who have claimed the same piece of land.  
Epilogue 
Chapter 9 described a period in Loita (2007-2008) when strategies of land appropriation 
were in full swing and individual property had not yet been formalized according to 
state law. It was only after I completed my long-term fieldwork in Loita that the first 
boundaries were surveyed to start the state-sanctioned process of land adjudication and 
demarcation. In mid-2009, the Loita found out that the Purko from Naikara Location on 
the northwestern side of Loita had formalized the contested Loita-Purko boundary with-
out consulting them. In the process, they had grabbed land that the Loita considered was 
theirs near an area called Leshuta. The Loita protested and a series of meetings fol-
lowed. Eventually the boundary was moved to the satisfaction of the Loita. Now it and 
the rest of the Loita-Purko boundary on the western side of Loita appear to have been 
surveyed by official land adjudication officers, marked using GPS and beaconed. The 
Leshuta land conflict forced Loita leaders to pursue land adjudication more seriously 
and they actively approached reluctant state authorities to initiate the process in Loita. 
To have Loita declared an ‘adjudication section’, as was legally required, it was neces-
sary to formalize the internal Loita boundaries of the five administrative locations first 
as these would serve as the boundaries for the still-to-be subdivided group ranches. Un-
certainty surrounding the implications of the 2010 Constitution regarding Trust Lands, 
which have been renamed ‘Community Lands’, has convinced many of the urgent need 
to start the adjudication process. Frustrated by slow state bureaucracy, Loita leaders 
imposed the payment of a compulsory Loita-wide contribution to cover the services of 
an official boundary surveyor. By the end of 2010, the Ilkerin Location boundaries were 
beaconed and the surveyor had proceeded to survey the Morijo Location boundaries, 
after which more locations would follow. But the Inkidongi (living in Morijo and Enta-
sekera Locations) insisted that they wanted their own separate area. The process of for-
mal adjudication and demarcation in Morijo Location (and the rest of Loita) stalled after 
a number of cases were filed. Court proceedings are still ongoing. 
  
10 
Talking claims and governing  
appropriation in a locality meeting 
Entering the arena of the land dispute meeting  
When a person objects to the grounded claims of another person from the same locality 
and the two fail to solve the issue among themselves, then a land dispute meeting at the 
level of the locality is convened to resolve the problem. As noted in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis, meetings of this kind were rampant in Loita during my fieldwork 
period. They were a new phenomenon that started around the turn of the 21st century, 
being held occasionally at first but increasing steadily in frequency until the last couple 
of years when they became very common. Land dispute meetings are a by-product of 
the processes of change analysed in the previous chapter.  
Land dispute meetings at the level of the locality are open to all circumcised men in 
the locality: no women, children or people from other localities may attend. The exclu-
sion of women from these meetings is because issues of land appropriation are seen as 
falling under the responsibility of the family head, as was seen in the previous chapter.1 
As with other types of meetings where women are excluded, the outcome may have a 
gendered effect and significantly affect the lives of women and children.2 Typically held 
in the shade of a tree or, in the absence of trees, next to a group of bushes or a termite 
hill,3 locality meetings about land disputes are usually well attended.4 This is not only 
because they deal with matters that are topical, controversial and the subject of real con-
                                                 
1  Although rare, exceptions do occur. Only once did I observe women at a land dispute meeting. It 
seems that they were tolerated because they were educated and had good jobs. Although listening 
attentively to the proceedings, they did not speak and remained seated at the farthest end of the group. 
2  Having to pay a fine, for example, may mean that no money is left to pay school fees.     
3  Tree (olchani, pl. ilkeek) or termite hill (olkiu, pl. ilkiun) are alternative names for ‘meeting’ 
(enkiguana, pl. inkiguanat). Each locality has at least one site marked by either a tree, a bush or a 
termite hill for holding meetings. 
4  Locality meetings may be called for reasons other than land disputes, for example to discuss the 
opening or closing of the common olokeri. Dispute meetings too constitute a broader category and are 
not exclusively tied to land tenure issues. For example, a fight between two age-mates is best solved 
during an age-group meeting and mediated by the age-group chief, and one between fellow clan- 
mates at a clan meeting mediated by the clan chief. 
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cern, but because the outcome may affect everyone. There is a general emphasis on con-
formity and achieving consensus in debate in Maasai meetings (Waller 1978: 181-182). 
Everybody who attends is allowed to speak and will be listened to. Typically, the 
speaker stands facing the rest of the group, who are seated on the ground. Standing still 
with a walking stick or knob-stick in his hand or walking up and down, the speaker de-
livers his speech without being interrupted. After he has finished, the next speaker 
stands up to speak. Quarrels may flare up when two or more men want to speak at the 
same time and the issue is resolved only when the stronger of the two prevails or others 
intervene. In the end, all who want to speak usually get the opportunity to do so but 
meetings can, consequently, be very long.  
There is generally one man or at times two who assume the role of mediator. No one 
person is approached to mediate a dispute. Only those with known talents in arbitration 
and resolving disputes in a fair and impartial manner but who are also responsive to the 
general mood of the meeting are accepted as mediators.5 They are typically chosen from 
the pool of elders who are considered as the locality leaders. They will be among the 
most respected and are often wealthy and successful. The positions of mediator and lo-
cality leader are mutually constitutive and being asked to mediate a dispute recognizes 
one’s position as locality leader. However, this position may be strengthened or weak-
ened depending on one’s performance as mediator and this will only become clear af-
terwards if one is asked to mediate again when another dispute arises. Unlike the leader-
ship positions discussed so far (the age-group chief, the ritual age-group leaders, the 
clan chief, the councillor, the PA chief, the chief laibon, the development leader), the 
position of locality leader is less formal. Locality leaders are not formally chosen and 
they are not installed during public events (like a ceremony) and are less permanent as 
they depend on the recognition of the wider community and the person’s performance 
as mediator in dispute meetings.  
Locality leaders/mediators typically belong (though not always) to the governing 
age-group and its elders are generally the most active in locality meetings. So even 
though all circumcised men in a locality can speak in a very democratic and egalitarian 
manner, the stage is typically dominated by elders from the governing age-group, and 
the locality leaders in particular.  
In addition to the disputants and the mediator, there are also the ‘supporters’. These 
men have obviously taken sides beforehand and speak on behalf of the disputant they 
support – often a relative or a close age-mate. The mediator should refrain from taking 
sides, although he may ultimately rule in favour of one of the contestants. 
Meetings follow a clear protocol. They open with blessings that are given by the 
most senior man present. Standing in front of the gathering, he calls out a series of sen-
tences, each of which is followed by a quiet ‘Naai’ (O God) in unison by those assem-
bled. For example: ‘Let the rising sun shine on us his blessed light’ Naai; ‘For the cattle 
and for the people’ Naai;6 or ‘May the clouds with water rain on us’ Naai. Another per-
                                                 
5  Mediators are generally approached by one of the parties involved in the dispute.  
6  The complete blessing was: ‘Let the rising sun shine on us his blessed light. Naai. For the cattle and 
for the people. Naai. And as you go to set, don’t take anybody with you. Naai. For those who are 
living here and those who have come, may you all be blessed. Naai. May the God of the country love 
us. Naai. Cattle and people. Naai. May the green and the dry grass be our blessing. Naai. As our cattle 
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son may follow with more blessings but usually no more than three stand up to offer 
blessings. These are followed by ‘eating news’, i.e. exchanging information, so that 
those present are up to date on any new events.7 Several people may stand up, one after 
another, to give a briefing about the latest happenings in the locality or the places they 
have been to recently. This may be about the presence or lack of rain, the state of the 
grass, animals that have been lost or stolen, the state of the fields, disputes and meetings 
that have taken place, and illnesses or deaths. The discussion and debate regarding the 
land dispute can then finally start. First, the disputants are given the chance to tell their 
side of the story and their speeches are followed by those of any witnesses before the 
floor is opened up and supporters and others can voice their opinions. The claimants’ 
arguments are weighted in view of social norms, past experiences but also any new real-
ities. Every now and then, the mediating leader interrupts with a specific question or 
asks for clarification. He also steps in if the discussion drifts away from the main topic, 
if people simply repeat arguments or the debate seems to be leading nowhere. Finally, 
after extensive debate and deliberation, it is the mediator’s task to wrap up the meeting. 
He will do this by giving his opinion, which reflects the general consensus, and will 
ultimately decide on the issue at hand. 
In their role as mediators, locality leaders take the lead and preside over land dispute 
meetings. They have the last word and offer their verdict after hearing all the arguments 
of those present. In so doing, they bring closure to the process of appropriation by ac-
cepting, rejecting or adjusting grounded claims to land as individual property. Measures 
to enforce a decision, if required, are taken immediately after the meeting is over. For 
example, if someone’s field extension is rejected, then the extension is undone immedi-
ately by removing the fence that has marked the extension. Locality leaders are like 
judges: they justify their decisions with reasoned arguments and with reference to rules 
that pertain to Loita Maasai law. Loita law is adaptive and flexible, and adopts new 
practices and conditions as old rules become infused with new meaning or as locality 
leaders create, dismiss or modify rules (see Chapter 2). By sanctioning claims to land 
and deciding what is legally acceptable, i.e. according to Loita law, as individual prop-
erty and what is not, locality leaders not only mediate a conflict between two individu-
als but also determine the rules of the game in the current land rush. In other words, 
they are governing the process of land appropriation in Loita. The locality leader as the 
                                                 
go to graze, may the sun protect them. Naai. Same to the coldness. Naai. May they see the entrances 
from far. Naai. Same to the river crossings. Naai. Let them follow the ones who are looking after 
them. Naai. Let them not turn their neck. Naai. We tell their enemies to be blind. Naai. Those who use 
the robes and the teeth, let them be blind. Naai. May they be blind and have torn robes. Naai. Be 
blessed. Naai’. This is a free translation of a blessing at a meeting between the Iromboi circumcision-
group and the Ilkitoip age-set in preparation of the ‘manyata of the feathered headdress’ in 
Olentarakuai on 20 February 2008. 
7  Apart from some hilltops and along the border with Tanzania, Loita had no mobile-phone network 
coverage during my fieldwork period. There was a radio service, installed by the Ilkerin Project, that 
facilitated communication between the main centres in Loita. But apart from this, ‘eating news’ was 
the most effective means of circulating information. When you meet someone on your way from one 
place to another, social etiquette dictates an extended and ritualized form of greeting where, after 
giving news about the homestead (the cattle and the family), one also gives the latest news of the 
place one is coming from. The other person will then follow with his/her account.  
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mediator between two parties and the locality leader as the governor of land issues re-
veal the two faces of leadership in Loita.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, two dynamics that pertain to appropriation are simultane-
ously hosted during land dispute meetings. On the one hand, in an attempt to have one’s 
grounded claims legally recognized, claims are ‘talked’. In this sense, the land dispute 
meeting forms an arena where land grabbers and land bookers can extend the practice of 
land appropriation. On the other hand, land dispute meetings are occasions when locali-
ty leaders assert their authority as governors and address the land rush and guide the 
process of land appropriation. In the first, the land dispute meeting reflects a process of 
negotiation over concrete property claims and, in the second, negotiations focus on cat-
egorical property and rules (F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006). The co-existence of 
these two dynamics in land dispute meetings and their interplay are at the heart of this 
chapter. 
Land dispute meetings can be held at the level of locality (when the disputants be-
long to the same locality); at the level of section (when the disputants belong to differ-
ent localities but to the same section) or at the level of the Maasai (if the disputants be-
long to different Maasai sections). This chapter presents the case of a land dispute meet-
ing that was held at locality level. It took place in a locality called Olorien in the middle 
zone,8 under a tree not far from the disputed site on 22 October 2008.9 The meeting was 
called to solve a boundary dispute between two neighbours called Shina ole Mashati 
and Kironkosi ole Sulul. This case is a typical example of a land dispute where the 
grounded claims of one person are challenged by another. The interplay between talking 
claims and governing appropriation is clearly seen and, by exploring the historical 
background of the dispute, some of the patterns and processes described in Chapter 9 
are illustrated in more detail.  
The land dispute meeting in Olorien was deliberately selected here because it shows 
something else too. Except for this one, all the land disputes that I recorded at locality 
level were mediated by locality leaders. In this case, it was the assistant PA chief of the 
Entasekera Location who took on the role of mediator and thus also of governor. This 
had to do with the long history of conflict between ole Mashati and ole Sulul. It was 
hoped that the assistant chief would put an end to this once and for all. At the same 
time, his presence implied that the locality leaders had failed as mediators because 
fights and dispute meetings between the two kept resurfacing. The involvement of the 
assistant chief was also indicative of a wider tension between locality leaders and (assis-
tant) PA chiefs over their authority to mediate/govern land disputes. I return to this im-
portant point in the last section of this chapter because it serves as a stepping stone for 
the topic under discussion in the next chapter on relations between Loita and the state. 
  
                                                 
8  Pseudonyms have been used for the name of the locality and for the protagonists in the dispute. 
9  I attended and (tape)recorded the meeting and had it transcribed into English. The meeting started 
around noon and lasted four hours. Background and additional information on the dispute was 
gathered on repeated visits to Olorien in the context of the longitudinal study following ole Keko’s 
family (see Chapter 9). 
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The importance of knowing how to talk 
This section explores the nature of the dispute by zooming in on the two protagonists 
and discussing their personalities, the history of their relationship and their position in 
the locality. Reconnecting this exploration into the lives of the men involved in this 
quarrel with the course and outcome of the meeting will reveal that personal traits, abili-
ties and skills can have a significant influence on the negotiation process and may de-
termine to a large extent who wins and who loses out in the practice of talking claims. 
 
The boundary and the problem of taking sides 
The meeting was the initiative of ole Mashati who bypassed the locality leaders and 
went to the office of the PA chief of Entasekera Location and persuaded the assistant 
PA chief to act as mediator at the meeting. The reason behind ole Mashati calling a 
meeting was a quarrel he had with ole Sulul the previous day about a boundary that ole 
Sulul had marked with cut branches. It went up the hill between the new homestead that 
ole Sulul was building and ole Mashati’s new homestead that he was constructing with 
his age-mate ole Keko and ran downhill as far as the Arus River (see Map 10.1). Offi-
cially the meeting was called to mediate between ole Mashati and ole Sulul but, in reali-
ty and due to the conflict’s history, it involved their immediate neighbours too: ole 
Keko with whom ole Mashati had formed a close alliance and ole Loet, who ole Sulul 
used to share a homestead with. During the meeting, ole Sulul explained that he was 
laying out the boundaries for a new field. Ole Mashati objected to the boundary because 
he felt that it ‘tied’ (aen) him unfairly. The demarcation of the boundary was done with 
branches cut from shrubs and trees nearby that were laid out on the landscape in a 
straight line. Rather than doing this by himself as is usually done, ole Sulul had orga-
nized a collective labour party, using his age-mates from the surrounding homesteads to 
help him in return for a home-brewed beer-drinking party. Ole Sulul and his age-mates 
belonged to the governing age-group and the fact that some of his age-mates had assist-
ed him in the demarcation exercise was reason for ole Mashati to assume that the gov-
erning elders of the locality were siding with ole Sulul to ‘tie’ him, which is what 
prompted him to go beyond the locality and ask the assistant chief to mediate in the dis-
pute. 
 
Local histories of settlement and ambivalent reputations 
To understand ole Mashati’s feelings that people in the area favoured and passively and 
actively supported ole Sulul, it is necessary to examine their mutual relationship in the 
context of the locality’s history of settlement over the past two decades. We shall see 
that ole Mashati had the reputation of being a clever, manipulative and opportunistic 
land-grabber and that ole Sulul was considered a man whose good heart turns sour when 
he starts to drink. 
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Map 10.1 The boundary of the branches 
 
 
 
In the past, both ole Mashati and ole Sulul lived in a single large homestead that housed 
all the families that reside in the locality of Olorien today. At the time, ole Sulul already 
had a family and ole Mashati, being from a younger age-group, was still unmarried. The 
homestead had four entrances (see Figure 10.1). Ole Sulul’s family shared an entrance 
with his brother’s family and with the family of ole Loet, whose daughter ole Sulul had 
married. A second entrance was owned by ole Keko’s father and ole Keko was young 
and unmarried then. A third entrance belonged to an uncle of ole Keko,10 and a fourth to 
the family of yet another elder. When ole Mashati was still young, his father abandoned 
his mother and her children. Ole Keko’s uncle, one of the wealthiest elders in the home-
stead, took them in and they joined his side of the homestead. Ole Mashati was there-
fore not an original inhabitant of the homestead and, although officially accepted by the 
locality, his status as outsider (even though it was never explicitly mentioned) would 
come to stigmatize the ambivalent opinion that people in the locality had of him. 
 
  
                                                 
10  Chapter 9 described how ole Keko had a fight with this uncle over land. 
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Figure 10.1 The large homestead of the past 
 
 
 
In 1992, the large homestead started to break up and the families moved away from 
the large homestead onto the open plain. Some established individual homesteads and 
others built smaller shared homesteads. Four families decided to cross the nearby valley 
in 2001 and relocate on the hill as the open space there had been used as common pas-
tureland. The area was also criss-crossed by paths that people and cattle used to reach 
and cross the river down the hill. Under the watchful eye of the elders, two new home-
steads were constructed next to each other on the site so that as little grazing land as 
possible would be lost and the paths would not be obstructed. Of the two new home-
steads, one was shared by the families of ole Sulul and ole Loet. The other was estab-
lished by ole Mashati and ole Keko who, by now, were married men (see Map 10.2). 
Ole Sulul and ole Mashati were not among the wealthiest people in the locality: they 
only had one wife each and hence only one homestead.  
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Map 10.2 Break-up and dispersal 
 
 
 
Ole Mashati and ole Keko, who were from the same age-group, had grown up to-
gether and were good friends, which was the social relationship on which their shared 
homestead was built. Their solid, loyal relationship stands in stark contrast to that of ole 
Sulul and ole Loet. The relationship that formed the basis of their shared homestead, 
that of in-laws but also of a firestick elder (ole Loet) and a firestick youngster (ole 
Sulul), was not able to withstand ole Sulul’s unpredictable behaviour. Ole Sulul is 
known to become abusive and aggressive when drunk, which he often is, and during the 
meeting it became clear that these two men had clashed several times since they had 
built their shared homestead. On one occasion, ole Sulul even had to give ole Loet a 
heifer to appease him. After a subsequent fight, they went their own ways but this was 
more a symbolic separation because the shared cattle enclosure was only replaced with 
two separate but adjacent cattle enclosures and their wives did not move house (see Map 
10.3). After yet another fight for which a locality meeting was called, it was concluded 
that ole Sulul had to move away. This was to avoid a situation where ole Loet might be 
tempted to unleash the deadly curse that every firestick elder has over his youngsters 
(see Chapter 7). Surprisingly, the locality leaders decided on a spot only some 100 me-
tres away from ole Loet’s homestead. This was where ole Sulul was building his new 
individual homestead when the quarrel with ole Mashati broke out and which was the 
concern of the meeting under consideration here. In May 2008, during one of my visits, 
ole Sulul had only erected part of his new cattle enclosure. His second step, in October 
2008, was the demarcation of the boundary for his field, which was the direct cause of 
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the land dispute meeting discussed in this chapter. The construction of his new home-
stead was taking months, if not years. In 2009, ole Sulul had not completed his new 
homestead and his family was still living next to ole Loet’s family.  
 
 
Map 10.3 Separation 
 
 
 
Ole Sulul was known as someone who behaves incorrectly and, because of this, peo-
ple avoid him as much as possible, as was clear when nobody wanted to give him a 
place for a new homestead near their homes. On the other hand, it is the responsibility 
of his relatives and age-mates to take care of him, direct him in the right direction and 
even forgive him his mistakes for the sake of his wife and children. At meetings, it was 
these men who acted as his supporters. Ole Sulul rarely spoke and whenever he stood 
up to talk, he was quickly told to sit down by his supporters.11 Ole Sulul was not con-
sidered a good talker and was unable to explain or defend himself, let alone steer the 
meeting in a favourable direction. The assistant chief noticed that: ‘Ole Sulul has a valid 
point, but he doesn’t know how to make it to be good’. It was therefore his supporters 
who pleaded his case, openly labelling him a fool and thereby justifying why they were 
talking on his behalf. But there was something else. If ole Sulul was considered a fool 
                                                 
11  Ole Sulul stood up to speak six times during the meeting but only gave one long speech and the others 
interventions were short, incoherent speeches. His longer speech occurred at the beginning and, 
following the protocol of dispute meetings, he was given time to present his side of the story. Ole 
Mashati on the other hand, spoke ten times, six of which were long speeches.  
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and a poor talker, then ole Mashati was considered a clever person who ‘knew’ how to 
talk to people in private and in meetings, and who could easily ‘trick’ ole Sulul, which 
is why ole Sulul’s supporters believed he needed protection and support in his dispute. 
Taking sides was thus considered vital by ole Sulul’s supporters. 
Ole Mashati interpreted this differently. He felt that ole Sulul was being incited, mis-
led and used by his supporters to thwart ole Mashati in his efforts at making a living. As 
he put it: ‘a driver is handling the steering of [ole Sulul]’ and it is the ‘inciters’ who 
‘add [something] to the fire to make the firewood flame’. The assistant chief, who was 
not from the locality, agreed with ole Mashati’s interpretation of the situation.  
Ole Sulul’s foolishness and ole Mashati’s cleverness were a topic that was touched 
on every now and then during the meeting.12 Both characterizations were looked on 
with mixed feelings. Ole Sulul’s misbehaviour was widely disapproved of but it was 
blamed on his drinking. When sober, ole Sulul is a reasonable and hardworking person. 
In the case of ole Mashati, his land grabbing practices were a source of both criticism 
and admiration. Admiration because he had grabbed large areas of land over the years 
and mostly got away with it; and criticism because his behaviour was considered antiso-
cial and unworthy of locality solidarity. I will come back to these accusations later but 
first an overview is given of ole Mashati’s land grabbing over the years. 
 
Diehard land-grabbers 
When the large homestead was falling apart, ole Mashati and ole Keko started the con-
struction of their own shared homestead across the valley, independently of their guard-
ian and their father respectively. The valley between the large homestead and the new 
site was the place where many had cleared their fields when cultivation started to take 
off in Loita. This was before the break-up of the large homestead and was, as described 
in Chapter 9, a factor that contributed to its disintegration. In the valley, ole Keko had 
worked on his family’s field when he was still unmarried and ole Mashati had cleared a 
piece of land there as well. Ole Sulul and ole Loet also had their fields in the valley. Ole 
Mashati, having travelled far beyond Loita as a livestock trader, introduced the field-
cum-olokeri into the locality, something he had observed on his travels (see Chapter 9). 
He did this by moving the fence round his field bit by bit, thereby extending its area in 
the valley. By not cultivating the extensions, he slowly created an individual olokeri to 
his field that formed the first field-cum-olokeri in the locality. Chapter 9 described how 
ole Keko took this innovation into account when he grabbed a very large piece of land 
to extend his field at the beginning of 2007. In reality though, he planned a field-cum-
olokeri like ole Mashati but instead of extending it little by little each year, he did so in 
one swift move. This was vehemently resisted but eventually accepted after locality 
meetings, though he paid a high price for it. At that time, the intentions of ole Keko 
(and ole Mashati) were not clear to the other locality residents. The field-cum-olokeri 
was a new phenomenon in Loita and at the locality meetings where ole Keko was chal-
                                                 
12  During the meeting, ole Sulul was called a fool or stupid (seven times), a drunkard or reference was 
made to his drinking behaviour (nine times) and he was described as a verbally abusive person (21 
times). Ole Mashati was called clever (three times) but, more negatively, a cheat (eight times), corrupt 
(once), a bitter person (once), a liar (five times), a trickster (nine times) and somebody with targets 
and a hidden agenda (twice). 
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lenged, he insisted that he was not making an olokeri but that it was his field and he had 
simply not yet got round to clearing it. Since the rule states that every married man is 
entitled to a field as large as the area he can work, his argument was reluctantly accept-
ed. In retrospect however, people accuse both ole Keko and ole Mashati of working 
together and using tricks and a hidden agenda in creating their individual ilookeri, 
thereby reducing the land base used collectively for grazing by the locality. Ole Mashati 
was blamed for this more than ole Keko. He was seen as somebody who had originally 
been an outsider and was now taking advantage of the hospitality he had been given 
when his family was in distress and of putting the people who welcomed him into the 
locality at a disadvantage. And he was also seen as influencing ole Keko and as being 
the mastermind behind their land grabbing.   
The last land grabbing move, which was in fact in full swing during my fieldwork 
period, gave rise to a land dispute meeting that preceded the one under discussion.13 It 
officially involved ole Keko and ole Sulul but, in reality, was between ole Keko and ole 
Mashati on the one side and ole Sulul on the other. When ole Sulul started to build his 
new individual homestead (after it was decided that he would separate from ole Loet 
because of their recurring fights), ole Keko decided to do so as well (see Map 10.4). 
One of the reasons he gave was that he wanted to be closer to his field-cum-olokeri and 
improve the view over his land to ensure better protection against unwanted human and 
non-human intruders. Another reason became apparent too when he explained to me 
that he actually wanted to open up more land in future. Only now, with ole Sulul’s new 
homestead, these plans were being thwarted. Ole Sulul was building his new homestead 
on a site that reduced ole Keko’s options for further expansion. Ole Keko was being 
blocked: on one side was ole Loet’s homestead, behind the homestead were the fields in 
the valley and now in front of his homestead ole Sulul was building a new place for 
himself. Ole Keko was in danger of being completely boxed in if he did not react quick-
ly. He thus started to book a site for a new homestead on the only land that remained 
open to him by fencing a cattle enclosure some 150 metres downhill towards the river 
and some 50 metres away from ole Sulul’s new homestead. Ole Keko’s grounded 
claims upset ole Sulul and almost led to a physical fight. During the ensuing meeting, it 
was agreed that both ole Sulul and ole Keko had the right to relocate in the immediate 
vicinity of their original homesteads. Ole Keko was ordered to move his new cattle en-
closure a short way uphill because its present location did not favour ole Sulul. It was 
decided that the homesteads should be in a line at the same elevation so that no one 
would block anyone else and they would look out on uninhabited land in case they 
wanted to expand. 
 
  
                                                 
13  I did not attend this meeting but it was discussed at length during the ole Mashati vs. ole Sulul 
meeting in order to give the assistant PA chief background information on the history of the conflict 
between the two men. Further information on the meeting was gathered during the longitudinal study 
of ole Keko’s family. 
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Map 10.4 Booking and grabbing land, I 
 
 
 
The people at the former meeting assumed ole Keko and ole Mashati were going to 
separate and that ole Mashati would remain behind when ole Keko moved to the new 
homestead. After all, this was what had been happening all over Loita, i.e. shared home-
steads were breaking down to form individual homesteads. And besides, considering the 
investment in ole Mashati’s wife’s house, which was now a large corrugated-iron sheet-
roofed house, migration of even only a few metres was illogical. However, as the con-
struction of ole Keko’s new homestead proceeded, it became clear that ole Mashati was 
moving there too. He built a house and he and ole Keko constructed the cattle enclosure 
together. Ole Mashati’s move was unexpected and highly unusual, but justifiable be-
cause ole Keko, who was now socially accepted as the owner, had agreed to it. Had it 
been the unpopular ole Mashati who had made the first move, he would have had had a 
bigger chance of losing the case in the land dispute meeting than ole Keko. Unlike ole 
Mashati, ole Keko had convincing arguments in defence of his move: that he needed to 
have his homestead closer to his field for protection was a strong and convincing argu-
ment as he had recently lost a considerable part of his harvest to intruding elephants and 
a giant forest hog. Ole Keko had, in effect, paved the way for ole Mashati to relocate 
smoothly. In this set-up, there were no grounds for the locality or for ole Sulul to com-
plain about ole Mashati’s move. For many locality inhabitants, this was additional proof 
of ole Mashati’s shrewdness. Now he was not only viewed as an ungrateful outsider and 
the instigator and master-minder of land grabbing but was also seen as benefiting from 
and hiding behind ole Keko’s painstaking efforts and successes. In the meeting, one 
person compared their relationship to two teeth that grow in the same place and one 
248 
 
‘hides’ behind the other. Ole Keko’s father voiced his disapproval of their friendship 
and blamed everything on ole Mashati. Others believed that ole Mashati and ole Keko 
had planned this from the outset and felt they were all being tricked and misled by this 
land grabbing duo.  
Ole Sulul’s demarcation of a boundary for his field needs to be seen in this context. 
On the one hand, he wanted to do as others did and grab land for the purpose of demar-
cating an olokeri, as he later openly (and foolishly) admitted. On the other hand, when 
ole Keko and ole Mashati continued construction of the cattle enclosure and even added 
a house, it became clear that they were not going to comply with the resolution that was 
reached in the meeting, i.e. of moving the cattle enclosure up the hill to be at the same 
height as ole Sulul’s homestead. Ole Sulul panicked. Given ole Keko and ole Mashati’s 
successful land grabbing activities in the locality that were characterized by sly and 
careful planning, he feared an enclosure that would ‘tie the sun’ (block his sunlight) and 
ultimately ‘finish’ him, as ole Sulul himself exclaimed during the meeting. Ole Sulul 
felt that their plan was to force him out of the place by blocking him in on all sides so 
that they could appropriate any land made available by his departure. This was, of 
course, never acknowledged by ole Keko and ole Mashati but ole Mashati’s move made 
sense in this respect when something of the sort became clear to me on one of my visits. 
When I asked ole Mashati about his future development plans, he explained that as soon 
as they migrated to the new homestead, he was going to cultivate the area of the old 
homestead, which he had already fenced off with barbed wire, and eventually join the 
two fields he owned on the hill to form one large contiguous field across the two slopes 
and over the top of the hill (see Map 10.5).  
 
 
Map 10.5 Booking and grabbing land, II 
 
249 
 
This would, indeed, block ole Sulul and he would be almost entirely enclosed by the 
properties of ole Mashati and ole Keko. This was not, however, discussed during the 
meeting and it was not clear whether ole Sulul or other elders had already foreseen it. In 
any case, ole Sulul’s boundary work was partly borne out of a plan to grab land and 
partly out of anxiety over what the two were up to. He desperately wanted to block their 
expansion (and his enclosure) by putting down a boundary marker. He explained: ‘I said 
… let me be the first one to be on fertile land so that if he is planning for his profit alone 
then he will not take it alone … let me cut my place for my field’. His act of unilateral 
demarcation was thus both an imitation of and a defence strategy in the face of two 
young, astute and successful land grabbing neighbours.  
 
‘The good mouth will take the land’14 
Time and again, ole Mashati seemed to outsmart the elders of the locality.15 As already 
discussed, ole Mashati was depicted by others as a clever, cunning and articulate man. 
This became clear at the meeting. Ole Mashati displayed great social sensitivity about 
what (or what not) to say, in what manner and at what time. A good example was his 
caution when talking about ilookeri. Although it was common knowledge that he had 
his own fenced olokeri, as was discussed openly by others during the meeting, ole 
Mashati made sure he did not make any compromising reference to it that would force 
him to acknowledge its existence. Publicly admitting one has an individual olokeri, a 
controversial practice in Loita, invites disciplinary measures. And this is what in fact 
happened to ole Sulul. He bluntly declared in the meeting that he wanted an olokeri just 
like ole Mashati and ole Keko had ‘because there is nowadays the habit of the [making 
one’s own] olokeri that they made and put posts [fenced] … so I do the same also!’. The 
elders concluded from this that the boundary that he had marked for a field was not real-
ly for a field as he had initially claimed but for an olokeri. The effect was immediate 
and decisive when the assistant chief mercilessly refused this claim and, after the meet-
ing, all those present proceeded to remove the boundary branches.  
Ole Mashati had in fact been the first in the meeting to casually suggest that ole 
Sulul’s boundary was for an olokeri. This cursory comment triggered a series of discus-
sions that eventually led to ole Sulul losing the case – and ole Mashati winning it. This 
shows another of ole Mashati’s skills: the capacity to manipulate the direction of a 
meeting and to steer it to his own advantage. This did not always work though. Ole 
Mashati had tried hard using all sorts of arguments to prevent the elders from discussing 
the previous meeting because this would expose his abuse of the resolution reached by 
the locality leaders, a point that would put him in a bad light in the eyes of the assistant 
chief. However when the elders started accusing him of this, he quickly resorted to us-
ing another tactic, i.e. a counterattack, that would eventually backfire on the elders. He 
accused them of taking sides and favouring ole Sulul, a point the assistant chief con-
curred with. 
                                                 
14  Enkutuk supat naya enkop. 
15  But not always. In one case, the elders refused to allow ole Mashati permission to use a new field that 
he had started to clear. Also ole Keko lost a battle with the elders when he had to move a new maize 
store because the elders objected to its location. In both cases, the elders had reached their decisions 
during meetings.   
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Ole Mashati is not only a master at navigating accusations but also at moving in an 
arena (in this case a meeting) that is constrained by social conventions: what issues mer-
it a meeting, what complaint he should raise during the meeting, who he should direct 
his complaint to, which socially accepted argument would work best in what context, 
how to build up a case verbally and when to press a particular argument. He was well 
aware of the kind of behaviour that strengthens or weakens an argument. This latter 
point can be captured by looking at the performances of ole Mashati (the good talker) 
and ole Sulul (the poor talker). Ole Mashati’s speech (logical, slow and clear with here 
and there a catchy proverb but also harsh and direct when necessary), his body language 
and his facial expressions (calm and composed, occasionally tapping the earth with the 
end of his walking stick to emphasize a point) contrasted with ole Sulul’s speech (inco-
herent, rambling back and forth, confrontational) and his body language (agitated, seek-
ing eye-contact with ole Mashati, and beating with his walking stick a lot). Another ex-
ample illustrates ole Mashati’s understanding of the rules of the game (and ole Sulul’s 
lack of skill in this direction). It was discussed in the meeting how ole Sulul should have 
called for a meeting and lodged a complaint when he realized that ole Mashati and ole 
Keko were continuing with the construction of their new homestead rather than moving 
it uphill as was ordered. He would have had a strong bargaining position in this case. 
But instead he opted, rather belatedly, to demarcate a boundary and in a way this pro-
voked a justified reaction from ole Mashati. Ole Mashati, on the other hand, followed 
the correct procedure and called for a meeting. His choice of assistant chief as mediator 
clearly increased his chances of success.  
During the meeting, ole Mashati and ole Sulul’s personal traits and talents were ex-
plicitly compared by the elders: ole Mashati is a good talker and ole Sulul is not, ole 
Mashati is clever and ole Sulul is a fool, ole Mashati is a successful land-grabber and 
ole Sulul not. A wealthy young man announced: ‘the only thing that can give you rights 
[to land] is to talk goodly and be clever’. His subsequent explanation was along the fol-
lowing lines: men are unequal in properties (cattle, wives, children) and are nowadays 
also unequal in ‘the places that we are cultivating’ (i.e. field sizes). This is because God 
(Enkai) did not make men equal; some were born cleverer than others. The implication 
of his rationale was that wealth and intelligence go hand in hand and that these are gifts 
given by God. This explanation is an impressive attempt at naturalizing the differences 
between wealthy and poor Maasai.16 It is also an indication of the dual attitude to land 
grabbing, of its attraction because its success is linked to cleverness and wealth. Suc-
cessful land-grabbers are highly regarded: they are clever and on their way to becoming 
rich(er). The conclusion of the above rationale is that somebody with ability and an apti-
tude for persuasiveness (Rose 1994) can gain legitimacy in any land-ownership claim. 
As another young man aptly observed: ‘the person who can grab land is a clever one, 
somebody who knows how to talk, somebody who knows how to reach another and 
someone who knows how life is going now because the custom of the land has 
changed’. The following proverb, expressed several times by different people during the 
meeting, nicely sums up the situation: ‘The good mouth [i.e. the good talker] will take 
the land’. 
                                                 
16  I have heard this logic on at least two other occasions. 
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To put it bluntly, the current land rush in Loita is creating winners and losers. Meet-
ings that deal with land disputes are events at which land claims are ‘talked’ about, ne-
gotiated and eventually decided upon by mediators. The negotiation process is crucial 
for the outcome of the meeting because it is when the claimant and the opponent (and 
their supporters) have to convince the mediators of their right. One’s chances of success 
thus depend for a large part on one’s talents when it comes to speaking and the ability to 
talk in public (to make strong arguments while remaining calm, to use Maasai proverbs, 
to avoid embarrassing emotional outbursts, etc.) with a keen sensitivity to the ambiance 
of the moment and the mood of the elders. The meeting between ole Mashati and ole 
Sulul shows just this: the ultimate winners in land dispute meetings are those who know 
how to talk. 
Governing appropriation by setting the limits  
The boundary issue signalled a much wider and disturbing problem for the elders of the 
locality and the assistant chief. Land grabbing was spiralling out of control and the land 
dispute meeting was used to address this problem. Their efforts at dealing with it reflect 
a negotiating process over what is accepted practice and what is not. At the end of the 
meeting, two lines-not-to-be-crossed were made clear. 
 
Denouncing land grabbing 
It was surprising how the issue that triggered the quarrel and the meeting, i.e. the 
boundary of branches, was dealt with swiftly and without much deliberation. The great-
er part of the meeting was dedicated to talking about land grabbing. Land grabbing in 
Loita was denounced (‘these fields that are all over the land!’) and one old man stub-
bornly declared that he was not ‘in that competition’. Most of the times, however, the 
discussion centred on ole Mashati (and ole Keko). He was directly accused of selfishly 
grabbing land (‘you have blocked us ten times at olokeri and at the paths where cattle 
pass … until you reached the small river’) and of grabbing land that was not permitted 
(‘you have been disturbing us, you even came to the places that you were not allowed’). 
He was suspected of planning more land grabbing activities (‘do you think the eye can-
not see this wire with which you already fenced?’) and there was speculation as to what 
his next trick would be. He was warned not to grab more land (‘if you come here, you 
will not block the way … [you] will not close the path and the river crossing for the 
cattle’). The anger and violence that his activities evoked were reported (‘on that day 
that ole Nchoe tried to come and kill him with the spear’). And finally, when deliberat-
ing on a solution for the conflict, several elders proposed prohibiting the three of them 
(ole Mashati, ole Keko and ole Sulul) from creating new fields or extending existing 
ones once and for all.  
The older men in particular were bitter about these developments and expressed their 
disappointment with reference to Maasainess and the ‘taking care of cattle’ (eramatare 
oo nkishu). One elder deplored how, since people had discovered the ‘sweetness’ of 
fields, they did not care anymore about cattle and that, because of these fields, ‘these 
new things’ were happening. The grabbing of land was occurring with disregard for 
cows: cattle paths were being closed, grazing land enclosed and saltlick areas, ilookeri 
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and river crossings were becoming unreachable. In other words, people were not ‘talk-
ing Kimaasai’ anymore, i.e. by disregarding pastoralism.17 What becomes clear is that, 
although the meeting was officially called to arbitrate between ole Mashati and ole 
Sulul and deal with the boundary issue, it was in fact used by the elders to condemn 
land grabbing, which they considered to be the underlying issue, and to discuss the 
problems it was creating. Land dispute meetings are not only platforms for mediating 
between individuals but also for discussing the new, widespread, increasingly open and 
problematic land grabbing practices occurring in Loita. 
 
Getting to grips with the field-cum-olokeri 
The land dispute meeting between ole Mashati and ole Sulul shows that controversy and 
confusion surrounds the new land grabbing practices in Loita, particularly the field-
cum-olokeri. This is not the first time that such a confusing period has occurred and 
neither will it be the last. A brief historical review indicates that cycles of initial confu-
sion and resistance when a new or modified form of land use and demarcation is intro-
duced and threatens to get out of hand are followed by efforts on the part of the elders in 
general and the locality leaders in particular to take charge of the practice in meetings 
and channel matters in the desired direction so that a new set of rules governing the 
practice can emerge. Meetings are arenas where new or modified forms of land use and 
rules for claim making are negotiated and governed in Loita.  
Chapter 9 explained that when fields started to proliferate and increase in size in the 
1990s, the elders ensured control over this process by determining the location and size 
of the new fields in locality meetings. At that time, it was common practice to make 
one’s intention for a new field (often in conjunction with a new homestead) public at 
locality meetings, which were the mechanism for elders to maintain a tight grip on the 
spatial planning of homesteads and fields. This ensured people would not take too much 
pastureland and would obstruct paths as little as possible. However, after the food short-
ages following the 2000-2001 drought, control was loosened considerably. The drought 
triggered a new rule, announced by the elders, that a field was allowed to be as large as 
an owner could conceivably cultivate. Thus, the size of the field came to depend on the 
labour invested in cultivating it. This criterion would later be manipulated in the context 
of the field-cum-olokeri to say that it was the size that one ‘planned’ to cultivate. If one 
wanted, the fields could be extended each subsequent year. With no more formal limits 
on size, locality meetings would now only be held if someone objected to an extension 
to or the location of a new field. This changed the timing but also the character of meet-
ings. They now came to be organized as dispute meetings between two parties that 
needed to be mediated, and ultimately reconciled. The assertion that I heard many times 
in Loita that land dispute meetings started ‘about 10 years ago’ and have been on the 
rise ever since strengthens this tentative historical reconstruction. Thus while meetings 
continued to be places where new forms of land use, claims and rules were negotiated 
and governed, they also came to function as sites where land claims were challenged, 
defended and fought over.  
                                                 
17  Kimaasai is the Swahili word for the Maa language. 
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This state of affairs seems to have worked well for a while but, with the emergence 
of the field-cum-olokeri, a whole new dynamic came into play. To create an individual-
ly owned olokeri only needs fencing, which involves a lot less labour than creating a 
field that additionally requires clearing an area of the bush and roots as well as plough-
ing, planting, tending crops and so forth. The size of an olokeri becomes almost limit-
less if it only depends on fencing. The implication in terms of individual land seizure 
when land availability is on the decline is tremendous. A field-cum-olokeri invites un-
limited land grabbing. This is why individual ilookeri are so controversial in Loita, es-
pecially in the populated middle zone where space is scarce. Those who insist on creat-
ing an individual olokeri need to proceed prudently with a carefully thought-out plan. 
The trick is to demarcate it in the name of a field, as ole Mashati and ole Keko did, as 
one that will supposedly be cleared, ploughed and planted in future. If opposition arises 
and a meeting is called, one then has to make sure that the claimed land is ‘given’ by 
using a socially accepted argument, even if this does not reflect the real intention. After 
some years, when the claim to the land is visibly grounded and thus socially stronger, 
one can finally disclose its true purpose and use it accordingly. The assistant chief 
summed this up nicely when he compared ole Mashati and ole Keko to bulls that were 
eating grass and growing strong until they came out to fight others: ‘same to these men, 
they have been using these fields as ilookeri until [when strong] they will come out to 
announce [that in fact the purpose was not a field but an olokeri]’. In private, as in con-
versations with me, ole Mashati and ole Keko already admitted this, but not in public. 
They understand that ‘announcing’ an individual olokeri in a meeting is not done – at 
least not yet. 
The outcome of the land dispute meeting between ole Mashati and ole Sulul con-
firmed that ‘announcing’ (i.e. publicly stating) an olokeri is a line not to be crossed. 
This rule was not verbally declared but it was made pretty clear when the assistant chief 
dismissed ole Sulul’s boundary as soon as ole Sulul ‘announced’ that he wanted his own 
olokeri. Publicly stating that land claimed is for an individual olokeri is off limits. The 
rule is ambivalent because it leaves open whether making an olokeri by ‘announcing’ a 
field is permitted. Silence on this issue during the meeting indicated that this practice is 
tolerated, albeit grudgingly. Two locality leaders of a nearby locality confirmed this 
state of affairs. The message is clear: the accepted way (‘the rule’) for making an indi-
vidual olokeri is by ‘announcing’ it as a field. 
The negotiation of new forms of land use and claim making by defining what is ac-
ceptable practice and what is not result in new rules and limits. Rules that regulate land-
ed property are confirmed, adjusted, made and unmade in land dispute meetings in dia-
lectical interaction with new events and circumstances (like the food shortage after the 
2000-2001 drought) and novel ways of using the land (such as the field-cum-olokeri). 
Meetings are arenas where rule-making is employed as an instrument for governing 
appropriation. 
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Limits to land grabbing 
Another line-not-to-be-crossed was evident in the meeting. The assistant chief conclud-
ed from the orientation and location of the boundary of branches that what ole Sulul was 
actually trying to do was to ‘cut’ (divide) the land and not to grab it. The assistant chief 
was not convinced by ole Sulul’s argument that he was demarcating a field, or an olo-
keri. First, the boundary was just a line and did not form a two-dimensional figure that 
enclosed an area, making the claim of field or olokeri refutable. Second, the boundary 
ran between the house of ole Mashati and that of ole Sulul, dividing the land between 
the two homesteads. This was a step too far for the assistant chief. As discussed in 
Chapter 9, land can only be claimed as individual property if it is to serve a particular 
livelihood purpose, such as for building a homestead, as the auluo of the homestead or 
for a field. The rest of the land in the locality is collective property. But what ole Sulul’s 
boundary appeared to do was divide the land and distinguish his from that of his neigh-
bours. One can say ‘my homestead’ and ‘my field’ but one cannot say ‘my land’. Trying 
to appropriate land like this without an acceptable reason is akin to dividing land which, 
the assistant chief made clear, falls within the ambit of the state. Dividing land will hap-
pen with the long-anticipated and state-sanctioned land adjudication process and since 
‘the Loita have not yet agreed on land demarcation’ what ole Sulul’s boundary was pur-
porting was still ‘against the [state] law’. By raising this issue, the assistant chief placed 
limits on land appropriation in Loita. Booking and grabbing is permitted with a valid 
reason only: for a new homestead, as one’s auluo or for a field. This is ‘the rule’. But 
dividing land is off-limits. This will only happen when adjudication finally arrives in 
Loita and land is surveyed, formally demarcated and registered as individually owned 
plots. By making this point clear, the assistant chief sought to prevent a new and even 
more radical and uncontrollable form of land grabbing in Loita. 
Questioning the authority of locality leaders 
Property is, we would argue, one of the most important fields in which 
politico-legal institutions seem persistently to compete for authority in 
post-colonial and post-socialist societies. 
(Sikor & Lund 2009: 10) 
 
When setting the limits of land grabbing, the assistant chief was also limiting the au-
thority of the locality elders as mediators of land disputes and governors of land tenure. 
It was not ole Sulul but the elders who had assisted him in making the boundary of 
branches who were blamed for this infraction. By helping him, the elders, who like ole 
Sulul belonged to the governing age-group, had implicitly agreed to what the assistant 
chief considered was dividing the land and they had therefore sanctioned something that 
they were not authorized to because, as the assistant chief noted, it fell within the juris-
diction of the state. The assistant chief felt that the elders had overstepped their authori-
ty by encroaching on the jurisdiction of the state.  
The assistant chief used his opportunity as mediator of the dispute to strengthen his 
authority as a Loita leader. And while he accused the elders of encroachment on the 
state’s domain, the fact remains that he also encroached on the domain of the locality 
elders by taking the place of the locality leaders as mediator of the land dispute. He was 
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able to do so in his capacity as a state official charged with maintaining state law and 
order (Mbuba & Mugambi 2011). This signals a power struggle between (assistant) PA 
chiefs and locality leaders over the authority to govern property relations and land ten-
ure change. The present case indicates that the locality leaders were on the losing side. 
What is of interest is that this is not because the assistant chief tried to mediate the con-
flict but because ole Mashati invited him to do so and thus also invited the state in. This 
is a dynamic that will be explored in the next chapter. 
By bypassing the locality leaders and inviting the assistant chief to mediate the land 
dispute meeting, ole Mashati questioned the impartiality and competence of the locality 
elders to handle the case. This was an issue that was repeatedly raised during the meet-
ing. Elders were either urged not to take sides and ‘to give everyone his right’ or they 
were more directly accused of supporting their friends and relatives irrespective of 
whether they ‘followed the truth’ (both in the sense of telling the truth and of acting 
rightfully). Ole Mashati’s move and the criticism voiced during the meeting seriously 
questioned the authority of the locality leaders, and the governing elders in general, 
when it came to solving land disputes. At the same time, this legitimized the assistant 
chief’s presence as mediator and strengthened his authority. The assistant chief seized 
the opportunity with both hands. He identified the issue of supporting friends as the 
reason why conflicts and land dispute meetings were always resurfacing in the locality. 
He claimed that had the locality leaders come to a fair and wise solution as mediators 
are supposed to, the issues in the locality would have been resolved after the first meet-
ing. 
What we see here is that, besides serving as a platform for dealing with issues of land 
appropriation (talking claims and governing appropriation), the land dispute meeting 
also hosted a political struggle between two types of leaders. Sikor & Lund (2009) have 
theorized this relationship between appropriation and political struggle and argue that 
issues of access and property recursively constitute and interconnect with questions of 
power and authority. The link between the two sets of relationships is established by the 
‘contract’ of mutual recognition between property and authority: ‘[t]he process of 
recognition of claims as property simultaneously works to imbue the institution that 
provides such recognition with the recognition of its authority to do so’ (Ibid.: 1). The 
particular ‘contract’ that had been in place in Olorien until the ole Mashati versus ole 
Sulul meeting confirmed and recognized Loita’s legal institutional order,18 i.e. the Loita 
way of mediating land disputes in localities. Disputants sought recognition of their 
grounded claims from locality leaders in the arena of the land dispute meeting and with 
Loita law as a source of legitimacy. The arrival of the assistant chief modified this con-
tract. While the arena and the source of legitimacy remained the same, mediation and 
arbitration changed hands. The word ‘modify’ is important here because what happened 
was not a replacement of one institution with another: the land dispute was not taken to 
court to be judged by a non-Loita magistrate with reference to state law. Only the locali-
ty leaders were replaced and it was therefore only their authority that was undermined 
while that of the assistant chief’s was legitimized and strengthened. The assistant chief 
was accommodated in the existing locality meeting format, happily for ole Mashati but 
                                                 
18  Sikor & Lund (2009) speak of ‘politico-legal institutions’.   
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to the chagrin of the locality leaders. Loita law, though defined and delimited in relation 
to state law, continued to apply, as did land dispute meeting protocols. It would thus be 
better to talk of the creation of an alternative ‘forum’ (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981) 
for the mediation of land disputes. This new forum constituted an adaptation of the lo-
cality meeting with the assistant chief as mediator. The next chapter will go into the 
struggles and dynamics surrounding different forums in more depth. 
This particular assistant chief was called at least once more to mediate a land dispute 
in another locality. And in this case too, it concerned a long-running conflict between 
neighbours that locality leaders did not seem able to contain. Although he did not even-
tually mediate the land dispute, the fact that he was called indicates that he was recog-
nized as a mediator. He might have been approached the first time in his capacity as 
assistant chief but he was certainly asked again because his previous performance had 
proven his ability to mediate. As a Loita Maasai, which all PA chiefs in Loita are, his 
familiarity with Loita law and the protocols and procedures of Loita meetings undoubt-
edly provided him with the background knowledge he required for success as a media-
tor. In one case, the DO of Loita Division was called to mediate a particularly compli-
cated land dispute between three localities in a border zone that they all claimed was 
theirs. However, not being a Maasai (and not understanding the language) and therefore 
totally unfamiliar with the Loita way of doing things, the meeting made no progress 
and, to save face, he simply referred the issue back to the section leaders, who are 
skilled locality leaders called to mediate disputes between localities. It is not the DO, 
who is the highest ranking state official in Loita, but his subordinates, i.e. the (assistant) 
PA chiefs, who challenge the authority of the locality and section leaders to mediate and 
govern land dispute meetings. And it is their intermediary position between Loita and 
the state (see Chapter 5) and particularly the fact that they are both Loita Maasai and 
agents of the state that make this possible. 
Conclusion: the multidimensionality of land dispute meetings 
Land dispute meetings are about talking claims as well as about governing appropria-
tion. The case of the Olorien meeting proves this. Although the meeting was convened 
because ole Mashati disputed the grounded claims of ole Sulul (talking claims), the oc-
casion was seized by the locality elders and the assistant chief as an opportunity to deal 
with the wider problem of land grabbing (governing appropriation) that they considered 
was the underlying issue in the dispute. The land dispute meeting thus reflected two 
struggles. One was between the two disputants over land. They had come into conflict 
while participating in the race to book and grab land, as was analysed in Chapter 9. We 
saw there that those who won the race were the wealthy herd owners with several wives 
and homesteads spread across Loita’s three ecological zones. This chapter has shown 
that when practices of appropriation are taken into the arena of the land dispute meeting, 
it is not wealth but another asset that becomes of importance, namely the ability to per-
suade people about one’s property claims (Rose 1994). This points to the personal di-
mension of land appropriation and the importance of an individual’s character and the 
skills required to succeed. Ole Mashati’s unscrupulous land grabbing activities had 
made him unpopular in the locality and the odds of the meeting going in his favour were 
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stacked against him. But, as an eloquent and persuasive speaker and thanks to his social 
know-how and ability to turn a setting constrained by explicit and implicit rules to his 
own advantage (for example by bringing in the assistant chief as mediator), he won the 
case. Persuasion made the difference. ‘Knowing how to talk’ is a crucial asset in the 
negotiation process since it can influence and shape the outcome of meetings.  
The other struggle that was reflected in the meeting was that of leaders attempting to 
govern the behaviour of others. The meeting was thus not only about property claims 
but about a claim to authority as well. The governing elders of the locality expressed 
their concern over the persistent and innovative land grabbing activities taking place in 
the locality and the assistant chief responded accordingly by defining two limits to land 
grabbing. The first addressed the field-cum-olokeri. In this case, the line that was not to 
be crossed was made clear by punishing the trespasser − ole Sulul − because he ‘an-
nounced’ an olokeri. At the same time, this confirmed that announcing an olokeri as a 
field is acceptable and will be tolerated. The second limit made a distinction between 
grabbing land by ‘dividing’ it at will (which was unacceptable) and grabbing land for a 
valid livelihood reason (which was acceptable).  
However there was a third struggle evident in the land dispute meeting too. It con-
cerned a tug-of-war between the locality leaders and the assistant chief over the authori-
ty to mediate land disputes and govern land issues. This struggle, between the custom-
ary land dispute leaders and the state-appointed leader venturing into the land dispute 
domain, shows a wider struggle between Loita leaders and the state over the power to 
govern Loita. The next chapter focuses on this wider power struggle and will show that, 
as in the case of the Olorien meeting, it is people from ‘within’ who are undermining 
the governing authority of the leaders in Loita. 
  
11 
Governing access to the state  
in a section meeting 
The meeting dealt with in this chapter, like the one discussed in the previous chapter, 
displays three struggles. The first was a dispute between two individuals that needed to 
be mediated and resolved. The second struggle was an attempt by leaders to govern the 
conduct of the people. And the third was an underlying power struggle between Loita 
leaders and the state, more specifically the law-enforcement wing of the state apparatus, 
over the authority to govern Loita. While the preceding chapter only cursorily men-
tioned the third struggle, the case considered here allows for a more detailed treatment 
of it. 
The dispute that prompted the meeting discussed in this chapter started as a typical 
land dispute between two neighbours. It was very similar to the one reviewed in Chapter 
10 in that one neighbour objected to the land claims of the other. To solve the issue, a 
locality meeting was convened and mediated by a locality leader. After it was resolved 
and the locality meeting was closed, a fight broke out and people were injured. Matters 
escalated out of control when one of the disputants tried to involve the police and even-
tually a section meeting was called to deal with the case. It is this second (section) meet-
ing that is the focus of this chapter. 
Section meetings are rare and I was fortunate to be able to attend and document one. 
They are typically convened to solve land disputes between neighbours of different yet 
adjacent localities or between whole localities. Land disputes of this kind usually flare 
up in the border-zone areas of neighbouring localities that were previously uninhabited 
and were used by both sides as open grazing areas, a forest block for gathering firewood 
or a valley. So if a land dispute between localities or individuals from different localities 
escalates and cannot be solved by the locality leaders of the localities involved, the case 
is then transferred to the level of the section to be resolved at a section meeting. These 
are open to all circumcised men in the section. Since they are open to all the circum-
cised men from all the localities in the Loita section, they can potentially be very large 
gatherings. Unlike locality meetings, not all those present are given time to speak. The 
259 
 
proceedings of the section meeting discussed in this chapter, for example, were closely 
controlled by the mediators. The meeting lasted two days.  
Locality leaders with recognized mediation skills are requested to mediate at section 
meetings. These leaders, who are promoted to the position of ‘section leader’, are from 
localities that are not involved in the case to avoid conflicts of interest and problems of 
loyalty. Once a matter is taken to a section meeting, the leaders of the localities in-
volved lose their say in the case and any resolution reached must be accepted even if 
they do not agree. Like locality leaders, section leaders are informal leaders, that is, they 
are not given formal recognition as leaders during a ceremony or given an artefact sym-
bolizing their authority, such as the black wooden club presented to the age-group chief 
and the clan chief or the divining horn to the chief laibon. Like locality leaders, their 
status as section leader depends on recognition by the wider community and typically 
hinges on their performance as dispute mediators in meetings. And like locality leaders, 
section leaders govern issues that relate to land. Locality and section leaders are thus the 
customary authorities regarding land issues and their spheres of influence correspond to 
the land categories that are relevant to the tenure organization in Loita, the locality and 
the section respectively. Land, however, turned out not to be the main issue at stake at 
the section meeting considered in this chapter. We shall see how the mediating section 
leaders took the opportunity of the land dispute between two neighbours of different 
localities, which had already got out of hand, to govern people’s behaviour in relation to 
the state and not people’s behaviour in relation to land, as those attending the meeting 
had initially expected. 
Power struggles in a context of legal pluralism 
Although it was a land dispute that triggered the chain of events that led to this section 
meeting, for the section leaders the meeting was not about land or the subsequent fight 
but about the fact that people had tried to involve the police. The police enforce state 
law. This is not, however, the way of the Maasai but ‘the way of the ilashumpa’ − the 
way of white men/state actors − and includes all that is associated with the state, such as 
its policies and development programmes (see Chapter 5) as well as the various compo-
nents of its legal system, such as state law, the police, court cases and prison. What was 
at stake in the section meeting was not competition for land but a struggle for power 
between Loita leadership and state actors and between Loita law and state law. The fact 
that land disputes often hide wider power conflicts has been well demonstrated in the 
literature (Nijenhuis 2003, 2013) but to understand how this plays out when different 
legal frameworks compete for authority (Sikor & Lund 2009: 10), we need to turn to the 
literature on legal pluralism. 
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2), legal pluralism refers to the co-
existence and interaction of multiple legal orders (or frameworks) with different institu-
tions and authorities, and different sources of legitimacy within a single social setting (J. 
Griffiths 1986; Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan 2002: 4; Benjamin 2008: 2258). Legal orders 
mutually influence each other. Their interaction can take different forms (competition, 
cooperation, overlap, subsidiary/domination, etc.), may change over time and is shaped 
by the often unequal power relationships between them (Merry 1992; Meinzen-Dick & 
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Pradhan 2002: 4, 7). Legal orders do not only apply to local customary legal frame-
works (like the Loita legal order) and national state legal orders (such as the Kenyan 
legal order) but also include transnational forms of law (Merry 1992; A. Griffiths 2002: 
298-302), for example those derived from religious movements or from international 
conventions on indigenous rights, or those embodied in institutions such as the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC). 
Legal pluralism has a particular relevance in Loita and offers the possibility of ‘fo-
rum shopping’. Forum shopping is when ‘disputants have a choice between different 
institutions and they base their choice on what they hope the outcome of the dispute will 
be, however vague or ill-founded their expectations may be’ (K. von Benda-Beckmann 
1981: 117). In the land dispute discussed in Chapter 10 and in this dispute, strategies of 
forum shopping by the disputants were the order of the day. This chapter offers two 
instances of forum shopping: one is within a legal order and the other is between legal 
orders. Chapter 10 presented a case where forum shopping involved a (new) forum lo-
cated in the overlap of two legal orders.  
Loita’s classification as Trust Land effectively rules out the option of forum shop-
ping between legal orders when an issue concerns a land dispute. Loita Maasai dispu-
tants may take a land issue to a section meeting mediated by section leaders, to a locali-
ty meeting mediated by locality leaders or to a locality meeting mediated by an (assis-
tant) PA chief (see Chapter 10), but they cannot take such cases to state courts because 
the category of Trust Land makes land in Loita subject only to customary law (see 
Chapters 1 & 8). The 2008 Constitution of Kenya states in Chapter IX, Section 115 (2) 
on Trust Land that: 
Each county council shall hold the Trust land vested in it for the benefit of the persons ordinarily resi-
dent on that land and shall give effect to such rights, interests or other benefits in respect of the land as 
may, under the African customary law for the time being in force and applicable thereto, be vested in 
any tribe, group, family or individual. (Emphasis added) 
African customary law is not spelled out or specified in state law as it is understood 
to vary from community to community. From this perspective, the African customary 
law that is being considered here is Loita Maasai customary law as it is enacted by Loita 
leaders during dispute meetings.1 As long as land in Loita remains Trust Land, it will 
                                                 
1  I have tried to avoid the term ‘customary law’ because the concept is loaded with disparate and often 
conflictual intellectual baggage. But for current purposes, the following distinction is important. I 
distinguish between ‘customary law’ (note the quotation marks) enacted in state courts and Loita 
Maasai customary law (without quotation marks) enacted in the arena of the Maasai meeting. A case 
of ‘Maasai customary law’ being enacted in court took place in 2008. This concerned a Maasai 
inheritance dispute where the judge referred to and considered ‘Masai customary law’ in his ruling 
(‘In Re Estate of Lerionka ole Ntutu (Deceased) [2008] eKLR’:  
www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/SUCCESION_CAUSE_No_1263%20OF%202000.pdf 
accessed 13/5/14. If the same case had been heard under Maasai customary law (note the absence of 
quotations marks), this would have happened under the mediation of the clan chiefs and during a clan 
meeting, as matters of inheritance come under the domain of the clan system. ‘Customary law’ is thus 
applied, interpreted and ultimately validated (or not) by state-appointed judges and magistrates and 
finds expression in state institutions such as tribunals and the court house. This is legally provided for 
in the Judicature Act that defines the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts and states that ‘African customary 
law’ is to guide civil cases (i.e. disputes) in which one or more of the parties is affected by the 
respective customary law as long as this does not conflict with written law (Judicature Act Cap 8, 
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continue to be governed under Loita law only. Locality and section leaders thus enjoy a 
certain degree of freedom and autonomy when it comes to settling land disputes. But 
there are limits too. Legislation regarding Trust Land specifies though does not elabo-
rate on the fact that African customary law is only valid as long as it is not inconsistent 
with written law.2 In civil cases, where customary law is sometimes considered, it is the 
courts that rule what it considers is in conflict with written law. What this means for 
land rights is unclear but the case described in Chapter 10 offers a clue. Chapter 10 
showed how the assistant chief, holding the ambiguous position of both Loita Maasai 
elder and agent of the state, played a crucial role in defining the limits of customary law 
vis-à-vis state law when he ruled that ‘dividing’ the land (as is purported to happen with 
formal state-led land demarcation and adjudication) pertained to state law and not to 
Loita law. Thus, although Loita law operates separately from –though in relation to – 
state law and although both laws are found empirically in different settings, Loita law 
stands in an unequal power relationship vis-à-vis Kenyan written state law as it is state 
law that defines the room for manoeuvre in Loita law.  
Although state courts have no jurisdiction over Loita’s land disputes, they do have 
the authority to hear cases of assault and injury. And it is precisely on these grounds that 
forum shopping between legal orders occurs in Loita. Reporting assault and injury to 
the police is a first step in initiating a state court. This was the basis on which the police 
were involved in the case presented in this chapter. It was not the land issue but the en-
suing fight that was the reason why the disputants ‘forum shopped’. Disputes can trans-
form over time (F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1997: 232) and state law in Loita only 
becomes an alternative legal framework when violence is part of the dispute. In fact, the 
(few) cases that were taken to the police on the grounds of assault and injury were in-
deed all triggered by disagreements over land. To my knowledge, none of these cases 
actually reached court but the threat of this possibility was an issue in dispute meetings 
in Loita. It is important to note that the state forums available are as diverse as the Loita 
forums. Theoretically, the disputants in the present case could have gone to the DO (or 
the PA chief) with their complaints, as they too have jurisdiction over matters of law 
and order. But the fact that they chose a particular state agency, namely the police, 
seems to have been because the police offered them a so-called P3 form (a legal docu-
ment that can be produced in court as evidence of bodily harm) that could be used as a 
weapon in the arena of the Loita dispute meeting. The ‘state’ was particularly visible in 
the form of this P3 form. Thus, by emphasizing the ‘legally relevant’ (F. von Benda-
Beckmann et al. 1997: 232) aspect of the dispute, namely physical harm, state law is 
often used in struggles over land. Strategies of forum shopping show that Loita Maasai 
play the different authorities off against each other and across and within legal orders or 
in their overlap, in an attempt to have their land claims recognized. We can see that ‘the 
definition of the dispute is a means to establish jurisdiction and thus a means of forum 
                                                 
Section 3 (2)). Both ‘customary law’ and customary law were historically formed and are subject to 
change. 
2  ‘Provided that no right, interest or other benefit under African customary law shall have effect for the 
purposes of this subsection so far as it is repugnant to any written law’ (Constitution of Kenya, revised 
edition 2008 (2001), Trust Land, Section 115 (2)). 
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shopping’ (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 118) and that only when violence becomes 
part of a land dispute can the state assume jurisdiction.  
Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1981: 117) also discusses ‘shopping forums’, which 
is when the authorities of forums try ‘to acquire and manipulate disputes from which 
they expect to gain political advantage or to fend off disputes which they fear will 
threaten their interest’. This brings us back to the struggle between Loita leadership and 
state actors and between Loita law and state law over power and authority. We will see 
how the section leaders displayed shopping-forum behaviour by appropriating the dis-
pute meeting because they expected to gain some political advantage: their aim was to 
regain their control over people and strengthen their position of power in Loita. State 
actors, on the other hand, seem to be more passive in their shopping-forum activities. As 
we shall see, the police were quite unwilling to travel all the way to Loita to make an 
arrest as they risked not even finding the person in question on their arrival. Instead, 
they chose to wait for a phone call with information as to the location of the suspect 
from the person who had reported the matter to them so that they would not waste time 
and resources.  
Prelude to the section meeting:  
forum shopping between and within legal orders 
This section presents a detailed description of the events that led up to the section meet-
ing that is the focus of this chapter. The reconstruction of what happened is primarily 
based on the oral statements given during the section meeting by the two disputants and 
that of a third man who attended the locality meeting and had witnessed the fight.3 The 
dispute started as a quarrel between two neighbours but the son of one of them also be-
came involved in the conflict.4 
 
The fight 
Having recently married and moved into his new homestead, Leshan ole Moniko started 
booking and clearing a field not far away on a plain on the eastern side of the Arus Riv-
er in Loita’s middle zone. Lemayian ole Kipurda, who lives on the hill north of ole 
Moniko’s homestead across the stream that runs from the forest into the Arus River, 
opposed the location of this new field. Ole Moniko and ole Kipurda belonged to differ-
ent localities but they both had valid claims to land on the plain. In the past, before 
members of ole Moniko’s locality started building homesteads on the plain, it had been 
an uninhabited border zone between the two localities and was a shared grazing area. 
However as settlements started to spread, the plain became an area where land disputes 
                                                 
3  Although at the time I was an immediate neighbour of one of the two disputants, I did not attend the 
locality meeting that erupted in fighting. However, I did follow the ensuing events closely afterwards, 
which was when I noticed commotion in the locality that same afternoon. I attended only the first day 
of the two-day section meeting that followed the locality meeting but both days were recorded and 
transcribed. I also attended (and recorded) the reconciliation ceremony a few days later that closed the 
series of meetings. Numerous conversations and informal interviews with the disputants, their family 
members, friends and neighbours, as well as the locality and section leaders further support the 
analysis of the section meeting. 
4  They all belong to different age-sets.   
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increasingly flared up. Following the correct procedure, ole Kipurda forwarded his 
complaint to the elders of ole Moniko’s locality. Ole Moniko was ordered to stop work 
on the field until the matter had been heard at a locality meeting that was set to take 
place the following Sunday.5 So far, so good. 
An incident that happened the day before the meeting set the stage for the violent 
events that occurred during the locality meeting the next day. That Saturday, the son of 
ole Kipurda started to fence off a piece of land for a homestead next to ole Moniko’s 
new field. The two young men quarrelled but parted before things got worse. Ole 
Kipurda’s son had been accompanied by an armed warrior. The following day, ole 
Kipurda’s son arrived at the locality meeting with a spear and adopted a rather aggres-
sive stand. He then took his spear home after an elder ordered him to do so but returned 
with an iron club instead of the common wooden one. These three factors would later be 
taken as proof that ole Kipurda’s son had been ready to resort to physical violence and 
was prepared to harm ole Moniko. 
 
 
Map 11.1 The disputed land 
 
 
 
On the day of the locality meeting, it was resolved that ole Moniko had the right to 
his own field like every married man in Loita, but that the spot that he had chosen and 
                                                 
5  This was on 30 September 2007. 
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where he had already started to clear land had been ill-chosen. That area, it was de-
clared, was part of the locality’s common olokeri and, as such, was unavailable for other 
uses. After the locality meeting, the elders proceeded to identify a place for ole Moniko 
to have his field. While determining its size, ole Moniko and ole Kipurda began to argue 
and exchanged harsh words and insults. At that point, ole Kipurda’s son lost his temper 
and attacked ole Moniko with his iron club. Some of ole Moniko’s friends and age-
mates intervened and started beating up ole Kipurda’s son until others could separate 
them. Ole Kipurda and his son fled the scene but ole Moniko was badly hurt and needed 
to be taken to the Entasekera Health Centre for treatment. 
 
Latent friction between the Inkidongi and the non-Inkidongi 
The fight was serious because blood flowed. In addition, the issue threatened to escalate 
into a much larger (land) conflict pitting Inkidongi against non-Inkidongi. This layer in 
the conflict is relevant because, as we saw in the epilogue to Chapter 9, the Inkidongi 
lineage increasingly seems to be claiming land for their own use separately from the rest 
of the Loita. Ole Kipurda belonged to the Inkidongi family and ole Moniko did not. The 
stream between ole Moniko and ole Kipurda’s homesteads not only marked the bounda-
ry between the plain and the locality to which ole Kipurda belonged but also represented 
the boundary between the area occupied by the Inkidongi family of laibons and the rest 
of the Loita Maasai.   
When Senteu settled in Loita after 1902 (see Chapter 3), his family and dependants 
occupied the Kisokon area in the east of Loita close to the Naimina Enkiyio Forest but 
on the southern side of the Olngarua Swamp. Senteu is said to have had 36 wives but he 
lost most of them before he settled in Loita.6 It appears that when Senteu arrived, he 
found the area was already occupied by a mix of Kisongo Maasai, Loita Maasai and 
other Inkidongi families (brothers of his father Mbatiany) but when he settled there 
‘they all ran away’.7 The Kisongo went back to their homeland around the Ngorongoro 
Crater in Tanzania and the Inkidongi families settled among the Matapato Maasai. The 
Loita withdrew to the south and west.  
Senteu’s family members did not disperse and settle among their fellow Loita. This 
nucleated settlement pattern is in stark contrast to the dispersed settlement pattern of the 
rest of the Maasai (Berntsen 1979: 137). Among Loita who do not belong to the Ink-
idongi, family members tend to disperse: adult sons commonly migrate to join other 
homesteads or form a separate homestead with other clans, often age-mates or, nowa-
days, on their own. Inkidongi families, by contrast, tend to remain in close proximity to 
each other (Ibid.). Spencer (1991: 334, 336) noted that Inkidongi homesteads were in-
clined to be located in areas where sections neighboured each other and each settlement 
cluster was typically associated with a branch of the wider Inkidongi family. The House 
of Senteu indeed occupies such a boundary area: Kisokon joins on to the boundary with 
the Purko. On the other side of the boundary in a locality called Oltarakuai, there is an-
other cluster of the Inkidongi family called the House of Neiliang (Enkang e Neiliang), 
who are the descendants of Neiliang, a half-brother of Senteu. Whereas the members of 
                                                 
6  Twenty of them according to Waller (1978: 234). 
7  Interview MS: 21/11/08. 
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the House of Senteu consider themselves Loita because they live in the Loita section, 
the House of Neiliang has attached itself to the Purko section. 
When Senteu settled in Loita, a considerable uninhabited area divided his homestead 
from the rest of the Loita. His sons Simel, Kone, Olooltoronken and Mepukori, all from 
the Ilterito age-set, were then still boys and they and their descendants later came to live 
on both sides of the Olngarua Swamp with their homesteads stretching to the north and 
south. Loita Inkidongi homesteads reach Napolasar in the north in Morijo Loita Loca-
tion. The sons of Senteu’s younger brother Ngabual − Letutui, Kididingi and Oloshoroi 
− spread southwards and westwards and their descendants now occupy part of Entasek-
era Location. At the same time that the Inkidongi were spreading to the south and west, 
non-Inkidongi families were moving in the opposite direction to occupy areas that had 
previously been used for dry-season grazing by Inkidongi, such as the Empurputia 
Swamp. Today, as a result of population growth and territorial expansion, the previous-
ly empty zone between the Inkidongi and the rest of the Loita has disappeared and, in 
some places, Inkidongi families live side by side with families that do not belong to the 
Inkidongi. This has created tensions over land that did not exist before. The land dispute 
between ole Kipurda (a member of the Inkidongi family) and ole Moniko (who is not an 
Inkidongi) was an expression of this underlying tension. In the turmoil that followed the 
fight when emotions were running high, I heard several people declaring that this was a 
‘war’ between the ‘Loita’ and the ‘Inkidongi’ over land and territory. Although this in-
terpretation was quickly dismissed by the elders, it indicates how disputes over land 
between members of these two groups are putting pressure on the historical alliance 
between the Loita and the House of Senteu to the point that the Inkidongi of Loita are 
not being considered ‘Loita’ anymore. 
    
Reporting the matter to the police: the P3 form 
Early in the morning on the day after the fight, ole Kipurda and his son travelled to 
Narok town, the administrative centre of Narok District. Ole Kipurda’s explanation was 
that he had gone to Narok because he was concerned about his son’s health as he had 
been vomiting blood since the fight and ole Kipurda wanted him to be treated in a hos-
pital with an X-ray machine, which the Entasekera Health Centre in Loita lacked. Ole 
Kipurda asserted that it was while he was in Narok that he decided to report the matter 
to the police. The procedure followed by the Kenyan police for filing a case and arrest-
ing an alleged offender requires a medical examination that reports the nature and extent 
of the injuries sustained by the complainant. This involves filling in a Kenya Police 
Medical Examination Form, also known as the P3 form. The medical examination has 
to be carried out by a medical officer or practitioner who, by signing the document, 
agrees to give evidence in a court of law if necessary. The fact that ole Kipurda went to 
Narok very early in the morning without informing anyone to get a P3 form for the ar-
rest of ole Moniko would become the main issue in the section meeting that is discussed 
later in this chapter. This is a clear instance of forum shopping between legal orders. 
Pursuing this road meant opting to fight a battle in a Kenyan court under state law. For 
the governing elders in Loita, this implied that ole Kipurda favoured Kenyan law over 
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Loita law. It is no surprise then that ole Kipurda’s actions met strong disapproval from 
the mediating leaders. 
Ole Moniko waited in Loita for the whole day for ole Kipurda to return from Narok 
to settle the fight at a dispute meeting according to Loita law. At this point, land was not 
the issue as this had already been resolved by the locality meeting: the issue was now 
the fight between the two men. Eventually, and uncertain as to what was happening in 
Narok, he got the go-ahead from the locality elders to go to Narok and get his own P3 
form so that he would be able to defend himself if ole Kipurda had gone to Narok to get 
one. 
In the meanwhile, ole Kipurda’s relatives from the locality he belonged to convinced 
ole Kipurda (who arrived shortly before ole Moniko left) to leave the police out of the 
issue and settle the fight in the Maasai way. They subsequently approached a respected 
elder from the area who belonged to neither of the two localities about mediating the 
dispute between ole Moniko and ole Kipurda. This move, brought about by ole Kipur-
da’s party, effectively lifted the issue from the locality level to section level. This is a 
second example of forum shopping but this time within the Loita legal order. 
Resolving the fight 
The section meeting was held in a neutral spot at the Entasekera trading centre twelve 
days after the locality meeting.8 Two mediators presided over the meeting and the fact 
that they were asked to mediate meant that they were recognized as section leaders. One 
was the respected elder who was introduced above and who I will simply refer to as the 
section leader. This man belonged to the governing age-group and was considered to be 
wise and fair. He is often called on to mediate matters that have got out of hand. The 
other mediator was age-group chief ole Maine, whom was introduced in Chapter 1. At 
that time (in 2007), ole Maine did not yet belong to the governing age-group but was an 
equally respected leader. Ole Maine had been approached because of his proven skills 
as a mediator and his leadership position as age-group chief further added weight to his 
authority. Both the section leader and ole Maine were influential Loita leaders and were 
considered to have a profound knowledge of Maasai law and experience with dispute 
mediation. Neither of them had gone to school. The analysis of the section meeting in 
this and the next section follows the course of the two-day meeting. 
 
Identifying ole Kipurda as the wrongdoer 
The meeting was opened by ole Maine who explained the way the meeting would pro-
ceed: ‘We first find the mistake before we go to the solution’. To find out what went 
wrong and the wrongdoer (olarruoni, pl. ilarruok), he called the two men to give their 
sides of the story. He called ole Moniko first to give his account of the events: ‘Ero, 
why were you beaten?’. Ole Moniko stood up to tell his story and ole Kipurda followed 
with his version of the story. Their accounts were largely consistent and only differed 
slightly in nuance. After their statements, the section leader called a witness to recount 
how the fight had occurred. The witness gave a lengthy and detailed speech that was 
                                                 
8  It was neutral because it did not belong to either of the two localities. 
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followed by a speech by ole Maine who concluded that the mistake lay with ole Kipur-
da. He clarified his point as follows: 
It was not ole Kipurda who planned the fight, for sure. This elder did not have that idea. And if you 
want to be sure [of this], [it is] because (...) he did not bring ten [supporters to fight], (...) but he came 
to talk [with] the elders [of ole Moniko’s locality]. If he had wanted to fight, he would have called his 
supporters [to go to the meeting with him]. Would he have fought if he was alone? It [the fight] was 
just an accident because [fathers] don’t have power over their children. (...) You [addressing ole 
Kipurda] didn’t tell him [i.e. his son] to beat him up. (...) You didn’t know you would quarrel with ole 
Moniko. You just planned to refuse him [the place for the field]. (...) But his son was ready [to fight]. 
(...) Why didn’t you [addressing ole Kipurda] go like the day you looked for peace [i.e. following the 
procedure of calling for a meeting to resolve the fight through dialogue]. And blood poured! And you 
were responsible because you are the one who quarrelled, but you refused, and you went to Narok in-
stead of him [ole Moniko] who was the one who was in his right to get the P3 [because his blood had 
flowed, he was visibly injured]. (...) And you could have called the elders and told them to come be-
cause the young men had fought. (...) You have degraded yourself [you didn’t act as an elder]. The 
custom of the Maasai is not like that. Let’s see how we can solve this issue of the young men so that it 
will not get worse. Can Narok solve it? Because you went the long [way of] solving, because you 
came with a P3. You say you seek peace but you are like an enemy. (...) The mistake is yours, not for 
anyone else. It was your child that applied [the mistake] on you. If you are a weak elder that cannot 
prevent the children from fighting, the mistake is yours. 
Ole Maine concluded that although ole Kipurda did not plan the fight, he made a mis-
take by going to Narok instead of solving the fight between his son and ole Moniko in 
the appropriate Loita Maasai way, i.e. by calling a meeting to resolve the issue. Ole 
Kipurda responded to ole Maine’s ruling with an extensive speech that ended with the 
following: 
 
Oyie, I have said I will accept if you tell me I made a mistake by going to bring the P3. And I have an-
swered you that I didn’t know about the issue of the fight [he did not plan it]. I have realized that I 
made a mistake, it doesn’t fit me, it is true, because I am a leader here and I am an elder. That is why I 
agree with the Maasai. It is as they say: you can make a mistake first because of foulness but you 
solve it later when you realize. I wish I had known. So in that, it is true, I accept that and I have fin-
ished. 
Ole Maine then clarified how the section meeting was only to deal with the issue of the 
fight and the issue of going to Narok to get P3 forms. The field or the homestead that 
ole Kipurda’s son wanted to erect were issues for the locality he explained, and needed 
to be discussed later at another locality meeting. After all, the locality had already 
reached a resolution before the fight broke out. Until this point, however, many of those 
who had come to the meeting had assumed that the land issue was part of the discussion 
and this announcement came as a shock. It was particularly disappointing for ole Moni-
ko who had hoped that the resolution reached by the locality leaders regarding the field 
he had started clearing would be overturned by the section leaders. 
 
Restraining ole Moniko 
After ole Maine spoke, the section leader stood up and questioned whether ole Kipurda 
had indeed had a P3 as he claimed. He believed that ole Kipurda was bluffing. So he 
concluded that the next step was to convince ole Moniko to annul the P3 that he, unlike 
ole Kipurda, had managed to get, to avoid ole Kipurda’s son being arrested by the po-
lice. The section leader compared the situation to two fighting bulls and explained that 
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they, the mediators, could not allow ole Moniko to ‘finish’ ole Kipurda’s son: ‘If a bull 
overthrows another one, will you [join him to] gore the one on the ground? No, you hit 
the one that overthrew him [to prevent him from killing the other one]’. The way for-
ward, the section leader explained, was to ‘guide everyone’ so that any animosity be-
tween the two neighbours would come to an end and peace would be restored. He then 
addressed ole Moniko directly: 
So I say, ole Moniko, you are the one who is in the right, as we see it. So from the meeting that we are 
in now, we are telling you, you cannot tie the other one. Or is there anyone who wants to say some-
thing different? [Everybody replied: ‘No one’.] And we are calling you to tell you that you cannot tie 
him. Even if you have the right. (...) We are not allowing you that weapon [i.e. the P3] that you have 
brought. We will take it away from you. That is why we are here. 
Ole Moniko, still angry that the land issue was not part of the agenda, reacted adamant-
ly: 
I will not listen to you because it is [ole Kipurda] who showed us the way to the police. So allow us to 
compete. (...) Let’s go further ahead [to the police], or you think we can’t do that? I say I don’t want 
that resolution. I am hurt, I lost the [case of the] field, I lost my cows, I lost blood. What if I don’t lis-
ten to you, what will you say? 
Ole Moniko’s reaction was one of genuine indignation and anger. He resented the fact 
that his obedience towards the elders of the locality (stopping work on his new field, 
accepting the elders’ resolution to move his field to another spot and later waiting for 
their blessing to involve the police) had been ‘rewarded’ with aggression on the side of 
ole Kipurda’s family. Not only had he been badly injured by a man from a younger age-
group (a shameful event in itself) but ole Kipurda and his son had also rushed to Narok 
and unjustly presented themselves to the police as victims. His anger was not only di-
rected at ole Kipurda and his son but also at the elders. He felt that while he had re-
spected the elders throughout, they were now letting him down. The only thing he need-
ed to do he shouted as he removed a piece of paper from his pocket was to rush uphill 
and call the police to come to get ole Kipurda’s son because, unlike ole Kipurda, he did 
get a P3 form in Narok. The section leader responded to ole Moniko’s defiant stance by 
announcing that it was time to compensate ole Moniko. He praised his respect towards 
the governing elders and the behaviour he had shown in these stressful times, but he 
stood firm on the issue of the P3: 
You [ole Moniko] are the brave one today, you are the one who can fine the other one. Do you think 
we can allow you to tie the other? Who is holding the spear now? So [you think] we can stand [in the 
meeting] to tell you to spear that elder? (...) Nobody can stand and say: kill him nicely. (...) We refuse 
you that P3. 
The section leader’s speech was backed by two locality elders but ole Moniko remained 
equally uncompromising. The section leader then recounted the story of another case 
where two elders had fought and went for P3s. When they realized that the P3s would 
not resolve the matter, they returned to Loita to seek mediation in the Maasai way: 
Ero, two elders who fought, ole Sinti and ole Nkai,9 cut each other’s ears. Ole Sinti stayed the way 
you did, and friends took ole Nkai to get a P3, and he got a P3. We heard in Narok that this guy had 
got a P3 and we told the other one [i.e. ole Sinti] to get one too because how can he stay without one, 
if the other one got one. He [i.e. ole Sinti] got it. Listen, ole Moniko, because I could have told you to 
                                                 
9  Not their real names. 
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go, I was like those elders. I could have told you to go. When they did this, the police came to take the 
other one and when they went to the table, they both had a P3. They locked them up together and they 
both had cut ears. And when they put them in jail, the police told them to come to an agreement. Ole 
Nkai refused. He was thinking his P3 was more powerful than the other one. And the other one told 
him that they should agree on one thing so that they could go home because they were the same. And 
he refused. And they were locked up. And when they were inside the cell, there were many different 
people, like those that say: ‘what can you give me then we will tell you how you can win’ [lawyers?]. 
Then they told him the cases were equal. Now and then he agreed and he told the other one let’s re-
quest [permission] to get out. They allowed them [to get out] and they went to mediation [in the Maa-
sai way]. 
As the meeting progressed, more elders stood up to urge ole Moniko to leave his P3. 
Ole Moniko started to realize that pursuing the police route might not be the best way 
forward as it might be a costly and time-consuming enterprise, and one that he could not 
afford. He had, after all, recently started a family and was still constructing his home-
stead. It would also put him in a bad light in Loita because he would go against the 
wishes of the Loita leaders. Aware at the same time that he was in a strong bargaining 
position because he had a P3 and ole Kipurda did not, he eventually, though reluctantly 
at first, opted to begin negotiations regarding compensation. Being uncooperative was 
initially a tactic to position himself advantageously in the face of the imminent negotia-
tions. However, it was not until ole Moniko’s eldest brother summoned ole Moniko to 
give a clear answer that he opened the negotiations by expounding on his (extremely 
exaggerated) expenses: 
I have aja conditions if you want me to bring back my P3, three of my oxen [that he claims he sold to 
pay his expenses]. If you don’t comply, I am going to tie [ole Kipurda’s son]. (...) Here is the P3 of 
my oxen and there is no way to reduce it, no way that you will do that. I demand aja thousand [KSh 
100,000]. Aja [100] thousand. During the fight I hired vehicles: it cost me KSh 10,000. And when I 
went to the police, and you know how they are, I used another 25,000. I was beaten yesterday, as you 
know, and I went for P3 after going to the hospital where I spent 25,000. And the transport I used to 
collect my brothers, it cost me 10,000. Oyie, I am deaf now and there are letters that are here that 
show that I am deaf, and if you try to hold this ear, it is like there is a drum inside. I also can’t see if I 
close this eye, I cannot differentiate a person and a tree from afar and I used to differentiate them be-
fore. So if [ole Kipurda’s son] knows where to buy a new eye then go and buy it. If such a place ex-
ists. If there is a place to go and buy an ear, then go and buy it. That costs 50,000 plus 25,000 plus 
10,000 becomes 85,000. Is it not the 100,000 of my P3 of my oxen? So stand up and find out how to 
do it because that is what I want. 
Ole Moniko finally gave in but demanded huge compensation in return for not going 
down the route of using the P3 to jail ole Kipurda’s son.  
 
Punishing ole Kipurda’s son 
Loita Maasai law provides different punishments for specific offences that breach cul-
tural rules of respect and proper behaviour in the mediation of fights. Punishments in-
volve fines in the form of livestock, sometimes accompanied by smaller gifts. In the 
case of a fight between two men, the fine and the direction of the fine, i.e. who gives 
what to who, is dictated by the nature of the injury, if any, and the relationship between 
the two men. The most unambiguous fines are those that involve men that belong to 
different age-groups and different clans. These fines are irrespective of who was found 
to be in the wrong. When a man kills another man and both are from Loita, clanship 
plays an important role (see Chapter 6). The rule is that the killer’s clan has to find 49 
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cows, which can be donated by any elder of the clan, and these are given to the clan of 
the person who was killed. A homicide in a section is a very serious case and its im-
portance is apparent as the whole clan bears responsibility for the act of one of its mem-
bers. In cases where the fight does not result in death, the fine is the personal responsi-
bility of the offender. A fine stands for the loss inflicted on the injured person, whether 
this is death or injury. In the case of death, the 49 cows stand for the 49 bones of the 
dead man.10 Broken bones are compensated with a heifer and the offender slaughters a 
sheep for the injured to compensate for the loss of blood. This fine is called enker enko-
pito. When the men involved in a fight are from different age-sets, the younger man has 
to give a heifer to the older man, even if the older man is found to be in the wrong. The 
heifer transferred from junior to senior is traditionally accompanied by a shuka (a blan-
ket worn as a cape, usually by old men) and honey beer. This fine (the heifer, the shuka 
and the beer) is called eropet and is offered to the older man in a reconciliation ceremo-
ny and he responds with a blessing. This peace-making ceremony restores the damaged 
relationship between the two men and brings closure to any enmity. 
The fight between ole Moniko and ole Kipurda’s son called for two of these rules. 
Because ole Moniko lost blood at ole Kipurda’s son’s hands, ole Kipurda’s son was 
required to slaughter a sheep for ole Moniko. In addition, because ole Kipurda’s son 
belonged to a younger age-group than ole Moniko, he had to give him a heifer too. 
These two fines were quickly decided upon during the meeting and did not require any 
negotiation as these rules have been in place since time immemorial. 
Regaining control by making a new rule 
As explained above, the mediating leaders knew how to punish and impose fines for the 
fight because fighting and meetings to resolve fights ‘were there from the time we were 
children’. However, a new element had complicated the fight between ole Moniko and 
ole Kipurda. Their case was one of a growing trend of individuals opting to involve the 
police and state law rather than seeking the mediation of Loita leaders. For the leaders, 
this trend was a cause of worry and needed to be dealt with. The issue ran through the 
entire section meeting but was particularly visible in the latter part. 
 
White men’s law 
The term ‘state law’ was not used in the meeting but was referred to in many ways. One 
man described it as ‘going to the government’ but it was mostly called ‘the way of the 
ilashumpa’ or the white men (see Chapter 5). This undoubtedly refers to the colonial 
period when Maasai first came into contact with a police force under white command 
and courts set up and cases heard by white administrators and officials (Berman 1990: 
103). This framework, which was imposed in the colonial period and inherited by Ken-
ya at independence, has not changed much in the eyes of the Loita. Even though the 
skin colour of the police commanders and magistrates changed with independence, state 
law is still called the ‘ilashumpa way’ by the Loita. 
                                                 
10  Elsewhere in Maasailand the number 9 from the 49 cattle fine stands for the number of orifices in a 
man’s body (ole Sankan 1971: 14). 
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Another way in which state law was referred to was by using the phrase ‘going to 
Narok’ or simply ‘Narok’. In Loita experience, Narok is the nearest hub of state law. 
And a final way of speaking about state law is in relation to cattle, which are the pride 
and wealth of the Maasai. Going to Narok is like ‘wasting cattle’: one has to sell cows 
to raise the cash to pay for transport to Narok, to pay for hotels and food in Narok, to 
pay hospital bills in Narok, perhaps to bribe police officers in Narok, to pay a lawyer for 
representation in court, etc. To follow the ilashumpa way is to ‘finish your cows’, and 
so instead of fellow Loita benefiting from this (by receiving fines imposed during meet-
ings for instance), it is ‘guys from other tribes [that] eat our cows’. One elder reasoned: 
‘Let us bring back [the case] to be us “who are eating”, it will not be a waste, let us not 
take it to the Kamba [nickname for the police]11 because they will eat these and more, 
and they cannot mediate [between the two of] you the way we are doing’. 
 
Cutting the horns of the Loita leaders  
One locality leader accused ole Kipurda of bypassing the locality elders: ‘That is what 
we tell you because you fought and you decided to go to the ilashumpa and we were not 
the ones who sent you!’ This accusation reveals an important issue: going to Narok for a 
P3 form is not in itself a problem. The problem is rather that ole Kipurda went without 
consulting the locality leaders. Ole Kipurda’s action was a direct affront to the authority 
of the locality leaders. For them, this trend of going to Narok, involving the police and 
fighting disputes in courts of law without the blessing of the elders was a serious prob-
lem that needed to be tackled head on. It was, after all, a threat to their authority that 
seriously jeopardized their role as the governors of Loita. 
Disapproval of this new trend was repeatedly voiced by the elders in the meeting. 
One elder exclaimed: ‘This thing that they go away [to Narok]. You know, we hate it!’ 
The reason for their dislike was succinctly put into words by the section leader: ‘[be-
cause it] takes away [the case] from the elders’. Choosing the ilashumpa way not only 
means disowning the authority of the elders to mediate disputes but also means curtail-
ing their power to govern and rule over Loita. Ole Maine discussed this issue in a clear 
and unequivocal manner by likening the power of the governing elders to the horns of 
the bull. The horn is the bull’s weapon and his horns give him strength and power. The 
sharper the horns, the stronger and more powerful the bull is. Ole Maine blamed the 
people who go to Narok of ‘cutting’ the horns of the Loita leaders, i.e. reducing their 
strength and power.   
The causes of this new development were also discussed and analysed during the 
meeting. For ole Maine, the problem lay in the criticism that the mediating leaders were 
facing in Loita. Ole Maine observed that people had been referring to mediators who 
punish offenders with heavy fines as ilowuarak (predators, sing. olowuaru), even if they 
had solved the case in a just way. The word olowuaru refers to animals like lions and 
leopards that take and eat Maasai livestock. When used for people, it retains this nega-
tive connotation and describes a greedy or jealous person (Spencer 1988: 134) who en-
joys ‘eating’ the livestock of others, i.e. by setting fines. Ole Maine believed that out of 
                                                 
11  The Kamba are one of the larger ethnic groups in Kenya. Loita Maasai say that the police and the 
army are mostly staffed by Kamba. 
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fear of developing a reputation as olowaru, mediators had been mediating disputes in a 
soft way. The problem with soft mediations was, he felt, that the punishments and fines 
were ‘weak’ and did not provide disputants with durable solutions or discourage others 
from committing the same infractions. ‘That is why’, in ole Maine’s opinion, ‘the cases 
are going to Narok’. He blamed the people who unfoundedly criticize mediators but he 
mostly blamed the leaders of Loita: ‘You are the ones who are allowing [these things to 
happen]’. It was because of their weakness and the fact that they were succumbing to 
social pressure that inconsistent and unwell mediations were taking place. He thus 
called on the governing elders and Loita leaders to ignore their critics and mediate 
‘strongly’ to ensure that disputes did not recur and that wrongdoers did not repeat the 
same mistakes and to discourage others from transgressing social rules.  
In this attempt at rallying the elders to regain control of social life in Loita, it was 
agreed that something needed to be done to stop people from taking recourse to state 
law – and thus of further ‘cutting the horns of the elders’. As a very old man told the 
governing elders: ‘You have to bring the people back into line’. One way in which this 
could be done was by formulating a new rule and determining a fine that punished those 
who involved the police and bypassed the governing elders. Ole Maine was the first to 
explicitly call for ‘a rule’ that would ‘guide’ the people: ‘that when people fight and 
take the cases to Narok without informing them [i.e. the governing elders of the locali-
ty], then there will be a fine’. As a result of the dispute context, the fine would go to the 
other side. In other words, what was being made unlawful was forum shopping without 
the elders’ knowledge and consent. The reasoning behind the rule was that those who 
opted to go to Narok anyway in this manner would face another case in Loita upon their 
return. Ole Maine rhetorically asked: ‘What do you think people will do if there are two 
cases that will eat you?’ 
 
The jurisdiction of the new rule 
At a certain point in the meeting, some of the locality leaders tried to take back owner-
ship of the meeting. They called for devolution of the case to the locality: ‘I wanted to 
tell the Loita, let’s postpone [the meeting] to next Sunday so that we can meet and agree 
as the locality [first]’. The locality elders wanted to decide on the fine to punish ole 
Kipurda without interference from the section leaders. The section leaders, however, 
refused this on two grounds. First, it was impossible to return the matter to the locality 
because it had already reached the level of section: ‘You wanted to take back [the case] 
to the group of the locality after you first called the Loita?’. Ole Kipurda and his rela-
tives had called for mediation at the level of Loita and the section leaders had accepted, 
so they now had the responsibility of solving the case. Secondly, Loita mediators raised 
some serious concerns about the impartiality with which ole Kipurda would be fined. 
They feared that the locality leaders, bitter as they were about his disrespect, might let 
their feelings determine his fine. A third point was not explicitly mentioned by the sec-
tion leaders but transpired as the meeting progressed. By mediating this particular case 
in a section meeting, the section leaders could tackle the sort of behaviour that ole 
Kipurda had shown, i.e. going to Narok without informing the locality leaders. The fight 
between ole Moniko and ole Kipurda offered them an opportunity to deal with this be-
273 
 
haviour and make it apply to all Loita Maasai in one fell swoop. This is because, as a 
section meeting, the rule that came out of it would cover the whole Loita section and not 
only the locality where ole Moniko and ole Kipurda lived. 
When fights cut across the social lines of age and clan, there are clearly defined rules 
and fines for dealing with the matter. But if the two men involved in a fight belong to 
the same age-group or clan, resolutions vary. When two age-mates or clan-mates fight, 
it is the responsibility of the respective age-group and clan to discipline them and fines 
are determined at the age-group’s or clan’s discretion. In this way, individual age-
groups and clans have developed their own legal rules for disciplining fellow age- or 
clan-mates at age-group and clan meetings. In a similar way, a locality has the freedom 
to impose and define new fines on its residents if existing rules are lacking, or to add a 
fine to a known one if the case seriously endangers social peace in the locality. Such a 
new rule and fine can be used by other localities as examples when they face a similar 
situation. But it is not compulsory. Only when a new rule with a new fine is imposed in 
a section meeting will this rule and fine apply in the whole of Loitaland. 
This is why the section leaders were keen to take up the case of ole Moniko and ole 
Kipurda. The section meeting offered an opportunity for the section leaders to deal with 
the problem once and for all. With a new fine, they killed two birds with one stone. On 
the one hand, it functioned as compensation to soothe ole Moniko and encourage him 
not to deploy his P3. On the other hand, attached as it was to the new rule, it dealt with 
concerns over people bypassing the governing leaders and reaching out to state actors 
and institutions directly. The section leaders may not have deliberately ‘shopped’ for 
this dispute but it was certainly a chance that they could not let pass and they gratefully 
took it up and hung on to it. The advantage they hoped to get out of it, i.e. to regain con-
trol over the actions of the Loita people in relation to the state, was in the interests of 
Loita leadership in general. 
 
Formulating the fine 
Precise, careful and exhaustive formulation was required because the new rule covered 
the whole of Loita territory. A relative of ole Kipurda’s pointed out to the elders what 
the implications would be if ole Moniko’s requested compensation (of KSh 100,000) 
was honoured: ‘If you give ole Moniko those 85,000 in the wrong way today, another 
person will take it tomorrow’. What he was suggesting was that if ole Moniko’s obvi-
ously exaggerated demand was honoured, the governing elders would have to be con-
sistent and treat future cases in the same way. He warned that this could trigger a new 
trend of people seeking to obtain large sums of money unfairly by using the precedent 
of the case of ole Moniko and ole Kipurda. With this argument on the jurisprudential 
effect of the new fine, ole Kipurda’s relative successfully rebuffed ole Moniko’s exorbi-
tant demand. 
The governing elders then proceeded to review other P3 cases that could serve as ex-
amples for formulating the fine for the new rule. The debate eventually centred on the 
last case that the area had known and that pertained to the same locality where ole 
Moniko and ole Kipurda lived. The most respected locality leader was asked to elabo-
rate on the case that involved a fight between an elder and a younger man who was seri-
274 
  
ously injured and then got a P3 from Narok to jail the older man. A locality meeting 
was called to solve the issue and the elders persuaded the young man to abandon his P3 
claim. The old man was fined two traditional fines (a sheep to represent the blood lost 
and a heifer for the broken bones) plus a new fine that involved donating the biggest ox 
he had in his herd for a ‘meat feast’ (olpul, pl. ilpuli) for the young man. In the past, 
meat feasts were held prior to cattle raids so that the warriors could gain the strength 
and bravery they needed from the meat, the soup and the special herbs added to it. The 
elders would typically donate oxen to the warriors and meat feasts could last for several 
weeks. With the new fine, the elder would donate an ox to the younger man so that he 
gained strength and recovered from his injuries. It was seen as an appropriate fine from 
senior to junior. 
From this P3 precedent, the idea of using ‘the biggest ox of the herd’ was adopted. A 
relative of ole Kipurda then raised the issue of the ox’s true monetary value. Rather than 
fining ‘the biggest ox of the herd’, he proposed imposing a fine of an ox valued at a 
fixed price to make the rule less ambiguous for future cases: ‘Let me finish what I was 
saying so that we can agree as the section (olosho) that the one who injured another … 
has to contribute a heifer, a sheep and KSh 10,000 or the ox for 10,000. (...) Let’s agree 
on this 10,000 or the ox for 10,000’. This relative probably knew that ole Kipurda’s 
biggest ox was valued at KSh 30,000 and wanted to formulate the fine slightly different-
ly to reduce the burden on ole Kipurda. However, the section leader refused this argu-
ment and reiterated that the fine would consist of ‘the biggest ox of the herd’ regardless 
of its monetary value: ‘[we take] what there is, whether it is the ox for 5,000 or for aja 
thousand. And we’ll take that one because that is the one we found [in the herd]’. 
On several occasions during the negotiation process over the new fine, the audience 
was reminded of the important fact that the rule that was being formulated was to be-
come a section (olosho) rule that could influence them personally in future. One elder 
explained: ‘If the chiefs (ilaiguanak) agree, then it will be that ox. (...) And maybe you 
might say that [the rule] will stop at the locality [of ole Moniko], but it won’t stop there. 
It will go up to Mausa [a place faraway on the southern edge of Loitaland]’. Other el-
ders explicitly asked the audience whether they accepted the proposed rule: ‘Will you 
agree or not because as we are at a section [meeting] we will be using this thing from 
Mausa [south of Loita] up to Osupuko Oirobi [north of Loita]’. And another elder said: 
‘Do you agree that, we will be using this in the coming days as the Loita section?’ 
When no objections were raised, the section leader recapitulated the new rule and the 
new fine. The fine, the biggest ox of the herd, would stand for unlawfully (i.e. without 
the consent of the Loita leaders) obtaining a P3 in Narok and it would function as a gift 
to soothe the injured party ‘so that he will not file a case’. Ole Maine concurred with the 
section leader and the matter was closed. 
Conclusion: sharpening the horns of the state 
This chapter has shown that the authority of Loita’s leaders is being undermined not by 
resolute state actors forcefully trying to strengthen the state’s grip on Loita but by its 
own people who are involving the state. In this case, the state was brought in through 
the P3 form that carried the threat of (state) law enforcement and police involvement. 
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The thing is, as ole Maine put it, that as people cut the horns of the Loita leaders, they 
are, at the same time, ‘sharpen[ing] the horn’ of ‘Narok’.12 This chapter was not about 
land but about power and authority. More precisely, it was about power relations be-
tween Loita leaders and state actors and the struggle over who has the authority to gov-
ern Loita. By turning to state actors and statutory legal institutions and taking cases 
away from Loita’s leaders, people are giving the state more power. This development, if 
left unchecked, threatens to alter the power relations between the Loita and the state, 
and between Loita’s leaders and the Loita population. And this will not be in the inter-
ests of Loita leaders. Their position as intermediaries between Loita and the outside 
world are at risk. For the leaders, it has therefore been of paramount importance to gain 
control over the relationship between the Loita people and the state, and particularly 
over the forum-shopping activities of disputants. 
The section meeting discussed in this chapter bears some similarities with the locali-
ty meeting discussed in Chapter 10. In both cases forum shopping took place. For ole 
Mashati, who was able to bring in the assistant chief (a state employee) as mediator, 
forum shopping worked well. But ole Kipurda did not succeed in forum shopping be-
cause his case was eventually brought back to the Loita leaders: turning to the state had 
a devastating effect. The ‘biggest ox in the herd’ fine was an exceptionally heavy one. 
In addition, the fines that his son was expected to pay (the sheep and the heifer) also fell 
on ole Kipurda’s shoulders because his son was still living at his homestead. Ole Kipur-
da was fined heavily not only because the section leaders disapproved of this type of 
behaviour but because they wanted to reassert their authority in Loita too. The mecha-
nism for achieving this was rule-making and this meeting, therefore, reflects a process 
of law-in-the-making as well. It demonstrates how changes in law are the product of 
negotiations and new rules may be politically motivated or reflect struggles over power 
(Chanock 1978). 
Even though the section meeting was a magnificent show of power at the hands of 
the section leaders, the fact that they needed to do this exposes the predicament of Loita 
leadership, namely their struggle to maintain control over the people and social life of 
Loita. This takes us back to some of the earlier chapters in this thesis. As the (colonial) 
state started to make its presence felt in Loita, the role of Loita leaders as intermediaries 
with the state and the outside world grew in importance. Kone, who had succeeded his 
father Senteu as head of the family and became the first PA chief of Loita, was the main 
intermediary in the late-colonial period (Chapter 4) and during the early years of the 
newly independent Kenya (Chapter 5). Under Kone’s mediation, Loita’s leaders were 
reasonably successful at keeping state interventions at bay, which allowed them to con-
tinue governing Loita without much outside interference. But as state interventions in-
creased and these were joined by interventions in the name of both state and non-state 
development and nature conservation, it became increasingly difficult for Loita leaders 
                                                 
12  I heard the same issue being raised in another meeting. This was during a sub-DDC meeting that 
brought together all the Loita leaders, including the two section leaders mentioned in this chapter, and 
was convened by the DO. At a certain point when they were discussing how to handle illegal logging 
in the forest, one leader stood up and, speaking in Maa which the DO could not understand, he warned 
all those present not to give the DO, as a state agent, too much power by allowing requests for cutting 
timber to go through him.  
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to control matters and agree on what course of action to take. Chapter 8 showed how 
this pressure mixed with other struggles and fractured the Loita leadership into two 
groups. Yet at that point, the Loita people were still following their leaders when it 
came to external interventions, even if this meant that some followed one group of lead-
ers and others another. So leaders only had to deal with their own political disputes and 
wrangling and those with state actors and other outsiders. This chapter has demonstrat-
ed, however, that the relationship between the leaders and Loita followers is now com-
ing under increasing strain. Although the role of intermediary remains important, such 
as the age-group chief ole Maine’s intermediary role when Prime Minister Odinga visit-
ed Loita (see Chapter 1), this chapter has highlighted how people occasionally reach out 
to the state without the mediation of leaders. Voices are increasingly questioning the 
competency of Loita leadership, as became clear in this and the previous chapter. The 
display of power in the section meeting discussed in this chapter was in response to 
such criticism and an attempt at reversing this worrying development. Yet it would 
seem that the damage has already been done. Just as ole Mashati successfully manipu-
lated the struggle of power between (assistant) PA chiefs and locality leaders to suit his 
own ends (Chapter 10), so too might the struggle of Loita leaders to contain the influ-
ence of the state be taken advantage of. If so, this will lead to a further sharpening of the 
horns of the state. 
  
12 
Conclusions 
The dynamics of continuity: the struggle for 
self-government and the link to land and forest 
The previous chapter discussed how the struggle by Loita leaders to govern Loita in the 
face of growing state influence took shape in a section meeting. The meeting was a 
powerful display of authority in the context of legal pluralism. The immediate cause for 
the section meeting had been a land dispute and even though this was not at the heart of 
the meeting, it is an important detail as it was no coincidence that the struggle for au-
thority was linked to a dispute over land. In fact, the power of Loita leadership in rela-
tion to the state depends on their continued control over matters relating to land tenure 
and forest use and access. In other words, efforts at maintaining a degree of self-
government and at not being governed too closely by the state and other actors appear to 
hinge on their authority in matters relating to land and the forest. 
This situation was shaped by the category of Trust Land,1 which stipulates that such 
areas will continue to be governed under the ‘customary law’ of the inhabitants until it 
acquires the status of Private Land through adjudication and titling or is taken over by 
either Kenya’s central government (when it will become Government Land) or by the 
relevant county council in its capacity as legal trustee. These scenarios have not hap-
pened in Loita despite repeated attempts at demarcation and registration through the 
land adjudication programme and efforts to turn the forest into a nature reserve by 
Narok County Council. The land and the forest therefore still remain classified as Trust 
Land. This has cushioned and emboldened Loita leaders’ control over domains, i.e. ac-
cess to land and the forest, that are the cornerstones of Loita identity and socio-cultural 
life and their livelihoods, which gives them a powerful basis from which to govern their 
relationship with the state and other outside actors in an attempt to remain autonomous. 
Chapter 11 demonstrates this by showing how a land dispute between neighbours pro-
vided Loita leaders with a platform from which to address the state’s growing authority 
                                                 
1  Crown Land and later Native Land in colonial Kenya, and Community Land after the new 
Constitution came into effect in 2013. 
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in Loita. Ironically, state law – through the legal category of Trust Land – has given 
Loita leaders an important foothold in their struggle over authority with the state. 
The importance of controlling land and the forest in the quest for self-government 
evolved historically and is evident in leaders’ growing concerns with it. Chapter 4, 
which considered the colonial period, discussed how state interventions aimed at ren-
dering Maasailand ‘legible’ introduced leadership positions (the PA chief and the coun-
cillor) that had jurisdiction over corresponding land categories, namely the location and 
the ward. Since these land categories were calibrated against Loita’s territorial occupa-
tion at the time, a sense of these leaders having territorial authority developed and this 
laid the basis for the Loita leadership’s subsequent actions. The absence of other inter-
ventions beyond those of legibility due to state disinterest and Loita’s relative isolation 
strengthened the power of Loita leaders to avert unwanted state interventions in the co-
lonial period. After independence, as interventions increased and new governing actors, 
such as missionaries and NGOs, arrived on the scene, securing territorial control in-
creasingly appeared to inform the practices and strategies of Loita leaders. Chapter 5 
discussed the emergence of this pattern by showing how leaders accepted and reworked 
development interventions like the construction of a school and the establishment of the 
Ilkerin Project to prevent ongoing Purko encroachment. Gradually, however, interven-
tions started to target the territory itself, as was the case with state plans to create a wild-
life park in Kamorora (Chapter 5) and to make a nature reserve out of the Naimina En-
kiyio Forest (Chapter 8). These state attempts implied a loss of land and forest but also, 
importantly, a loss of autonomy as state control and scrutiny would have increased in 
the area. It challenged Loita leaders’ political leverage and much of their struggle for 
the authority to govern Loita therefore played out in the domains of land and forest. 
Continued control over land and the forest became an important source of power for 
Loita leadership. 
The fact that Loita leaders still have a significant degree of control over matters relat-
ing to land tenure and forest access in a context of increasing interventions is the result 
of a historically formed political space. Although this now appears to be narrowing (see 
Chapters 10 & 11), it has enabled leaders to operate and exercise authority fairly auton-
omously. The basis for this political space was set in the early colonial period when the 
Loita withdrew to the inaccessible and remote Loita Hills after losing the War of Mori-
jo, which meant they were spared the direct effects of the 1905 and 1910-1913 Maasai 
Moves (Chapter 3). It was also around this time that state legislation defining what 
would later become Trust Land started to be formulated. In addition, state control in the 
area remained relatively weak due to few interventions, certainly in comparison to those 
in other parts of Maasailand and Kenya (Chapter 4). Loita was largely left alone during 
the colonial period and this gave Loita leaders political latitude to negotiate and territo-
rialize state and non-state development interventions after independence to avert ongo-
ing Purko encroachment and other perceived threats to their territory, only some of 
which were successful (Chapter 5). At the same time, new leadership positions emerged 
(the PA chief, the councillor, the development leader) from engagement with the (colo-
nial) state and the world of development. These interlaced with the existing leadership 
cadre − the age-group leaders, the clan chief, the chief laibon − and the age-group-
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configured organization of leadership and transformed the structure of leadership and 
the role of leaders in the process (Chapters 4, 5, 6 & 7). But continued control of land 
and forest has not always been the result of the concerted and strategic actions of Loita 
leaders. Chapter 5 briefly discussed how internal leadership quarrels were partly to 
blame for the fact that the land adjudication programme did not materialize in Loita. 
And Chapter 8 showed how this same intra-Loita leadership conflict was at the root of 
the failures of Narok County Council’s forest plan and the IUCN project, a point that 
will be elaborated on later in this concluding chapter. In all three cases, the intervention 
was welcomed by some of the Loita leaders. At the end of the day, we can see that Loita 
leaders’ political manoeuvring, either intentionally or accidentally, played a significant 
role in Loita land and forest remaining in Loita hands.2 There was continuity not be-
cause nothing happened but as a result of the dynamics at play. 
A transnational arena of governmentality and political struggle 
The dynamics outlined in the previous section are themselves part and also an effect of 
a larger, historically produced arena that revolves around governmentality, political 
struggles and social change. To delineate the contours of this broad arena, I have com-
bined insights from Foucault (2001), Li (2007a), Scott (2009) and Ferguson & Gupta 
(2002) who all emphasize or elaborate on a particular aspect of it (see Chapter 2). Fou-
cault (1982, 2007 in Dean 2010: 17) coined the term ‘governmentality’ to analyse the 
form of power that is inherent in government by defining government as the conduct of 
conduct to denote a practice that aims to shape people’s behaviour. This study has bene-
fited from his broad concept of government, which was used to approach a wide range 
of interventions (colonial state interventions of legibility, the land adjudication pro-
gramme, Narok County Council’s forest plan and the IUCN project) as well as the ac-
tions of Loita leaders in meetings as practices of government and thus manifestations of 
governmentality. The tendency in the Foucauldian-inspired governmentality literature 
has been to analyse how governmental power is contained in governmental interven-
tions. Li (2007a), who focuses on interventions carried out in the name of development 
and/or nature conservation, goes a step further and has studied what it does to the peo-
ple who are targeted. She has investigated the effects of governmental interventions as 
they articulate with existing relations, practices, processes and struggles. Like Li, this 
study also analysed articulations and the effects of governmental interventions (Chap-
ters 4, 5, 8 & 9) but did so by incorporating the governing practices and political strate-
gies of leaders more explicitly in the analysis to capture all the relevant forces of power 
at play in Loita. Scott’s (2009) historical study of Zomia (upland South-East Asia) in 
The Art of Not Being Governed is useful in pinpointing more precisely the nature of 
these practices and strategies. Scott describes the social practices that were adopted by 
the inhabitants of Zomia to avoid being governed by emerging states as ‘state effects’. 
                                                 
2  Matter (2010b), who studied forest politics and the unofficial land adjudication process in 
Enoosupukia in the north of Narok District, makes a strikingly similar argument but by showing the 
opposite, i.e. how a lack of leadership (notably of state intermediaries such as the PA chief and 
councillor) among the local Dorobo appears to underlie their gradual loss of control over land and 
their forest. 
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For a long time, these political choices and strategies were successful thanks to the in-
accessibility and remoteness of the area. A similar dynamic is evident in Loita: increas-
ing governmental interventions over time have triggered political strategies by Loita 
leaders to avoid being governed too much by the state and other actors. The political 
space created for this is possibly partly due to Loita’s relative isolation geographically. 
Loita leaders were clearly not passively accepting the interventions that targeted them 
but were actively and strategically negotiating and governing them. But there is more to 
this, and both Li and Scott hint at it although neither elaborates on it. Scott referred to 
the population of Zomia as a ‘self-governing people’ and Li, with her case of the Free 
Farmers’ Forum in Indonesia, described how the farmers’ actions, in word and deed, 
conveyed claims to sovereignty and self-government. This shows that political respons-
es to governing interventions often go hand in hand with claims for self-determination 
and self-government. This was exactly the case in Loita. Such claims in Loita did not 
come out of the blue but were founded on existing self-governing structures organized 
at the level of the section and institutionalized in the age-group and clan systems (see 
Chapters 6 & 7). Here, leaders exercised authority (governmental power) in meetings 
and this represents a different form of governing from that in projects and programmes 
of intervention. What the political struggle for self-government and for not being gov-
erned in Loita most clearly shows is that governmentality is layered and multifarious, 
and transformative effects (in institutions, livelihoods and identities) occur as different 
forms of governing intersect, overlap and articulate over time. Leadership, as the field 
where this overlap most obviously takes place, has seen tremendous institutional change 
as it gradually took a territorial dimension after new leadership positions were intro-
duced and interventions started to target land and forest. In this changing context, lead-
ers slowly came to define themselves and their roles in relation to the state and other 
governing institutions and actors as these increasingly made their presence felt in Loita.     
Insights from Foucault, Li and Scott were useful in delineating the broad, historically 
produced arena of governmentality and political struggle as governmental interventions 
meet, intersect, influence and are influenced by governing practices and political strate-
gies in Loita. The case of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts (Chapter 8) best shows 
how this arena took shape in practice, as it was illustrative of how governmental inter-
ventions targeting part of Loita territory (the forest) articulated with the Loita leaders’ 
struggle for self-government and for not being governed. This case also helps to further 
refine the model outlined above in two important ways. First, it shows how governmen-
tal interventions and the practices of leaders are increasingly becoming interlocked. 
Ferguson & Gupta (2002) called this new form of governmentality ‘transnational gov-
ernmentality’ to highlight the complex and shifting alliances and networks of differently 
positioned governing actors. Both the Narok County Council forest plan and the IUCN 
project are good examples of this. The IUCN project came about through the alliance of 
an international environmental organization (IUCN) and a group of Loita leaders (the 
Ilkerin group) that were closely linked to a donor-funded NGO in Loita (the Ilkerin Pro-
ject). Narok County Council’s forest plan brought together a minister, Narok County 
Council and another group of Loita leaders (the Olorte group) that all rallied around a 
co-opted Loita councillor, who was also a clan chief.  
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The second point of refinement is connected to the first and springs from the centrali-
ty of a longstanding intra-Loita leadership conflict regarding understanding the course 
and outcome of the forest conflicts. The same amount of differentiation that Li (2007a) 
affords to her review of governmental interventions in Indonesia − i.e. by showing the 
variety of actors and institutions involved, their alliances and their struggles and the 
different, sometimes contradictory, ways in which they operationalized their projects 
and programmes of intervention − also needs to be extended to the governing practices 
of leaders. It is then clear that Loita leadership is a heterogeneous entity composed of 
actors with their own mutual histories and relations that may not always agree as to 
what path to follow when confronted with a new governmental intervention from out-
side. In combination with the first point, it follows that Loita leaders engage differently 
in the struggle for self-government and for not being governed since some may form 
alliances and become part of the governmental intervention as co-governing partners, 
while others will be involved in the politics of self-government and not being governed. 
The forest conflicts in Loita are interesting because the two leadership groups that di-
vided along this line in the first conflict (the Olorte group that aligned with the Narok 
County Council plan and the Ilkerin group opposing it) saw their positions, as ‘trustees’ 
and political ‘targets’ of intervention (Li 2007a) respectively, inverted in the second 
round of the conflict (the Ilkerin group allying with IUCN and the Olorte group oppos-
ing their project of co-management). This dynamic was decisive and led to the ultimate 
failure of both the Narok County Council plan and the IUCN project, with the result that 
the Naimina Enkiyio Forest is still under Loita control. 
What also became clear is that not only the governmental intervention was transna-
tionalized but so too was the struggle to not be governed. The Ilkerin group, for in-
stance, found widespread national and international support for their fight against Narok 
County Council’s plan. Using the case of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts, this 
thesis has shown that, in order to understand articulations and the effects of governmen-
tal interventions, it is not only important to incorporate practices and strategies of self-
government and those aimed at not being governed by the targeted people but to do so 
by paying attention to internal political tensions and dynamics in an era of transnational 
governmentality and political struggle.  
The introductory chapter to this thesis (Chapter 1) drew attention to the peculiar situ-
ation of a degree of political and territorial autonomy on the one hand, yet deeply rooted 
land- and forest-related change and conflict on the other in a context of increasing inter-
ventions and pressures. Both continued autonomy and profound changes are best under-
stood in the historically formed transnational arena of governmentality and political 
struggle that is outlined here. Continuity and change are effects of the articulations of 
governmental interventions with the struggle for not being governed and the claim to 
self-government. How Loita’s relative autonomy came into being has already been dis-
cussed in the first section of this chapter. The following sections draw some conclusions 
on the topic of change.   
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Capturing societal change  
This thesis captured a society in flux. Of course, social change is of all times but it 
would appear that, in relation to land, it has reached a point of heightened controversy 
in Loita, as is evident from the numerous land dispute meetings that took place during 
my period of fieldwork in the area. This fortuitously enabled me to see change happen – 
literally! I was able to witness snippets of law-in-the-making. But how can change be 
captured methodologically and analytically? This thesis has shown that a historically 
embedded actor-oriented approach, i.e. by focusing on what actors do, why and how, is 
a particularly suitable strategy for capturing societal change. 
Exploring the overlap of governmentality and political ecology made this theoretical-
ly possible. Governmentality is about changing and shaping the conduct of people and, 
in this way, making new subjects. Governmentality involves subject formation 
(Agrawal 2005; Bose et al. 2012; Bevir 1999: 349-350, 354-355). By focusing on the 
changing strategies of actors, including the way new rules are made that are then inter-
nalized, this study captures subjects-in-the-making. The study was interested in under-
standing the changing ways in which people engage with land and the forest, and with 
each other in relation to them. Tools and insights from political ecology, which takes 
these dynamics as its object of study, were thus part of the theoretical framework (see 
Chapter 2). Political ecology approaches socio-environmental change as a political pro-
cess. What governmentality and political ecology have in common and that bodes well 
for their compatibility is that they both engage with questions of power, power relations 
and political struggle. Governmentality as a form of power impinges on the political 
ecology of land tenure and forest use and access. This study offers a perspective on so-
cial change by linking governmentality and political ecology and by analysing the 
changing strategies of actors and subjects-in-the-making as political processes. The par-
adox is that by strategizing so as not to be governed, the Loita Maasai inevitably 
changed as subjects and internalized state-introduced rules, such as when Loita leaders 
allied with high-level politicians and adopted the role of political clients. 
Methodologically, social change was captured by studying the practices and strate-
gies of actors ethnographically and placing them in a long timeframe. The in-depth lon-
gitudinal study of six families that was carried out to understand Loita Maasai liveli-
hoods resulted in a finely tuned understanding of the family heads’ past, present and 
future strategies in relation to use, access and appropriation of land, which laid the 
groundwork for Chapters 9 & 10. By looking at the changing strategies and practices of 
particular actors, I have demonstrated how they were a manifestation of wider processes 
of societal change, such as the transition of pastoralism to agro-pastoralism, and chang-
ing tenure practices as well as how they were related to anticipated governmental inter-
ventions (Chapter 9). Land dispute meetings are arenas where practices and strategies of 
land appropriation by family heads are attended to when contested, but they also show 
how leaders (locality and section leaders but also PA chiefs) play an important role in 
mediating conflict and governing land appropriation (Chapter 10). Leaders were another 
group of actors whose strategies, practices and struggles were studied to understand 
processes of social change. Being at the forefront of dealing with governmental inter-
ventions and other pressures that imply a change in access and control of land and for-
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est, leaders are not only mediators of externally imposed change but, as governors 
themselves, they also shape and direct change, for example by formulating new rules, 
most visibly during meetings, as was evident in Chapters 10 & 11. 
This brings us to the last point I want to make here. Meetings turned out to be excel-
lent events for observing change. They are arenas where changes and problems were 
discussed, negotiated, dealt with and directed. Chapter 10 showed how a new way of 
land grabbing was seen as a problem in a land dispute meeting and how the mediat-
ing/governing leader tried to shape its course by making rules that would henceforth 
govern and put limits on the practice of land appropriation. And Chapter 11 showed 
how another emerging change, i.e. that disputants were by-passing Loita leaders and 
reaching out to the state’s legal system directly, was redirected by introducing a fine and 
formulating a new rule to tackle this pattern because it strengthened the power of the 
state and challenged the authority of the Loita leaders. To understand the arguments and 
actions observed in meetings, it was necessary to take a historical perspective and look 
into the mutual histories of the actors involved (the disputants, the supporters and the 
leaders), other antecedents and meetings that were referred to as well as expectations of 
what the future held for the persons involved and the Loita in general. This demonstrat-
ed that institutional changes can be captured by taking a historical perspective of peo-
ple’s motives, practices and strategies in the arena of meetings.            
Property-in-the-making 
 
 [S]ocial institutions such as property regimes are not ‘things’ which 
are there or not, they are what people do. 
(Juul & Lund 2002: 4 original emphasis) 
 
A long timeframe approach of arenas and practices of actors, including anticipation and 
future planning, made it possible for this study to capture how property is being ‘made’ 
in Loita. This was done by exploring the process of land appropriation and focusing on 
practices of claim making (Chapters 9 & 10). It shows how making property claims is 
all about ‘persuasion’ (Rose 1994) and communicating ‘territoriality’ (Ingold 1986). By 
describing how people ‘ground’ claims (for example, by building a fence) and ‘talk’ 
claims (such as in land dispute meetings), I demonstrate that land that was open for all 
to use is increasingly being claimed by individuals as their exclusive property. This is 
property-in-the-making and in analysing this dynamic, this study makes a theoretical 
contribution to illuminating the ‘grey zone’ between access and property (Sikor & Lund 
2009).  
Some conceptual and theoretical clarification is needed here. The process of proper-
ty-in-the-making in Loita is not part of a formalization process in the sense that custom-
ary tenure is made official through state-sanctioned, legally protected written documents 
(Benjaminsen et al. 2008). It is not a semi-formalization or informal formalization of 
property (Ibid.: 30, 32) and it is also not an informalization of formal tenure transfor-
mation (Matter 2010a). Instead, it is about individualization and consolidation of prop-
erty claims in line with the Loita’s own legal and tenure practices and arrangements. 
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Although the process of individualization occurs outside the formal state structures of 
tenure reform, it is not entirely an ‘autonomous evolution’ driven by population growth, 
land scarcity and the commercialization of agriculture (Platteau 1996). Loita’s land ten-
ure transformations are not only economically driven but must be seen in the changing 
context of political struggle and (transnational) governmentality that increasingly puts 
pressure on Loita territory and highlights the need to secure claims. This changing polit-
ical context combined with a growing anticipation of formalization in the context of a 
move from pastoralism to subsistent agro-pastoralism (itself triggered by population 
growth, among other things) and set the stage for property-in-the-making in Loita, as 
was demonstrated in Chapter 9. 
The process of property-in-the-making in Loita is not a move away from an open-
access regime to an individual property arrangement. Open access is what Hardin 
(1968) had in mind with his famous example of a pasture limitlessly open to all herds-
men, denoting that nobody can be excluded (Ostrom & Hess 2008: 6). Yet, as is seen in 
Chapters 8 & 9, although the unsettled lowland and highland areas (including the 
Naimina Enkiyio Forest) were open for transhumant pastoral use by all Loita Maasai, 
they were closed to pastoralists from other Maasai sections, except in times of drought. 
The same system was mimicked on a smaller scale at the level of locality where non-
residents were excluded from the pastoral resources in the locality that were used col-
lectively by the people who lived there. Grazing areas in Loita were thus not ungov-
erned or lawless, as is connoted with the notion of open access.  
They cannot either be adequately described as common property, even though the 
definition of common-property regimes revolves around the idea of ‘members of a 
clearly demarked group hav[ing] a legal right to exclude nonmembers of that group 
from using a resource’ (Ostrom & Hess 2008: 8). The point is that, in the past, the con-
cern was the ability to use land, not to hold it, even if this was done collectively (Colson 
1971: 199). This is a subtle but important nuance. It was not about holding land collec-
tively but about belonging to a group because access to land was predicated on mem-
bership of the group that controlled the land, as is generally common among pastoralists 
(van Dijk 1996). Property presupposes clear boundaries but, as we have seen throughout 
this thesis, Loita territorial control has changed over the years. Land was not seen as 
something that could be owned and the concept of common property carries a notion of 
holding land.3 The theory of access, with its focus on the ability to benefit from natural 
resources (even by using force) and its three dimensions of gaining, controlling and 
maintaining access (Ribot & Peluso 2003), best captures the concern about using land. 
In Loita, it was thus not about holding or owning land as common property but about 
being able to continue to benefit from – or to use – the pastoral resources of the low-
lands and highlands seasonally by maintaining access to them through territorial control 
in the context of encroaching Purko Maasai and other pressures on the land and forest 
(see Chapters 3, 5 & 8). Rather than a transition from common property to individual 
property, property-in-the-making in Loita therefore reflects a shift from a tenure prac-
tice where access regulated the use of land, to an arrangement where individual property 
                                                 
3  The collectively held group ranches that were established elsewhere in Maasailand may, however, be 
seen as common-property holdings (Mwangi 2007a; Galaty 1994b). 
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has increasingly become the norm. By focusing on ‘what people do’ (Juul & Lund 
2002: 4, see quote above), this study demonstrates how property is being made and 
analyses the shift from access to property. 
Property-in-the-making is most pertinently seen in the arena of the land dispute 
meeting where claims are ‘talked’ and appropriation is governed (Chapter 10). The 
‘making’ here comes about from the interaction of the various actors involved who each 
have their own agenda. The disputants and their supporters ‘talk claims’ and are preoc-
cupied with the concrete case at hand, and the mediators who govern appropriation are 
concerned with categorical property, i.e. the rules that define what is legitimate individ-
ual property. The practice of talking claims and governing appropriation are phenomena 
that belong to respectively the ‘concretised social relationships’ and the ‘legal-
institutional’ analytical layer of property (F. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006), as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. Land dispute meetings are thus empirical arenas where interaction 
between these different analytical layers occurs. It is in this process of interaction be-
tween the different actors that property is negotiated and what is individual property and 
what is not, is determined.   
During the negotiation process in land dispute meetings, old rules are discarded or 
adjusted and new rules are formulated (Chapter 10). Property-in-the-making is about 
rules-in-the-making too, and because these rules form part of a repertoire of regulations, 
procedures and prescriptions that together form Loita law, property-in-the-making is 
also about law-in-the-making. Land dispute meetings are not only key arenas for study-
ing property-in-the-making but are also for examining rules-in-the-making and laws-in-
the-making. 
Subjects-in-the-making 
The move from claiming access to land on the basis of one’s membership of the Loita 
section to claiming land as individual property entails transformations in the way people 
identify and come to define themselves. From identifying oneself as a mobile herd own-
er, there appears to be a tendency to identify oneself as a settled landowner and ‘farmer’ 
with a field of one’s own and a diversified livestock holding composed of cattle, goats 
and sheep. There is a general trend towards individualization: from sharing a large 
homestead with several families to having one’s own individual homestead, from col-
lectively using and managing a common olokeri to finding ways of having one’s own 
individual olokeri. When people claim individual property over land, this not only re-
flects an individualization of land tenure but also a change in relations with the state, 
which become more individual. The practices and strategies of land appropriation, 
which were discussed in Chapter 9, were partly in anticipation of formal land adjudica-
tion. The expectation, even the wish by individual Loita Maasai, including their leaders, 
that state-sanctioned land adjudication would happen sooner or later indicates that state 
power is increasingly being internalized, and that people are redefining themselves as 
citizens and voters, and as subjects of the state.  
An important motivation is individual tenure security but tenure security is also rele-
vant at the more collective level in the face of encroaching Purko Maasai and other 
threats of territorial alienation. The paradox is that because of the concern about secur-
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ing land and territory, the Loita need recognition by the state even though they do not 
want to be governed. This is a dilemma that is particularly evident among leaders who 
are responsible for the collective yet also have interests as individuals and family heads. 
And this brings us back to the anecdote discussed in Chapter 1 about Prime Minister 
Raila Odinga’s visit to the manyata of the upcoming governing age-group in Loita. On 
the one hand, age-group chief ole Maine spoke of the unity of the Loita and formally 
introduced his age-group and its leaders to Prime Minister Odinga, hinting at Loita’s 
capacity for self-government and implying that they were a political entity that should 
be taken into account. On the other hand, he positioned himself, Loita leadership and 
the Loita in general as clients of the political elite and as citizens of the state with the 
right to vote in return for development resources and projects. Of particular interest here 
is the fact that the specific requests that ole Maine made to the Prime Minister for funds 
for the development of the local health centre, a mobile network booster, road repairs 
and increased political representation in the local authority did not include governmen-
tal interventions targeting land and the forest as these would challenge the power and 
authority of Loita leadership vis-à-vis the state. Ole Maine clearly wanted to keep the 
issue of land and forest off the agenda but the fact that the Prime Minister himself as 
well as some of the other politicians that accompanied him (including Narok North MP 
Ntimama!) did raise the issue by speaking of land loss and the importance of conserving 
the Naimina Enkiyio Forest shows that these matters are inextricably linked to, and are 
even central to, the whole discussion. Loita leaders want to hold on to power by keeping 
the state at bay, which they partially achieve by maintaining control over land and the 
forest, yet they also need the state legislation that makes this possible (Trust Land) as 
well as state recognition of their leadership. They want resources and development but 
not those that might lead to the loss of land and the forest and, as individuals, they hope 
for tenure security and the formalization of individual claims to land. However this 
means becoming more closely subjected to the power of the state, which counteracts 
their leaders’ long-running struggles for autonomy and not being governed. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the societal and institutional changes that accom-
panied and followed governmental interventions went − and still go – together with 
struggles, conflicts and disputes between differently positioned people. Similarly, 
changes and transformations in subjectivities, though not necessarily in the direction 
planned by the governing actors, involve internal struggles, contradictions and a moving 
around of the ‘mental furniture’ (Agrawal 2005: 174). The formation of new subjectivi-
ties, like the emergence of different social practices, is part and parcel of, and refracted 
in, the process of governmentality and political struggle. 
  
Appendix: The role of the ritual age-group 
leaders in the age-group ceremonial cycle 
The enkipaata ceremony is the first collective ceremony in the age-group ceremonial 
cycle and marks the launch of a new circumcision-group.1 It is named after the en-
kipaata dance that is performed by the boys in the circumcision-group over four days 
and the ceremony is held twice in quick succession at different manyatas (ceremonial 
settlement) in different locations.2 The firestick elders decide on a name for the new 
circumcision-group during the ceremony (Mol 1996: 189, 247). The enkipaata ceremo-
ny is held by both the right-hand and left-hand circumcision-groups. But in the case of a 
right-hand circumcision-group, the ceremony also includes the announcement of the 
two boys who have been chosen to hold the leadership positions of olorripu olkila and 
olopising olkiteng (Ibid.: 37).3 The olorripu olkila is chosen from the Ilmakesen clan4 
and the olopising olkiteng from the Ilmolelian clan. The task of the olorripu olkila is to 
collect five small skins from each of the five clans, after which his mother makes a 
cloak from them. When this is ready, it is given to the olopising olkiteng who takes it to 
the manyata that will be built after the enkipaata ceremony and where his task will be to 
smother the ox that features in the ceremony with the new cloak (Ibid.). 
The ceremony held shortly after the second enkipaata ceremony is called ‘seizing the 
horn of the ox’ (enkibungata e mowuo o lkiteng) because one of the rituals involves a 
                                                 
1  Information given here about the enkipaata and the ‘seizing the horn of the ox’ ceremony is based on 
the experiences of a young man who participated in both ceremonies in 1999-2000. He is from the 
Iromboi circumcision-group and was interviewed not long after these ceremonies during my Masters 
field research in 2001 (Interview LK: 7/10/01). He was among the 49 boys who were selected to live 
in the manyatas during these ceremonies with their mothers.  
2  The Iromboi circumcision-group built the manyata for the first enkipaata ceremony at a place called 
Ilmotiok in Morijo Loita Location. This was in late 1999 and the manyata remained for three months. 
The second enkipaata ceremony was held within months at another manyata in Olentarakuai in 
Olmesutie Location. Mol confusingly reported that the gap between first and second enkipaata 
ceremonies is two years (1996: 37) and later  that it is four years (Ibid.: 189). During my PhD field 
research in 2008, the circumcision-group that followed the Iromboi, the Iltumusika, celebrated an 
enkipaata dance at a manyata in the same place where their predecessors had built their first enkipaata 
manyata (Ilmotiok).    
3  I use Mol’s descriptions on Loita ceremonies here, rather than Spencer’s (1988) descriptions that are 
based on the Matapato Maasai, to fill in the gaps in my own data. Where our information differs, I 
give preference to my own data and make mention of the difference as was done in the previous 
footnote.   
4  It has been tradition in Loita to choose this ritual leader from either ole Siloma’s family or ole 
Munga’s family. They are both from the Ilmakesen clan. 
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competition between the boys to see who can be the first to grab the ox’s horns.5 The 
ceremony celebrates the start of the formation of a future age-set that will end during 
the ‘stool’ ceremony some 20-25 years later when a right- and a left-hand circumcision-
group merge to form a single age-set. As the senior half of a future age-set, only right-
hand circumcision-groups perform the ‘seizing the horn of the ox’ ceremony. A third 
ritual age-group leader, the olorrip olasar, is chosen from the Iltaarosero clan in one of 
the rituals performed during the ceremony. This ritual age-group leader is considered 
more important than the olorripu olkila and the olopising olkiteng, the two ritual leaders 
already selected (Mol 1996: 38). His task at the ceremony is to guard the place in the 
forest where the ox was smothered (by the olopising olkiteng with the cloak made by 
the olorripu olkila’s mother) and slaughtered and where its blood was drunk, the meat 
roasted and eaten, and the bones and leftovers burned. The olorrip olasar’s task is to 
stay awake the whole night to make sure everything is burned, which has to be done in 
the shade of an olive tree. He has to stand motionless and upright, without talking or 
spitting. A boy will stay with him (a firestick elder, according to Mol 1996: 38) 
throughout the night to keep a small fire going to scare off any wild animals. Since the 
‘seizing the horn of the ox’ ceremony is only performed by right-hand circumcision-
groups, left-hand circumcision-groups do not have this kind of leader, just as they do 
not have the other two ritual leaders – the olorripu olkila and the olopising olkiteng − 
that play a role in this ceremony. 
After the ‘seizing the horn of the ox’ ceremony, a small manyata is adjoined to the 
homestead of the age-group chief to house the three ritual age-group leaders and the five 
additional boys selected to live there (Mol 1996: 261).6 The three ritual leaders, the five 
boys plus the age-group chief will be circumcised on one day, after which the circumci-
sion period for their circumcision-group will be officially opened (Ibid.: 261-262).7 
Boys belonging to that circumcision-group will then be circumcised individually at 
home and, after a period as initiates that allows their wounds to heal, they become men 
and formally enter the stage of warriorhood. N.B. this involves only the right-hand cir-
cumcision-groups. The circumcision period of a left-hand circumcision-group opens 
with the enkipaata ceremony.  
About four or five years after the initiation of a new circumcision-group during the 
enkipaata ceremony, a large eunoto ceremony (the ‘planting’ or the ‘establishing’ cere-
mony) inaugurates the circumcision-group as a corporate entity with its specific mem-
bership. After this, no more youth are allowed to be circumcised or recruited into this 
age-group. The eunoto ceremony closes the flamboyant and colourful period of warrior-
hood and age-mates then prepare to settle down and marry in their first major step to-
wards elderhood.  
                                                 
5  The manyata for this ceremony was built at a sacred place on the edge of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest 
called Loitokitok. The last ‘seizing the horn of the ox’ ceremony was held in 2001 for the Iromboi 
circumcision-group. 
6  The Iromboi circumcision-group built this manyata at Olentarakuai, which is where the homestead of 
the age-group chief is located. I paid a short visit to this manyata during my Masters field research in 
2001. 
7  In practice, however, boys can be circumcised before this.  
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In the run-up to the eunoto ceremony, a ritual is held to install the two final ritual 
age-group leaders who will be central in the eunoto ceremony. This ceremony is per-
formed by both right- and left-hand circumcision-groups and they both therefore have 
these ritual leaders. The olotuno and the oloboru enkeene are announced and promul-
gated at the ceremonial settlement ‘of the woven mat’ (emanyata e ntirpe) (Mol 1996: 
265).8 The olotuno, that is also referred to as olaunoni in the literature (Voshaar 1979: 
91, 1998: 76), is probably the most important ritual officer in an age-group. Unlike oth-
er officers, he is not only responsible for certain tasks but also holds a profoundly sym-
bolic position that is a great honour but also a personal curse.9 Chosen with assistance 
from the chief laibon, he symbolizes the establishing or planting of the circumcision-
group at the eunoto ceremony. According to Voshaar (1979: 92), the olotuno is not only 
a symbol but is in fact the ‘creator’ of his circumcision-group. He is respected as an 
elder by his age-mates and indeed by society as a whole. Although this is an honour, 
this position is unpopular because it cuts him off from the camaraderie of his age-mates 
(Spencer 1988: 167) and he is forcefully installed. 
The oloboru enkeene is chosen and installed with the olotuno as his right-hand man 
(Voshaar 1979: 94) and they will henceforth be among the first in their age-group to 
execute the ritual actions at the collective age-group ceremonies. In addition to his role 
as deputy to the olotuno, the oloboru enkeene provides the ox that will be ritually 
slaughtered at the ceremonial settlement ‘of the woven mat’. The ox’s hide will then be 
cut into a long strip and given to the olotuno for the eunoto ceremony, where it will be 
used to outline a ritual house that plays an important role in the final part of the eunoto 
ceremony (Spencer 1988: 158; Galaty 1983: 374). At the manyata I attended in 2008, 
the Iromboi age-group was preparing for their ‘raiding-party of the brisket’ ceremony 
and the hide strip was brought outside and handed over to the firestick elders who used 
it to outline the circumference of another ritual house in the middle of the manyata. 
By the time the eunoto ceremony is performed, all the ritual age-group leaders 
have been chosen and installed. Although they have fulfilled their ritual roles in their 
respective ceremonies, they remain age-group leaders for life and are expected to attend 
all the future collective ceremonies of their age-group and live in the manyatas with 
their mothers and, later, their wives. 
 
                                                 
8  It is unclear which clans these two ritual leaders should belong to but Voshaar (1979: 319) writes: ‘In 
Loita, olaunoni [Olotuno] used to be of the Lugumai [Ilukumai] clan. Today a holy person can also be 
chosen from another clan’. 
9  For descriptions of the eunoto ceremony and the symbolism of the position of olotuno and oloboru 
enkeene, see Voshaar (1979: 91-94, 1998: 76-77), Spencer (1988: 145-146, 166-169, 2010a: 23-26) 
and Galaty (1983: 368-377). 
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Summary 
This is an anthropological study about the Loita Maasai in Kenya who, in the face of 
increasing outside interventions and pressure from neighbouring communities as well as 
the state and other agencies, have been struggling to maintain access and control over 
the land they inhabit and the forest they use. They have been on the losing side in terri-
torial struggles with neighbouring Purko Maasai and (non-Maasai) Sonjo. However, 
they have successfully navigated land reform policies and development and nature con-
servation projects by the state, NGOs and international environmental organizations and 
have managed to retain access to and control of their land and forest. This is remarkable 
because similar interventions in other parts of Maasailand and Kenya since the colonial 
period have triggered processes that eventually led to loss of land and exclusion from 
forest areas for the local people. Interventions have, nevertheless, changed the way peo-
ple in Loita engage with these areas and with each other on such issues. This thesis ex-
amines the effects of interventions and how they have articulated with existing relations, 
practices, processes and struggles (Li 2007a) in Loita. It focuses on the social and polit-
ical changes taking place in relation to land, forest and leadership and demonstrates how 
the struggle to maintain control over land and forest is interlaced and embedded in a 
more subtle struggle for self-government and for ‘not being (too) governed’ by the state 
and other powerful, external agencies.  
Chapter 1 argues that, to understand the effects and articulations of land and forest 
interventions in Loita, it is necessary to include the subject of leadership in the analysis. 
This is done by describing the interventions that form the focus of this study and con-
sidering their social, legal and political implications. The state-led land adjudication 
programme of the 1960s sought to convert Kenya’s pastoral lands into privately owned 
group ranches. Although the programme failed in Loita, it has had indirect effects: land 
use changed, new claims to individual property emerged and land disputes, which did 
not exist before, developed. This reflects profound land tenure transformations over 
time and a changing relationship between Loita leaders and the state. The attempt by a 
state institution, namely Narok County Council, to turn the Naimina Enkiyio Forest into 
a nature reserve for tourism in the 1990s and a forest management and conservation 
project carried out by an international environmental organization (IUCN) in the early 
2000s evoked widespread opposition at a time of longstanding conflict among the lead-
ership of Loita. Although Narok County Council’s forest plan and the IUCN project 
were eventually abandoned, the internal political conflicts they generated are still sim-
mering a decade later.  
Inspired by the literature on governmentality, interventions in this thesis are seen as 
‘governmental interventions’ (Li 2007a, 2007b). And in line with political ecology, ar-
ticulations and effects are approached as political processes, with Ribot & Peluso’s 
(2003) notion of ‘access’ being a central analytical concept. Chapter 2 proposes a theo-
retical framework to understand the role of governmental interventions in land tenure 
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change and the forest conflicts, and to assess the struggle by Loita leaders to remain 
autonomous from the state and other outside actors. With respect to land tenure change, 
Sikor & Lund’s (2009) ‘grey zone’ between access and property is addressed, i.e. when 
people attempt to turn their access to land into recognized (individual) property. For 
this, the term ‘appropriation’ is suggested to account for this process and a focus on 
claim making is proposed. The forest conflicts are placed in the political ecological de-
bate of whether access to the forest has become ‘politicized’ or whether an existing po-
litical conflict has been ‘ecologized’ (Robbins 2004). To understand the struggles and 
political strategies of Loita leaders, the literature on self-government and ‘not being 
governed’ (Scott 2009; Li 2007a) is considered. Finally, the topic of state interventions 
and local responses is situated in discussions of ‘seeing like a state’ (Scott 1998) and 
‘seeing the state’ (Corbridge et al. 2005). 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 give historical depth to the research topic. Chapter 3 examines 
the period between 1800 and 1913 that was constitutive for the present territorial occu-
pation of the area and is important for understanding current territorial conflicts between 
the Loita and their neighbours. It traces the emergence of the Loita as a separate Maasai 
section and their occupation of the Loita Hills and the surrounding areas, offering an 
alternative to mainstream Purko-biased Maasai history from around the time when the 
colonial powers arrived in East Africa. It explains how the Loita lost control of the Ma-
ra Plains and the Loita Plains to incoming Purko Maasai after the British-enforced Maa-
sai Moves of 1905 and 1910-1913. As a consequence, neighbouring Purko in the west 
and north and geographical features to the east buffered the Loita Maasai from the de-
veloping centres of Kenyan colonial rule around Nairobi. This shaped the way the rela-
tionship between Loita leaders and the state would unfold. 
Chapter 4 engages with a ‘seeing like a state’ perspective to analyze state interven-
tions that aimed to make colonial Kenya administratively ‘legible’ (Scott 1998). It con-
siders the articulations and effects of these interventions in Loita between 1908 and 
1965. Attention is paid to the new categories of land as well as to the leadership posi-
tions of Provincial Administration (PA) chief and councillor that were introduced by the 
state. With the creation of Loita Location, the Loita section as a social unit was pegged 
more firmly to the geographical area marked as their designated administrative location, 
which has given Loita identity a stronger territorial twist. And the articulation of the 
new leadership positions with existing leadership positions led to what are called ‘dou-
ble authorities’, i.e. when two forms of authority are accumulated in one social figure. 
New leadership positions and land categories defined the way state power started to be 
experienced in Loita in the colonial period. These interventions were not, however, fol-
lowed by others, such as in areas that were closer to the colonial centre and/or were 
economically more interesting to the colonial authorities. As a result, state control in 
Loita was much less pronounced than in other areas of Kenya and Loita therefore re-
mained relatively autonomous from the state for the whole of the colonial period. 
Chapter 5 moves on to the post-colonial period. It reverses the angle taken in the 
previous chapter and employs a ‘seeing the state’ perspective to describe how Loita 
leaders capitalized on the political space created during the colonial period to deal with 
increasing outside governmental interventions that were being carried out in the name of 
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development. This chapter describes the gradual process by which Loita leaders became 
involved in securing control of their territory by using and reworking development in-
terventions between 1966 and 1974. It discusses both successful and unsuccessful cases 
and touches on the emergence of a new category of Loita leader called the ‘development 
leader’. 
Chapters 6 and 7 tackle the subject of leadership. Chapter 6 introduces the leadership 
positions of age-group chief, clan chief and chief laibon that, with the positions of PA 
chief, councillor and development leader as well as those of locality and section leader 
(discussed in Chapters 10 and 11), form the whole spectrum of Loita leaders relevant to 
this thesis. To understand the authority of these leadership positions, the age-group sys-
tem, the clan system and laibonism are examined. This chapter demonstrates that, while 
ritual authority is exercised in ritual arenas such as ceremonies, political authority and 
the practice of governing are seen in the arena of the meeting.  
The question as to why most Loita leaders (are expected to) belong to the ‘governing 
age-group’ is taken up in Chapter 7. It explains how the temporality of the age-group 
system configures leadership by prescribing the age-group that has the authority to gov-
ern the section, and for how long. The ‘firestick’ relationship between alternate age-sets 
functions as a key mechanism when it comes to organizing this. 
Drawing on background information on Loita leadership and by showing that the 
forest conflicts can best be understood by focusing on frictions and struggles within the 
governing age-group and between Loita leaders, Chapter 8 proposes a new interpreta-
tion of the Naimina Enkiyio Forest conflicts. Analyzing them from both ‘the politiciza-
tion of ecology’ and ‘the ecologization of an existing political struggle’ angles, the 
chapter identifies four major political struggles that were at the heart of the conflicts: a 
conflict over access and access control; personal rivalry between double authorities; 
political wrangling linked to Kenya’s elections in 1992, 1997 and 2002; and the centu-
ry-old territorial struggle between the Loita and the Purko. The analysis presented in 
this chapter contributes to the existing scholarship on the Naimina Enkiyio Forest con-
flicts and shows that the four political struggles crystallized along an internal line of 
division in Loita’s leadership.  
Chapters 9 and 10 discuss the process of appropriation and the practice of claim 
making. Chapter 9 focuses on how families ‘ground’ claims in Loita by inscribing or 
altering the landscape with visible markers that are socially understood as conveying 
individual property. It describes how areas that were formerly jointly used are undergo-
ing a process of enclosure, individualization and exclusion and links this to a diminish-
ing land base and the transition from pastoralism to agro-pastoralism and a more seden-
tary way of life. It is argued that Kenya’s land adjudication programme fed into these 
changing dynamics and that, although the programme has not been implemented, there 
is a growing conviction that, sooner or later, formal land adjudication and demarcation 
will happen. What has taken place elsewhere and the anticipation of land adjudication 
have affected the decision-making and livelihood strategies of Loita families and have 
led to the practices of appropriation and claim making discussed in this chapter. Such 
processes of change reflect profound land tenure transformations over time.   
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Chapter 10 moves into the arena of the land dispute meeting and highlights what 
happens when grounded claims are challenged. By focusing on a particular case at lo-
cality level and describing the claims and counterclaims voiced in the meeting, a prac-
tice that I call ‘talking claims’, an impression is given of how such events unfold and 
disputes are eventually resolved. The chapter demonstrates the multidimensionality of 
land dispute meetings by showing the way they display three struggles at one time: (i) a 
dispute between two individuals that needs to be mediated and resolved; (ii) an attempt 
by the mediating leaders to govern appropriation as they accept, reject or adjust ground-
ed claims to land as individual property; and (iii) a wider power struggle between Loita 
leaders and the state over the authority to govern Loita.   
Chapter 11, which focuses on this last point but is also based on a land dispute meet-
ing at section level, shows how this particular meeting was more about power and au-
thority than about land. The main issue addressed in this meeting was that individuals in 
Loita were turning to state actors and statutory legal institutions with their disputes and 
were thus taking cases away from Loita’s leaders that, in turn, undermined their govern-
ing authority in Loita. The chapter illustrates how Loita leaders have attempted to con-
trol this behaviour by imposing new rules that govern people’s access to state law in an 
attempt to retain their own autonomy and to avoid the state becoming more powerful in 
Loita.  
Chapter 12 is the final chapter and it connects some of the themes that run through 
the thesis, ties up various loose ends and presents some concluding remarks. It high-
lights five main points: (i) Loita leaders will have to ensure their continued control over 
matters relating to land tenure and forest use and access if they are to maintain a degree 
of self-government in relation to the state and other actors; (ii) when it comes to land, 
forest and leadership, social change in Loita is best understood in the context of a larger, 
transnational and historically produced arena that revolves around governmentality and 
political struggle; (iii) this is a society in flux that was captured by taking a historically 
embedded actor-oriented approach and linking governmentality and political ecology; 
(iv) this thesis analysed the process of making property in Loita and this reflects a shift 
from a tenure practice, where access regulated the use of land, to an arrangement 
whereby individual property is increasingly becoming the norm; and (v) in the process 
of property-in-the-making, the way people are now identifying and defining themselves 
is also changing and this, in turn, is compromising the long-running struggle by Loita 
leaders for autonomy and for ‘not being governed’. 
  
Samenvatting 
 
 
Controle betwist: land en bos in de strijd voor Loita Maasai zelfbestuur in Kenia 
Dit is een antropologische studie over de Loita Maasai in Kenia, die, in de context van 
toenemende externe interventies, druk van omliggende gemeenschappen, de staat en 
andere instanties, strijden om toegang tot en controle over het land waar zij wonen en 
het bos dat zij gebruiken, te behouden. Zij verliezen terrein in de territoriale strijd met 
de naburige Purko Maasai en (non-Maasai) Sonjo. Maar als het gaat om landhervormin-
gen, ontwikkelings- en natuurbeschermingsprojecten uitgevoerd onder leiding van de 
staat, NGO's en internationale milieuorganisaties dan zijn zij erin geslaagd om toegang 
tot en controle over hun land en bos te behouden. Dit is opmerkelijk omdat soortgelijke 
interventies in andere delen van Maasailand en Kenia sinds de koloniale periode proces-
sen in gang hebben gezet die uiteindelijk tot het verlies van land en afsluiting van bos-
gebieden voor de lokale bevolking hebben geleidt. Interventies in Loita hebben niette-
min de manier veranderd waarop mensen omgaan met rechten op land en bos en met 
elkaar over dergelijke kwesties. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de effecten van interventies 
en hoe ze articuleren met bestaande relaties, praktijken, processen en de strijd over land 
en bos in Loita. Het richt zich op de sociale en politieke veranderingen die plaatsvinden 
in relatie tot land, bos en leiderschap en laat zien hoe de strijd om behoud van de contro-
le over het land en het bos vervlochten en ingebed is in een meer subtiele strijd voor 
zelfbestuur en om ‘niet (te veel) bestuurd te worden’ door de staat en andere machtige, 
externe actoren. 
Hoofdstuk 1 stelt dat om de effecten van en veranderingen door interventies in land-
recht en de toegang tot bos in Loita te begrijpen, het nodig is om de rol van lokaal lei-
derschap nader te analyseren. Dit wordt gedaan door de interventies die de focus van dit 
onderzoek vormen te beschrijven en hun sociale, juridische en politieke implicaties te 
bespreken. Het land registratie programma, in gang gezet door de staat in de jaren 60, 
probeerde pastorale gebieden in Kenia om te zetten in groep ranches in privé eigendom. 
Hoewel het programma in Loita faalde, had het een aantal indirecte effecten: landge-
bruik veranderde, nieuwe claims op individueel eigendom kwamen op en geschillen 
over land, die voorheen niet bestonden, staken de kop op. Deze effecten weerspiegelden 
dieper liggende veranderingen in landrecht door de tijd heen en de relatie tussen Loita 
leiders en de staat. De pogingen van een staatsinstelling, de Narok County Council, om 
het Naimina Enkiyio bos om te zetten in een natuurgebied voor de ontwikkeling van 
toerisme in de jaren 90 en een bosbeheer- en natuurbeschermingsproject uitgevoerd 
door een internationale milieuorganisatie (International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature) in de eerste jaren van de 21ste eeuw leidden tot wijdverspreide oppositie in een 
situatie waarbij Loita’s leiderschap al geruime tijd diep verdeeld was. Hoewel het plan 
van Narok County Council en het IUCN project uiteindelijk niet doorgingen, sudderen 
de interne politieke conflicten die ze gegenereerd hebben een decennium later nog na. 
Geïnspireerd door de literatuur over ‘gouvernementaliteit’ (‘governmentality’ Fou-
cault 2001), worden interventies in dit proefschrift beschouwd als bestuurlijke interven-
ties (‘governmental interventions’ Li 2007a, 2007b). En in overeenstemming met poli-
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tieke ecologie, worden de politieke articulaties en effecten benaderd als politieke pro-
cessen, waar Ribot & Peluso's (2003) notie van ‘toegang’ (access) een centraal analy-
tisch concept vormt. Hoofdstuk 2 bevat een theoretisch kader om de rol van de bestuur-
lijke interventies van welke aard dan ook in de veranderingen in landrecht en de conflic-
ten over het bos te begrijpen, alsmede het streven van de leiders van de Loita Maasai 
om autonomie ten opzichte van de staat en andere externe actoren te behouden, te be-
oordelen. Met betrekking tot veranderingen in landrecht, wordt Sikor & Lund’s (2009) 
‘grijze zone’ tussen toegang en eigendomsrecht als uitgangspunt genomen, dat wil zeg-
gen dat we inzoomen op het proces wanneer mensen proberen om hun toegang tot land 
erkend te krijgen als (individuele of collectieve) eigendom. Om dit proces te benoemen 
en te bestuderen wordt de term ‘toe-eigening’ geïntroduceerd en wordt een analyse ge-
maakt van de manier waarop claims worden gemaakt. De conflicten over het bos wor-
den geplaatst in het politiek ecologisch debat omtrent de vraag of toegang tot het bos 
‘gepolitiseerd’ is of dat een bestaand politiek conflict ‘geëcologiseerd’ is geraakt (Rob-
bins 2004). Om de strijd en politieke strategieën van Loita leiders te begrijpen, wordt de 
literatuur over zelfbestuur en de kunst van het niet bestuurd worden (‘the art of not be-
ing governed’) (Scott 2009; Li 2007a) beschouwd. Tot slot wordt het onderwerp van 
staatinterventies en lokale reacties besproken in debatten over ‘kijken als een staat’ 
(‘seeing like a state') (Scott 1998) en ‘kijken naar de staat’ (‘seeing the state’) (Corbrid-
ge et al. 2005). 
Hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 geven historische diepte aan het onderzoeksonderwerp. 
Hoofdstuk 3 betreft de periode tussen 1800 en 1913, dat constitutief was voor de huidi-
ge territoriale bezetting van het gebied en is belangrijk voor het begrijpen van de huidi-
ge territoriale conflicten tussen de Loita en hun buren. Het traceert de opkomst van de 
Loita als een aparte ‘Maasai sectie’ en hun bezetting van de Loita Hills en de omliggen-
de gebieden. Dit hoofdstuk is tevens een alternatief voor de standaard – op de Purko 
Maasai gebaseerde – geschiedenis over de periode dat de koloniale machten aankwa-
men in Oost-Afrika. Er wordt uitgelegd hoe de Loita de controle verloren over de Mara 
Plains en de Loita Plains aan de zich verplaatsende Purko Maasai als gevolg van de 
‘Maasai Moves’ van 1905 en 1910-1913, die door de Britse kolonisatoren werden afge-
dwongen. Als gevolg daarvan, vormden de naburige Purko Maasai in het westen en 
noorden en geografische grenzen in het oosten een buffer tussen de Loita Maasai en de 
koloniale centra rond Nairobi. Deze geopolitieke situatie gaf mede vorm aan de wijze 
waarop de relatie tussen Loita leiders en de staat zich zou ontwikkelen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 houdt zich bezig met het ‘kijken als een staat’ perspectief om staatsin-
terventies die erop gericht waren om koloniaal Kenia administratief ‘leesbaar’ (Scott 
1998) te maken, te analyseren. Dit hoofdstuk behandelt de articulaties en de effecten 
van deze interventies in Loita tussen 1908 en 1965. Er wordt aandacht besteed aan de 
nieuwe juridische categorieën om land te classificeren en aan de nieuwe leiderschapspo-
sities van provinciaal stamhoofd en raadslid die werden geïntroduceerd door de kolonia-
le staat. Met de oprichting van Loita Location, werd de Loita sectie van de Maasai als 
een sociale eenheid vaster gekoppeld aan het geografische gebied dat gemarkeerd was 
als hun administratieve locatie. Dit heeft Loita identiteit een territoriaal aspect gegeven. 
Een andere uitkomst van de creatie van de nieuwe leiderschapsposities naast de be-
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staande leiderschapsposities was het ontstaan van zogenaamde ‘dubbele autoriteitsposi-
ties’, wanneer twee bestuurlijke posities verenigd worden in één persoon. Nieuwe lei-
derschapsposities en landcategorieën definieerden de manier waarop de macht van de 
staat werd ervaren in het Loita gebied in de koloniale periode. Deze maatregelen werden 
echter niet gevolgd door anderen, zoals in gebieden die dichter bij het koloniale centrum 
gelegen waren en/of economisch interessant waren voor de koloniale autoriteiten. Als 
gevolg hiervan, was staatscontrole in Loita veel minder uitgesproken dan in andere ge-
bieden van Kenia, en bleef Loita dus relatief autonoom van de staat tijdens de gehele 
koloniale periode. 
Hoofdstuk 5 behandeld de postkoloniale periode. Het draait het genomen perspectief 
uit het vorige hoofdstuk om en maakt gebruik van een ‘kijken naar de staat’ perspectief 
om te beschrijven hoe Loita leiders gebruik maakten van de politieke ruimte die over-
bleef tijdens de koloniale periode om de toenemende ‘bestuurlijke’ ontwikkelingsinter-
venties van buitenaf het hoofd te bieden. Dit hoofdstuk beschrijft het geleidelijke proces 
waarbij Loita leiders betrokken raakten bij het veiligstellen van de controle van hun 
grondgebied door het gebruiken en het manipuleren van ontwikkelingsinterventies tus-
sen 1966 en 1974. Het behandelt zowel geslaagde en mislukte gevallen en de opkomst 
van een nieuwe categorie van Loita leider genaamd de ‘ontwikkelingsleider’. 
In de hoofdstukken 6 en 7 wordt lokaal leiderschap besproken. Hoofdstuk 6 introdu-
ceert de leiderschapsposities van de leeftijdsgroep leider, clanhoofd en hoofdlaibon, die 
samen met de posities van provinciaal stamhoofd, raadslid en ontwikkelingsleider even-
als die van nederzettings- en sectie leider (besproken in de hoofdstukken 10 en 11), het 
gehele spectrum vormen van Loita leiderschapsposities die relevant zijn voor dit proef-
schrift. Om de uitoefening van gezag door deze verschillende leiders te begrijpen, wor-
den het leeftijdsgroep systeem, clan-systeem en het laibonisme geanalyseerd. Dit hoofd-
stuk toont aan dat, terwijl ritueel gezag wordt uitgeoefend in rituele arena's zoals cere-
monies, politieke autoriteit en bestuur uitgeoefend worden in de arena van de meeting. 
De vraag waarom de meeste Loita leiders behoren en zouden moeten behoren tot de 
besturende leeftijdsgroep wordt opgenomen in hoofdstuk 7. Er wordt uitgelegd hoe de 
configuratie in de tijd van het leeftijdsgroep systeem leiderschap organiseert door voor 
te schrijven welke leeftijdsgroep de bevoegdheid heeft om de sectie te regeren, en voor 
hoe lang. De speciale relatie tussen afwisselende leeftijd-sets gesymboliseerd door de 
firestick functioneert als een belangrijk mechanisme om de betrekkingen tussen de leef-
tijdsgroepen te reguleren. 
Gebruikmakend van de achtergrond informatie over Loita leiderschap en door te la-
ten zien dat de conflicten over het bos, het best te begrijpen zijn door te kijken naar fric-
ties en rivaliteit binnen de leeftijdsgroep die aan de beurt is om de leiding te nemen en 
tussen Loita leiders, stelt hoofdstuk 8 een nieuwe interpretatie van de conflicten over het 
Naimina Enkiyio bos voor. Het hoofdstuk benadert de conflicten zowel vanuit een ‘poli-
tisering van de ecologie’ als vanuit een ‘ecologisering van een bestaande politieke 
strijd’ perspectief, en identificeert vier dimensies in de politieke strijd die met deze con-
flicten in verband stonden: een conflict over toegang en controle over toegang tot het 
bos: persoonlijke rivaliteit tussen twee personen met dubbele autoriteitsposities; politie-
ke verwikkelingen rondom de Keniaanse verkiezingen in 1992, 1997 en 2002; en de 
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langdurige territoriale strijd tussen de Loita en de Purko Maasai. De in dit hoofdstuk 
gepresenteerde analyse voegt nieuwe elementen toe aan de bestaande literatuur over de 
conflicten over het Naimina Enkiyio bos en laat zien dat deze vier politieke dimensies 
uitkristalliseerden langs een interne breuk in Loita’s leiderschap. 
De hoofdstukken 9 en 10 bespreken het proces van toe-eigening van land en de prak-
tijk van het maken van claims. Hoofdstuk 9 richt zich op hoe families claims op land 
maken in Loita door het ‘schrijven’ of het veranderen van het landschap met zichtbare 
markers die sociaal worden begrepen als tekens van individueel eigendom. Het hoofd-
stuk beschrijft hoe de gebieden die voorheen gezamenlijk werden gebruikt een proces 
ondergaan van individualisering en uitsluiting en koppelt deze aan een afnemende land-
basis en de overgang van pastoralisme naar agro-pastoralisme en een meer sedentaire 
manier van leven. Er wordt betoogd dat de Keniaanse land registratie programma articu-
leerde met deze veranderende dynamiek en dat, hoewel het programma nog niet is ge-
implementeerd, er een groeiende overtuiging is dat, vroeg of laat, formele registratie en 
afbakening zal gebeuren. Op basis van hoe dit proces elders is verlopen en in anticipatie 
van land registratie in hun eigen gebied hebben veel Loita huishoudens besluitvorming 
en overlevingsstrategieën veranderd hetgeen leidde tot een verandering in de praktijken 
van toe-eigening en het leggen van claims op land. Dergelijke processen weerspiegelen 
vergaande veranderingen in (lokale percepties op) landrecht door de tijd heen. 
Hoofdstuk 10 verplaatst zich naar de arena van een land geschil meeting en bespreekt 
wat er gebeurt wanneer claims op land worden betwist. Door te focussen op een bepaald 
geval op het niveau van een nederzetting en het beschrijven van de claims en tegen-
claims die geuit worden in de vergadering, een praktijk die ik ‘talking claims’ noem, 
wordt een indruk gegeven van hoe dergelijke gebeurtenissen zich ontvouwen en ge-
schillen uiteindelijk worden opgelost. Het hoofdstuk toont de multidimensionaliteit van 
landgeschil meetings door het tonen van de manier waarop op drie niveaus strijd wordt 
geleverd: (i) een geschil tussen twee individuen dat bemiddeld en opgelost moet wor-
den; (ii) een poging van de bemiddelende leiders om het proces van toe-eigening te stu-
ren wanneer zij claims op land als individueel eigendom accepteren, weigeren of aan-
passen; en (iii) een bredere machtsstrijd tussen Loita leiders en de staat over de autori-
teit om Loita regeren. 
Hoofdstuk 11, dat zich richt op dit laatste punt, maar ook is gebaseerd op een landge-
schil meeting maar dan op sectie niveau, laat zien hoe deze meeting in het bijzonder 
meer over macht en gezag ging dan over land. De belangrijkste kwestie die behandeld 
werd in deze bijeenkomst was dat individuen in Loita zich richten tot overheidsactoren 
en statutaire juridische instellingen met hun geschillen en op deze manier de gevallen 
uit handen van Loita leiders houden wat hun regelgevende autoriteit in Loita onder-
mijnd. Het hoofdstuk illustreert hoe Loita leiders probeerden om dit gedrag te sturen en 
te controleren door het ontwikkelen van nieuwe regels die de toegang tot staatrecht re-
guleren in een poging om hun eigen autonomie te behouden en om te voorkomen dat de 
staat steeds machtiger wordt in Loita. 
Hoofdstuk 12 is het laatste hoofdstuk en het verbindt enkele van de doorsnijdende 
thema’s van het proefschrift, knoopt diverse losse eindjes samen en presenteert een aan-
tal slotopmerkingen. Zij wijst op vijf belangrijke punten: (i) Loita leiders zullen hun 
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voortdurende controle over zaken met betrekking tot landrecht, gebruik en toegang tot 
het bos  moeten veiligstellen willen ze een zekere mate van zelfbestuur in relatie tot de 
staat en andere actoren behouden; (ii) als het gaat om landrecht, bosbeheer en leider-
schap, wordt sociale verandering in Loita het best begrepen in de context van een groter, 
transnationale en historisch geproduceerd arena die draait rond gouvernementaliteit en 
politieke strijd; (iii) dit is een samenleving in verandering die beter begrepen kan wor-
den door het kiezen van een historisch ingebedde en actor gerichte aanpak en het koppe-
len van gouvernementaliteit met politieke ecologie; (iv) dit proefschrift analyseerde het 
proces van het maken van eigendom in Loita en dit weerspiegelt een verschuiving van 
een rechtspraktijk, waar min of meer vrije toegang het gebruik van de grond regelt, tot 
een situatie waarbij individueel eigendom steeds meer de norm wordt; en (v) in het pro-
ces van eigendom-in-ontwikkeling, verandert ook de manier waarop mensen zich identi-
ficeren en zichzelf definiëren en dit proces op zijn beurt, compromitteert de langlopende 
strijd door Loita leiders om autonomie te bewaren en om niet (te veel) bestuurd te wor-
den. 
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Name of the learning activity Department/Institute  Year ECTS* 
A) Project related competences 
Writing research proposal  2007 6 
Maa language course Maasai Centre Lemek, Lemek, Kenya 2007 6 
 ‘Getting to the bottom of Mount 
Kenya: analysis of land dynamics and 
development in a multi?disciplinary 
perspective’ 
Wageningen University Graduate School, 
in Nairobi and Embu, Kenya. 
 
2009 4 
‘Theoretical and methodological 
approaches to the study of local 
politics in developing countries’ 
Institute 
of Society and Globalization, Roskilde 
University, Denmark  
2010 
 
2 
 
‘“Grabbing” and “booking” land in 
Loita Maasai, Kenya: a historical 
perspective to current forms 
of land demarcation’. 
XVIth International Union of 
Anthropological and 
Ethnological Sciences (IUAES) congress, 
Kunming, China 
2009 2 
‘Law and self?government in Loita 
Maasailand, Kenya’. 
‘Work in Progress Seminar: The Role of 
Law in Development’, British Institute in 
Eastern Africa (BIEA), Nairobi, Kenya 
2011 1 
B) General research related competences 
CERES orientation programme CERES, Utrecht 2007 5 
CERES presentation tutorials CERES, Utrecht 2007 5.5 
C) Career related competences/personal development 
Social scientist East Africa expert at 
the CCAFS (Climate Change, 
Agriculture and Food Security) East 
Africa scenarios workshop 
CGIAR, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania 2011 2 
Guest lectures ‘Ethnography: land 
tenure and forest conflicts in Kenya’ 
 
MA course ‘Environment & development: 
indigenous peoples rights, poverty 
alleviation and biodiversity conservation 
in tropical forests’, Institute of Cultural 
Anthropology & Development Sociology, 
Leiden University, the Netherlands. 
2013, 
2014 
1 
Total    34.5 
 
*One credit according to ECTS is on average equivalent to 28 hours of study load 
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